South-East Asia 東南亞

On the rails

The economics of a new train line

第一段：

In the late 1860s, French sailors who had set off from Saigon to find the source of the Mekong river encountered the precipitous Khone Falls between Laos and Cambodia, and realised that the waters would be impassable for larger trading vessels. Their dreams of reaching the riches of southern China by river were dashed.?Quixotic plans for rail networks followed, first from British and French imperialists, and then from the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which in 1995 outlined its ambition to connect Singapore with Kunming, in China’s Yunnan province.

19世紀(jì)60年代末，從西貢出發(fā)尋找湄公河源頭的法國(guó)水手遇到了老撾和柬埔寨之間陡峭的孔尼瀑布，他們意識(shí)到大型商船無(wú)法通過(guò)這片水域。他們想通過(guò)河流到達(dá)富裕的中國(guó)南方的夢(mèng)想破滅了。隨之而來(lái)的是英法帝國(guó)主義者提出了不切實(shí)際的鐵路網(wǎng)計(jì)劃，隨后，東南亞國(guó)家聯(lián)盟(ASEAN)在1995年提出了將新加坡與中國(guó)云南省昆明市連接起來(lái)的雄心壯志。

第二段：

On December 3rd, at long last, a portion of those aspirations was realised. A high-speed rail line connecting Kunming to Vientiane, the capital of Laos, was opened after five years of construction. The route is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and the completed section comes with a hefty price tag of $5.9bn—equivalent to nearly a third of Laos’s annual GDP before the pandemic.

12月3日，這些愿望的一部分終于實(shí)現(xiàn)了。從昆明到老撾首都萬(wàn)象的高速鐵路經(jīng)過(guò)5年的建設(shè)終于開(kāi)通。這條路線是中國(guó)“一帶一路”倡議的一部分，完工的部分耗資59億美元，相當(dāng)于老撾疫情前年度GDP的近三分之一。

第三段：

For China, the rationale for closer links with South-East Asia is clear. Rising factory wages at home make the case for moving low-complexity manufacturing to cheaper nearby locations. In 2019 Vietnam was China’s fourth-largest trading partner for intermediate goods, between America and India, and up from 15th place a decade ago. China’s intermediate-goods trade with Cambodia and Laos has risen nine- and 11-fold, respectively, in the same time.

對(duì)中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，與東南亞建立更緊密聯(lián)系的理由是顯而易見(jiàn)的。中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)工廠工資水平的不斷上升，為將低復(fù)雜度的制造業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移到成本更低的周邊地區(qū)提供了理由。2019年，越南是中國(guó)在美國(guó)和印度之間的第四大半成品貿(mào)易伙伴，10年前排在第15位。與此同時(shí)，中國(guó)與柬埔寨和老撾的半成品貿(mào)易分別增長(zhǎng)了9倍和11倍。

第四段：

The strategy has historical precedent. Until the 1970s Japanese firms’ main interest in South-East Asia was buying raw materials. Then they began moving production to the region. The shift took off after the Plaza Accord of 1985, at which Japan agreed to let the yen appreciate, which widened the gap between domestic wages and those in low-cost countries. Firms were able to preserve their competitive advantage by moving, while also fostering technological expertise elsewhere.

這一戰(zhàn)略有歷史先例。直到20世紀(jì)70年代，日本公司在東南亞的主要興趣是購(gòu)買(mǎi)原材料。然后他們開(kāi)始將生產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到該地區(qū)。這種轉(zhuǎn)變始于1985年的廣場(chǎng)協(xié)議，當(dāng)時(shí)日本同意讓日元升值，這擴(kuò)大了日本國(guó)內(nèi)工資與低成本國(guó)家工資之間的差距。企業(yè)能夠通過(guò)遷移來(lái)保持他們的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)，同時(shí)也在別處培養(yǎng)技術(shù)專長(zhǎng)。

第五段：

What does the new train line mean for Laos? The landlocked country suffers most from South-East Asia’s limited connectivity. The World Bank has been cautiously optimistic about the new route: Vientiane, it reckons, could become a logistical hub into China from Thai ports, but only if the Lao customs system were made more efficient and connecting roads improved. Although Laos has a land border with Yunnan and no coastline, as recently as 2016 almost two-thirds of its exports to China were transported via maritime routes.

這條新鐵路線對(duì)老撾意味著什么?這個(gè)內(nèi)陸國(guó)家深受東南亞有限的聯(lián)系之苦。世界銀行對(duì)這條新路線持謹(jǐn)慎的樂(lè)觀態(tài)度:它認(rèn)為，只有老撾海關(guān)系統(tǒng)更加高效，連接道路得到改善，萬(wàn)象才能成為從泰國(guó)港口進(jìn)入中國(guó)的物流中心。盡管老撾與云南有陸地邊界，沒(méi)有海岸線，但就在2016年，老撾對(duì)中國(guó)的出口近三分之二是通過(guò)海上航線運(yùn)輸?shù)摹?/span>

第六段：

Other assessments, however, are less optimistic. A paper published by the Asian Development Bank Institute last year suggested that the investment was unlikely to be profitable given its expense. Opinions of the Belt and Road Initiative have soured since 2016, and fears have risen that the infrastructure acts as a debt trap which gives China influence over borrowers. Laos has assumed 30% of the liability for the project, most of the funding for which was borrowed from the Export-Import Bank of China. Nor will the line bring in Chinese tourists for the foreseeable future, given China’s zero-covid policy.

然而，其他評(píng)估卻不那么樂(lè)觀。亞洲開(kāi)發(fā)銀行研究所去年發(fā)表的一篇論文指出，考慮到投資成本，這項(xiàng)投資不太可能有利可圖。自2016年以來(lái)，人們對(duì)“一帶一路”倡議的看法開(kāi)始惡化，人們?cè)絹?lái)越擔(dān)心基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施會(huì)成為一個(gè)債務(wù)陷阱，讓中國(guó)對(duì)借款國(guó)施加影響。老撾為該項(xiàng)目承擔(dān)了30%的責(zé)任，其中大部分資金來(lái)自中國(guó)進(jìn)出口銀行。考慮到中國(guó)的零疫情政策，在可預(yù)見(jiàn)的未來(lái)，這條線路也不會(huì)吸引中國(guó)游客。

第七段：

A wider network across the region would yield greater economic benefits for everyone, but that is outside any one country’s control. Thailand approved the first step of a Chinese-built high-speed line in March; it is intended to reach the Lao border at a later stage. Even the first half is not expected to be completed for five years, however, and such schemes often miss their deadline, if they materialise at all. The Malaysian government is studying a high-speed link to Bangkok, but serious discussion has barely begun. Until those longer-term benefits arrive, Laos may mainly be stuck with the bill.

在該地區(qū)建立更廣泛的網(wǎng)絡(luò)將為所有人帶來(lái)更大的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益，但這是任何一個(gè)國(guó)家都無(wú)法控制的。今年3月，泰國(guó)批準(zhǔn)了中國(guó)建造的一條高鐵的第一步;它打算在稍后階段到達(dá)老撾邊界。然而，即使是上半年，預(yù)計(jì)也不會(huì)在5年內(nèi)完成，而這些計(jì)劃即使實(shí)現(xiàn)，也往往會(huì)錯(cuò)過(guò)最后期限。馬來(lái)西亞政府正在研究修建通往曼谷的高速鐵路，但認(rèn)真的討論才剛剛開(kāi)始。在這些長(zhǎng)期的利益到來(lái)之前，老撾可能主要會(huì)被賬單纏住。