Global technopolitics--The new grand bargain??

Without teaming up, democracies will not be able to establish a robust alternative to China’s autocratic technosphere

Don’t stop me now

Their dominant positions in this world of platforms give companies like Facebook and Google powers approaching or surpassing those of many countries.?Yet countries can as their economies become more digitised be increasingly understood as platforms, too: national operating systems of sorts. Natural resources still count, but digital resources are gaining ever more relevance: skilled and well-trained tech workers, access to?scads?of data, computing power, internet bandwidth, industrial policy and venture capital. And as with technology platforms, a country’s competitiveness will, to a large extent, depend on how it manages and multiplies these resources.

?Scads??n. /sk?dz/~ (of sth) 大量；許多?? scads of $20 bills 許多20元面值的鈔票

America is a platform like Microsoft’s Windows and Android, Google’s mobile operating system. These mix aspects of open and closed systems, allowing others to develop applications for their platform, but also closely control it. America combines monopolies and a strongish?state with lots of competition.?Mainly thanks to this profitable amalgam, the country has given rise to most of the world’s leading tech firms. China is more like Apple and Oracle, which combine being closed with lots of internal competition. The European Union is best compared to an open-source project such as Linux, which needs complex rules to work. India, Japan, Britain, Taiwan and South Korea all run differently and have technology bases to match.

Monopoly ?n. /m??n?p?li/ ?1.~ (in/of/on sth)壟斷；專營服務(wù)；被壟斷的商品（或服務(wù)） ?In the past central government had a monopoly on television broadcasting. 過去，中央政府對電視節(jié)目播放實行壟斷。 2.~ in/of/on sth 獨占；專利；專利品 ?Managers do not have a monopoly on stress. 并不只是經(jīng)營管理者有壓力。3.“大富翁”（棋類游戲，游戲者以玩具鈔票買賣房地產(chǎn)）

Strongish??/'str????/?adj. 稍強的，有點兒強的

Amalgam??n. /??m?lɡ?m/ ?1.~ (of sth) 混合物；綜合體?The film script is an amalgam of all three books. 這個電影腳本由三本書合成。 2.汞合金，汞齊（尤用于補牙）

The rise of cloud computing and AI--the first a truly global infrastructure, the second its most important application?has heightened the tensions between these platforms. More and more value is created by using?oodles?of computing power to extract AI?models from digital information generated by people, machines and sensors.?The models can then be turned into all sorts of services. Transport, health care, teaching, campaigning, warfare --these parts of society will not become data-driven as fast as many predict, but in time they will all be transformed. Whoever controls the digital flows involved can divert?much of the rent they generate. Knowledge is power in the virtual world even more than in the real one and it generates profit. Ian Hogarth, a British tech thinker, summarised the sudden sense of urgency when he wrote in a paper in 2018 that “AI?policy will become the single most important area of government policy”.

Oodles??n. /?u?dlz/ ?~ (of sth) 大量；很多

divertv. ??/da??v??t/??

1. 使轉(zhuǎn)向；使繞道；轉(zhuǎn)移?Northbound traffic will have to be diverted onto minor roads. 北行車輛將不得不繞次要道路行駛。

2. 改變（資金、材料等）的用途

3.轉(zhuǎn)移（某人）的注意力；使分心??The war diverted people's attention away from the economic situation. 戰(zhàn)爭把民眾的注意力從經(jīng)濟狀況上移開了。

4. 娛樂；供消遣??Children are easily diverted. 孩子們很容易被逗樂。

Many rich countries have drawn up ambitious industrial-policy plans for AI. Some have also?institutednational data strategies which limit the data that can leave the country.?A few have begun attacking other countries’ platforms by hacking their computer systems and spreading misinformation. In short, they are behaving increasingly like the companies producing the technology reshaping their world. “Everybody has become much more techno-nationalist,” says Justin Sherman of the Atlantic Council, a think-tank.

