作者：John Haldon約翰·哈爾頓

出版商：Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

自翻：神尾智代

Conclusion and consequences：War, peace, and survival

結(jié)論與影響：戰(zhàn)爭、和平與生存

????????? The Byzantine state survived as an important force in the Balkan and east Mediterranean region until the later 12th century because it maintained an effective fiscal apparatus that could support an efficient and well-organised army. It was as much the changes and shifts in the international situation as it was the internal evolution of Byzantine social and economic relations that led to its decline in the 13th century and its collapse and disappearance in the 14th and 15th centuries. One of the most important reasons for its longevity and its success in defending a territory surrounded on all sides by hostile forces was the system of logistical support that it maintained almost to the end. It was this system which permitted the state to allocate resources from the land to its armies as they needed them, to plan in advance the requirements for offensive operations, to hinder hostile appropriation of the same resources, and thus to make the conditions for enemy forces on Byzantine soil as difficult as possible. The taxation system ensured the raising of supplies in kind at the right time and in the right place, as well as of cash in order to purchase other requirements as well as mercenary soldiers, livestock, and so forth. Naturally, in reality this system was by no means as effective at all times as a simple description might suggest, and it often worked less to the advantage of the army than to that of the social elite, who could exploit it for their own ends. The whole apparatus worked often to the disadvantage of the producing population, who could be very oppressed by the incessant demands of this bureaucratic state.

（直到 12 世紀(jì)后期，拜占庭國家作為巴爾干和東地中海地區(qū)的一支重要力量幸存下來，因?yàn)樗S持著一個(gè)有效的財(cái)政機(jī)構(gòu)，可以支持一支高效且組織嚴(yán)密的軍隊(duì)。? 13世紀(jì)拜占庭社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系的內(nèi)在演變和14、15世紀(jì)的瓦解和消失，既是國際形勢的變化和變遷，也是拜占庭社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系的內(nèi)部演變。 其長壽并成功保衛(wèi)四面八方被敵對(duì)勢力包圍的領(lǐng)土的最重要原因之一是它幾乎保持到最后的后勤保障系統(tǒng)。 正是這種制度允許國家根據(jù)需要從土地上分配資源給軍隊(duì)，提前計(jì)劃進(jìn)攻行動(dòng)的需要，阻止敵對(duì)相同資源的侵占，從而為敵軍創(chuàng)造條件。 在拜占庭的土地上盡可能困難。 稅收制度確保在適當(dāng)?shù)臅r(shí)間和地點(diǎn)籌集實(shí)物供應(yīng)以及現(xiàn)金以購買其他需要以及雇傭兵、牲畜等。 自然，在現(xiàn)實(shí)中，這個(gè)系統(tǒng)絕不像簡單描述所暗示的那樣在任何時(shí)候都有效，而且它對(duì)軍隊(duì)的好處往往不如對(duì)社會(huì)精英的好處，后者可以為自己的目的利用它。 整個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)的運(yùn)作往往對(duì)生產(chǎn)人口不利，他們可能會(huì)被這個(gè)官僚國家的不斷要求所壓迫。）

????????? Other factors also played a role. Tactical order and discipline were regarded by the Byzantines themselves as key elements in their success over the long term, and they were only too aware of what could happen when these were not respected or maintained. It is also the case that the Byzantine military were by no means unique in this respect. The Islamic armies were also well organised and operated under a strict discipline, while the crusaders in the late 11th century soon learned the value of particular formations and tight tactical discipline in dealing with the fast-moving and hard-hitting Seljuk horse archers. Yet it is clear that Byzantium had an edge over most of its enemies in this respect until the 11th century, even if tactical discipline did not always deliver the results expected because individual officers or commanders lacked the leadership and authority to impose and maintain it. On the other hand, Byzantium was not Rome, and it is important to bear this in mind — the medieval east Roman empire was indeed a medieval empire, and it exhibited similar developmental traits in terms of social organisation, political structures and economic evolution as many of its neighbours.

