1975年 4月，越南西貢解放前兩周，一群衣衫襤褸、瘦弱而年輕的農(nóng)民男女在鄰國柬埔寨擊敗了美國支持的政府。1979年 1月，約 44個月后，這個新政權(quán)被入侵的越南士兵趕下臺并被拆散。

這段時期的短暫是其難以理解的部分原因。此外，沒有全面的目擊報告，甚至連一些基本事實都在研究柬埔寨（或高棉，因為它在該國的高棉語里被如此稱呼）的人之間存在爭議。一個主要的困難是，由波爾布特領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的安卡（柬共）在大部分掌權(quán)時間對其政策和目標(biāo)甚至存在秘不告人，從那時起，他們之中無一人出面捍衛(wèi)其路線。然而，這一時期的迷霧的主要原因是反動的共識已被施加，它已被媒體灌進(jìn)了人們的頭腦，且?guī)缀鯖]有反對聲音。每當(dāng)提到波爾布特時（通常，考慮到民主柬埔寨政權(quán)滅亡已經(jīng)二十年），結(jié)論總是一樣的：革命比它聲稱要治愈的社會弊病更糟糕。許多研究關(guān)注的是關(guān)于民主柬埔寨時期死亡人數(shù)的未證實的數(shù)據(jù)，以證明將美國驅(qū)趕出東南亞的紅色高棉比帝國主義者更糟糕。

然而事實真的是這樣嗎？需要為柬埔寨負(fù)責(zé)的是否真的只有安卡的槍械酷刑？200萬人命的大多數(shù)是死于子彈，砍刀，審訊還是空襲之后無法產(chǎn)出大米的焦土？這一復(fù)雜的歷史事件真的可以歸咎于少數(shù)臆病者的妄想空談？還是看看接下來的資料吧

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原文歷史資料整理者：國際反戰(zhàn)人士泰勒·歐文和本·基爾南。

article by Taylor Owen and Ben Kiernan

mapping by Taylor Owen

轟炸地圖繪制者：國際反戰(zhàn)人士泰勒·歐文

Notice: this article is a translation for the evidence and static analasis section, but I only agree a part of the author's opinion. I'm sorry that there was a revision mistake the initial version of the translation, which has been corrected.

New information reveals that Cambodia was bombed far more heavily during the Vietnam War than previously believed—and that the bombing began not under Richard Nixon, but under Lyndon Johnson.

新解密的歷史檔案顯示，越南戰(zhàn)爭期間柬埔寨遭到的轟炸比以前認(rèn)為的要嚴(yán)重得多——而且轟炸不是在理查德·尼克松總統(tǒng)的批準(zhǔn)下開始的，而是在林登·約翰遜總統(tǒng)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下開始的。

To put 2,756,941 tons into perspective, the Allies dropped just over 2 million tons of bombs during all of World War II. Cambodia may be the most heavily bombed country in history.The

motives that lead locals to help insurgencies do not fit into strategic rationales. Those whose lives have been ruined don’t care about geopolitics; they tend to blame the attackers.

從不完全統(tǒng)計后的 2,756,941 噸來看，盟軍在整個二戰(zhàn)期間投下了才200 萬噸當(dāng)量的炸彈，包括襲擊廣島和長崎的原子彈：分別為 15,000 噸和 20,000 噸。柬埔寨受到相當(dāng)于200多枚原子彈當(dāng)量的轟炸，很可能是人類歷史上被轟炸最嚴(yán)重的國家

廣島原子彈對每個廣島市民人均當(dāng)量62.5公斤，而美軍在柬埔寨投彈275萬噸對照當(dāng)時柬埔寨500萬人口人均當(dāng)量500公斤。按戰(zhàn)前700萬人計算人均393公斤)，超過了廣島原子彈人均當(dāng)量的6倍，相當(dāng)于柬埔寨全國被原子彈摧毀6次以上

