正文翻譯

I was watching a show on the American war of independence, and saw battles between the American and British forces being fought in this way. Many battles in that era seem to have been fought with this weird protocol where the two sides stood in rows and patiently loaded their guns taking turns shooting at each other.

我正在看一檔關(guān)于美國獨立戰(zhàn)爭的節(jié)目，看到美國和不列顛軍隊之間的戰(zhàn)爭就是這種方式。那個時代的很多戰(zhàn)爭似乎都是以這種奇怪的規(guī)則進行的，雙方站成一排，耐心地裝槍，輪流向?qū)Ψ缴鋼簟?/p>

why would anybody agree to this way of fighting? Were there instances of the fighting starting out this way, but ending in a free-for-all?

為什么會有人同意這種戰(zhàn)斗方式？有沒有這樣的例子：以這樣子開打，最后卻打成混戰(zhàn)？

評論翻譯

Units in general fought in compact formations during this period for a number of reasons.

在這段時期里，部隊通常以緊湊的隊形作戰(zhàn)是有很多原因的。

Weight of fire. The average fire rate for a musket is 3 rounds a minute in the 18th century. That's very low, but if you have 700 men in a battalion in a line formation two or three ranks deep, that's 2100 rounds a minute going down range in a relativity small area. Even if the opposition is in skirmish line and using cover, they will struggle to stand against concentrated firepower like that.

2、火力密度。在18世紀，火槍的平均射速是每分鐘3發(fā)。這是很低的，但是如果一個營700人排成兩到三排的橫隊，那么在相對論的小范圍內(nèi)每分鐘就有2100發(fā)。如果對手是成散兵線哪怕?lián)碛醒谧o，他們也很難對抗這樣集中的火力。

Cavalry. This is a huge threat in this time, and due to the low rate of fire of muskets, individuals or small groups have little chance to repel them. A large compact mass of men can, as noted, put out a lot of shots and present a wall of pikes or bayonets that will stop any charges.

3、騎兵。在這個時代，騎兵是一個巨大的威脅，由于火槍的射擊速度很低，個人或小團體幾乎無法擊退它們。但一大群密集的隊形可以，他們可以射出大量的子彈，并擺出一堵由長槍或刺刀組成的墻來阻止沖鋒。

The bottom line is that most directors aren't educated in this period of warfare or interested in depicting much of this, a bunch of guys in a ditch doesn't look as dramatic as neat lines of men.

歸根結(jié)底，大多數(shù)導(dǎo)演都沒有受過戰(zhàn)爭時期的教育，也沒有興趣對戰(zhàn)爭描繪太多，一堆貓在壕溝里的人看著沒有整齊隊列那么好看。

There were of course many situations where mass formations of men met at less than 100 yards or less and poured fire into each other till one side broke, but this is akin to a modern situation where units might fight in a meeting engagement with very little cover.

當然，在很多情況下，會有大編隊在不到100碼的地方相會，互相開火，直到一方崩潰，但是，這就類似于現(xiàn)代部隊在沒有掩護的情況下戰(zhàn)斗。

Mass formations could be effective in frontal charges, as used by Napoleon placing his infantry in attack columns and sending them to directly break enemy lines, however again you have to look at the context of these tactics. These attacks would be supported by mass barrages of hundreds of cannons, and huge formations of cavalry. When effective and not countered properly, the enemy would be heavily suppressed and then broken by a massive swamp of men, which would be incredibly difficult to stop.

大編隊在正面沖鋒中是有效的，就像拿破侖把他的步兵放在攻擊縱隊中，并派他們直接突破敵人的防線一樣，然而，你要看看這些戰(zhàn)術(shù)的背景。這些攻擊是由數(shù)百門大炮的火力和龐大的騎兵編隊來支持。當這種攻擊有效而沒有遇到適當?shù)姆磽魰r，敵人就會被嚴重壓制，然后被一大群人擊潰，這是很難阻止的。

As mentioned, land warfare advanced rapidly throughout this period, and military science was heavily studied. Unfortunately, I've yet to see it really depicted accurately in any mainstream visual medium, and even games like Empire Total War drastically simplify it, most movies and show's don't even begin to scratch the surface. Even some older stuff, like Waterloo isn't that accurate. It depicts the scale of the battle correctly, but doesn't really show any of the tactics in detail.