（其他因素也發(fā)揮了作用。 拜占庭人自己認(rèn)為戰(zhàn)術(shù)秩序和紀(jì)律是他們長期成功的關(guān)鍵因素，他們非常清楚如果不尊重或維護(hù)這些會(huì)發(fā)生什么。 拜占庭軍隊(duì)在這方面也絕不是獨(dú)一無二的。 伊斯蘭軍隊(duì)也組織嚴(yán)密，作戰(zhàn)紀(jì)律嚴(yán)明，而 11 世紀(jì)后期的十字軍很快就了解了特定陣型和嚴(yán)密戰(zhàn)術(shù)紀(jì)律在應(yīng)對(duì)快速移動(dòng)和攻擊力強(qiáng)的塞爾柱騎射手時(shí)的價(jià)值。 然而，很明顯，直到 11 世紀(jì)，拜占庭在這方面比大多數(shù)敵人更具優(yōu)勢，即使戰(zhàn)術(shù)紀(jì)律并不總是能帶來預(yù)期的結(jié)果，因?yàn)閭€(gè)別軍官或指揮官缺乏強(qiáng)加和維持它的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力和權(quán)威。 另一方面，拜占庭不是羅馬，記住這一點(diǎn)很重要——中世紀(jì)的東羅馬帝國確實(shí)是一個(gè)中世紀(jì)的帝國，它在社會(huì)組織、政治結(jié)構(gòu)和經(jīng)濟(jì)演變方面表現(xiàn)出類似的發(fā)展特征。它的鄰居。）

????????? Another important aspect was leadership, the other side of the disciplinary coin, as it were. When Byzantine armies were well led, it usually meant that they were well-disciplined, fought in coherent units and obeyed the basic tactical rules of engagement appropriate to their equipment and weaponry. It also meant that they were, more often than not, victorious, because Byzantine leaders were supposed to observe the fundamental principle of east Roman warfare, namely that of ensuring that they fought only when they were fairly sure they could win, and at the same time that of minimising the loss of life on their side. This was not mere philanthropy, although that was certainly an important ideological element. It was common sense in such a beleaguered state, in which manpower was at a premium and demographic change could lead to serious problems for the armies. But there were plenty of foolish commanders, men whose vanity, arrogance or ignorance led them to throw the lives of their soldiers away in futile attacks or ill-considered actions. And it seems often to have been the case that these were the leaders who paid least attention to the fundamental principles of managing soldiers, discipline, tactical cohesion and esprit de corps. For with good leadership usually came good morale and self-confidence — crucial ingredients for successful fighting, especially in offensive warfare.

（另一個(gè)重要方面是領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力，這是紀(jì)律硬幣的另一面。 當(dāng)拜占庭軍隊(duì)得到良好領(lǐng)導(dǎo)時(shí)，這通常意味著他們紀(jì)律嚴(yán)明，以連貫的單位作戰(zhàn)，并遵守適合其裝備和武器的基本交戰(zhàn)戰(zhàn)術(shù)規(guī)則。 這也意味著他們往往是勝利的，因?yàn)榘菡纪ヮI(lǐng)導(dǎo)人應(yīng)該遵守東羅馬戰(zhàn)爭的基本原則，即確保他們只有在相當(dāng)確定自己能獲勝時(shí)才進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)斗，同時(shí) 時(shí)間，以盡量減少他們身邊的生命損失。 這不僅僅是慈善事業(yè)，盡管這當(dāng)然是一個(gè)重要的意識(shí)形態(tài)因素。 在這樣一個(gè)四面楚歌的國家，人力非常寶貴，人口結(jié)構(gòu)的變化可能會(huì)給軍隊(duì)帶來嚴(yán)重的問題，這是常識(shí)。 但是有很多愚蠢的指揮官，他們的虛榮、傲慢或無知導(dǎo)致他們在徒勞的攻擊或考慮不周的行動(dòng)中舍棄士兵的生命。 而且似乎經(jīng)常出現(xiàn)這樣的情況，這些領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人最不關(guān)注管理士兵、紀(jì)律、戰(zhàn)術(shù)凝聚力和團(tuán)隊(duì)精神的基本原則。 因?yàn)榱己玫念I(lǐng)導(dǎo)通常會(huì)帶來良好的士氣和自信——成功戰(zhàn)斗的關(guān)鍵因素，尤其是在進(jìn)攻戰(zhàn)中。）

????????? Even with well-equipped, disciplined and well-trained troops, the result of a battle in the medieval period, as well as at other times, was, in the end, unpredictable. The ultimate arbiter was a combination of the soldiers' morale and fighting skills, the quality of the leadership, and good luck. But as the emperor Leo VI points out in his military handbook, or tactica, in the early 10th century, the difference between the good general and the bad general was that the good general understood this, acted in a manner appropriate to the circumstances, and made sure that his dispositions could cope with sudden surprises or changes in the conditions of battle. Another writer, this time the son of a famous Byzantine general, noted at the end of the 11th century that he had never known a diligent and alert man who had not been able to make his own good fortune on the battlefield. And while it would be incorrect to suggest that Byzantine defeats were due only to the incompetence or arrogance of commanding officers, this did nevertheless play an important role.

