Are you a body with a mind or a mind with a body

你是有思維的身體還是有身體的思維

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Look at your hand.

How do you know it's really yours?

It seems obvious, unless you've experienced the rubber hand illusion.

In this experiment, a dummy hand is placed in front of you

and your real hand is hidden behind a screen.

Both are simultaneously stroked with a paint brush.

No matter how much you remind yourself the dummy hand isn't yours,

you eventually start to feel like it is,

and inevitably flinch when it's threatened with a knife.

看看你的手，

你怎么知道這就是你的手呢？

答案看似明顯，除非你有 體驗(yàn)過“橡膠手錯覺”。

這個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)是放一只假手在你面前，

然后把你的真手藏在隔板后面。

兩邊同時(shí)被刷子撫摸。

無論你如何提醒自己那只假手不是你的，

你最終都會覺得它屬于你，

所以當(dāng)它快被刀子刺中時(shí)你一定會退縮。

That may just be a temporary trick, but it speaks to a larger truth:

our bodies, the physical, ?biological parts of us,

and our minds, the thinking, conscious aspects,

have a complicated, tangled relationship.

Which one primarily defines you or your self?

可能這只是個(gè)暫時(shí)的伎倆， 但卻證明了一個(gè)更大的事實(shí)：

我們的身體在生理上屬于我們，

和我們的思維，思考能力和意識

有著復(fù)雜而糾結(jié)的關(guān)系。

哪一個(gè)更能定義你呢？

Are you a physical body that only experiences thoughts and emotions

as a result of biochemical interactions in the brain?

That would be a body with a mind.

Or is there some non-physical part of you that's pulling the strings

but could live outside ?of your biological body?

That would be a mind with a body.

That takes us to an old question

of whether the body ?and mind are two separate things.

你是只有通過大腦內(nèi)的生化相互作用

才能感受到想法和情緒的身體嗎？

這是有著思維的身體。

或是有一些非生理的部分在幕后操縱，

但這些部分在你的生物身體之外？

這就是有著身體的思維。

這讓我們回歸到一個(gè)古老的問題，

究竟身體和思維是不是兩樣不同的東西？

In a famous thought experiment,

th-century philosopher ?René Descartes pointed out

that even if all our physical sensations were just a hallucinatory dream,

our mind and thoughts ?would still be there.

That, for him, was the ultimate proof of our existence.

And it led him to conclude that

the conscious mind is something separate from the material body

that forms the core of our identity.

The notion of a non-physical consciousness

echoes the belief of many religions in an immaterial soul

for which the body is only ?a temporary shell.

在一個(gè)著名的思想實(shí)驗(yàn)中，

世紀(jì)的哲學(xué)家笛卡兒指出，

即使我們所有的身體感覺都只是幻想，

我們的思維和想法依然存在。

對他來說，這也是我們存在的最終證明。

由此，他總結(jié)出，

意識是與構(gòu)成我們身份核心

的物質(zhì)身體相分離的東西。

非生理意識的概念

與許多宗教信奉非物質(zhì)的靈魂，

認(rèn)為身體只是一個(gè)臨時(shí)軀殼的信仰相呼應(yīng)。

If we accept this, ?another problem emerges.

How can a non-physical mind have any interaction with the physical body?

If the mind has no shape, ?weight, or motion,

how can it move your muscles?

Or if we assume it can, why can your mind only move your body and not others?

但如果我們接受了這個(gè)概念， 另一個(gè)問題就出現(xiàn)了。

非生理的思維如何 和生理上的身體互動？

如果思維沒有形， 重量或動作，

它如何使肌肉運(yùn)動？

假設(shè)它可以，為什么你的思維只能 控制你的而不能控制其他人的身體呢？

Some thinkers have found creative ways to get around this dilemma.

For example, the French priest ?and philosopher Nicolas Malebranche

claimed that when we think about reaching for a fork,

it's actually god who moves our hand.

Another priest philosopher ?named George Berkeley

concluded that the material world is an illusion,

existing only as mental perceptions.

This question of mind versus body isn't just the domain of philosophers.

有些思想家找到了一些 有創(chuàng)意的方法來回答這個(gè)問題。

比如，法國神父兼哲學(xué)家 尼古拉斯?馬勒伯朗士認(rèn)為，

當(dāng)我們考慮伸手拿一個(gè)叉子時(shí)，

其實(shí)是神在移動我們的手。

另一名叫喬治·貝克萊的神父及哲學(xué)家

總結(jié)出，物質(zhì)世界只是一個(gè)幻像，

僅作為精神觀念存在。

這個(gè)心靈與身體的問題 不僅存在于哲學(xué)領(lǐng)域。

With the development of psychology and neuroscience,

scientists have weighed in, as well.