慘無人道的轟炸恰恰成為促使柬埔寨人民支持紅色高棉的動機(jī)之一。被轟炸的人民可不關(guān)心美國的地緣政治，他們傾向于譴責(zé)侵略者。(注:平民傷亡對照:越南戰(zhàn)爭對越南本土投彈500萬噸，平民死亡300萬人左右)

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2000年秋天，在越南戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束 25 年后，比爾·克林頓成為自理查德·尼克松以來第一位訪問
越南的美國總統(tǒng)。雖然媒體對這次旅行的報道主要是關(guān)于約 2000 名美軍士兵被歸類為在行動中失蹤的歷史問題，但一個具有重大歷史意義的小舉動幾乎沒有引起人們的注意。作為一種人道主義姿態(tài)，克林頓公布了1964 年至1975 年間所有美國轟炸印度支那的大量空軍數(shù)據(jù)。

該數(shù)據(jù)庫使用IBM設(shè)計的開創(chuàng)性系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行記錄，提供了有關(guān)在越南、老撾和柬埔寨進(jìn)行的出擊空軍出動記錄的大量信息。

The still-incomplete database (it has several “dark” periods) reveals that from October 4, 1965, to August 15, 1973, the United States dropped far more ordnance on Cambodia than was previously believed: 2,756,941 tons’ worth, dropped in 230,516 sorties on 113,716 sites. Just over 10 percent of this bombing was indiscriminate, with 3,580 of the sites listed as having “unknown” targets and another 8,238 sites having no target listed at all. The database also shows that the bombing began four years earlier than is widely believed—not under Nixon, but under Lyndon Johnson.

仍然不完整的數(shù)據(jù)庫（它有幾個“空白”時期）顯示，從1965 年 10 月 4 日到1973 年8 月15 日，美國在柬埔寨投放的彈藥比以前認(rèn)為的要多得多：共計2,756,941噸，在113,716個目標(biāo)共計進(jìn)行230,516次投彈行動。略超過 10 % 的轟炸是不分青紅皂白的，其中3,580個地點被列為“未知”目標(biāo)，另外8,238個地點根本沒有目標(biāo)。該數(shù)據(jù)庫還顯示，轟炸開始的時間比人們普遍認(rèn)為的要早四年——不是在尼克松總統(tǒng)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，而是在林登·約翰遜總統(tǒng)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下。

當(dāng)時柬埔寨只有500萬人口，人均被炸當(dāng)量500多公斤(按戰(zhàn)前700萬人計算人均393公斤)，相當(dāng)于廣島原子彈對廣島市民人均核爆當(dāng)量62.5公斤的6倍。

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這次轟炸的影響是過去三十年爭論不休的主題，現(xiàn)在比以往任何時候都更加清晰。柬埔寨的平民傷亡將憤怒的民眾推向了在轟炸開始之前獲得相對較少支持的起義者的懷抱，從而推動越南戰(zhàn)爭深入柬埔寨，這是1970 年的事變，迅速紅色高棉崛起。

數(shù)據(jù)表明，一個國家選擇退出沖突的方式可能會產(chǎn)生災(zāi)難性的后果。因此，它也涉及當(dāng)代
戰(zhàn)爭，包括美國在伊拉克的行動。盡管有許多不同之處，但伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭與柬埔寨
沖突有一個關(guān)鍵的相似之處：越來越依賴空中力量來對抗多變、多變的起義。

We heard a terrifying noise which shook the ground; it was as if the earth trembled, rose up and opened beneath our feet. Enormous explosions lit up the sky like huge bolts of lightning; it was the American B-52s.