如前所述，陸戰(zhàn)在這一時期迅速發(fā)展，軍事科學(xué)也有著大量研究。不幸的是，我還沒有看到哪個主流視覺媒體能夠準確地進行描述，即使是像《帝國：全面戰(zhàn)爭》這樣的游戲描繪得也很粗陋，大多數(shù)電影和節(jié)目甚至都沒有觸及表面。即使是一些老片，比如《滑鐵盧》也不是那么準確。它對戰(zhàn)斗規(guī)模的描述是正確的，但真的沒有展示任何戰(zhàn)術(shù)細節(jié)。

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FlashbackHistory
Command and control. The only way to send messages from a general was a man on horse or foot. This could lead to commanders having very limited awareness or taking drastic action to regain control. During the battle of Marston Moor, Sir Thomas Fairfax, a Parliamentarian commander, had to remove his identification and ride through the middle of the battle to reach the opposite flank and bring up cavalry reinforcements. If troops were deployed in open order out of formation, they would be almost impossible to control because of how spread out they would be.
I see what you're saying here and it's true.

“指揮和控制……”
我明白你的意思，這是對的。

It's also worth considering that this problem wasn't insurmountable. Bugles, individual training, etc. made it possible to control and fight a relatively large bodies of skirmishers. By the wars of the French Revolution and the Napeoleonic Wars, armies were deploying (and controlling) thousands and thousands of skirmishers. While the majority of the army was still in line or column, well over a quarter might be thrown out as skirmishers.

但值得考慮的是，這個問題并不是無法克服的?？梢酝ㄟ^軍號、個人訓(xùn)練等，使他們能夠控制并與規(guī)模相對較大的散兵作戰(zhàn)。在法國大革命和拿破侖戰(zhàn)爭時期，軍隊部署成大量的散兵。雖然軍隊的大多數(shù)人仍然組成隊列，但四分之一以上的人可能會派出去做散兵。

At Bu?aco, for instance, the Light Division employed 1,300 skirmishers (out of just under 3,800 men)! In other cases, large numbers of regular infantry were thrown out as skirmishers alongside (or in the absence of) light infantry. At Borodino, one Polish division deployed six of its nine battalions to fight as skirmishers. At Leipzig, six battalions (a third of an entire Polish corps) were deployed to skirmish.

例如，在布薩科之戰(zhàn)，輕步兵師就雇傭了1300名散兵（總共才3800人）！在其他情況下，大量的常規(guī)步兵被派出作為散兵與輕步兵并肩作戰(zhàn)。在波羅底諾戰(zhàn)役，一個波蘭師九個營中的六個作為散兵去戰(zhàn)斗。在萊比錫戰(zhàn)役，六個營(波蘭軍團的三分之一)被部署成散兵。

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MyPigWhistles
It was the most effective way to fight and holding the lines meant to maximize the chance for the soldiers to survive the battle.
The actual question is why you would consider this "ridiculous". What would you suggest as an alternative?

因為這是最有效的戰(zhàn)斗方式，撐住防線就能最大限度地提高士兵在戰(zhàn)斗中的生存機會。
為什么你會認為這 “荒謬”？你覺得還有其他選擇嗎？

Lor360
He is probably viewing this as "why would you stand still in a line letting the enemy shoot you"

樓主可能是認為“為什么你們站成排讓敵人射殺??？”

ankydog
Yes, thanks. That's what I meant.

是的，這就是我的意思。

ppitm
Well it is ridiculous. The logical alternative is not to take part in warfare. This has always been the only non-ridiculous option.
War is hell. Certain technology levels make the ridiculousness more apparent.

確實荒謬。合理的選擇是不參加戰(zhàn)爭。這是唯一不荒謬的選擇。
戰(zhàn)爭就是地獄。某些技術(shù)水平使得這種荒謬變得更加明顯。

Wea_boo_Jones
They didn't. All those assumptions are just bad history memes.
The style of fighting was a result of was worked best with the technology at the time. It seems absurd to stand in formation against cannons and muskets but that's because we're used to modern artillery and rifles/machineguns. They also didn't "take turns" firing, they fired as quickly as they ever could but sometimes you would save your reload for the last moment of a charge attack/defense or something similar and you would be given the order to only fire on command etc.

