近日，中美雙邊經(jīng)貿(mào)磋商因美方原因受挫，美國繼而打壓華為等中國公司，開啟 “科技冷戰(zhàn)”。
面對這一局勢，不少專家學(xué)者深表擔(dān)憂。
耶魯大學(xué)高級研究員、摩根士丹利亞洲區(qū)前主席斯蒂芬·羅奇（Stephen S. Roach）就認(rèn)為，中美沖突已經(jīng)明確進(jìn)入了危險地帶。

斯蒂芬·羅奇向中國日報旗下傳播型智庫中國觀察獨家撰文《從貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)到冷戰(zhàn)》（“From Trade War to Cold War”），觀點犀利，有理有據(jù)，一起來看看。

中美沖突進(jìn)入危險地帶

文章認(rèn)為，盡管中美在6月下旬舉行的大阪G20峰會上達(dá)成某些協(xié)議的可能性仍然很大，但這樣的協(xié)議大多都是表面上的。

Amid charges and counter-charges, the US-China conflict has now moved squarely into the danger zone.?

在指控和反指控中，中美沖突已經(jīng)直接滑入危險地帶。

And in light of the sharp recent escalation of pressures from the American side — the early May hike in tariffs from 10% to 25% on $200 billion of Chinese exports to the US along with a promise of more to come on the remaining $325 billion of exports, together with a full frontal assault in Huawei — even the odds of a?cosmetic?agreement are slipping by the day.

繼對2000億美元中國輸美產(chǎn)品加征的關(guān)稅從10%上調(diào)至25%后，美方又進(jìn)一步威脅啟動對剩下的3250億美元中國輸美產(chǎn)品增加關(guān)稅，同時對華為展開全面攻擊。由于美國對中國的壓力急劇上升，即使是達(dá)成表面協(xié)議的可能性也在一天天地下降。

而華盛頓習(xí)慣性打壓中國的嗜好已經(jīng)上升到一個新高度（Washington's penchant for China bashing has been taken to an entirely new level）。
共和黨和民主黨在刁難中國這一點上難得地達(dá)成了一致。

Republicans and Democrats agree on very little these days. But blaming China for America’s economic ills resonates across the political spectrum.

共和黨和民主黨現(xiàn)今很難達(dá)成一致意見。但指責(zé)中國是造成美國經(jīng)濟困境的罪魁禍?zhǔn)?，卻成為美國政界的和鳴。

Once the pro-business constituency of free trade, the Trump takeover of the Republican Party has now embraced tariffs with open arms.

特朗普曾是自由貿(mào)易的支持者，政策親商，但如今接管了共和黨，卻對關(guān)稅張開了雙臂。

For pro-working class Democrats, many of whom have long warned of the perils of globalization and trade liberalization, the transformation into tariff warriors has been relatively easy.

對于支持工人階級的民主黨人來說，他們中的許多人早就發(fā)出過全球化和貿(mào)易自由化的危險警告，轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)殛P(guān)稅戰(zhàn)士自然相對容易。

After years of abusive trade practices, goes the shared bipartisan rhetoric, it is high time America stood up against China.

在做了多年的違規(guī)貿(mào)易之后，兩黨來了一番共同論調(diào)：美國是時候站出來反對中國了。

美國打壓中國，

甚于當(dāng)年對待日本

斯蒂芬·羅奇認(rèn)為，今天美國對中國的攻擊力度已經(jīng)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出了30年前對日本的打壓。

Back then, the US manufacturing sector was experiencing its first taste of pressures on jobs and real wages that could be traced to a sharply widening trade deficit. A mercantilist Japan, fixated on suppressing the value of the yen and accounting for about 42% of the total US merchandise trade deficit in the first half of the 1980s, was the culprit.

當(dāng)時，美國制造業(yè)首次感受到就業(yè)和工資的壓力，這可以追溯到貿(mào)易赤字的急劇擴大。而重商主義的日本是罪魁禍?zhǔn)?，他們?zhí)著于壓低日元匯率，占上世紀(jì)80年代初美國商品貿(mào)易逆差總額的42%左右。

This led to the so-called Plaza Accord of 1985, when the so-called G-5 coalition of leading industrial nations put Japan in a straight-jacket of currency appreciation that led to asset bubbles and a string of lost decades of economic stagnation and deflation.