Institute動詞：建立，制定（體系、政策等）；開始；實行

That the 21st-century internet would be a splinternet was, perhaps, inevitable. It is not just that nations act in their own interests; they also have different preferences and values, for instance regarding privacy.?High digital borders behind which data get stuck, however, are not in the interests of most countries--though they may be in the interest of some governments.?Russia wants to create a “sovereign internet” that can be cut from the rest of the online world at the flip of a switch (while retaining the capability to mess around in more open systems). Countries interested in using flows of data to improve their citizens’ lot, though, will see few advantages. In a splinternet world choice will be limited, costs will rise and innovation will slow. And all the while China, with the biggest silo and thus the greatest access to data, loses least.

silo ?n. /?sa?l??/ ?1.筒倉；2.（核武器的）發(fā)射井；（危險物品的）地下貯藏庫；3.青貯窖?

譯文

Don’t stop me now

Their dominant positions in this world of platforms give companies like Facebook and Google powers approaching or surpassing those of many countries.?Yet countries can as their economies become more digitised be increasingly understood as platforms, too: national operating systems of sorts. Natural resources still count, but digital resources are gaining ever more relevance: skilled and well-trained tech workers, access to?scads?of data, computing power, internet bandwidth, industrial policy and venture capital. And as with technology platforms, a country’s competitiveness will, to a large extent, depend on how it manages and multiplies these resources.

這些企業(yè)在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)平臺上的超然地位使得臉書和谷歌這類公司有接近或者超過國家的實力。當(dāng)然，隨著經(jīng)濟越來越數(shù)字化，各國也可以越來越多地被理解為平臺:各種各樣的國家操作系統(tǒng)。自然資源依然重要，但數(shù)字資源變得更加重要：熟練和訓(xùn)練有素的技術(shù)工人、獲取大量數(shù)據(jù)的途徑、云計算、互聯(lián)網(wǎng)寬帶、產(chǎn)業(yè)政策和風(fēng)險投資。與技術(shù)平臺一樣，一個國家的競爭力在很大程度上取決于它如何管理和擴大這些資源。

America is a platform like Microsoft’s Windows and Android, Google’s mobile operating system. These mix aspects of open and closed systems, allowing others to develop applications for their platform, but also closely control it. America combines monopolies and a strongish?state with lots of competition.?Mainly thanks to this profitable amalgam, the country has given rise to most of the world’s leading tech firms. China is more like Apple and Oracle, which combine being closed with lots of internal competition. The European Union is best compared to an open-source project such as Linux, which needs complex rules to work. India, Japan, Britain, Taiwan and South Korea all run differently and have technology bases to match.

美國如同平臺，比如微軟的窗口操作系統(tǒng)和安卓系統(tǒng)，谷歌的移動操作系統(tǒng)一樣。這些開源或者封閉的系統(tǒng)各方面組合，使得第三方可以在其平臺上開發(fā)應(yīng)用，當(dāng)然，這些應(yīng)用也受制于平臺。美國是壟斷和較強勢政府的特征與大量的競爭融合。多虧了這個盈利的混合體，美國本土誕生了世界絕大多數(shù)領(lǐng)頭科技公司。而中國如同蘋果或者甲骨文一樣，混合了封閉性與激烈的內(nèi)部競爭。然歐盟更像開源項目，如Linux，需要復(fù)雜的規(guī)則運行。印度、日本、英國、中國臺灣和韓國運營模式各有不同，都有相應(yīng)的技術(shù)基礎(chǔ)。

The rise of cloud computing and AI--the first a truly global infrastructure, the second its most important application?has heightened the tensions between these platforms. More and more value is created by using?oodles?of computing power to extract AI?models from digital information generated by people, machines and sensors.?The models can then be turned into all sorts of services. Transport, health care, teaching, campaigning, warfare --these parts of society will not become data-driven as fast as many predict, but in time they will all be transformed. Whoever controls the digital flows involved can divert?much of the rent they generate. Knowledge is power in the virtual world even more than in the real one and it generates profit. Ian Hogarth, a British tech thinker, summarised the sudden sense of urgency when he wrote in a paper in 2018 that “AI?policy will become the single most important area of government policy”.

