Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River

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The Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River (Chinese: 清川江戰(zhàn)役; pinyin: Qīngchuānjiāng Zhànyì), also known as the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on, was a decisive battle in the Korean War, and it took place from November 25 to December 2, 1950, along the Ch'ongch'on River Valley in the northwestern part of North Korea. In response to the successful Chinese First Phase Campaign against the United Nations (UN) forces, General Douglas MacArthur launched the Home-by-Christmas Offensive to expel the Chinese forces from Korea and to end the war. Anticipating this reaction, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) Commander Peng Dehuai planned a counteroffensive, dubbed the "Second Phase Campaign", against the advancing UN forces.

Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River

Part of the Korean War

A snow covered hill with the hill top on fire and the slopes filled with charging soldiers

Chinese forces overrun a U.N. position.

Date November 25 – December 2, 1950 Location?

Ch'ongch'on River, North Korea

Result Chinese victory[1] Territorial

changes DPRK regains control of all areas north of the 38th Parallel[2]?

Belligerents

?United Nations (UNC)

?United States

?South Korea

?Turkey

?United Kingdom

?China

?North Korea

Commanders and leaders

United States Douglas MacArthur

United States Walton H. Walker

United States John B. Coulter

United States Laurence B. Keiser

First Republic of Korea Yu Jae-hung

First Republic of Korea Paik Sun-yup

Turkey Tahsin Yaz?c?

United Kingdom Basil Aubrey Coad[3]

China Mao Zedong

China Peng Dehuai

China Han xianchu

Units involved

United States I Corps

1st Cavalry Division

1st ROK Infantry Division

24th Infantry Division

United States IX Corps

2nd Infantry Division

25th Infantry Division

United Kingdom 27th Commonwealth Brigade

Turkey Turkish Brigade

South Korea II Corps

6th ROK Infantry Division

7th ROK Infantry Division

8th ROK Infantry Division

United States US Fifth Air Force

38th Corps

112th Division

113th Division

114th Division

39th Corps

115th Division

116th Division

117th Division

40th Corps

118th Division

119th Division

120th Division

42nd Corps

124th Division

125th Division

126th Division

50th Corps

148th Division

149th Division

150th Division

66th Corps

196th Division

197th Division

198th Division

Strength

254,571[4]

230,000[5][6]

Casualties and losses

United States 676 killed

3,034 wounded

2,055 captured[7][nb 1]

813 missing

Turkey 218 killed

455 wounded[8]

94 missing

Total:

11,000+[9]

Chinese estimation:

23,000[10]

Official data:

10,000+ battle casualties

~20,000 non-battle casualties[11][nb 2]

30,000+ total casualties

38th Corps: 415 killed, 5,005 wounded

39th Corps: 463 killed, 1,125 wounded

40th Corps: 869 killed, 3,267 wounded

42nd Corps: 298 killed, 1,378 wounded

66th Corps: 1,347 killed or wounded

(From November 25 to December 25)[12]

Hoping to repeat the success of the earlier First Phase Campaign, the PVA 13th Army[nb 3] first launched a series of surprise attacks along the Ch'ongch'on River Valley on the night of November 25, 1950 at the western half of the Second Phase Campaign[nb 4] (Chinese: 第二次戰(zhàn)役西線; pinyin: Dì'èrcì Zhànyì Xīxiàn), effectively destroying the Eighth United States Army's right flank while allowing PVA forces to move rapidly into UN rear areas. In the subsequent battles and withdrawals during the period of November 26 to December 2, 1950, although the US Eighth Army managed to avoid being surrounded by PVA forces, the PVA 13th Army were still able to inflict heavy losses onto the retreating UN forces which had lost all cohesion. In the aftermath of the battle, the US Eighth Army's heavy losses forced all UN forces to retreat from North Korea to the 38th Parallel.

