虛假信息的戰(zhàn)爭

哈馬斯于10月7日對以色列進(jìn)行攻擊，以色列軍方隨后對加沙地帶進(jìn)行了報復(fù)性打擊。像這種重大事件發(fā)生時，人們的第一反應(yīng)不再是打開電視看新聞，而是去社交媒體平臺獲取最新信息。但電視上的新聞受到播出制度的要求，其報道大多都是真實(shí)可信的，而社交媒體則是一個彌漫著真相，謊言和爾虞我詐的戰(zhàn)場。輿論的戰(zhàn)場上，政府，記者，執(zhí)法部門和一些民間活躍分子你方唱罷我登場，各方實(shí)力也參差不齊。

用“戰(zhàn)爭迷霧”來描述社交媒體上對巴以爭端的討論未免有些保守，實(shí)際情況則是一股裹挾著恐慌，暴力，悲痛和虛假信息的狂潮。一些人利用這一事件來激怒俄羅斯，另一些人通過發(fā)布游戲片段或舊的戰(zhàn)爭照片來獲取流量。以色列的情報機(jī)構(gòu)沒能預(yù)見來自哈馬斯的襲擊，這使包括美國在內(nèi)的許多國家都很詫異。以色列以其網(wǎng)絡(luò)防御和間諜軟件聞名于世，同時也飽受爭議，他們利用這些軟件對記者和敵對勢力的網(wǎng)絡(luò)進(jìn)行監(jiān)聽。所以以色列為什么沒有回避襲擊呢？

我們每天都在參與社交媒體平臺的信息戰(zhàn)爭，這可能會令一些人感到驚訝。但是了解虛假信息是一回事，積極（或不知情）參與到信息戰(zhàn)爭中則又是一回事。

與個人不同，國家按照DIME模式執(zhí)行戰(zhàn)爭行動，即“外交（Diplomacy），信息（Information），軍事（Military），經(jīng)濟(jì)（Economy）”。大多數(shù)國家在派遣軍隊前都會盡可能地給對手造成痛苦與混亂。事實(shí)上，信息方面的攻擊是作戰(zhàn)的常用伎倆，并且在作戰(zhàn)開始后通常首當(dāng)其沖。電信數(shù)據(jù)和通信網(wǎng)絡(luò)被政府監(jiān)聽是常事，這也是為什么倡導(dǎo)隱私和人權(quán)的人對網(wǎng)絡(luò)數(shù)據(jù)公開政策如此關(guān)注的原因。

隨著社交媒體在世界范圍內(nèi)的普及，更多的國家通過網(wǎng)絡(luò)部隊參與到了低等級的信息戰(zhàn)中。根據(jù)牛津互聯(lián)網(wǎng)研究所2020年的研究，網(wǎng)絡(luò)部隊是“負(fù)責(zé)操縱網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿論的政府或政黨行為者”。牛津研究組識別出有81個國家擁有活躍的網(wǎng)絡(luò)部隊，他們通過各種策略執(zhí)行行動，散播虛假信息，包括花費(fèi)重金進(jìn)行網(wǎng)上宣傳。重點(diǎn)是，他們的行為與那些直接攻擊對手或其基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的黑客行為或其他形式的網(wǎng)絡(luò)戰(zhàn)爭大有不同。網(wǎng)絡(luò)部隊通常不加改變地利用社交媒體和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)，并運(yùn)用社會工程學(xué)技巧，比如模仿扮演，聊天機(jī)器人和增長黑客。

由于研究者嚴(yán)重依賴于拆解分析社交媒體公司的報告，關(guān)于網(wǎng)絡(luò)部隊的數(shù)據(jù)仍較為有限。但牛津的研究者們已經(jīng)分析出在2020年，巴勒斯坦是伊朗在Facebook上的信息行動目標(biāo)，以色列是伊朗在Twitter上的目標(biāo)。這表明虛假信息活動沒有國界。研究者同樣發(fā)現(xiàn)以色列在國內(nèi)實(shí)施網(wǎng)絡(luò)部隊行動，運(yùn)用僵尸網(wǎng)絡(luò)或人工賬戶等手段傳播親政府信息，打擊反對派和反以色列言論。以色列網(wǎng)絡(luò)部隊實(shí)施或參與的行動包括虛假信息宣傳，發(fā)布釣魚信息，傳播有利于政府的言論，還通過數(shù)據(jù)驅(qū)動策略來操縱社交媒體上的公眾意見。