—Cambodian bombing survivor

我們聽到了可怕的聲音，震動了地面；就好像大地在我們腳下顫抖起來，升起并張開。巨大的爆炸像巨大的閃電一樣照亮了天空；那是美國的 B-52機(jī)群。
——柬埔寨地毯式轟炸幸存者

On December 9, 1970, US President Richard Nixon telephoned his national-security adviser, Henry Kissinger, to discuss the on-going bombing of Cambodia. This sideshow to the war in Vietnam, begun in 1965 under the Johnson administration, had already seen 475,515 tons of ordnance dropped on Cambodia, which had been a neutral kingdom until nine months before the phone call, when pro-US General Lon Nol seized power.The first intense series of bombings, the Menu campaign on targets in Cambodia’s border areas—labelled Breakfast, Lunch, Supper, Dinner, Desert, and Snack by American commanders—had concluded in May, shortly after the coup.

1970年 12 月 9 日，美國總統(tǒng)理查德尼克松打電話給他的國家安全顧問亨利·基辛格，討論正在進(jìn)行的對柬埔寨的轟炸。這場始于 1965 年在約翰遜政府領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下的越南戰(zhàn)爭的擴(kuò)大化戰(zhàn)區(qū)，這時已有 475,515 噸的炸彈投向了柬埔寨，直到 9 個月前親美的朗諾將軍打通電話之前，柬埔寨還是一個中立的王國。朗諾發(fā)動軍事事變奪取了政權(quán)。第一次激烈的轟炸中，針對柬埔寨邊境地區(qū)平民目標(biāo)的“菜單”運(yùn)動——由美國指揮部標(biāo)記為早餐、午餐、晚餐、晚餐、甜點和小吃——在政變后不久于 5 月結(jié)束。

Nixon was facing growing congressional opposition to his Indochina policy. A joint US–South Vietnam ground invasion of Cambodia in May and June of 1970 had failed to root out Vietnamese Communists, and Nixon now wanted to covertly escalate the air attacks, which were aimed at destroying the mobile headquarters of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army (vc/nva) in the Cambodian jungle. After telling Kissinger that the US Air Force was being unimaginative, Nixon demanded more bombing, deeper into the country: “They have got to go in there and I mean really go in...I want everything that can fly to go in there and crack the hell out of them. There is no limitation on mileage and there is no limitation on budget. Is that clear?”

尼克松正面臨越來越多的國會反對他的印度支那政策。1970 年 5 月和 6 月美南越聯(lián)合
地面入侵柬埔寨未能根除越共，尼克松現(xiàn)在想暗中升級空襲，旨在摧毀越共與柬埔寨叢林中的北越軍隊（ vc/nva）。在告訴基辛格美國空軍缺乏想象力后，尼克松要求進(jìn)行更多轟炸，深入柬埔寨：“我們的空軍必須進(jìn)入那里，我的意思是真的進(jìn)入...... . . 我命令我們的空軍讓所有能飛的東西都進(jìn)去，把這個國家變成地獄！我命令空軍執(zhí)行這項命令，沒有轟炸范圍限制，也沒有預(yù)算限制。明白了嗎？”

Kissinger knew that this order ignored Nixon’s promise to Congress that US planes would remain within thirty kilometres of the Vietnamese border, his own assurances to the public that bombing would not take place within a kilometre of any village, and military assessments stating that air strikes were like poking a beehive with a stick. He responded hesitantly:“The problem is, Mr. President, the Air Force is designed to fight an air battle against the Soviet Union. They are not designed for this war...in fact, they are not designed for any war we are likely to have to fight.”

基辛格知道，這一命令無視尼克松對國會的承諾，即美國飛機(jī)將停留在越南邊境三十公里范圍內(nèi)，他自己向公眾保證不會在任何村莊一公里范圍內(nèi)發(fā)生轟炸，以及軍方評估指出，空襲就像用棍子戳蜂箱。他遲疑地回答：“問題是，總統(tǒng)先生，空軍旨在與蘇聯(lián)交戰(zhàn)。它們不是為這場戰(zhàn)爭而設(shè)計的。事實上，它們并不是為我們現(xiàn)在可能打的任何戰(zhàn)爭而設(shè)計的?！?/p>

Five minutes after his conversation with Nixon ended, Kissinger called Gen-eral Alexander Haig to relay the new orders from the president: “He wants a massive bombing campaign in Cambodia. He doesn’t want to hear anything. It’s an order, it’s to be done. Anything that flies, on anything that moves. You got that?” The response from Haig, barely audible on tape, sounds like laughter.