Background Edit

A map of Northwest Korea with arrows pointing towards Unsan and Kunu-ri

Map of Chinese First Phase Campaign, October 25 – November 1, 1950

Well, if they go fast enough, maybe some of them can be home by Christmas.

—?General Douglas MacArthur[13]

In the wake of the UN forces' successful landing at Inchon, the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter and the subsequent destruction of the Korean People's Army (KPA) during September 1950, the Eighth United States Army crossed the 38th Parallel and advanced rapidly towards the Sino-Korean border.[14] Alarmed by this development, Chinese Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong ordered the PVA to intervene in Korea and to launch the First Phase Campaign against the UN forces.[15] Between October 25 and November 4, 1950, the PVA 13th Army surprised and defeated the Republic of Korea Army (ROK) II Corps and the US 1st Cavalry Division in a series of battles around Onjong and Unsan, destroying the right flank of the US Eighth Army while forcing the UN forces to retreat back to the Ch'ongch'on River.[16] Although PVA forces were able to break through the UN line, logistics difficulties forced the PVA to withdraw on November 5, 1950.[17]

Despite the success of the PVA First Phase Campaign, the UN planners still believed that China had not intervened in Korea on a large scale.[18] The suddenness of the PVA withdrawal in the face of a victory further reinforced this belief.[19] Working on the assumption that only 30,000 PVA troops could remain hidden in the hills,[20] General Douglas MacArthur ordered the bombing of the bridges over the Yalu River in an effort to cut off PVA reinforcements.[21] Confident that the UN air forces could detect and disrupt any troop movements across the Yalu River, MacArthur launched the Home-by-Christmas Offensive on November 24 to rout the remaining PVA and KPA forces and to end the Korean War.[22]

Unknown to the UN planners, however, there were already 180,000 PVA troops stationed in Korea, with more reinforcements infiltrating across the border.[23] Although the PVA was ordered to maintain a defensive posture in North Korea until Soviet weapons could arrive in the spring of 1951,[24] its earlier successes convinced the Chinese leadership that the PVA was capable of turning the tide of UN advance.[25] Encouraged by the fact that the UN did not know their true numbers, PVA Commander Peng Dehuai outlined the Second Phase Campaign, a counteroffensive aimed at pushing the UN forces back to a line halfway Between Ch'ongch'on River and Pyongyang.[5] As a part of a deception plan to further reinforce the weak appearance of PVA forces, Peng ordered all units to rapidly retreat north while releasing POWs along the way.[26] With 230,000 troops at his disposal and another 150,000 heading to the Chosin Reservoir,[5] Peng authorized the start of the Second Phase Campaign on November 22, 1950.[27]

Prelude Edit

Location, terrain and weather Edit

The battle was fought along the UN front line around the Ch'ongch'on River and its tributaries,[28] which is located 50 mi (80 km) south of the Sino-Korean border.[29] The UN front line stretched horizontally from the Korean west coast to the Taebaek Mountains in central Korea,[30] while the Ch'ongch'on River crosses into the north of the UN line at the town of Kujang-dong.[31] From west to east, a series of towns, such as Chongju, Yongsan-dong, Ipsok, Kujang-dong, Tokchon, and Yongwon dot the front line,[32] and connecting those towns are a series of road junctions located at Sinanju, Anju, Kunu-ri and Pukchang-ni.[33] A road runs south from Kunu-ri into Sunchon and eventually into Pyongyang, and it would later become the main retreat route for the UN forces stationed at the center of the front line.[34] The hilly terrain on the northern bank of the Ch'ongch'on River formed a defensive barrier that allowed the Chinese to hide their presence while dispersing the advancing UN forces.[35] The battle was also fought over one of the coldest Korean winters in 100 years,[36] with temperatures dropped to as low as ?30 °F (?34 °C).[37]

Forces and strategies Edit

A map showing a front line with the UN labeled in blue and the Chinese in red. Multiple red arrows crossed over the front line on the map's right side

