Journal of Political Economy 2023年第4期

Volume 131, Issue 4

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——更多動(dòng)態(tài)，請(qǐng)持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨(dú)

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?Heterogeneity and Asset Prices: An Intergenerational Approach

異質(zhì)性與資產(chǎn)價(jià)格:代際分析
by?Nicolae Garleanu & Stavros Panageas

In an overlapping-generations economy, the consumption growth of a given cohort member (the “marginal agent”) differs from the aggregate consumption growth. A cohort member is faced with long-run consumption uncertainty even in the absence of aggregate (and within-cohort) consumption risk. This uncertainty allows the model to account for several stylized asset-pricing facts (high market price of risk and volatility, return predictability, low and nonvolatile interest rate) despite deterministic macroeconomic aggregates and inequality measures that are contemporaneously uncorrelated with asset returns. We devise and implement a methodology to measure the marginal agent’s consumption growth and evaluate the model’s quantitative implications.

在代際重疊經(jīng)濟(jì)中，特定群體成員(“邊際代理人”)的消費(fèi)增長(zhǎng)不同于總消費(fèi)增長(zhǎng)。即使在沒(méi)有總(和隊(duì)列內(nèi))消費(fèi)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的情況下，隊(duì)列成員也面臨長(zhǎng)期消費(fèi)不確定性。盡管確定性宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)總量和不平等措施同時(shí)與資產(chǎn)回報(bào)不相關(guān)，但這種不確定性使模型能夠解釋幾個(gè)風(fēng)格化的資產(chǎn)定價(jià)事實(shí)(高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和波動(dòng)性的高市場(chǎng)價(jià)格、回報(bào)可預(yù)測(cè)性、低且無(wú)波動(dòng)性的利率)。我們?cè)O(shè)計(jì)并實(shí)施了一種方法來(lái)衡量邊際代理人的消費(fèi)增長(zhǎng)，并評(píng)估該模型的定量含義。

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?Distinctively Black Names and Educational Outcomes

獨(dú)特的黑人名字和教育成果
by?Daniel Kreisman & Jonathan Smith

Names can convey information about race or ethnicity and therefore can be used to discriminate against protected groups; many researchers have demonstrated as much through audit studies. Yet few studies link life outcomes with names using observational data. We use administrative data from over 3 million Black students to ask whether those with more statistically Black names have differential educational outcomes. We find that while test scores, college enrollment, and college completion are negatively correlated with Black names net of background characteristics, this relationship is absent when we compare across siblings within households.

名字可以傳達(dá)有關(guān)種族或民族的信息，因此可以用來(lái)歧視受保護(hù)群體;許多研究人員已經(jīng)通過(guò)審計(jì)研究證明了這一點(diǎn)。然而，很少有研究利用觀測(cè)數(shù)據(jù)將生活結(jié)果與名字聯(lián)系起來(lái)。我們使用了來(lái)自300多萬(wàn)黑人學(xué)生的行政數(shù)據(jù)，以詢問(wèn)那些在統(tǒng)計(jì)上更像黑人的名字是否有不同的教育成果。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，雖然考試成績(jī)、大學(xué)入學(xué)率和大學(xué)畢業(yè)率與黑人姓名的背景特征呈負(fù)相關(guān)，但當(dāng)我們比較家庭中的兄弟姐妹時(shí)，這種關(guān)系就不存在了。

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?Social Networks with Unobserved Links
by?Arthur Lewbel & Xi Qu & Xun Tang

帶有未觀察鏈接的社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)

We point-identify and estimate linear social network models without observing any network links. The required data consist of many small networks of individuals, such as classrooms or villages, with individuals who are each observed only once. We apply our estimator to data from Tennessee’s Project STAR (Student-Teacher Achievement Ratio). Without observing the latent network in each classroom, we identify and estimate peer and contextual effects on students’ performance in mathematics. We find that peer effects tend to be larger in bigger classes and that increasing peer effects would significantly improve students’ average test scores in some classes.

