While General Walker fully expected the Eighth Army to encounter Chinese when it moved north, the lack of revealing contact in his zone left him uncertain about the location of enemy positions. From a study of air sightings, aerial photographs, and prisoner of war statements, his G-2, Lt. Col. James C. Tarkenton, traced two possible enemy defense lines. The nearer line curved from Chongju northeast through T'aech'on and Unsan above the western half of the army front, then extended almost due east into the mountains roughly ten miles above the eastern segment of the front. The second line started at Sonch'on, twenty miles beyond Chongju, and ran northeast through Kusong, Onjong, and Huich'on and into the Taebaeks as far as the northern end of the Changjin Reservoir. Colonel Tarkenton estimated that the Eighth Army would meet some 48,000 Chinese and several North Korean units defending important road centers along these lines.1

Walker distributed assault forces evenly for the advance toward the suspected lines. In the west, the I Corps comprised the 24th Infantry Division, ROK 1st Division, and British 27th Commonwealth Brigade. At center, the IX Corps included the 25th Infantry Division, the 2d Infantry Division, and the brigade-size 1st Turkish Armed Forces Command, which had not yet seen combat in Korea. The ROK II Corps, on the east, would operate with the ROK 6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions. The 1st Cavalry Division and the British 29th Independent Infantry Brigade were Walker's immediate reserves. While in reserve the cavalrymen were to protect forward army supply points at Kunu-ri, located just below the Ch'ongch'on River in the IX Corps area, and at Sukch'on, fifteen miles south of the river on Route 1 behind the I Corps. The British brigade, a recent arrival in Korea, was currently far to the south assembling temporarily at Kaesong, thirty miles north of Seoul.2

Eighth Army units with no assignment in the attack included the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team, which were guarding supply installations in the Pyongyang-Chinnamp'o area, and the ROK III Corps with four recently activated or reactivated ROK divisions (the 2d, 5th, 9th,

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and 11th) which was operating against guerrillas in central and southern Korea. The infantry battalion from Thailand had just finished processing at the U.N. Reception Center and was en route to P'yongyang on the eve of the advance. Replacing the Thais at the reception center was the Netherlands Battalion, which had reached Korea on 23 November and was to receive two weeks' training before joining operations.3

On the morning of the 24th Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn, commander of the I Corps, sent his two divisions west and northwest toward Chongju and T'aech'on, holding his British brigade in reserve. Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter, in command of the interior IX Corps, kept the Turkish brigade in reserve at Kunu-ri, sent one division north astride the Kuryong River toward Unsan and Onjong, and moved his other division up the Ch'ongch'on valley in the direction of Huich'on. On the army right, Maj. Gen. Yu Hae Ueng, the ROK II Corps commander, started two of his three divisions north through the mountains toward terrain objectives aligned with those of Coulter's forces.4

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At the I Corps left, Maj. Gen. John H. Church's 24th Division led off with a regimental attack over Route 1, its 21st Infantry and a company of tanks moving westward toward Chongju, eighteen miles out. On the corps right, two regiments of Maj. Gen. Palk Sun Yup's ROK 1st Division supported by a company of American tanks advanced on T'aech'on, moving upstream on both sides of the Taeryong River over secondary roads that converged on the objective ten miles northwest. General Church's single regiment marched more than halfway to Chongju during the day, receiving only a little long range small arms fire from the hills north of Route 1 as it moved. Two platoons of Chinese infantry and a ditch that delayed the tanks were the only opposition to General Paik's forces, who established night defenses within four miles of T'aech'on.5

In the left half of the IX Corps zone, the 25th Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, moved north astride the Kuryong River toward Unsan with two regiments and an armored force, Task Force Dolvin.6 General Kean's 35th and 24th Infantry Regiments on left and right, respectively, advanced four miles unopposed, while Task Force Dolvin in the middle moved seven miles along the east bank of the Kuryong, receiving only small arms fire as it covered the last mile. Four miles southeast of Unsan the Dolvin force recovered thirty members of the 8th Cavalry who had been captured at Unsan in early November and then released by the Chinese. Most were wounded and frostbitten.7

Maj. Gen. Laurence B. Keiser's 2d Division, at the IX Corps right, sought no sweeping first-day gains since it was already three miles ahead of the 25th Division. Rather than risk an open west flank, General Keiser ordered short moves by his line regiments, the 9th and 38th, to mass along the lower bank of the Paengnyong River, a westwardflowing tributary of the Ch'ongch'on.8

In the ROK II Corps zone, gains by the ROK 7th and 8th Divisions ranged from a quarter to a full mile but none at all against two enemy battalions dug in near the boundary Between them. In one of the deeper gains, the 3d Regiment of the ROK 7th Division at the corps left came up to the Paengnyong River and tied in with the 38th Infantry of the 2d Division.9

