中文目錄
1.大數(shù)據(jù)時代的市場效率
2.沉默是金：受眾偏好不確定下的信息披露策略
3.高管非本地口音與投資決策
4.洋洋得意：情緒與管理層判斷
5.年報復(fù)雜性與銀行信貸
6.會計研究中的控制變量使用

1.Market efficiency in the age of big data（JFE2022）

Modern investors face a high-dimensional prediction problem: thousands of observable variables are potentially relevant for forecasting. We reassess the conventional wisdom on market efficiency in light of this fact. In our equilibrium model,?N?assets have cash flows that are linear in?J?characteristics, with unknown coefficients. Risk-neutral Bayesian investors learn these coefficients and determine market prices. If?J?and?N?are comparable in size, returns are cross-sectionally predictable ex post. In-sample tests of market efficiency reject the no-predictability null with high probability, even though investors use information optimally in real time. In contrast, out-of-sample tests retain their economic meaning.

2.Silence is safest: Information disclosure when the audience’s preferences are uncertain(JFE2022)

We examine voluntary disclosure decisions when firms are uncertain about audience preferences and are risk averse. In contrast to classic “unraveling” results, some firms remain silent in equilibrium. Silence is safer than disclosure; silence reduces the sensitivity of a firm’s payoff to audience preferences. Increases in firm (audience) risk-aversion reduce (increase) disclosure. Our model explains why some firms do not disclose earnings breakdowns, executive compensation, or Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance when they face diverse audiences, and why they disclose less under regulatory rules mandating that disclosure be entirely public.

3.Do Managers' Nonnative Accents Influence Investment Decisions?(TAR2022)

Reactions to earnings calls are sensitive to subtle features of managers' speech, but little is known about the effect of nonnative accents in this setting. Nonnative-accented CEOs may avoid holding calls in English for fear of investors' negative stereotypes. However, theory indicates that stereotypes from the CEO position and nonnative accents conflict, and that the process of reconciling conflicting stereotypes requires effortful processing. We use a series of four experiments to test each link of the causal chain that we hypothesize based on this theory. We demonstrate that motivated investors reconcile conflicting stereotypes by inferring exceptional qualities, such as hard work and determination, that positively affect their impressions of nonnative-accented CEOs and, hence, of the company as an investment. We also show that, because bad news stimulates effortful processing, investors receiving bad (versus good) news are more likely to form a positive image of nonnative-accented CEOs and their companies.

4.Emotions and Managerial Judgment: Evidence from Sunshine Exposure（TAR2022）

We examine the role and economic consequences of emotions in shaping the judgment of corporate executives. Analyzing a large sample of U.S. public firms, we find that sunshine-induced good mood leads managers to make upwardly biased earnings forecasts. Importantly, our evidence implies that managers become less susceptible to the sunshine priming effect in unambiguous settings, when their forecasts are subject to stricter external monitoring, and when they have stronger incentives to issue accurate forecasts. Additional tests show that equity market participants discern less informative signals from forecasts influenced by sunshine and that managers prone to the sunshine priming effect impose costs on their firms in the form of higher information risk and equity financing costs. Reflecting that labor markets also play a disciplinary role, we find that mood-prone managers suffer adverse career outcomes. We provide the first large-scale Analysis on the nuanced ways in which emotions affect top executives.

5.Financial Statement Complexity and Bank Lending（TAR2022）

Recent evidence suggests that investors struggle to process complex financial disclosures. Relative to equity and public debt investors, banks have unique advantages in acquiring information and can impose contractual terms to mitigate information frictions. We investigate whether financial statement complexity is associated with firms' reliance on bank financing and the terms of bank loans. We focus on two aspects of complexity: the length of financial reports and the complexity of financial reporting rules. We document that both aspects of complexity are positively associated with firms' reliance on bank financing (i.e., level of debt and new financing). This result is consistent with banks' superior information processing capabilities. Next, we document that banks ameliorate information frictions using loan contractual terms that depend on the source of complexity. Overall, banks are an attractive source of financing for firms with complex disclosures, but banks also increase screening and monitoring for relatively complex borrowers.

6.Out of Control: The (Over) Use of Controls in Accounting Research（TAR2022）

In the absence of random treatment assignment, the selection of appropriate control variables is essential to designing well-specified empirical tests of causal effects. However, the importance of control variables seems under-appreciated in accounting research relative to other methodological issues. Despite the frequent reliance on control variables, the accounting literature has limited guidance on how to select them. We evaluate the evolution in the use of control variables in accounting research and discuss some of the issues that researchers should consider when choosing control variables. Using simulations, we illustrate that more control is not always better and that some control variables can introduce bias into an otherwise well-specified model. We also demonstrate other issues with control variables, including the effects of measurement error and complications associated with fixed effects. Finally, we provide practical suggestions for future accounting research.