中文目錄
1.中國的財務(wù)報告和披露實踐（JAE）
2.毛利報告時的參考點和不規(guī)則模式 （RAS）
3.統(tǒng)一財年時點的財務(wù)報告后果（TAR）
4.每股收益數(shù)據(jù)的戰(zhàn)略性四舍五入（JFQA）
5.財務(wù)報告附注中的估計情況與盈余（MS）
6.數(shù)字財務(wù)報告的生產(chǎn)力效應(yīng)（RAS）

1.Financial reporting and disclosure practices in China（JAE）

We study financial reporting and disclosure practices in China using survey methods similar to prior studies of U.S. firms (i.e., Graham et al., 2005; Dichev et al., 2013). Comparing earnings features, motives to manage and smooth earnings, and voluntary disclosure practices between the two countries, we reveal three major differences. First, Chinese firms exhibit a stronger preference for predictive, relative to verifiable, attributes of earnings that can signal stable firm performance to their stakeholders. Second, smooth earnings are desired by various stakeholders and can be achieved through coordination among connected stakeholders, which is conceptually different from earnings management. Third, Chinese firms consider public disclosure as less relevant in the reduction of the cost of capital. In addition, Chinese firms do not have a bias towards conservative reporting. We explain and reconcile these differences as resulting from some unique institutional features of China. Our study provides novel field evidence that contributes to, expands, and directly corroborates existing empirical studies.

2.Round number reference points and irregular patterns in reported gross margins（RAS）

We find irregular patterns in the distribution of firms’ reported quarterly gross margin percentages. Specifically, there is significant bunching around percentage integers that are highly round (e.g., multiples of 10, such as 30%, 40%, etc.) or are neatly divisible (e.g., 25%, 75%), compared to what is predicted by counterfactual distributions. Further investigation reveals that highly round gross margin firms are smaller, exert higher effort, achieve higher productivity, have more difficult goals, and pay their CEOs with a higher portion of fixed income. We also find that highly round gross margins are associated with superior performance. Additionally, we do not find consistent evidence that highly round gross margin reference points are linked to external rewards. Collectively, our evidence is consistent with reference-dependent preferences for highly round gross margins likely being driven by intrinsic (rather than extrinsic) motivations.

3.Ending at the Wrong Time: The Financial Reporting Consequences of a Uniform Fiscal Year-End（TAR）

There is an ongoing debate over uniformity versus flexibility in accounting regulation. This study examines the financial reporting consequences of a rigid accounting rule in China under which the fiscal year-end is uniform for all companies. Using extensive interviews together with large-sample archival analyses, we find that “mismatched” firms—those whose mandated financial reporting cycles are not aligned with their business cycles—exhibit higher levels of absolute abnormal accruals than their nonmismatched counterparts. Further analyses suggest that the negative association between mismatching and financial reporting quality is mainly driven by unintentional estimation errors rather than intentional earnings manipulation.

4.Quadrophobia: Strategic Rounding of EPS Data（JFQA）

Managers’ incentives to round up reported earnings per share (EPS) cause an underrepresentation of the number 4 in the first post-decimal digit of EPS, or “quadrophobia.” We develop a novel measure of aggressive financial reporting practices based on a firm’s history of quadrophobia. Quadrophobia is pervasive, persistent, and successfully predicts future restatements, Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions, and class action litigation. It is more pronounced when executive compensation is more closely tied to the stock price and when the firm anticipates violating debt covenants. Quadrophobia is especially strong when rounding-up EPS allows firms to meet analyst expectations, and investors seem not to see through this behavior.

5.The Number of Estimates in Footnotes and Accruals（MS）

This study quantifies the number of estimates involved in firms’ accruals and examines whether it is informative about the relation between accruals and future earnings. We measure the number of estimates using the frequency of the use of the word estimate in the qualitative portions of a firm’s Notes to the Financial Statements (footnotes). Motivated by arguments regarding the impact of estimation errors in accruals, we hypothesize and find that the accruals of firms that have more estimates have a lower relation with future earnings (i.e., lower persistence) and a lower association with their past, current, and future cash flows.

6. The productivity effect of digital financial reporting（RAS）

We examine the effect of digital financial reporting on firm productivity. Information frictions represent a constraint that impedes efficient resource allocation and a major source of such frictions stems from the fact that firms’ production functions (the conversion from inputs to outputs) are not observable to corporate outsiders. Digital communication of corporate financial data fundamentally changes how firm-specific information is disclosed, released, and disseminated by mitigating information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders and facilitates the processing of such information. We use the staggered implementation of the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering and Analysis Retrieval (EDGAR) system to investigate the impact of digital financial reporting on firms’ productivity. We show that the implementation of EDGAR results in an economically meaningful and statistically significant increase on firms’ productivity, measured by total factor productivity (TFP). By focusing on the role of information dissemination in coordinating investments and production, our findings provide evidence on the real effects of “going digital” in corporate reporting.