1. Earnings Inequality and the Minimum Wage: Evidence from Brazil

最低工資和收入不平等：來自巴西的證據(jù)

Niklas Engbom ??Christian Moser

Increases in the minimum wage can substantially reduce earnings inequality. To demonstrate this, we combine administrative and survey data with an equilibrium model of the Brazilian labor market. We find that a 128 percent increase in the real minimum wage in Brazil between 1996 and 2018 had far-reaching spillover effects on wages higher up in the distribution. The increased minimum wage accounts for 45 percent of a large fall in earnings inequality over this period. At the same time, the effects of the minimum wage on employment and output are muted by reallocation of workers toward more productive firms.

提高最低工資可以大大減少收入不平等。為了證明這一點，我們將行政和調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)與巴西勞動力市場的均衡模型結(jié)合起來。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在1996年至2018年期間，巴西實際最低工資上漲了128%，這對收入分配中更高階層的工資產(chǎn)生了深遠的溢出效應(yīng)。在此期間，收入不平等程度大幅下降，最低工資的提高在其中貢獻了45%。與此同時，最低工資對就業(yè)和產(chǎn)出的影響由于工人向生產(chǎn)效率更高的企業(yè)的重新分配而減弱。

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181506

?

2. Interaction, Stereotypes, and Performance: Evidence from South Africa

交互、墨守成規(guī)和表現(xiàn):來自南非的證據(jù)

Lucia Corno ??Eliana La Ferrara ??Justine Burns

We exploit a policy designed to randomly allocate roommates in a large South African university to investigate whether interracial interaction affects stereotypes, attitudes and performance. Using implicit association tests, we find that living with a roommate of a different race reduces White students' negative stereotypes towards Black students and increases interracial friendships. Interaction also affects academic outcomes: Black students improve their GPA, pass more exams and have lower dropout rates. This effect is not driven by roommate's ability.

我們利用南非一所大型大學(xué)隨機分配室友的政策來研究種族間的互動是否會影響定型觀念、態(tài)度和表現(xiàn)。通過隱性關(guān)聯(lián)測試，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，與不同種族的室友生活在一起會減少白人學(xué)生對黑人學(xué)生的負面刻板印象，并增加種族間的友誼。交往也會影響學(xué)業(yè)成績。黑人學(xué)生提高了他們的GPA，通過了更多的考試并降低了輟學(xué)率。這種影響不是由室友的能力驅(qū)動的。

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181805

?

3.Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists

過度等待列表中的動態(tài)匹配

Jacob D. Leshno

This paper introduces a stylized model to capture distinctive features of waiting list allocation mechanisms. First, agents choose among items with associated expected wait times. Waiting times serve a similar role to that of monetary prices in directing agents' choices and rationing items. Second, the expected wait for an item is endogenously determined and randomly fluctuates over time. We evaluate welfare under these endogenously determined waiting times and find that waiting time fluctuations lead to misallocation and welfare loss. A simple randomized assignment policy can reduce misallocation and increase welfare.

本文引入了一個程式化的模型來捕捉等待列表分配機制的獨特特征。首先，代理在與預(yù)期等待時間相關(guān)的項目中進行選擇。等待時間在指導(dǎo)代理人的選擇和配給物品方面起著與貨幣價格類似的作用。其次，物品的預(yù)期等待時間是內(nèi)生決定的，并隨時間隨機波動。我們在這些內(nèi)生決定的等待時間下評估福利，發(fā)現(xiàn)等待時間的波動會導(dǎo)致分配不當(dāng)和福利損失。簡單的隨機分配策略可以減少分配不當(dāng)，提高福利。

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201111

?

4.Optimality of Matched-Pair Designs in Randomized Controlled Trials

隨機對照試驗中配對匹配的最優(yōu)性

Yuehao?Bai

In randomized controlled trials, treatment is often assigned by stratified randomization. I show that among all stratified randomization schemes that treat all units with probability one half, a certain matched-pair design achieves the maximum statistical precision for estimating the average treatment effect. In an important special case, the optimal design pairs units according to the baseline outcome. In a simulation study based on datasets from ten randomized controlled trials, this design lowers the standard error for the estimator of the average treatment effect by 10 percent on average, and by up to 34 percent, relative to the original designs.

在隨機對照試驗中，處理通常是分層隨機分配的。本文證明，在所有以1 / 2概率處理所有單元的分層隨機化方案中，某個配對匹配在估計平均處理效應(yīng)方面達到了最大的統(tǒng)計精度。在一個重要的特殊情況下，優(yōu)化設(shè)計根據(jù)基準(zhǔn)結(jié)果對單元進行匹配。在基于10個隨機對照試驗數(shù)據(jù)集的模擬研究中，與原始設(shè)計相比，這種設(shè)計將平均處理效應(yīng)估計結(jié)果的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)誤差平均降低了10%，最高可降低34%。

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201856

?

