Global technopolitics--The new grand bargain??

Without teaming up, democracies will not be able to establish a robust alternative to China’s autocratic technosphere

You’re my best friend

It is against this background that a grand bargain needs to be struck. Its broad outline would be for America to get security guarantees and rule-making bodies in which its interests can be taken seriously. In return it would recognise European privacy and other regulatory concerns as well as demands that tech titans be properly taxed. Ideally, such a deal would also include India and other developing countries, which want to make sure that they do not risk becoming mere sources of raw data, while having to pay for the digital intelligence produced.

Against this background：在這樣的背景下

strike a ?bargain/?deal?達(dá)成（對(duì)雙方都有利的）協(xié)議

broad outline：梗概，大致輪廓

In terms of security, the parties to the bargain would ensure each other secure, diverse supply chains for digital infrastructure. To get there, the CNAS?proposes, in effect, to partially mutualise?them: among other things, members of a tech alliance should co-ordinate their efforts to restructure supply chains and might set up a semiconductor consortium with facilities around the world. Supporting open technologies and standards that create a diverse set of suppliers would help, too. An example is OpenRAN, a mobile network that allows carriers to mix and match components rather than having to buy from one vendor. A world with open infrastructure like this need not, in principle, just depend on a few suppliers, as is the case today with Huawei, Nokia or Ericsson.

Mutualise?/tj?t???la?z/?v. 使互相；按共享原則組織（公司等）；共同承擔(dān)（某物）（等于 mutualize）

Semiconductor /?semik?n?d?kt?(r)/ 半導(dǎo)體

consortium ?/k?n?s??ti?m/（合作進(jìn)行某項(xiàng)工程的）財(cái)團(tuán)，銀團(tuán)，聯(lián)營(yíng)企業(yè)?? the Anglo-French consortium that built the Channel Tunnel 修建英吉利海峽隧道的英法財(cái)團(tuán)。

To give in to Europe on other fronts in return for help in such matters would be costly to America, which has largely opposed attempts to regulate and tax its tech giants abroad. In terms of statecraft, that is an attractive part of the arrangement; to be willing to pay a cost shows that you place real value on what you are getting.

Statecraft??n. /?ste?tkrɑ?ft/ 治國(guó)才能；政務(wù)才能

If an alliance of democracies is to deliver a China-proof technosphere, America will have to accept that the interdependence of the tech world on which the whole idea is based means that it cannot act unconstrained. Henry Farrell of Johns Hopkins University argues that America has so far simply weaponised this interdependence, using chokepoints?where it has leverage to strangle enemies and put pressure on friends. But Europe’s resistance to banning Huawei’s gear and the ECJ’s decision show that even friends can balk. America needs to give if it is to receive.

Chokepoint?/'t??uk,p?int/ ?n. 阻塞點(diǎn)

Strangle?v. ??/?str??ɡl/ ?1.扼死；勒死；掐死??to strangle sb to death 把某人掐死；2.抑制；壓制；扼殺??The current monetary policy is strangling the economy. 現(xiàn)行貨幣政策抑制了經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展。

Balk??/b??k/ 阻止; 反對(duì)?? Even biology undergraduates may balk at animal experiments. 即使是生物專業(yè)的大學(xué)生都可能會(huì)反對(duì)動(dòng)物實(shí)驗(yàn)。

譯文

You’re my best friend

It is against this background that a grand bargain needs to be struck. Its broad outline would be for America to get security guarantees and rule-making bodies in which its interests can be taken seriously. In return it would recognise European privacy and other regulatory concerns as well as demands that tech titans be properly taxed. Ideally, such a deal would also include India and other developing countries, which want to make sure that they do not risk becoming mere sources of raw data, while having to pay for the digital intelligence produced.