這導(dǎo)致了1985年所謂的“廣場協(xié)議”，當(dāng)時五大工業(yè)國聯(lián)盟聯(lián)合干預(yù)外匯市場將日本置于貨幣升值中，從而使日本陷入資產(chǎn)泡沫和持續(xù)幾十年的經(jīng)濟停滯和通貨緊縮。

中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層仔細(xì)研究過日本的教訓(xùn)，所以拒絕西方類似的建議。

And so Washington has embraced different and tougher tactics to address a Chinese threat that it judges to be far more serious than that which arose from Japan back in the late 1980s.

因此，華盛頓采取了不同和更強硬的策略來應(yīng)對中國威脅。在他們看來，中國的威脅要比上世紀(jì)80年代末日本的威脅嚴(yán)重得多。

美國慣于把自己當(dāng)受害者

從打壓日本到打壓中國，美國總是將自己視為受害者，把自己造成的經(jīng)濟問題歸咎于他人（blame others for economic problems that are very much of its own making）。

然而，美國這種推卸責(zé)任的行為與宏觀經(jīng)濟學(xué)（macroeconomics）最基本的原理背道而馳。

經(jīng)濟學(xué)專業(yè)的學(xué)生都知道簡單的國民收入核算恒等式，即投資等于儲蓄。

這個問題帶來的必然結(jié)果就是：

When nations are short of saving and want to invest and grow, they must borrow surplus saving from abroad and run current account deficits in order to attract the foreign capital.

當(dāng)各國缺乏儲蓄，又希望投資和增長時，他們必須從國外借入盈余儲蓄，并常年保持賬戶赤字，從而吸引外資。

These balance-of-payments deficits — which the US has experienced in every year since 1982 (with the exception of 1991, when the US ran a small surplus by charging other nations for its military campaign to wage the Gulf War) — are a recipe for trade deficits.?

自1982年以來美國每年都經(jīng)歷過國際收支赤字（1991年除外，當(dāng)時美國向其他國家收取發(fā)動海灣戰(zhàn)爭的軍事行動的少量盈余），這些國際收支逆差是造成貿(mào)易逆差的主要原因。

But since the trade deficits stem from macro saving-investment imbalances, they tend to be broad based, or multi-lateral, in scope. Indeed, in 2018, the United States had merchandise trade deficits with 102 countries.

不過，由于貿(mào)易逆差源于宏觀儲蓄-投資失衡，它們的范圍往往是廣泛的，或者說是多邊的。事實上，2018年美國對102個國家的商品貿(mào)易出現(xiàn)逆差。

而這也是抨擊中國的漏洞所在。美國政府以為消除中國的逆差就能“讓美國再次偉大”。

Yes, China accounted for fully 48% of America’s massive $879 billion merchandise trade deficit in 2018. That makes it a lightning rod in the current US policy debate. Eliminating the Chinese piece of the deficit, goes the argument, is the only way to “make America great again” and thereby alleviate pressures on American workers.

沒錯，2018年，美國8790億美元商品貿(mào)易逆差中，中國占了整整48%。在關(guān)于當(dāng)前美國政策的討論中，中國也就成了眾矢之的。他們認(rèn)為，“讓美國再次偉大”的唯一辦法是消除中國的這一部分逆差，從而也能夠減輕美國工人的壓力。

If it were only that easy.?For a saving-short US economy, there is no bilateral fix for a multilateral problem.

要是有這么簡單就好了。對于儲蓄不足的美國經(jīng)濟，多邊問題沒有雙邊解決辦法。

這是一場“打鼴鼠”游戲

如今，美國把火力都對準(zhǔn)了中國，對于這種做法，斯蒂芬·羅奇打了一個比方：

A China-centric solution is like?“whack-a-mole.”?