Map of Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River, November 25–28, 1950

Acting on MacArthur's instructions, General Walton Walker of the Eighth Army started the Home-by-Christmas Offensive at 10:00 on November 24, 1950.[38] With a reconstituted ROK II Corps placed on the Eighth Army's right flank, the advance was led by US I Corps to the west, US IX Corps in the center and ROK II Corps to the east.[39] The three UN Corps advanced cautiously in a continuous front line in order to prevent more ambushes similar to the PVA First Phase Campaign,[39] but the lack of manpower stretched the UN forces to the limit.[39] Except for the strong PVA resistance against ROK II Corps, the Eighth Army met little opposition, and the line Between Chongju to Yongwon was occupied on the night of the November 25.[40]

Despite the lack of manpower, the US Eighth Army had three and half times the firepower of the opposing PVA/KPA forces.[41] The US Fifth Air Force, which was responsible for the air support, also had little opposition due to the lack of anti-aircraft weapons by the PVA/KPA.[42] Boosted by a Thanksgiving feast with roasted turkeys on the eve of the advance, the morale was high among the UN ranks, and home by Christmas and Germany by spring was in everyone's mind.[43] The high morale, however, caused a degradation of troop discipline, and most of the soldiers had discarded their equipment and ammunition supply before the battle. A rifle company from the US IX Corps, for example, started its advance with most of the helmets and bayonets thrown away, and there were on average less than one grenade and 50 rounds of ammunition carried per man.[44] Because the UN planners did not foresee that the war would be dragged into a winter campaign, all elements of the Eighth Army started the offensive with a shortage of winter clothing.[38]

"As a main objective, one of the units must fight its way rapidly around the enemy and cut off their rear.... Route of attack must avoid highways and flat terrain in order to keep tanks and artillery from hindering the attack operations.... Night warfare in mountainous terrain must have a definite plan and liaison Between platoon commands. Small leading patrol groups attack and then sound the bugle. A large number will at that time follow in column."

Chinese operation principles for the Second Phase Campaign[45][46]

While the Eighth Army was advancing, the PVA 13th Army was hiding in the mountains with the 50th and 66th Corps to the west, the 39th and the 40th Corps in the center and the 38th and 42nd Corps to the east.[6] Anticipating the UN advances, the PVA planned a series of counterattacks to catch the Eighth Army off guard.[5] Hoping to repeat the success of the earlier First Phase Campaign, the 38th and 42nd Corps would first attack ROK II Corps and destroy the UN right flank, then cut behind the UN lines.[47] At the same time, the 39th and 40th Corps would hold US IX Corps in place while preventing any reinforcements to ROK II Corps.[48] The 50th and 66th Corps would stay behind and check the advances of the US I Corps.[48]

Although the PVA 13th Army had a nominal strength of 230,000 men,[6] its actual strength during the battle could be as low as 150,000 men.[28] The PVA 66th Corps, for example, had only 6,600 men per division at the start of the battle,[49] as opposed to the expected 10,000 men per division.[50] There was also only one firearm available for every three soldiers, and the rest were employed as grenade throwers.[42] Because most of the Chinese howitzers and guns were left behind in Manchuria, mortars were the only artillery support available for the PVA.[42] For the counteroffensive, the average soldier was issued with only five days worth of rations and ammunition, and resupply could only be obtained by scavenging on the battlefield.[51] To compensate for its shortcomings, the PVA relied extensively on night attacks and infiltrations in order to avoid the UN firepower.[52] The primitive logistics system had also allowed the PVA to maneuver over the rough hilly terrains, thus enabled them to by-pass the UN defenses and to surround the isolated UN positions.[53][54] Because the Chinese had captured large numbers of Nationalist weapons during the Chinese Civil War, most of the PVA weapons were composed of US-made small arms such as the Thompson submachine gun, the M1 Garand rifle, the M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle, the bazooka and the M2 mortar.[55]