當(dāng)然，在借助網(wǎng)絡(luò)部隊抹黑政治對手，外國政府和其他礙事者這一方面，美國政府及其附屬企業(yè)遙遙領(lǐng)先于其他國家。甚至一些企業(yè)，比如Facebook，也會雇公關(guān)公司在社交媒體上詆毀競爭對手。這是一場公開的戰(zhàn)爭，你我也會參與其中。

至于在網(wǎng)上開展影響力行動的主體，研究者發(fā)現(xiàn)有證據(jù)表明，或是政府特工，或是簽約執(zhí)行網(wǎng)絡(luò)媒體操縱的私營企業(yè)。這一狀況表明當(dāng)代的網(wǎng)絡(luò)行動是第四代戰(zhàn)爭的突出特點(diǎn)，其模糊了平民與參戰(zhàn)者的界限。

這也對社交平臺對信息真?zhèn)螌彶榈挠行蕴岢隽速|(zhì)疑。比如，唐納德·特朗普上傳了一段詳細(xì)的戰(zhàn)爭視頻，聲稱視頻來自于“以色列內(nèi)部”，但被X的事實(shí)核查工具——社區(qū)筆記（Community Notes）標(biāo)明為虛假消息。但是問題在于那段視頻是真實(shí)的。這并不是我們第一次見到事實(shí)核查散播虛假消息，一些親俄賬戶在2022年就做過類似的事。

一次又一次，社交媒體被用來引導(dǎo)輿論，詆毀對手，泄露政府文件，其欺詐手段包括但不限于編造虛假參與，搜索引擎優(yōu)化，偽裝和冒名頂替賬戶，還有通過模因戰(zhàn)進(jìn)行文化干預(yù)。相比以往，我們更加需要政客們實(shí)事求是，用事實(shí)說話。甚至美國總統(tǒng)拜登都聲稱自己看過斬首嬰兒的照片，但實(shí)際上他只是看過新聞報道。

如今巴以交戰(zhàn)日趨激烈，政客，商人，運(yùn)動員，名人，記者，甚至普通民眾，這些具有影響力的人以網(wǎng)絡(luò)信息為武器在第四代戰(zhàn)爭中嚴(yán)陣以待。社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)是這場戰(zhàn)爭中的關(guān)鍵因素，因?yàn)榻粦?zhàn)會把信息（流行視頻，話題標(biāo)簽，meme等）傳播到世界各地。

如果我們被牽扯到這場戰(zhàn)爭中，我和信息科學(xué)家兼教授阿米莉亞·阿克（Amelia Acker）總結(jié)出了一些方法來辨別網(wǎng)絡(luò)帖子的真?zhèn)?。問你自己：這是推廣帖子還是廣告？這個方法對大多數(shù)網(wǎng)友比較方便，也很容易推廣。這個帖子是否有真正的參與或者其回復(fù)都是奇怪或不相關(guān)的？如果你懷疑賬戶有人冒名頂替，可以對賬戶的頭像圖片和賬戶橫幅廣告進(jìn)行反向圖片搜索，從時間軸上查看該賬戶是否有幾個月前或幾年前的截圖。最后，識別垃圾信息，查看附件媒體（圖片，視頻，鏈接）調(diào)查其重復(fù)性，查看該賬戶是否參與了垃圾信息的發(fā)布，比如對大量的帖子進(jìn)行無關(guān)緊要的評論。

盡管我呼吁和平，但我們必須見證這些暴行。戰(zhàn)爭年代，真相需要被擁護(hù)。

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詞匯：

A modicum of：少量的，些許的

Tap into：挖掘，利用

Well-worn：老生常談的

Be tasked with：被委派任務(wù)

Growth hacking：增長黑客：一種創(chuàng)新性的市場營銷策略，通過低成本、高效的手段來實(shí)現(xiàn)產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)的快速增長。

Botnet：僵尸網(wǎng)絡(luò)

Original Article:

Misinformation Is Warfare

Rather than flip on the TV when major news-worthy events happen, like Hamas’ attack on Israel on Oct. 7 and the subsequent retaliation by Israeli forces in Gaza, we open up social media to get up-to-the-minute information. However, while television is still bound to regulations that require a modicum of truthful content, social media is a battleground of facts, lies, and deception, where governments, journalists, law enforcement, and activists are on an uneven playing field.????