并不荒謬。會這么說的都是在玩歷史爛梗。
這種戰(zhàn)斗風格是匹配當時技術(shù)的結(jié)果。站成隊列來對抗大炮和火槍似乎很荒謬，但那是因為我們已經(jīng)習慣了現(xiàn)代大炮和步槍、機槍的緣故。他們也沒有“輪流”開火，他們會以最快的速度開火，但有時你會在沖鋒、防御的情況下保持裝彈，到最后一刻才在命令下開火。

Pike and shot formations from the 1500s-1600s like this one or this one or this one involved a mix of troops armed with polearms like pikes and troops armed with firearms like arquebuses. They fought in tightly packed formations for good reasons, too. Pikemen needed to stay close to create a thick hedge of pikes that were impenetrable to enemy cavalry and infantry. Musketeers needed to stay close to mass their fire. Both sides needed to stay close for mutual support. The pikes protected the musketeers from cavalry charges. The musketeers protected the pikes from enemy musketry and firearm-carrying cavalry. If one group strayed too far from the other or got scattered, it was asking for trouble. Depending on the threat, formations could be adjusted to maximize firepower (ex. a line) or protection against cavalry (ex. a square). Since its first arrival on the European battlefield, the arquebus/musket was used mostly by troops in close order.

從16世紀到17世紀的長矛、射擊陣型，包括了裝備像長矛這樣的長桿武器，還有像火繩槍這樣的槍支。他們以密集隊形戰(zhàn)斗也是有原因的。長矛兵需要靠得很近以形成濃密的長矛林，讓敵軍騎兵和步兵無法穿透。火槍手需要靠得很近才能集中火力。雙方也要靠的很近以便互相支援。長矛兵保護火槍兵免受騎兵攻擊?；饦尡Ｗo長矛兵受敵軍火槍手和火槍騎兵的攻擊。如果一群人離另一群人太遠，或者分散開來，那就是在自找麻煩。根據(jù)威脅的不同，陣型可以調(diào)整，或最大化火力（比如排成排），或防御騎兵（例如排成方陣）。自從第一次出現(xiàn)在歐洲戰(zhàn)場上，火槍基本都是在近距離使用。

However, European tactics began to evolve in the late 1600s. Political changes meant armies became better drilled and more professional. Technological changes introduced bayonets and lighter muskets. It became possible to combine the functions of the pikeman and the musketeer into a single soldier in the late 1600s (although some armies, like the Swedish army, retained some pikes until the end of the 1600s).

然而，歐洲的戰(zhàn)術(shù)在17世紀末開始演變。政治變革讓軍隊更加訓(xùn)練有素，更加專業(yè)。技術(shù)上的變化產(chǎn)生了刺刀和更輕的火槍。在17世紀末，將矛兵和火槍的職能合二為一成為了可能（盡管有些軍隊，如瑞典軍隊，直到17世紀末還繼續(xù)使用一些長矛）。

So why did these new armies with these new weapons decide to form lines 2-4 men deep and shoot at each other in open fields? After all, this was very similar to how the "shot" part of pike and shot armies had fought.

那么，為什么這些擁有新式武器的新軍隊，要決定排成2-4排的隊列，在開闊的戰(zhàn)場互相射擊？畢竟，這與長矛、火槍部隊的“射擊”部分非常相似。

Surely it would have been smarter to spread out or rush in with the bayonet or blast enemy troops with artillery! Well, armies of the period did all those things, too. However, there were good reasons why linear tactics became such an important part of Western infantry combat.

當然，散開或者用刺刀沖鋒或者用大炮轟擊敵軍，這樣更聰明！是的，當時的軍隊也是會做這些事情的。然而，線列戰(zhàn)術(shù)成為西方步兵戰(zhàn)斗中的重要部分是有充分理由的。

Infantry in line could deliver massed fire. If you want to deliver as much fire as quickly as possible, a 2-3 deep line of men standing shoulder-to-shoulder is the best way to do it (see this comparison between infantry in open order and a close order line). In this period, delivering a lot of fire very quickly could be a battle winner. A well-placed volley from 700 muskets would kill and wound enemy soldiers and could rattle their comrades so badly they routed or retreated. In some cases, a few volleys won an engagement (ex. the firefight between the Guards at Fotenoy), so you can see why armies of the 18th and early 19th centuries put great faith in volley fire (although experience in the early 19th century would ultimately prove skimishers were better at shooting up enemy lines). The issue of morale brings us to the next point...