與尼克松的談話結(jié)束五分鐘后，基辛格打電話給美國空軍司令亞歷山大·黑格將軍，轉(zhuǎn)達(dá)尼克松總統(tǒng)的新命令：“他希望在柬埔寨發(fā)動大規(guī)模轟炸行動。他什么都不想聽。這是命令，必須完成。出動任何會飛的東西，任何會動的東西。你明白了嗎？”黑格的回答在錄音帶上幾乎聽不見，聽起來像是笑聲。

Air operations were subject to rules of engagement that prohibited the use of B-52s against targets closer than one kilometre to friendly forces, villages, hamlets, houses, monuments, temples, pagodas, or holy places.—henry kissinger, ending the vietnam war

Hundreds of examples of villages being bombed can be extrapolated from the database, countering Kissinger’s claim. The “after” map shows the destruction of villages in Kandal Province, southwest of Phnom Penh, by 6,418 tons of ordnance dropped between Nov. 7, 1972, and Aug. 14, 1973. Black dots represent huts, red dots are bombing points, and red circles are areas carpet bombed by B-52s.

空中作戰(zhàn)必須遵守交戰(zhàn)規(guī)則，禁止使用 B-52打擊距離友軍、村莊、小村莊、房屋、紀(jì)念碑、寺廟、寶塔或圣地不到一公里的目標(biāo)。——亨利·基辛格，越南戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束時的外交辭令

數(shù)以百計的村莊被轟炸的例子可以從數(shù)據(jù)庫中得知，這與基辛格的說法截然相反?！笆潞蟆钡貓D顯示，1972 年11 月7日至1973 年8 月14日期間， 6,418噸炸彈摧毀了金邊西南部干丹省的村莊。黑點代表小屋，紅點是轟炸點，紅圈是被B-52地毯式轟炸的投彈區(qū)域。

The US bombing of Cambodia remains a divisive and iconic topic. It was a mobilizing issue for the antiwar movement and is still cited regularly as an example of American war crimes. Writers such as Noam Chomsky, Christopher Hitchens, and William Shawcross emerged as influential political voices after condemning the bombing and the foreign policy it symbolized.

美國轟炸柬埔寨仍然是一個具有分裂性和標(biāo)志性的話題。這是反戰(zhàn)運(yùn)動的一個動員問題，并且仍然經(jīng)常被引用為美國戰(zhàn)爭罪行的一個例子。諾姆·喬姆斯基、克里斯托弗·希欽斯和威廉·肖克羅斯等作家在譴責(zé)轟炸事件及其象征的外交政策后，成為有影響力的政治聲音。

In the years since the Vietnam War, something of a consensus has emerged on the extent of US involvement in Cambodia. The details are controversial, but the narrative begins on March 18, 1969, when the United States launched the Menu campaign. The joint US– South Vietnam ground offensive followed. For the next three years, the United States continued with air strikes under Nixon’s orders, hitting deep inside Cambodia’s borders, first to root out the vc/nva and later to protect the Lon Nol regime from growing numbers of Cambodian Communist forces. Congress cut funding for the war and imposed an end to the bombing on August 15, 1973, amid calls for Nixon’s impeachment for his deceit in escalating the campaign.

