原封面：

作者：Leon Trotsky

出版社：Marxists Internet Archive

原書語言：English

原書出版聲明：These writings were first published in 1923 by the Soviet Government. They were translated by Brian Pearce. Annotation is by Brian Pearce. Footnotes are from the original Russian edition. Transcribed for the Trotsky Internet Archive, now a subarchive of the Marxists’ Internet Archive, by David Walters in 1996 with permission from Index Books/Trade Union Printing Services, 28 Charlotte St, London, W1P 1HJ.這些著作于1923年由蘇維埃政府首次出版。它們是由布菜恩﹣皮爾斯翻譯的。注釋由布萊恩﹣皮爾斯負責。腳注來自俄文原版。1996年，經(jīng) Index Books / Trade Union Printing Services ,28 Charlotte St , London ,W1P1HJ許可， David Walters 為托洛茨基在線檔案館（現(xiàn)在是馬克思主義者在線檔案館的一個子檔案館）轉(zhuǎn)錄。Converted to eBook format by Kollektiv Yakov Perelman, from the on-line version of The Military Writings of Leon Trotsky - Volume 1, 1918 available at Trotsky Internet Archive on 28 January 2013.由 Kolektiv Yakov Perelman 將《托洛茨基軍事著作﹣第一卷，1918》的在線版本轉(zhuǎn)換為電子書格式，可于2013年1月28日在托洛茨基網(wǎng)（https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/）查閱。

原書在線版本的聲明（Introduction to the on-line version）：This five volume collection of Leon Trotsky’s military writings are a major contribution to Revolutionary Marxism. Trotsky was Commissar of Military and Navel Affairs for the newly formed Soviet Republic. In this capacitiy he lead the organization of the Red Army and Navy. This workers’ and peasants’ army, the first regular army of a workers’ state, was to immediately face its first conflict with Imperialism and it’s Russian representatives in 1918. The five volumes represents the sum total of Trotsky’s articles, essays, lectures and polemics as the leader of the Red Army. Some of the writings here were given at Red Army academies, at Bolshevik Party meetings and at national and local soviets. These writing represent official Soviet policy in general and Bolshevik Party positions specifically. All the writings represent Trotsky’s thoughts in reaction to the events as they were transpiring around him from 1918 through 1922: war, revolution, counter-revolution, all without the calm reflection a historian, for example, would have enjoyed in writing about such events with the advantage of 20/20 hindsight. These are the writings of a revolutionary under the actual gunfire of counter-revolution, often times written on the armored train Trotsky used to command the Red Army during various campaigns of the Civil War.這五卷托洛茨基的軍事著作集是對革命馬克思主義的重大貢獻。托洛茨基是新成立的蘇維埃共和國的軍事和海軍事務委員。在這個職位上，他領導了紅軍和海軍的組織。這支工人和農(nóng)民的軍隊是工人國家的第一支正規(guī)軍，將在1918年立即面臨與帝國主義及其俄國代表的第一次沖突。這五卷書是托洛茨基作為紅軍領導人的文章、散文、演講和論戰(zhàn)的總和。這里的一些文章是在紅軍學院、布爾什維克黨的會議以及國家和地方蘇維埃上發(fā)表的。這些文字代表了蘇聯(lián)官方的總體政策，特別是布爾什維克黨的立場。所有的文章都代表了托洛茨基對1918年至1922年發(fā)生在他周圍的事件的反應：戰(zhàn)爭、革命、反革命，所有這些都沒有像歷史學家那樣，在寫這些事件時享有完全事后式的冷靜思考。這些都是一個革命者在反革命的實際槍聲下的寫照，很多時候是在托洛茨基在內(nèi)戰(zhàn)的各種戰(zhàn)役中用來指揮紅軍的裝甲列車上寫的。