Many modern scientists reject the idea

that there's any distinction ?between the mind and body.

Neuroscience suggests that our bodies, along with their physical senses,

are deeply integrated ?with the activity in our brains

to form what we call consciousness.

From the day we're born,

our mental development is formed through our body's interaction

with the external world.

Every sight, sound, and touch create new maps and representations in the brain

that eventually become responsible for regulating our experience of self.

隨著心理學(xué)和神經(jīng)科學(xué)的發(fā)展，

科學(xué)家也開始重視這個(gè)問題。

很多現(xiàn)代科學(xué)家反對

心靈和身體之間有區(qū)別的想法。

神經(jīng)科學(xué)表明， 我們的身體以及身體的感覺

與我們大腦中的活動密切相關(guān)，

從而形成我們所謂的意識。

從我們出生那天起，

我們的心理發(fā)展便是通過

身體與外部世界互動而形成的。

每一次視覺，聽覺和觸覺的接觸 都會在大腦中創(chuàng)造出新的地圖和代表物，

最終使我們能調(diào)節(jié)自我體驗(yàn)。

And we have other senses, besides the typical five,

such as the sense of balance

and a sense of the relative location of our body parts.

The rubber hand illusion, and similar virtual reality experiments,

show that our senses can easily mislead us in our judgment of self.

They also suggest that our bodies and external sensations

are inseparable from ?our subjective consciousness.

If this is true, then perhaps Descartes' experiment was mistaken from the start.

After all, if we close our eyes in a silent room,

the feeling of having a body isn't something we can just imagine away.

除了最典型的五感以外， 我們還有其他感覺，

比如平衡感

以及對我們身體相對位置的感覺。

橡膠手錯覺和類似的虛擬現(xiàn)實(shí)實(shí)驗(yàn)顯示，

在對自我的判斷中， 我們的感覺很容易誤導(dǎo)我們。

這些實(shí)驗(yàn)也表明我們的身體和外在感覺

與我們的主觀意識是分不開的。

如果這是真的，那么可能 笛卡兒的實(shí)驗(yàn)從一開始就是錯誤的。

畢竟，如果在一個(gè) 安靜的房間里閉上眼睛，

我們并不能讓心靈從軀體中脫離。

This question of mind and body becomes particularly interesting

at a time when we're considering future technologies,

such as neural prosthetics and wearable robots

that could become extended parts of our bodies.

Or the slightly more radical idea of mind uploading,

which dangles the possibility ?of immortal life without a body

by transferring a human consciousness into a computer.

If the body is deeply mapped in the brain,

then by extending our sense of self to new wearable devices,

our brains may eventually adapt to a restructured version

with new sensory representations.

心靈和身體的這個(gè)問題 在考慮到未來科技時(shí)

會變得特別有趣，

比如神經(jīng)假肢和可穿戴機(jī)器人，

這類可以作為我們身體延展部分的東西。

又或者更激進(jìn)的，思想上傳，

也就是通過將人的意識轉(zhuǎn)移到電腦中

創(chuàng)造出無需身體便能獲得永生的可能。

如果身體深深映射在大腦中，

那么通過將自己的感覺 延展到新型的可穿戴設(shè)備，

我們的大腦最終可能會用新的感官表現(xiàn)

來適應(yīng)這個(gè)重組的版本。

Or perhaps uploading our consciousness into a computer might not even be possible

unless we can also simulate a body capable of delivering physical sensations.

The idea that our bodies are part of our consciousness and vice versa

also isn't new.

It's found extensively ?in Buddhist thought,

as well as the writings of philosophers from Heidegger to Aristotle.

也許將我們的意識上傳到 電腦是不太可能的，

除非我們還能模擬一個(gè) 能夠傳遞生理感覺的身體。

身體是意識的一部分 和意識是身體的一部分

的想法都不是什么新鮮事。

它們不單在佛教思想中廣泛存在，

從海德格爾到亞里士多德 等哲學(xué)家的著作中也能找到。

But for now, we're still left with the open question

of what exactly our self is.

Are we a mind equipped with a physical body as Descartes suggested?

Or a complex organism ?that's gained consciousness

over millions of years of evolution

thanks to a bigger brain and more neurons than our distant ancestors?

Or something else entirely that no one's yet dreamt up?

但現(xiàn)在，我們?nèi)杂幸粋€(gè)未解決的問題，

那就是自我究竟為何物？

我們是否像笛卡兒所說的 是個(gè)配備了身體的思維？

還是個(gè)通過數(shù)百萬年的進(jìn)化

而獲得意識的復(fù)雜生物體?

畢竟我們的大腦比遠(yuǎn)古祖先的 要大，也有更多的神經(jīng)元，

或是其他完全沒有人想到過的東西呢？