自越南戰(zhàn)爭以來的幾年里，關(guān)于美國在柬埔寨的參與程度已經(jīng)形成了某種共識。細(xì)節(jié)存在爭議，但故事始于1969 年 3 月 18 日，當(dāng)時美國發(fā)起了菜單運(yùn)動。隨后美國與南越聯(lián)合發(fā)起對柬埔寨的地面入侵。在接下來的三年里，美國在尼克松的命令下繼續(xù)進(jìn)行空襲，深入柬埔寨邊境，首先是為了”圍剿“vc/nva（越共） ，后來是為了保護(hù)朗諾傀儡正權(quán)，防止其被柬共擊敗。.1973 年 8 月 15 日，在要求彈劾尼克松以欺騙升級競選活動的呼聲中，國會名義上結(jié)束了對柬埔寨的地毯式全面性的戰(zhàn)略轟炸。

Thanks to the database, we now know that the US bombardment started three-and-a-half years earlier, in 1965, under the Johnson administration. What happened in 1969 was not the start of bombings in Cambodia but the escalation into carpet bombing. From 1965 to 1968, 2,565 sorties took place over Cambodia, with 214 tons of bombs dropped. These early strikes were likely tactical, designed to support the nearly two thousand secret ground incursions conducted by the cia and US Special Forces during that period. B-52s—long-range bombers capable of carrying very heavy loads—were not deployed, whether out of concern for Cambodian lives or the country’s neutrality, or because carpet bombing was believed to be of limited strategic value.

多虧了數(shù)據(jù)庫，我們現(xiàn)在知道美軍對柬埔寨的越境轟炸始于三年半前，即 1965 年，當(dāng)時是約翰遜政府。1969 年發(fā)生的事情并不是柬埔寨轟炸事件的開始，而是升級為地毯式轟炸。從1965 年到 1968 年，柬埔寨上空出動了 2,565 架次，投下了 214 噸炸彈。這些早期的越境空襲很可能是戰(zhàn)術(shù)性的，旨在支持美國中情局和美國特種部隊在此期間進(jìn)行的近兩千次秘密地面入侵。B-52——能夠攜帶非常重載荷的遠(yuǎn)程轟炸機(jī)——這時候還沒有部署，無論是出于對柬埔寨國家中立的關(guān)注，還是因為地毯式轟炸被認(rèn)為具有有限的戰(zhàn)略價值。

Nixon decided on a different course, and beginning in 1969 the Air Force deployed B-52s over Cambodia. The new rationale for the bombings was that they would keep enemy forces at bay long enough to allow the United States to withdraw from Vietnam. Former US General Theodore Mataxis depicted the move as “a holding action.... The troika’s going down the road and the wolves are closing in, and so you throw them something off and let them chew it.” The result was that Cambodians essentially became cannon fodder to protect American lives.

尼克松決定另辟蹊徑，從 1969 年開始，空軍在柬埔寨上空部署 B-52。地毯式覆蓋轟炸的新理由是他們將使敵軍陷入足夠長的時間，以使美國能夠從越南撤軍。美國前將軍西奧多·馬塔西斯將這一舉動描述為“一個控股行動”。. . . 三駕馬車在路上，狼群正在逼近，所以你把東西扔給它們，讓它們咀嚼?！?結(jié)果是柬埔寨人基本上成了保護(hù)美國人生命的炮灰。

The last phase of the bombing, from February to August 1973, was designed to stop the Khmer Rouge’s advance on the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh. The United States, fearing that the first Southeast Asian domino was about to fall, began a massive escalation of the air war—an unprecedented B-52 bombardment that focused on the heavily populated area around Phnom Penh but left few regions of the country untouched. The extent of this bombardment has only now come to light.

轟炸的最后階段，從1973 年 2 月到 8 月，旨在阻止紅色高棉對柬埔寨首都金邊的進(jìn)攻。
美國擔(dān)心第一張東南亞多米諾骨牌即將倒下，開始大規(guī)模升級地毯式轟炸——空前的 B-52 轟炸每日達(dá)到三千噸（根據(jù)上圖數(shù)據(jù)）集中在金邊周邊人口極度稠密的地區(qū)，但只留下了該國少數(shù)地區(qū)未觸及。這次轟炸的程度現(xiàn)在才被曝光。

The data released by Clinton shows the total payload dropped during these years to be nearly five times greater than the generally accepted figure. To put the revised total of 2,756,941 tons into perspective, the Allies dropped just over 2 million tons of bombs during all of World War II, including the bombs that struck Hiroshima and Nagasaki: 15,000 and 20,000 tons, respectively. Cambodia may well be the most heavily bombed country in history.