Chongju and T'aech'on remained the immediate I Corps objectives on 25 November. Chongju, previously tagged as a probable center of enemy resistance, was empty when the 21st Infan-

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try entered in midafternoon. In preparation for widening the 24th Division's advance, General Church meanwhile moved the 19th Infantry out on Route 1 to Napch'ongjong, eight miles behind Chongju.10 The ROK 1st Division, on the other hand, had found during the night that T'aech'on would be harder to take when Chinese supported by artillery and mortar fire counterattacked along the east bank of the Taeryong and forced part of General Paik's right regiment two miles to the rear. Although the Chinese lifted their attack after daylight, they allowed the South Koreans only to restore and improve slightly their previous position. Paik's forces west of the Taeryong held themselves to a small advance while those on the east regained lost ground. The division was still three miles short of T'aech'on at dark on the 25th.11

Encountering no organized enemy positions but receiving considerable long range small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire, the two IX Corps divisions gained two to four miles on the 25th. At that rate the 25th Division astride the Kuryong on the corps left was easily within a day's advance of Unsan. On the corps right, the 9th Infantry of the 2d Division moved two miles up the Ch'ongch'on valley, closing into positions split by the Ch'ongch'on with the bulk of the regiment on the west side of the river. The 38th Infantry meanwhile stayed at the Paengnyong except for patrols that searched above the river to cover the 9th's east flank.12

The ROK II Corps advanced one to two miles against opposition that varied in much the same pattern as on the previous day. The corps center continued to be a trouble spot, and at the far right, ten miles to the rear of the South Korean front, an enemy force tested the 16th Regiment of the ROK 8th Division protecting the corps and army east flank from positions some eight miles east of the village of Yongdong-ni. The force, presumably Chinese and possibly a reconnaissance unit since it was reported to include a hundred horse cavalrymen, struck the easternmost battalion of the 16th and lifted its attack only after forcing the South Koreans to withdraw two miles.13

Although the second day of advance had produced heavier enemy fire and local counterattacks, General Walker's forces had little reason to lose enthusiasm for their renewed offensive. All divisions had gained ground. In the I Corps zone, the 24th Division, having occupied Chongju, was on the Eighth Army's first phase line, and the ROK 1st Division was close to it. In the IX Corps zone, the 25th Division was not far from Unsan, and the 2d Division had made progress in the Ch'ongch'on valley. Despite rougher going in the Taebaek ridges farther east, the ROK II Corps also had pushed forward.

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Casualties had not been heavy in any of the corps zones. The advance, moreover, was soon to be reinforced by the X Corps' attack from the east. Walker issued a single order on the 25th, one that shortened the final objective line of the ROK II Corps to conform with the 27 November attack by General Almond's forces. Otherwise, he intended that the Eighth Army would continue its advance on the 26th as originally conceived.14

The Eighth Army's optimism still hinged on the assumption that the Chinese had not tapped their large Manchurian reserve for offensive operations in Korea. Although the final army intelligence report on 25 November showed an increase in Chinese forces opposing the advance, the new figure stood at only 54,000, just 6,000 more than the pre-attack estimate. In reviewing possible enemy actions, army G-2 Tarkenton added only that he now expected enemy forces to employ local counterattacks in conjunction with their defense.15

The Chinese Attack

At dark on the 25th the 2d Division occupied a fifteen-mile front centered in the Ch'ongch'on valley twenty miles north of Kunu-ri. (Map 4) In the 9th Infantry sector at the division left, the companies of the 3d Battalion and all but one company of the 2d Battalion occupied separated positions atop the first ridges west of the Ch'ongch'on. The remainder of the regiment was east of the river on a line hooking southeastward from the Ch'ongch'on to the lower bank of the Paengnyong. Beyond a halfmile gap to the right of the 9th, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 38th Infantry carried the division line along the south bank of the Paengnyong to the boundary with the ROK II Corps. After a daylight patrol, Company A of the reserve 1st Battalion was in perimeter two miles north of the Paengnyong.16

Two miles behind the 9th Infantry, the headquarters, tank company, and 1st Battalion of the 23d Infantry occupied a position arching from the lower bank of the Ch'ongch'on eastward across the valley road. Col. Paul L. Freeman, commander of the 23d, had taken these forces forward during the day under General Keiser's order to pass through the 9th Infantry on the 26th. When Keiser later postponed this change, Colonel Freeman held his remaining battalions near Kunu-ri and deployed his leading units behind the 9th, amid the firing positions of three artillery battalions supporting the division's advance.

Between dark and midnight two Chinese regiments struck the 9th Infantry in the Ch'ongch'on valley while a third hit the center of the 38th Infantry's Paengnyong position. Coming southeast from the area above the 25th Divi-

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Map 4. Battle of the Ch'ongch'on, 25-28 November 1950

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sion, one enemy regiment advanced in several columns toward the two battalions of the 9th Infantry west of the Ch'ongch'on. Moving mostly over valley trails, the Chinese missed the 2d Battalion's hilltop positions, which were farthest north, but found either the front or flanks of the three separated companies of the 3d. At the sound of bugle signals, the Chinese in file changed formation for assaults that through the night gradually pressed the 3d Battalion toward the river.