It is a massive understatement to use the term “fog of war” to describe what is happening in discussions of Hamas and Israel on social media. It’s a torrent of true horror, violent pronunciations, sadness, and disinformation. Some have capitalized on this moment to inflame Russia or gain clout by posting video game clips or older images of war recontextualized. Many governments, including the U.S., were shocked that Israeli Intelligence failed to see the land, sea, and air attack. Israel is known for its controversial cyber defense and spyware used to tap into journalists’ and adversaries’ networks. How could this have happened?

It may come as a surprise to some that we are involved in an information war playing out across all social media platforms every day. But it’s one thing to see disinformation, and it’s another to be an active (or unwitting) participant in battle.

Different from individuals, states conduct warfare operations using the DIME model—"diplomacy, information, military, and economics.” Most states do everything they can to inflict pain and confusion on their enemies before deploying the military. In fact, attacks on vectors of information is a well-worn tactic of war and usually are the first target when the charge begins. It’s common for telecom data and communications networks to be routinely monitored by governments, which is why the open data policies of the web are so concerning to many advocates of privacy and human rights.

With the worldwide adoption of social media, more governments are getting involved in low-grade information warfare through the use of cyber troops. According to a study by the Oxford Internet Institute in 2020, cyber troops are “government or political party actors tasked with manipulating public opinion online.” The Oxford research group was able to identify 81 countries with active cyber troop operations utilizing many different strategies to spread false information, including spending millions on online advertising. Importantly, this situation is vastly different from utilizing hacking or other forms of cyber warfare to directly attack opponents or infrastructure. Cyber troops typically utilize social media and the internet as it is designed, while employing social engineering techniques like impersonation, bots, and growth hacking.

Data on cyber troops is still limited because researchers rely heavily on takedown reports by social media companies. But the Oxford researchers were able to identify that, in 2020, Palestine was a target of information operations from Iran on Facebook and Israel was a target of Iran on Twitter, which indicates that disinformation campaigns know no borders. Researchers also noted that Israel developed high-capacity cyber troop operations internally, using tactics like botnets and human accounts to spread pro-government, anti-opposition, and suppress anti-Israel narratives. The content Israel cyber troops produced or engaged with included disinformation campaigns, trolling, amplification of favored narratives, and data-driven strategies to manipulate public opinion on social media.

Of course, there is no match for the cyber troops deployed by the U.S. government and ancillary corporations hired to smear political opponents, foreign governments, and anyone that gets in the way. Even companies like Facebook have employed PR firms to use social media to trash the reputation of competing companies. It’s open warfare—and you’ve likely participated.

As for who runs influence operations online, researchers found evidence of a blurry boundary between government operatives and private firms contracted to conduct media manipulation campaigns online. This situation suggests that contemporary cyber operations are best characterized as fourth generation warfare, which blurs the lines between civilians and combatants.

It also has called into question the validity of the checks that platforms have built to separate fact from fiction. For instance, a graphic video of the war was posted by Donald Trump Jr.—images which Trump Jr. claimed came from a “source within Israel,”—was flagged as fake through X’s Community Notes fact-checking feature. The problem, though, was that the video was real. This would not be the first time we have seen fact-checkers spread disinformation, as pro-Russian accounts did something similar in 2022.

Time and time again, we have seen social media used to shape public opinion, defame opponents, and leak government documents using tactics that involve deception by creating fake engagement, using search engine optimization, cloaked and imposter accounts, as well as cultural interventions through meme wars. Now more than ever we need politicians to verify what they are saying and arm themselves with facts. Even President Biden was fact-checked on his claim to have seen images of beheaded babies, when he had only read news reports.

Today, as we witness more and more attacks across Israel and Palestine, influential people—politicians, business people, athletes, celebrities, journalists, and folks just like me and you—are embattled in fourth generation warfare using networks of information as a weapon. The networks are key factors here as engagement is what distributes some bytes of information—like viral videos, hashtags, or memes—across vast distances.

If we have all been drafted into this war, here are some things that information scientist and professor Amelia Acker and I developed to gauge if an online post might be disinformation. Ask yourself: Is it a promoted post or ad? This is a shortcut to massive audiences and can be very cheap to go viral. Is there authentic engagement on the post or do all of the replies seem strange or unrelated? If you suspect the account is an imposter, conduct a reverse image search of profile pics and account banners, and look to see if the way-back machine has screenshots of the account from prior months or years. Lastly, to spot spam, view attached media (pictures, videos, links) and look for duplicates and see if this account engages in spam posting, for example, replying to lots of posts with innocuous comments.

While my hope is for peace, we all must bear witness to these atrocities. In times of war, truth needs an advocate.

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原網(wǎng)址

https://time.com/6323387/misinformation-israel-hamas-war-essay/