我們點(diǎn)識(shí)別和估計(jì)線性社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)模型，而不觀察任何網(wǎng)絡(luò)鏈接。所需的數(shù)據(jù)包括許多小型的個(gè)人網(wǎng)絡(luò)，如教室或村莊，每個(gè)人只被觀察一次。我們將我們的估計(jì)器應(yīng)用于田納西州的STAR項(xiàng)目(學(xué)生-教師成就比)的數(shù)據(jù)。在不觀察每個(gè)教室的潛在網(wǎng)絡(luò)的情況下，我們識(shí)別和估計(jì)同伴和情境對(duì)學(xué)生數(shù)學(xué)成績(jī)的影響。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)同伴效應(yīng)在更大的班級(jí)中往往更大，增加同伴效應(yīng)會(huì)顯著提高學(xué)生在某些班級(jí)的平均考試成績(jī)。

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?Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, Quasi Nonergodicity, and Wealth Inequality
by?Jean-Philippe Bouchaud & Roger E. A. Farmer

We construct a model of an exchange economy in which agents trade assets contingent on an observable signal, the probability of which depends on public opinion. The agents in our model are replaced occasionally, and each person updates beliefs in response to observed outcomes. We show that the distribution of the observed signal is described by a quasi-nonergodic process and that people continue to disagree with each other forever. These disagreements generate large wealth inequalities that arise from the multiplicative nature of wealth dynamics, which makes successful bold bets highly profitable.

我們構(gòu)建了一個(gè)交換經(jīng)濟(jì)模型，在這個(gè)模型中，代理人根據(jù)可觀察到的信號(hào)進(jìn)行資產(chǎn)交易，而該信號(hào)的概率取決于公眾輿論。我們模型中的代理偶爾會(huì)被替換，每個(gè)人都會(huì)根據(jù)觀察到的結(jié)果更新自己的信念。我們證明了觀測(cè)到的信號(hào)的分布是由一個(gè)準(zhǔn)非遍歷過(guò)程描述的，并且人們永遠(yuǎn)繼續(xù)彼此不同意。這些分歧產(chǎn)生了巨大的財(cái)富不平等，這種不平等源于財(cái)富動(dòng)態(tài)的乘法性質(zhì)，這使得成功的大膽賭注非常有利可圖。

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Race, Representation, and Local Governments in the US South: The Effect of the Voting Rights Act

美國(guó)南方的種族、代表制和地方政府:投票權(quán)法案的影響
by?Andrea Bernini & Giovanni Facchini & Cecilia Testa

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 redefined race relations in the United States. Yet evidence on its effect on Black office holding remains scant. Using novel data on Black elected officials between 1962 and 1980, we assess the impact of the Voting Rights Act on the racial makeup of local governments in the Deep South. Exploiting predetermined differential exposure of Southern counties to the mandated federal intervention, we show that the latter fostered local Black office holding, particularly in the powerful county commissions, controlling local public finances. In the presence of election by district, covered counties experienced Black representation gains and faster capital spending growth.

1965年的《投票權(quán)法案》重新定義了美國(guó)的種族關(guān)系。然而，關(guān)于其對(duì)黑人擔(dān)任公職的影響的證據(jù)仍然很少。利用1962年至1980年間黑人當(dāng)選官員的新數(shù)據(jù)，我們?cè)u(píng)估了《投票權(quán)法案》對(duì)南方腹地地方政府種族構(gòu)成的影響。利用預(yù)先確定的南方各縣對(duì)聯(lián)邦強(qiáng)制干預(yù)的不同暴露，我們表明后者促進(jìn)了當(dāng)?shù)睾谌宿k公室的持有，特別是在強(qiáng)大的縣委員會(huì)中，控制著當(dāng)?shù)氐墓藏?cái)政。在按區(qū)選舉的情況下，覆蓋的縣經(jīng)歷了黑人代表人數(shù)的增加和更快的資本支出增長(zhǎng)。

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?The Multidimensional Impact of Teachers on Students

教師對(duì)學(xué)生的多維影響
by?Nathan Petek & Nolan G. Pope

Test score measures of teacher quality may not fully capture teachers’ impact on students. We use test score and non–test score measures of student achievement and behavior to estimate multiple dimensions of teacher quality. We find that these two measures of teacher quality are only weakly correlated and that both affect students’ high school performance. A teacher removal simulation that uses both measures improves most long-term student outcomes by over 50%, compared to a policy that uses test scores alone. Our results also show that for high school outcomes the effects of teachers in later grades are larger than those in earlier grades and that performance in core elementary school subjects matters more than that in other subjects.