正是在這種背景下，需要達(dá)成一項(xiàng)大協(xié)議。它的大概輪廓是美國(guó)得到安全保障和制定規(guī)則的主體，在這個(gè)主體中美國(guó)的利益能被嚴(yán)肅對(duì)待。作為回報(bào)，他承認(rèn)歐洲隱私和其他監(jiān)管關(guān)注點(diǎn)以及對(duì)科技巨頭合理收稅的需求。理想中，印度與其他發(fā)展中國(guó)家也應(yīng)該參加該協(xié)議，當(dāng)然這些發(fā)展中國(guó)家不想冒著變成原始數(shù)據(jù)資源提供國(guó)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)同時(shí)還要支付電子智能產(chǎn)品的費(fèi)用。

In terms of security, the parties to the bargain would ensure each other secure, diverse supply chains for digital infrastructure. To get there, the?CNAS?proposes, in effect, to partially?mutualise?them: among other things, members of a tech alliance should co-ordinate their efforts to restructure supply chains and might set up a?semiconductor consortium?with facilities around the world. Supporting open technologies and standards that create a diverse set of suppliers would help, too. An example is OpenRAN, a mobile network that allows carriers to mix and match components rather than having to buy from one vendor. A world with open infrastructure like this need not, in principle, just depend on a few suppliers, as is the case today with Huawei, Nokia or Ericsson.

在安全方面，協(xié)議各方將確保彼此為數(shù)字基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施提供安全、多樣化的供應(yīng)鏈。為了達(dá)到這種效果，CNAS提議在實(shí)際中實(shí)現(xiàn)他們的相互作用，在其他事物中，科技聯(lián)盟的成員應(yīng)該共同努力重建供應(yīng)鏈并應(yīng)用全世界的設(shè)備創(chuàng)建半導(dǎo)體聯(lián)盟。支持技術(shù)開放和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)建立來(lái)創(chuàng)造一個(gè)多樣化供應(yīng)商世界也會(huì)有幫助。典型例子是OpenRAN，它是一家允許運(yùn)營(yíng)商混合和匹配零件，而不是從一個(gè)供應(yīng)商購(gòu)買的移動(dòng)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)。一個(gè)擁有這樣開放基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的世界，原則上不需要依賴少數(shù)供應(yīng)商，就像今天的華為、諾基亞或愛立信那樣。

To give in to Europe on other fronts in return for help in such matters would be costly to America, which has largely opposed attempts to regulate and tax its tech giants abroad. In terms of statecraft, that is an attractive part of the arrangement; to be willing to pay a cost shows that you place real value on what you are getting.

對(duì)美國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)在其他方面向歐洲讓步，以換取在此類問(wèn)題上的幫助的代價(jià)是高昂的，因?yàn)槊绹?guó)很大程度上反對(duì)歐洲對(duì)其海外科技巨頭進(jìn)行監(jiān)管和征稅。對(duì)于治國(guó)戰(zhàn)略來(lái)說(shuō)，這是協(xié)議的吸引人之處；愿意付出代價(jià)表明你重視你所得到的東西。

If an alliance of democracies is to deliver a China-proof technosphere, America will have to accept that the interdependence of the tech world on which the whole idea is based means that it cannot act unconstrained. Henry Farrell of Johns Hopkins University argues that America has so far simply weaponised this interdependence, using?chokepoints?where it has leverage to?strangle?enemies and put pressure on friends. But Europe’s resistance to banning Huawei’s gear and the ECJ’s decision show that even friends can balk. America needs to give if it is to receive.

如果民主國(guó)家的聯(lián)盟是傳遞“防備中國(guó)”科技道路，美國(guó)將不得不承認(rèn)，作為整個(gè)理念基礎(chǔ)的科技世界是相互依賴的，這意味著它不能不受約束地采取行動(dòng)。Johns Hopkins大學(xué)的Henry Farrell表示美國(guó)目前為止只是簡(jiǎn)單的“武器化”這種相互依存的關(guān)系，通過(guò)使用有影響力的關(guān)鍵點(diǎn)扼殺敵人和向盟友施壓。但歐盟對(duì)禁止華為設(shè)備的抵觸和歐洲法院的裁決表表明即使盟友也會(huì)反水。美國(guó)如果想要獲得收獲需要付出相應(yīng)的代價(jià)。（UP主：以前覺得媒體是中立的，覺得人家都說(shuō)你不好肯定是自己有問(wèn)題，現(xiàn)在想想too naive，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人上面非常多的文章明顯是站在美國(guó)精英角度思考如何處理中國(guó)這個(gè)威脅到它自身地位的麻煩。并不是你錯(cuò)了，而是你的存在就影響到它的呼吸了。當(dāng)然里面很多思考問(wèn)題的模式蠻有意思的，有耳目一新的感覺）

經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人2020年12月刊

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