This on-line version consists of everything available from the printed Russian and English editions with the exception of the color maps showing the various stages of the Civil War, which were to fine in detail reproduce for the World Wide Web.該在線版本包含俄文和英文印刷版中的所有內(nèi)容，但顯示內(nèi)戰(zhàn)各個階段的彩色地圖除外，這些地圖將在萬維網(wǎng)（World Wide Web）上進行詳細復制。

——David Walters

譯序：見國內(nèi)本專題譯作空缺，特精選本書譯出，以填補空白。有助于提供更多不同于國內(nèi)傳統(tǒng)方面的對于托本人的研究學習角度。譯文不精確之處請指正，特附原文。

托洛茨基論軍事

第一卷（1918，革命是如何武裝起來的）

作者前言

五年的經(jīng)歷

? ? ? ?專門發(fā)表我所撰寫的關于紅軍的論文、演講、報告、呼吁、命令、說明、信件、電報和其他文件的想法是在紀念紅軍成立五周年時形成的。V·P·波隆斯基同志提出了出版這些文章的倡議，這些材料的選取、檢查、整理和修正是由Ya·G·布魯姆金同志、F·M·維梅爾同志、A·I·魯賓同志和A·A·尼基丁同志負責的。S·I·溫特索夫同志則承擔了年表、注解和索引的收集工作。當我快速瀏覽這些將要付印的手稿時，我所得到的大概印象是

? ? ? ? 這些材料所反映的是不充分的，更重要的是缺乏具體性。所有的這些材料都反映了建設紅軍的實際工作。

? ? ? ? 今天，當我們能夠?qū)徱曃迥陙砀锩娜砍删蜁r，這一行動就會很清楚地表明，幾乎所有（如果不是全部）關于蘇維埃的建設性工作的原則問題和困難首先出現(xiàn)在我們面前，在軍事領域中最為重要——而且以極其嚴格、簡潔和緊湊的形式。在這方面，它作為一般規(guī)則，不允許我們有任何喘息的機會而我們的一些。幻想和錯誤帶來了幾乎是立即的懲罰。而最負責任的決議遭到抨擊。對這些決議可能存在的任何反對意見都立即進行了實踐，接下來則是在戰(zhàn)場上。因此，總的來說，在紅軍建設的內(nèi)在邏輯上，沒有從一個系統(tǒng)到另一個系統(tǒng)的任何瘋狂跳躍?？梢哉f，在某種意義上，正是我們所面臨的危險的尖銳性拯救了我們。如果我們有更多的時間進行討論和辯論，我們可能會犯更多的錯誤。

? ? ? ? 最困難的時期是第一個時期——大約是在 1918 年下半年。部分出于必要，部分出于慣性，革命的力量首先被引導到打破所有舊的聯(lián)系（或可譯為環(huán)節(jié)）的方向，從所有崗位上撤換舊社會的代表。但與此同時，必須塑造新的聯(lián)系，首先是最嚴格、最高壓和強制性的聯(lián)系——即新的，革命的軍事團的聯(lián)系。光是我們黨，雖然堅強的干部還遠沒有很多，但他們卻能在彈片織成的冰幕下實現(xiàn)這一轉(zhuǎn)變。這一工作所涉及的困難和危險是巨大的。在無產(chǎn)階級先鋒隊已經(jīng)完成了向“工作、紀律和命令”的過渡（雖然并非沒有內(nèi)部問題）的時候，廣大工人群眾，甚至是比之規(guī)模更大的農(nóng)民才剛剛開始搖擺，這一現(xiàn)象要被根除，就像必須做的那樣！剩下的一切人都是舊秩序的殘余附庸，他們還沒有以實際的方式思考新的秩序。這是蘇維埃力量發(fā)展中非常關鍵的時刻。左翼“社會革命黨人”的政黨——一個知識分子的組織，它的一個分支延伸到農(nóng)民，另一個延伸到城市里的小市民——在其命運中最生動地反映了從革命的自發(fā)破壞期到建國期的痛苦過渡。咬牙切齒的小資產(chǎn)階級（der rabiat gewordene Spiessburger，引自恩格斯）不想知道任何限制、任何讓步、任何對歷史現(xiàn)實的妥協(xié)——直到后者用橫梁敲打他的頭骨。接著他癱倒在地，無助地向敵人投降。反映了這一切的正是社會革命黨！革命昨日的次要的自發(fā)性面對布列斯特和約、中央集權或正規(guī)軍時完全無能為力。左翼社會革命黨在這些問題上的反對很快轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)榉磁?，最終導致該黨在政治上的毀滅。幸運的是，布魯姆金同志雖是一位在 1918 年 7 月將自己的生命押在與我們的斗爭上的前左翼社會革命黨人，但現(xiàn)在他是我們黨的一員，他應該成為我的合作者來編寫這本書，而書中的其中一個部分反映了我們與左翼社會革命黨的致命沖突。