以中國為核心的解決方案就像“打鼴鼠”游戲。

whack-a-mole：“打鼴鼠”，指無用而重復(fù)的工作，解決問題的嘗試是表面的，結(jié)果只是暫時的。

因為根本問題并未得到解決：

Eliminating one piece of the trade deficit without fixing the saving problem — a very real possibility in light of a further depression of domestic saving following from the ill-timed Trump tax cuts of late 2017 — simply means that trade will be diverted from China to other foreign producers.

由于2017年末特朗普減稅的時機不合時宜，直接的可能性是國內(nèi)儲蓄進(jìn)一步低迷。在不解決儲蓄問題的情況下，消除一部分貿(mào)易逆差，只意味著貿(mào)易將從中國轉(zhuǎn)移到其他外國生產(chǎn)商手中。

Inasmuch as China is one of America's lowest cost foreign suppliers, that means the trade diversion will invariably go to higher cost foreign producers — the functional equivalent of a tax hike on American consumers.

由于中國是美國成本最低的外國供應(yīng)商之一，這意味著貿(mào)易轉(zhuǎn)移必然會流向成本較高的外國生產(chǎn)商。這就相當(dāng)于在美國消費者頭上增稅。

所以，針對中國的猛烈攻擊還可能對美國經(jīng)濟產(chǎn)生反作用。

這便引發(fā)了一個更深層次的問題：為什么美國政府還要推行這樣的戰(zhàn)略呢？

The answer is as much an outgrowth of hegemonic overreach as it is a reflection China's alleged unfair trading practices.

答案既是霸權(quán)擴張的結(jié)果，也是針對所謂中國的不公平貿(mào)易行為的反映。

With the dollar pre-eminent as the world's reserve currency, the United States has developed a sense of entitlement toward open-ended budget deficits that are funded by dollar-denominated debt issuance in its own currency.

隨著美元作為世界儲備貨幣地位的加強，美國越發(fā)覺得自己有資格無限制擴大財政赤字，這種財政赤字是以發(fā)行美元計價的本幣債券作為支撐的。

Never mind the inefficiencies of a healthcare system that eats up 18% of GDP, or a defense budget that is essentially equal to the combined military outlays of the next seven largest defense budgets around the world.

所以，不用管低效的醫(yī)療體系了，盡管它消耗了18%的GDP，也不用管國防預(yù)算了，盡管它龐大到相當(dāng)于位居美國之后7個軍費支出大國之和。

Washington would rather pursue fiscal recklessness than come clean with the American public. And it would rather blame the consequences of such a strategy on the trading practices of others than take a long hard look in the mirror.

華盛頓政府寧愿在財政政策上如此魯莽，也不愿向美國公眾坦白。他們寧愿把這樣一種策略的后果歸咎于其他國家的貿(mào)易行為，也不愿認(rèn)真地照照鏡子在自己身上找原因。

承擔(dān)不了責(zé)任，就抹黑中國吧

同時，美國政府還下大功夫抹黑中國，以證明自己充滿攻擊性的貿(mào)易政策是正當(dāng)?shù)摹?/p>

China has been charged with a number of so-called Section 301 violations of the US Trade Act of 1974 and vilified, accordingly, in the arena of US public opinion.

中國被指控違反所謂《1974年貿(mào)易法》第301條的多項規(guī)定，也由此遭到美國公眾輿論的嚴(yán)重詆毀。

Yet the evidence behind such allegations is flimsy at best and outright misleading at worst.

然而，這些指控背后的證據(jù)往好了說是站不住腳，往嚴(yán)重了說，完全是誤導(dǎo)。

Apparently, it is much easier to find comfort in the false narrative than to?accept responsibility for fiscal excesses and saving shortfalls that spawn the macroeconomic imbalances that give rise to multilateral trade deficits.