（即使擁有裝備精良、訓(xùn)練有素、訓(xùn)練有素的軍隊(duì)，中世紀(jì)和其他時(shí)期的一場戰(zhàn)斗的結(jié)果最終也是不可預(yù)測的。 最終的仲裁者是士兵的士氣和戰(zhàn)斗技巧、領(lǐng)導(dǎo)素質(zhì)和運(yùn)氣的結(jié)合。 但是，正如利奧六世皇帝在 10 世紀(jì)早期的軍事手冊或戰(zhàn)術(shù)中指出的那樣，好將軍和壞將軍之間的區(qū)別在于，好將軍明白這一點(diǎn)，以適合當(dāng)時(shí)情況的方式行事，并且 確保他的性格能夠應(yīng)對(duì)突然的意外或戰(zhàn)斗條件的變化。 另一位作家，這次是一位著名的拜占庭將軍的兒子，在 11 世紀(jì)末指出，他從來沒有見過一個(gè)勤奮而機(jī)警的人，他不能在戰(zhàn)場上賺到自己的好運(yùn)。 雖然認(rèn)為拜占庭的失敗僅僅是由于指揮官的無能或傲慢是不正確的，但這確實(shí)發(fā)揮了重要作用。）

????????? The Byzantine world has attracted western popular and scholarly attention, not only because it stood at the crossroads of east and west, bridging very diverse cultures, but because it evoked a romantic lost medieval Christian world which was both eastern in its forms yet western in its cultural significance. For some, it had been a bastion of Christianity against Islam; for others, especially in the 16th and 17th centuries, it was a source of politically relevant information about the Ottomans who threatened Europe at that time. And it was to Byzantine authors and texts that later generations directed their attention in the context of increasing national self-awareness as interest grew in the pre-Renaissance and early medieval antecedents of the formerly Byzantine lands. And while both medieval Islam and the Byzantine world served to transmit the heritage of classical and Roman civilisation to the Renaissance and beyond, it was in particular through collections of Byzantine manuscripts and books that many texts were preserved, influencing in this way the evolution and content of modern classical scholarship.

（拜占庭世界吸引了西方大眾和學(xué)術(shù)界的關(guān)注，不僅因?yàn)樗驹跂|西方的十字路口，連接了非常多樣化的文化，還因?yàn)樗鼏酒鹆艘粋€(gè)浪漫的失落的中世紀(jì)基督教世界，它的形式既是東方的，又是西方的。 文化意義。 對(duì)一些人來說，它曾是基督教對(duì)抗伊斯蘭教的堡壘； 對(duì)于其他人來說，尤其是在 16 和 17 世紀(jì)，它是有關(guān)當(dāng)時(shí)威脅歐洲的奧斯曼帝國的政治相關(guān)信息的來源。 隨著人們對(duì)前拜占庭土地的文藝復(fù)興前和中世紀(jì)早期前身的興趣日益濃厚，后來的幾代人將注意力轉(zhuǎn)向了拜占庭作家和文本，以提高民族自我意識(shí)。 雖然中世紀(jì)的伊斯蘭教和拜占庭世界都有助于將古典和羅馬文明的遺產(chǎn)傳遞到文藝復(fù)興時(shí)期及以后，但特別是通過拜占庭手稿和書籍的收藏，許多文本得以保存下來，以這種方式影響了演變和內(nèi)容 現(xiàn)代古典學(xué)術(shù)研究。）

????????? Byzantium was, in a sense, always at war, for as we have seen, it always had an enemy or a potential enemy on one front or another. This situation necessarily inflected the whole history of the empire and determined in part at least its social structure and the way in which the state as well as the political system could evolve. Byzantium made war against its enemies over a period of some 700 years, from the 7th to the 14th and 15th centuries. In this sense, we might also assert that war made Byzantium what it was.

（從某種意義上說，拜占庭總是處于戰(zhàn)爭狀態(tài)，因?yàn)檎缥覀兯?，它總是在一條或另一條戰(zhàn)線上有一個(gè)敵人或潛在的敵人。 這種情況必然影響整個(gè)帝國的歷史，并至少部分地決定了它的社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)以及國家和政治制度的演變方式。 從 7 世紀(jì)到 14 世紀(jì)和 15 世紀(jì)，拜占庭在大約 700 年的時(shí)間里與敵人作戰(zhàn)。 從這個(gè)意義上說，我們也可以斷言，戰(zhàn)爭造就了拜占庭。）

Further reading

進(jìn)一步閱讀

Angold, M., The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204.

A Political History, London, Longman, 19114.

Bartusis, M.C., The Late Byzantine Army. Arms and Society, 1204-1453, Philadelphia, U.

Penn. Press, 1992.