? ? ? ?總的來說，革命標志著歷史的急劇轉(zhuǎn)變。但是，如果我們更仔細地研究它，我們會在其中發(fā)現(xiàn)一系列轉(zhuǎn)折，這些轉(zhuǎn)折越激烈、越具有轉(zhuǎn)折性，革命的事件以驚人的速度展開得越徹底。最重要的是，這些局部轉(zhuǎn)變中的每一個都是對黨的一次非常大的考驗。簡而言之，黨的任務——或者更準確地說，它的戰(zhàn)斗中心的任務——可以分解為以下幾個要素：及時認識到新階段的需要；為這個新階段做準備；在不使黨脫離仍然受前一時期慣性支配的群眾的情況下完成轉(zhuǎn)變。同時，有必要記住，革命在給予執(zhí)政黨的基本原材料——時間方面是非常節(jié)約的。如果領導中心轉(zhuǎn)得太急，它可能會發(fā)現(xiàn)自己與自己的政黨對立，或者該黨可能會發(fā)現(xiàn)自己與革命階級對立：但是，另一方面，一個隨昨日的過時潮流搖擺的政黨以及它所領導的階級，在完成客觀事件進程所提出的緊迫任務時可能為時已晚——每一次如上對動態(tài)平衡的違反都可能對革命造成致命的威脅。這一規(guī)律不僅適用于軍隊，也適用于經(jīng)濟，它要求的節(jié)奏的必要調(diào)整。

? ? ? ?當我們已經(jīng)不得不組建新團時，舊軍隊仍在回到全國各地，散布著對戰(zhàn)爭的仇恨。沙皇軍官被逐出軍隊，在某些地方受到了無情的處理。然而，我們不得不邀請前軍官來擔任新軍隊的教官。沙皇軍隊團里的委員會就是革命的化身——至少在它的第一階段。在新的團中，委員會是無法容忍的，這是它解體的根源。當我們不得不引入一門新學科時，對舊學科的詛咒還沒有停止響起。然后是從自愿征兵到強制征兵，從游擊隊到正規(guī)軍事組織的過渡。與“游擊主義”的斗爭日復一日地進行著，這需要最大的堅持、不妥協(xié)，有時甚至是苛刻。 “游擊主義”是革命中農(nóng)民背景的軍事表現(xiàn)，因為這件事還沒有上升到國家意識的層面。反對“游擊主義”的斗爭同時也是爭取無產(chǎn)階級國家地位，反對正在破壞它的無政府主義的小資產(chǎn)階級自發(fā)性的斗爭。然而，游擊隊的方法和習慣也在黨的隊伍中得到體現(xiàn)：在黨內(nèi)與它們進行思想斗爭是對軍隊采取的組織、教育和懲罰措施的必要補充。只有通過最大壓力，才能將無政府主義的“游擊主義”帶入集權和紀律的框架內(nèi)。這種壓力既是外部的——德國的進攻，然后是捷克軍團的暴動——也是內(nèi)部的，通過軍隊內(nèi)部的共產(chǎn)主義組織。