Other columns of the same regiment infiltrated the gaps Between companies and waded the cold Ch'ongch'on to hit the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, and the 61st Field Artillery Battalion just north of Colonel Freeman's position.17 The strike startled the 61st into retreat, especially the members of Battery A, who, after their commander had been killed and all other battery officers wounded, abandoned both guns and vehicles. A few artillerymen withdrew eastward, but most of them, with Chinese following, moved south over the valley road through Colonel Freeman's position. Though the confused southward rush of American artillerymen and Chinese infantry complicated the defense, Freeman's forces eventually beat off the Chinese without losing ground. Seeking both cover from Freeman's fire and a position on which to reorganize, the Chinese pulled away and climbed a low but rugged mountain, called Chinaman's Hat, located northeast of Freeman and immediately below the rearmost position of the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry.

In company with the attack from the northwest, a second Chinese regiment struck south along the east side of the Ch'ongch'on. While some of its searching columns hit and hurt the Ist Battalion, 9th Infantry, another moved behind that battalion through the halfmile gap Between the 9th and 38th Regiments. Part of the forces reaching the rear area overran the 1st Battalion command post and aid station, then climbed Chinaman's Hat to join the forces who had broken away from the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry. Following this juncture, the Chinese moved off the Hat and again attacked Colonel Freeman's battalion, focusing this time on the refused right flank east of the valley road. Freeman lost part of his flank position but then shifted forces to the east and blocked the assault. Near dawn, the Chinese again withdrew to Chinaman's Hat.

Farther east, some of the Chinese entering the gap Between regiments discovered and assaulted Company G, 38th Infantry, holding a detached position at the west end of the 38th's line. About 2330 a third enemy regiment opened an attack against the 38th's center, part of it surrounding and engaging Company A north of the Paengnyong, the bulk crossing the river to attack at the boundary Between the 2d and 3d Battalions. Pressing frontal assaults against the central companies, F and L, the Chinese invested portions of the company positions, then called off their attack near 0230 after suffering heavy casualties.

Within two hours the Chinese renewed their attacks against the regimental center, this time forcing Companies F and L to withdraw. Their withdrawal, although short, isolated

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Companies I and K to the east. Col. George B. Peploe, the regimental commander, countered near dawn, attacking with his reserve 1st Battalion, less Company A but with Company C of the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion attached as the third rifle company. Starting from a point west of the enemy penetration and moving east into the Chinese flank, the 1st Battalion cleared the area sufficiently to permit Colonel Peploe to restore his central positions.

West of the 2d Division, Chinese also struck the 25th Division during the night, centering a small but sharp blow on Task Force Dolvin on the east side of the Kuryong. In a give-and-take battle that ran the course of the night and into the morning of the 26th, Colonel Dolvin's forces lost one of two hills at their forwardmost position.18

Although the 25th had not been hit in strength, General Kean canceled plans for continuing the advance on the morning of the 26th. Against a possible renewal of the attack at the division center, he merged the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, and all Dolvin elements except the ranger company (which withdrew from the front) into Task Force Wilson under Brig. Gen. Vennard Wilson, the assistant division commander.19

A half hour after noon the Chinese switched attention to the rightmost position of Col. John T. Corley's 24th Infantry, surrounding two companies of the regiment while they were receiving a supply airdrop in somewhat isolated positions at the east flank. Most members of the two units managed to slip out of the encirclement and withdraw eastward into the 2d Division sector. Against this new threat, Kean ordered the bulk of his reserve 27th Infantry to assemble behind the weakened position of the 24th. Leaving the 2d Battalion to back up Task Force Wilson, Col. John H. Michaelis, commander of the 27th, started the remainder of his regiment toward the right sector around midnight.20

In the 2d Division sector, General Keiser spent the 26th rebuilding his line in the Ch'ongch'on valley. Near dawn he authorized Col. Charles C. Sloane, commander of the 9th Infantry, to pull in the 2d Battalion, which, although it had survived the night without difficulty, was precariously separated from the remainder of the regiment. Colonel Sloane then established the entire regiment in a tight position facing generally northwest on high ground along the upper bank of the Ch'ongch'on. To compensate losses in the 3d Battalion the previous night, Keiser gave Sloane all but Company C of the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion for use as infantry.21

East of the Ch'ongch'on, Keiser assigned the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 23d Infantry to defend the ground just below Chinaman's Hat. While Colonel Freeman brought the 2d Battalion up from Kunu-ri into position at the right of the 1st, members of the 61st Field Artillery Battalion, at Keiser's order, returned to the position they had vacated during the night, just above Freeman, and recovered most of the equipment