顯然，通過抹黑別人尋找慰藉，可比承擔(dān)起責(zé)任，承認(rèn)美國儲蓄不足是導(dǎo)致宏觀經(jīng)濟失衡和多邊貿(mào)易逆差的主要原因，容易多了。

單純解決貿(mào)易逆差就有用了嗎

諷刺之處在于，此類貿(mào)易協(xié)議即便達(dá)成，也只是看重中國承諾購買超過1萬億美元的美國制造的商品，由此縮小兩國間的貿(mào)易不平衡。

This is pure political theater at its worst —?underscoring the folly of?a bilateral fix for a multilateral problem.?As noted above, the bilateral fix is a recipe for trade diversion that does next to nothing in providing lasting relief for American workers and consumers.

這等于是在以雙邊貿(mào)易手段解決多邊問題，極其愚蠢，簡直是一場政治鬧劇。正如上文所述，雙邊解決方案是對貿(mào)易轉(zhuǎn)移有效，但長遠(yuǎn)來看，對于長期緩解美國工人和消費者的壓力卻無濟于事。

最重要的是，單純解決雙邊貿(mào)易逆差并沒有觸及到長久威脅兩國局勢的結(jié)構(gòu)性問題（the fixation on the bilateral trade deficit fails to address the structural issues that threaten lasting tensions between the two nations）。

而市場準(zhǔn)入就是這些結(jié)構(gòu)性問題中的一個：

Market access is at the top of that list — the opportunity of multinational corporations in both nations to invest freely in each other's markets.?The US claims that China's joint venture requirements imposed on such investments is a recipe for forced technology transfer.

市場準(zhǔn)入至關(guān)重要，這是指兩國跨國公司在彼此市場上自由投資的機會。美國聲稱，中國企業(yè)對合資企業(yè)提出的技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓要求，實質(zhì)上是對專利創(chuàng)新和知識產(chǎn)權(quán)的強制竊取。

As highlighted in the March 2018 Section 301 report of the US Trade Representative (USTR), this charge has become the poster child of the US-China dispute and the foundational evidence for Trump’s tariffs. This has occurred despite the fact that the USTR admits (on page 19 of the March 2018 report) that there is no direct evidence to support the allegation that technology transfer is forced by joint ventures that represent voluntary agreements between US and Chinese partners. Once again, the false narrative apparently matters more than fact-based analytics.

正如美國貿(mào)易代表辦公室（USTR）2018年3月的301條款報告所強調(diào)的那樣，這已經(jīng)成為美國的典型指控，也是特朗普關(guān)稅政策的基本證據(jù)——盡管USTR承認(rèn)（在2018年3月19日的報告第19頁）并沒有直接證據(jù)支撐美國和中國合作伙伴之間簽署自愿協(xié)議的合資企業(yè)迫使技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓的指控。再一次，抹黑顯然比基于事實的分析更重要。

解決辦法還是有的

斯蒂芬·羅奇認(rèn)為，中美還是有許多務(wù)實的解決方法來緩和雙邊關(guān)系。如以下三例：

??Bilateral Investment Treaty.

雙邊投資協(xié)定。

Market access is best addressed through the formalization of cross-border investment rules and standards that are stipulated in a bilateral investment treaty (BIT).

市場準(zhǔn)入最好是通過雙邊投資協(xié)定中規(guī)定的跨境投資規(guī)則和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的正規(guī)化來解決。

The United States currently has 42 BITs on the books and China has 145. Under a BIT, foreign ownership caps can be eliminated, thereby rendering joint ventures unnecessary and taking allegations of forced technology transfer off the table.

美國累計簽訂了42個雙邊投資協(xié)定，中國累計簽訂了145個。在雙邊投資協(xié)定框架內(nèi)，可以取消外資持股上限，這樣討論合資公司就不再那么重要，有關(guān)被迫技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓的指控也即不成其為問題了。

Prior to the 2016 presidential election in the United Sates, the US and China spent 10 years attempting to negotiate a BIT. Stymied by Trump’s tariffs, those negotiations have been suspended.

在2016年美國總統(tǒng)大選之前，美國和中國花了10年時間試圖談判。由于受到特朗普關(guān)稅政策的阻礙，這些談判已經(jīng)暫停。

Restarting BIT negotiations would be the single best strategy to resolve the thorny issue of forced technology transfer.

重啟雙邊投資協(xié)定談判將是解決棘手的技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓問題的主要策略。

??Trans Pacific Partnership.

跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系。

The political decision to abrogate America's commitment to TPP in the first days of the Trump presidency was a mistake. This multilateral agreement provided a high-quality framework linking 12 nations accounting for 40% of world GDP through cross-border trade liberalization, labor standards, intellectual property rules, Internet protocols, and environmental norms.

在特朗普總統(tǒng)任期的頭幾天就廢除了美國對TPP承諾，這個政治決定是個錯誤。這項多邊協(xié)議提供了一個高質(zhì)量的框架，通過跨境貿(mào)易自由化、勞工標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、知識產(chǎn)權(quán)規(guī)則、互聯(lián)網(wǎng)協(xié)議和環(huán)境規(guī)范，將12個占世界GDP40%的國家連接起來。

With China on the outside looking in, TPP would have provided a powerful mechanism for Chinese conformity to many of the structural norms that are currently being contested. While a rethinking of America’s TPP strategy may not be politically possible for President Trump, it may well be a realistic option after the 2020 presidential election.
TPP將為中國遵守目前備受爭議的許多結(jié)構(gòu)性規(guī)范提供一個強有力的機制。雖然對特朗普總統(tǒng)來說，重新考慮美國的TPP戰(zhàn)略在政治上是不可能的，但在2020年總統(tǒng)大選之后，這很可能是一個現(xiàn)實的選擇。

??Global cyber accord.?

全球網(wǎng)絡(luò)協(xié)議。

Like the trade conflict, this is not a bilateral problem. The US and China should take the lead in forging a global cyber accord, complete with pooled metrics of cyber incursions, attack-reduction targets and a robust dispute-resolution mechanism.

與貿(mào)易沖突一樣，這不是一個雙邊問題。美國和中國應(yīng)率先打造一項全球網(wǎng)絡(luò)協(xié)議，包括網(wǎng)絡(luò)入侵、減少攻擊目標(biāo)和強有力的爭端解決機制等綜合指標(biāo)。

當(dāng)前世界迫切需要政治智慧

在文章的最后，斯蒂芬·羅奇指出，面對當(dāng)前局勢，現(xiàn)在這個世界比以往任何時候都更加迫切地需要政治智慧。

The United States and China are on a collision course. The world’s two largest economies have accounted for fully 44% of world GDP growth since 2008. If they opt for a superficial resolution or fail to come to terms on their trade conflict, the global economy could well falter. Resolution is possible but it won’t be easy in the current climate.?

如今，美國和中國有發(fā)生嚴(yán)重沖突的可能性。自2008年以來，這世界上最大的兩個經(jīng)濟體已經(jīng)占據(jù)全球GDP增長的44%。如果他們沒能選擇正確的解決方案，或者未能就貿(mào)易沖突達(dá)成協(xié)議，那么全球經(jīng)濟很可能就會搖搖欲墜。問題并非不可解決，但在現(xiàn)今的氛圍下并不是一件容易的事情。

Saving-short America's bipartisan political support of China bashing is especially problematic in threatening to turn a trade war into a protracted and destructive economic cold war. Now, more than ever, a fragile world is in desperate need of political will and wisdom — and a leadership courage that is sorely lacking today.

儲蓄短缺的美國政壇上下對中國進(jìn)行大力抨擊，這有可能將貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)變成一場曠日持久、具備破壞性的經(jīng)濟冷戰(zhàn)?，F(xiàn)在這個世界比以往任何時候都更加迫切地需要政治智慧，以及一種極度缺乏的、領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者應(yīng)當(dāng)具備的膽識。

耶魯大學(xué)高級研究員，摩根士丹利亞洲區(qū)前主席，他被公認(rèn)為華爾街最具影響力的經(jīng)濟學(xué)家之一。他的研究著作被金融報刊和其他傳媒廣為引用，最新著作是《失衡：美國與中國的相互依存》（Unbalanced: The Codependency of America and China(2014)）。

編輯：劉夏 布英娜 左卓

實習(xí)生：黃悅

運營實習(xí)生：張慧娟? 呂邁