Dixon, Karen R. and Southern, Pat , The Late Roman Army, London, Routledge, 1996.

Elton, 11., Warfare in Roman Europe, A.D.

350-425, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996, Haldon, J. F., State, Army and Society in Byzantium. approaches to Military, Social and Administrative History, Aldershot: Variorum, 1995.

Haldon, J. F., Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565-1204, London, Routledge, 1999.

Haldon, J. F., Byzantium. A History, Stroud, Tempus, 2000.

Haldon, J. F., The Byzantine Wars, Stroud.

Tempt's, 2001.

Kaegi, W. E., Jr., Byzantine Military Unrest 471-843. An Interpretation, Amsterdam, Hakkert, 1981.

McGeer, Eric, Sowing the Dragon's Teeth.

Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Cenhity, Dumbarton Oaks Studies XXXII!, Washington DC, Dumbarton Oaks, 1995.

Miller, T. S. and Nesbitt, J. S. (eds)., Peace and War hi Byzantium, Washington DC, CUA, 1995.

Nicol.le, D., Medieval Warfare Source Book, 2.

Christian Europe and its Neighbours, London, Arms Sr Armour Press, 1996.

Oikonomides, N. (ed.)., Byzantium at War, Athens, National Research Foundation, 1997.

Whittow, M., The Making of Orthodox Byzantium, 600-1025, London, MacMillan, 1996.

Angold, M.，拜占庭帝國 1025-1204。

?? 政治史，倫敦，朗文，19114。

?? Bartusis, M.C.，晚期拜占庭軍隊(duì)。 武器與社會(huì)，1204-1453，美國費(fèi)城??? 佩恩。 出版社，1992 年。

?? Dixon, Karen R. 和 Southern, Pat，The Late Roman Army，倫敦，勞特利奇，1996 年。

?? 埃爾頓，11 世，羅馬歐洲戰(zhàn)爭，公元??? 350-425, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996, Haldon, J. F., State, Army and Society in Byzantium。 軍事、社會(huì)和行政歷史的方法，奧爾德肖特：Variorum，1995 年。

?? Haldon, J. F.，拜占庭世界的戰(zhàn)爭、國家和社會(huì)，565-1204，倫敦，勞特利奇，1999 年。

?? Haldon, J. F., 拜占庭。 歷史，斯特勞德，坦帕斯，2000 年。

?? Haldon, J. F.，拜占庭戰(zhàn)爭，斯特勞德。

?? 誘惑，2001。

?? Kaegi, W. E., Jr.，拜占庭軍事動(dòng)亂 471-843。 解釋，阿姆斯特丹，哈克特，1981 年。

?? 麥吉爾，埃里克，播種龍牙。

?? 第十世紀(jì)的拜占庭戰(zhàn)爭，敦巴頓橡樹園研究 XXXII！，華盛頓特區(qū)，敦巴頓橡樹園，1995 年。

?? Miller, T. S. 和 Nesbitt, J. S. (eds)., Peace and War hi Byzantium, Washington DC, CUA, 1995.

?? Nicol.le, D.，中世紀(jì)戰(zhàn)爭資料書，2。

?? 基督教歐洲及其鄰居，倫敦，Arms Sr Armor Press，1996 年。

?? Oikonomides, N. (ed.)，《戰(zhàn)爭中的拜占庭》，雅典，國家研究基金會(huì)，1997 年。

?? Whittow, M.，東正教拜占庭的形成，600-1025，倫敦，麥克米蘭，1996 年。

????????? Byzantium survived for 800 years, yet its dominions and power fluctuated dramatically during that time. John Haldon tells the story from the days when the empire was barely clinging on to survival, to the age when its fabulous wealth attracted Viking mercenaries and Asian nomad warriors to its armies, their very appearance on the field being enough to bring enemies to terms. In 1453 the last emperor of Byzantium, Constantine XII, died fighting on the ramparts, bringing to a romantic end the glorious history of this legendary empire.

????????? 拜占庭存在800年，但在那段時(shí)間里，它的領(lǐng)土和權(quán)力發(fā)生了劇烈的波動(dòng)。約翰哈爾頓講述了從帝國勉強(qiáng)生存的時(shí)代，到其驚人的財(cái)富吸引維京雇傭兵和亞洲游牧戰(zhàn)士加入其軍隊(duì)的時(shí)代，他們在戰(zhàn)場上的出現(xiàn)足以讓敵人屈服。 1453年，拜占庭最后一位皇帝君士坦丁十二世戰(zhàn)死在城墻上，為這個(gè)傳奇帝國的輝煌歷史畫上了一個(gè)浪漫的句號(hào)。

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完結(jié)