1、線列步兵可以發(fā)射密集火力。如果你想盡可能快、盡可能多地發(fā)射火力，2-3排肩并肩站成隊列是最好的方法。在這個時期，盡快發(fā)射大量火力可以讓你成為戰(zhàn)斗的勝利者。700支火槍的有效齊射會使敵軍大量死傷，也會使他們的戰(zhàn)友恐懼，使他們潰散或撤退。在某些情況下，幾次齊射就能贏得一次交戰(zhàn)，所以你可以理解為什么18世紀和19世紀早期的軍隊非常信任齊射火力（盡管19世紀早期的經(jīng)驗最終證明散兵在打擊敵人隊列時更好）。而士氣問題就引出了下一點…

Infantry in line could deliver effective bayonet charges. After a few volleys, commanders might attempt a bayonet charge, provided the enemy appeared to be wavering or disrupted. In some cases, commanders might forgo musketry entirely and just go in with the bayonet. In either event, the line was a useful formation for bayonet charges. Bayonet attacks often succeeded or failed because of morale. Either the enemy got intimidated and ran away or your men lost their nerve an abandoned the charge. Putting your infantry shoulder-to-shoulder in a closely-packed line improved their morale, since each individual man felt less exposed. And the momentum of their comrades pushed forwards any shirkers in the front ranks. Meanwhile, the enemy had to watch a wall of very angry men with very sharp bayonets running at them, which was understandably rather unnerving.

2、線列步兵可以發(fā)動有效的刺刀沖鋒。在幾次齊射之后，指揮官們可能會嘗試刺刀沖鋒，前提是敵人有所動搖或混亂。在某些情況下，指揮官們可能會完全放棄射擊，直接刺刀沖鋒。不管是哪種情況，線列都是刺刀沖鋒的有用陣型。刺刀攻擊的成敗往往取決于士氣。要么敵人恐懼然后逃跑，要么你的士兵失去勇氣然后放棄沖鋒。讓你的步兵肩并肩排成密集線列能提高他們的士氣，因為每個人都能感覺到掩護。而且他們戰(zhàn)友的推進力，會把所有逃避者往前推。與此同時，敵人不得不看著一群怒氣沖沖的人拿著鋒利的刺刀向他們沖來，這是相當令人恐懼的。

Infantry in line could repulse bayonet charges. If enemy infantry try to launch a bayonet charge in line or in column, you want to confont them with as much fire as possible. Shoot up the enemy infantry enough and they'll likely abort their charge. Mathematically, a close ordered line 2-3 deep is the best way to maximize your frontage (and your firepower).

3、線列步兵能擊退刺刀沖鋒。如果敵人步兵試圖以線列的形式發(fā)動刺刀沖鋒，你要用盡可能多的火力來對抗他們。射的夠多，他們很可能會中止沖鋒。從數(shù)學(xué)上講，2-3排密集隊列是最大化火力的最好方法。

Fighting in a close order line gave infantry protection from cavalry. Spread-out infantry are easy meat for cavalry, since the troopers will simply ride between the scattered infantrymen and cut them down. Infantrymen standing shoulder-to-shoulder in a line could stay in line and fire at charging cavalry, like the "Thin Red Line" did at Balaclava. Or, the infantry could fold back their line to form a square and create a hedge of bayonets and muskets to keep the cavalry at bay.

4、密集線列作戰(zhàn)使步兵免受騎兵的攻擊。分散的步兵對騎兵來說很脆弱，因為騎兵可以在分散的步兵之間來回穿梭并砍倒他們。步兵肩并肩站成線列，可以列隊向沖鋒的騎兵開火，就像電影《細細的紅線》在巴拉克拉瓦戰(zhàn)役中做的一樣?；蛘?，步兵可以把他們線列縮成方陣，用刺刀和步槍圍成密林來阻擋騎兵的進攻。

With all that said, European warfare from the late 1600s to the early 1800s was not static and unchanging. Although the basic weapons (musket and bayonet, cannon, and sabre) remained the same, the way armies fought battles evolved considerably.

從17世紀末到19世紀初的歐洲戰(zhàn)爭并不是一成不變的。雖然基本武器（火槍、刺刀、大炮和軍刀）仍然一樣，但軍隊作戰(zhàn)的方式有了很大的發(fā)展。