? ? ? ?正如我所說，這里匯編的文章、演講和命令僅在非常不充分的程度上反映了已完成的實際建設工作。這項工作的主要部分通常是通過演講和文章以外的方式進行的。此外，最重要的講話，即針對現(xiàn)場、前線和部隊中的軍事工作者的講話，它們具有深刻的實際、具體的意義，這由當時的要求決定——這些是最重要的。重要的演講通常不會被任何人以書面形式記錄下來。除此之外，還必須進一步補充的是，即使是錄制的演講也大多錄制得很糟糕。在革命時期，速記藝術的水平與所有其他藝術一樣低。一切都是倉在促和“無論如何”中完成的。在辨認字跡時，速記抄本通常由一組神秘的短語組成，其含義并不總是可以隨后重建，當這項任務由演講者以外的人承擔時更是如此。

? ? ? ?盡管如此，這些文章確實反映了過去的偉大歲月。這就是為什么，盡管有上面列出的所有保留意見，我仍同意將它們印出來。時不時回顧我們最近的過去對我們來說并不是什么壞事。此外，這些文章可能被證明對我們那些盡管進展緩慢，但仍正在向奪取政權邁進的海外同志并非沒有用處。他們也將在一定的階段面對我們曾經(jīng)的基本任務和已經(jīng)克服的問題。也許這些材料將幫助他們避免至少一些等待他們的錯誤。如果不犯錯誤，任何事情都無法完成，尤其是革命：但無論如何，將這些錯誤減少到最低限度總是好的。

??????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????列·托洛茨基

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 1923年2月23日

???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 莫斯科

?

P.S.：本出版物主要包括公開發(fā)表或已在報刊上發(fā)表的文章、演講、文件等。只有相對較小的部分由由于某種原因在撰寫時未出版的材料組成，第一次在這里印刷。本書不包括尚未出版的大量文件（訂單、報告、直通電文等）的出版時間，也不會這么快出版。在對整本書進行評估時，需要牢記這一點。

???列·托

?

注

為了挑起蘇俄和德國之間的戰(zhàn)爭而殺死德國大使米爾巴赫的布魯姆金（或布拉金）在德國戰(zhàn)敗后被赦免。他繼續(xù)在契卡（后來的格別烏）工作。 1929 年，他拜訪了流亡中的托洛茨基，帶回了一封給俄國反對派的信。他被背叛（顯然是被拉狄克）并被處決。 [抄寫員注：布魯姆金是一名左派社會革命黨人，他幫助協(xié)調(diào)針對布爾什維克的恐怖行動。如前所述，他暗殺米爾巴赫是企圖挑起德國攻擊蘇維埃共和國和工人國家。試圖暗殺列寧的同一政治邊緣使對米爾巴赫的暗殺得以進行。這不是按照布爾什維克的要求做的，而是針對他們的。 – David Walters 在 Joska Rabb 的幫助下注]

以下為英文版原文，用于對照閱讀

AUTHOR’S PREFACE

* * *

Through Five Years

The idea of publishing my articles, speeches, reports, appeals, orders, instructions, letters, telegrams and other documents devoted to the Red Army arose in connection with the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the Red Army. Comrade V.P. Polonsky took the initiative in publishing these papers. Selection, critical checking, arrangement and correction of the material was undertaken by Comrades Ya. G. Blyumkin, F.M. Vermel, A.I. Rubin and A.A. Nikitin. The notes, the chronology and the indexes of names and subjects were compiled by Comrade S.I. Ventsov. When I looked quickly through the manuscripts after they had already been assembled for printing, the general impression I got was – how inadequately and, most important, with how little concreteness, all this material reflects the actual work involved in building the Red Army.