5. Convex Supply Curves

凸的供給曲線

Boyan Jovanovic ?Viktor Tsyrennikov

We provide evidence that industries' supply curves are convex. To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a model in which capacity constraints at the firm level generate supply curves that are convex in logs at the industry level. The industry's capacity utilization rate is a sufficient statistic for the supply elasticity. Using data on capacity utilization and three different instruments, we estimate the supply curve and find robust evidence for an economically sizable degree of convexity. The nonlinearity we identify has several macroeconomic implications, including that responses to shocks are state dependent and that the Phillips curve is convex.

我們提供的證據(jù)表明，行業(yè)的供給曲線是凸的。為了指導(dǎo)我們的實證分析，我們開發(fā)了一個模型，在該模型中，企業(yè)層面的能力約束產(chǎn)生了行業(yè)層面的對數(shù)凸供給曲線。該行業(yè)的產(chǎn)能利用率是供給彈性的充分統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)。利用產(chǎn)能利用率數(shù)據(jù)和三種不同的工具變量，我們估計了供給曲線，并找到了經(jīng)濟上相當(dāng)大的凸度的有力證據(jù)。我們確定的非線性具有幾個宏觀經(jīng)濟含義，包括對沖擊的響應(yīng)是依賴于狀態(tài)的，以及菲利普斯曲線是凸的。

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210811

?

6. Trading on Sunspots

太陽黑子交易

Boyan Jovanovic ?Viktor Tsyrennikov

In a model with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, we show that the set of equilibria shrinks if we allow trade in assets that pay based on the realization of a sunspot acting as an equilibrium-selection device. When the probability of a low-output outcome is high, the desire to insure against it leads the poor to promise large transfers to the rich in the high-output state. The rich then lose the incentive to exert the effort needed to sustain the high output. Thus the opening of financial markets may destroy the high equilibrium.

在一個具有多個帕累托排序均衡的模型中，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，如果我們允許基于實現(xiàn)太陽黑子作為均衡選擇設(shè)備的資產(chǎn)進行交易，則均衡的解集將縮小。當(dāng)出現(xiàn)低產(chǎn)出結(jié)果的概率很高時，為了防范這種情況，窮人承諾向高產(chǎn)出狀態(tài)下的富人轉(zhuǎn)移大筆資金。于是，富人就失去了付出維持高產(chǎn)出所需努力的動力。因此，金融市場的開放可能會破壞這種高度均衡。

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210972

?

7. Learning from Manipulable Signals

從可操縱信號中學(xué)習(xí)

Mehmet Ekmekci；Leandro Gorno；Lucas Maestri；Jian Sun；Dong Wei

We study a dynamic stopping game between a principal and an agent. The principal gradually learns about the agent's private type from a noisy performance measure that can be manipulated by the agent via a costly and hidden action. We fully characterize the unique Markov equilibrium of this game. We find that terminations/market crashes are often preceded by a spike in manipulation intensity and (expected) performance. Moreover, due to endogenous signal manipulation, too much transparency can inhibit learning and harm the principal. As the players get arbitrarily patient, the principal elicits no useful information from the observed signal.

我們研究一個委托人和代理人之間的動態(tài)停止博弈。委托人從一個嘈雜的績效指標(biāo)中逐漸了解到代理人的私人類型，而代理人可以通過一個昂貴的隱藏行動來操縱這個指標(biāo)。我們完全描述了這個博弈的唯一馬爾科夫均衡。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在終止/市場崩潰之前，往往有一個操縱強度和（預(yù)期）業(yè)績的高峰。此外，由于內(nèi)生的信號操縱，過多的透明度會抑制學(xué)習(xí)并損害本金。隨著參與者變得任意的耐心，委托人從觀察到的信號中得不到有用的信息。

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211158

?

8. Dynamic Amnesty Programs

動態(tài)赦免計劃

Sam Kapon

A regulator faces a stream of agents engaged in crimes with stochastic returns. The regulator designs an amnesty program, committing to a time path of punishments for criminals who report their crimes. In an optimal program, time variation in the returns from crime can generate time variation in the generosity of amnesty. I construct an optimal time path and show that it exhibits amnesty cycles. Amnesty becomes increasingly generous over time until it hits a bound, after which the cycle resets. Agents engaged in high return crime report at the end of each cycle, while agents engaged in low return crime report always.

一個監(jiān)管者面臨著一群從事犯罪的代理人，他們有隨機的回報。監(jiān)管者設(shè)計了一個特赦計劃，承諾對報告其罪行的罪犯進行懲罰的時間路徑。在一個最佳方案中，犯罪收益的時間變化可以產(chǎn)生大赦的時間變化。我構(gòu)建了一個最佳的時間路徑，并表明它表現(xiàn)出特赦周期。赦免隨著時間的推移變得越來越慷慨，直到它達到一個界限，之后赦免周期就會重置。從事高回報犯罪的代理人在每個周期結(jié)束時報告，而從事低回報犯罪的代理人總是會選擇報告。

DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211428

其他平臺同名同號

歡迎訂閱?。?！