云計算（真正的全球基礎(chǔ)建設(shè)）和人工智能（云計算最重要的應(yīng)用）的興起，加劇了這些（國家）平臺的競爭局勢。通過大量計算能力計算由人類、機器和傳感器產(chǎn)生的數(shù)據(jù)精煉AI模型創(chuàng)造了越來越多的價值。這些創(chuàng)建的模型之后會轉(zhuǎn)化為各種各樣的服務(wù)。交通、醫(yī)療保健、教育、社會活動（競選）及戰(zhàn)爭--這些生活內(nèi)容不會如預(yù)測一樣快速轉(zhuǎn)變成“數(shù)據(jù)驅(qū)動模式”，但終將都進入數(shù)據(jù)的世界。無論誰控制相關(guān)的數(shù)字流，都可以轉(zhuǎn)移它們產(chǎn)生的大部分租金。知識就是力量--它在虛擬世界要比在現(xiàn)實社會中更加明顯表現(xiàn)，還有知識產(chǎn)生利潤。Ian Hogarth，一位英國科技思想家，在他2018年的論文中總結(jié)了這突如其來的緊迫感：“人工智能的政策方針將會是政府政策方針中唯一最重要的部分?！?/span>

Many rich countries have drawn up ambitious industrial-policy plans for AI. Some have also?instituted national data strategies which limit the data that can leave the country.A few have begun attacking other countries’ platforms by hacking their computer systems and spreading misinformation. In short, they are behaving increasingly like the companies producing the technology reshaping their world. “Everybody has become much more techno-nationalist,” says Justin Sherman of the Atlantic Council, a think-tank.

許多富有國家都制定了野心勃勃的人工智能產(chǎn)業(yè)政策計劃。一些設(shè)立了國家數(shù)據(jù)戰(zhàn)略用于限制數(shù)據(jù)外流他國。少數(shù)一些國家通過黑掉他國電腦系統(tǒng)和傳播謠言攻擊他國網(wǎng)絡(luò)平臺。簡而言之，一些國家的行為表現(xiàn)更像開發(fā)技術(shù)和重塑世界的企業(yè)。智囊團大西洋理事會的Justin Sherman說道“每個人都變得越來越科技民族主義?！?/span>

That the 21st-century internet would be a splinternet was, perhaps, inevitable. It is not just that nations act in their own interests; they also have different preferences and values, for instance regarding privacy.?High digital borders behind which data get stuck, however, are not in the interests of most countries--though they may be in the interest of some governments.?Russia wants to create a “sovereign internet” that can be cut from the rest of the online world at the flip of a switch (while retaining the capability to mess around in more open systems). Countries interested in using flows of data to improve their citizens’ lot, though, will see few advantages. In a splinternet world choice will be limited, costs will rise and innovation will slow. And all the while China, with the biggest silo and thus the greatest access to data, loses least.

21世紀(jì)的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)可能會是一個四分五裂，割據(jù)狀態(tài)的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)，也許不可避免。不僅是國家處于自身利益行動，而且國家也有不同的偏好和價值觀，比如關(guān)于隱私方面的問題。然而，讓數(shù)據(jù)停滯不前的高度數(shù)字邊界并不符合大多數(shù)國家的利益——盡管它們可能符合某些政府的利益。比如俄羅斯想要創(chuàng)建一個“主權(quán)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)”，只需按一下開關(guān)，就能與其他網(wǎng)絡(luò)世界切斷聯(lián)系(同時保留在更開放的系統(tǒng)中亂搞的能力)。而有意于通過數(shù)據(jù)流改變居民命運的國家將看不到什么好處。在割據(jù)的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)世界中，選擇受限、成本增加、創(chuàng)新變緩。與此同時，中國擁有最大的數(shù)據(jù)倉庫，因此也擁有最大的數(shù)據(jù)獲取渠道，損失最少。