Today, when it has become possible for us to survey the entire achievement of the revolution through five years, it stands out quite clearly that nearly all, if not all, the questions of principle and the difficulties of Soviet constructive work arose before us first and foremost in the sphere of military affairs – and, in extremely hard, concise and compact form. In this sphere, as a general rule, no respite was allowed us. Illusions and errors brought with them almost immediate retribution. The most responsible decisions were taken under fire. Any opposition there might be to these decisions was tested in action there and then, on the spot. Hence, by and large, the inner logically in the building of the Red Army, the absence of any wild leaps from one system to another. It can be said that, in a certain sense, it was precisely the acuteness of the danger to which we were subjected that saved us. If we had had more time for discussion and debate we should probably we would of made a great many more mistakes.

The most difficult period of all was the first – covering approximately the second half of 1918. Partly through necessity, partly through mere inertia, revolutionary effort was directed above all into breaking all the old links, removing from all posts the representatives of the old society. But at the same time it was necessary to forge new links and, in the first place, the strictest, most peremptory and coercive of links – namely, the links of new, revolutionary regiments. Our Party alone, with its still far from numerous, though sturdy cadres was capable of effecting this turn, under a hail of shrapnel. The difficulties and dangers involved were colossal. At the time when the vanguard of the proletariat had already accomplished, though not without internal problems, the transition to ‘work, discipline and order’, the broad masses of the workers, and, even more so, of the peasants were only beginning to shake themselves free, wiping out, as had to be done! Everything that remained of the old order, and they were not as yet thinking in a practical way about the new one. This was a very critical moment in the development of the Soviet power. The party of the Left ‘Socialist-Revolutionaries’ – an organization of intellectuals, one wing of which extended to the peasantry and the other to the mass of the urban philistines – reflected most vividly, in its fate, the painful transition from the spontaneously-destructive period of the revolution to the state-building period. The petty-bourgeois who has taken the bit between his teeth (der rabiat gewordene Spiessburger, to use Engels’s expression) does not want to know about any limitations, any concessions, any compromises with historical reality – until the moment when the latter bangs its beam against his skull. Then he collapses into prostration and helplessly surrenders to the enemy. The Socialist-Revolutionary party, which reflected! The peripheral spontaneity of the revolution’s yesterday was utterly incapable of understanding either the Brest peace, or centralized authority, or the regular army. The opposition of the Left SRs on these questions was quickly transformed into revolt, which ended in the political ruin of that party. It has pleased fate that Comrade??Blyumkin, a former Left SR who in July 1918 staked his life on the fight against us, but who is now a member of our party, should have turned out to be my collaborator in putting together this volume, which in one of its sections reflects our mortal conflict with the Left SR party. The revolution is highly skilled both in separating men from one another and also, if need be, in bringing them together. All the most courageous and consistent elements that existed in the Left SR party are now with us.

Taken as a whole, the revolution signifies a sharp turn in history. But, if we examine it more carefully, we find within it a series of turns which are the more acute and critical, the further the events of the revolution unfold, at a furious pace. Each of these partial turns is, above all, a very great test for the leading party. Schematically, the task of the party – or, to be still more precise, that of its fighting center – breaks down into the following elements: appreciating in good time the need for a new stage; preparing the party for this new stage; carrying through the turn without detaching the party from the masses who are still governed by the inertia of the previous period. At the same time it is necessary to remember that the revolution is very sparing in its allowance to the ruling party of that basic raw material,?time. If the leading center makes the turn too sharply, it may find itself in opposition to its own party, or the party may find itself in opposition to the revolutionary class: but, on the other hand, a party that drifts with the current of yesterday, along with the class that it leads, may turn out to be too late in fulfilling urgent tasks posed by the objective course of events – and every such violation of the dynamic equilibrium threatens to prove fatal for the revolution. This applies, with the necessary modification regarding tempos, not only to the army but also to the economy.

The old army was still straggling back across the country, spreading hatred for war, when we were already having to form new regiments. The Tsarist officers had been thrown out of the army, and in some places dealt with in merciless fashion. Yet we had to invite former officers to come and serve as instructors of the new army. The committees in the Tsarist regiments were the very embodiment of the revolution – in its first stage, at least. In the new regiments, committees could not be tolerated, being a source of disintegration. The curses cast upon the old discipline had not yet ceased to resound when we were already obliged to introduce a new discipline. Then followed the transition from voluntary to compulsory recruitment and from guerrilla bands to regular military organisation. The struggle against ‘guerrillaism’ was waged unremittingly, from one day to the next, and it called for the greatest persistence, intransigence and, sometimes, severity. ‘Guerrillaism’ was the military expression of the peasant background of the revolution, in so far as the matter had not yet been raised to the level of state consciousness. The struggle against ‘guerrillaism’ was at the same time a struggle for proletarian statehood against the anarchical petty-bourgeois spontaneity that was undermining it. Guerrilla methods and habits found expression, however, in the Party’s ranks as well: an ideological struggle against them within the Party was a necessary supplement to the organisational, educational and punitive measures that were taken in the army. Only through maximum pressure was anarchical ‘guerrillaism’ brought within the framework of centralisation and discipline. This pressure was both external – the German offensive, and then the Czechoslovak revolt – and internal, by way of Communist organisation within the Army.

The articles, speeches and orders assembled here reflect, as I have said, only to a very inadequate degree the work of actual construction that was done. The principal part of this work was generally performed otherwise than by means of speeches and articles. Besides which, the most important speeches, namely, those which were addressed to military workers on the spot, at the fronts and in the Army units, and which had profoundly practical, concrete significance, determined by the demands of the moment – these most important and significant speeches were, as a rule, not taken down in writing by anyone. To all which it must further be added that even the speeches that were recorded were mostly recorded badly. The art of writing shorthand was in that period of the revolution at just as low a level as all the other arts. Everything was done hastily and ‘a(chǎn)nyhow’. When deciphered, a shorthand transcript often consisted of a collection of enigmatic phrases, the meaning of which it was not always possible to reconstruct subsequently, and all the less so when this task was undertaken by someone other than the person who had delivered the speech.

Nevertheless, these pages do reflect the great years that have passed; which is why, with all the reservations set out above, I have agreed that they be printed. It is no bad thing for us, from time to time, to look over our recent past. Furthermore, these pages may prove to be not without use to our comrades abroad who are advancing, even though slowly, towards the conquest of power. The fundamental tasks and problems which we have overcome will in due course confront them too. Perhaps these materials will help them to avoid at least some of the mistakes that lie in wait for them. Nothing is ever accomplished without making mistakes and a revolution least of all: but it is good, at any rate, to reduce these mistakes to the minimum.

L. Trotsky
February 27, 1923
Moscow

P.S. Included in the present publication are, predominantly, articles, speeches, documents and so on which were delivered publicly, or which have already been published in the press. A comparatively small section is made up of materials which, for one reason or another, were not published at the time they were written, and are printed here for the first time. The book does not include numerous documents (orders, reports, correspondence over the direct wire, etc.) the time to publish which has not yet come, and will not come so soon. This circumstance needs to be kept in mind when evaluating the book as a whole.

L.T.

Notes

Blyumkin?(or Blurakin), who killed the German ambassador Mirbach in order to provoke war between Soviet Russia and Germany, was pardoned after Germany’s defeat had made it safe to do this. He resumed his work in the Cheka (later the GPU). In 1929 he visited Trotsky in exile, taking back with him a letter to Russian oppositionists. He was betrayed (apparently, by Radek) and executed.?[Note by transcriber:Blyumkin was a Left SR who helped coordinate terrorist actions against the Bolsheviks. His assassination of Mirbach was an attempt, as stated, to provoke Germany into attacking the Soviet Republic and workers’ state. The assassination of Mirbach was perpetuated by the same political fringe that attempted the assassination of Lenin. It was not done at the behest of the Bolsheviks, but rather it was directed against them. – David Walters with help from Joska Rabb]

非常感謝各位的支持，請期待接下來的譯文

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