克林頓公布的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，美軍在柬埔寨投彈量，是之前歷史學(xué)家估計的五倍。從不完全統(tǒng)計后的 2,756,941 噸來看，盟軍在整個二戰(zhàn)期間投下了才200 萬噸當(dāng)量的炸彈，包括襲擊廣島和長崎的原子彈：分別為 15,000 噸和 20,000 噸。柬埔寨受到相當(dāng)于200多枚原子彈當(dāng)量的轟炸，很可能是人類歷史上被轟炸最嚴(yán)重的國家。

Asingle B-52d “Big Belly” payload consists of up to 108 225-kilogram or 42 340-kilogram bombs, which are dropped on a target area of approximately 500 by 1,500 metres. In many cases, Cambodian villages were hit with dozens of payloads over the course of several hours. The result was near-total destruction. One US official stated at the time, “We had been told, as had everybody. . .that those carpetbombing attacks by B-52s were totally devastating, that nothing could survive.” Previously, it was estimated that between 50,000 and 150,000 Cambodian civilians were killed by the bombing. Given the fivefold increase in tonnage revealed by the database, the number of casualties is surely higher.

一架B -52 D “大肚皮”有效載荷由多達(dá) 108 225 公斤或 42 340 公斤的炸彈組成，投擲到大約 500 x 1,500 米的目標(biāo)區(qū)域。很多時候，柬埔寨普通小村莊在幾個小時內(nèi)遭到數(shù)十枚重型炸彈的火力覆蓋。結(jié)果幾乎是整個村莊幾乎滅絕。一位美國軍官表示，“我們被告知，每個人都如此。. . B-52的地毯式轟炸是完全是毀滅性的，沒有任何東西可以幸存?！?此前，美國歷史學(xué)家推測估計有50,000 至 150,000 名柬埔寨平民在轟炸中喪生。鑒于解密數(shù)據(jù)庫顯示的投彈噸位超過歷史學(xué)家估計五倍，柬埔寨平民的實際傷亡人數(shù)絕對比美國歷史學(xué)家起初的估計高得多。

The Cambodian bombing campaign had two unintended side effects that ultimately combined to produce the very domino effect that the Vietnam War was supposed to prevent. First, the bombing forced the Vietnamese Communists deeper and deeper into Cambodia, bringing them into greater contact with Khmer Rouge insurgents. Second, the bombs drove ordinary Cambodians into the arms of the Khmer Rouge, a group that seemed initially to have slim prospects of revolutionary success. Pol Pot himself described the Khmer Rouge during that period as “fewer than five thousand poorly armed guerrillas . . . scattered across the Cambodian landscape, uncertain about their strategy, tactics, loyalty, and leaders.”

柬埔寨的轟炸行動有兩個意想不到的副作用，最終結(jié)合起來產(chǎn)生了越南戰(zhàn)爭本應(yīng)防止的多米諾骨牌效應(yīng)。首先，轟炸迫使越共越來越深入柬埔寨，使他們與紅色高棉起義者有更多的接觸。其次，炸彈更加將普通柬埔寨人推入了紅色高棉的懷抱，這個組織最初似乎在格命成功方面前景渺茫。在那期間，波er布特本人描述了起初的紅色高棉為“不到五千名武裝不足的游擊隊。. . 分散在柬埔寨各地，不確定他們的戰(zhàn)略、戰(zhàn)術(shù)、忠誠度和領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者。

Years after the war ended, journalist Bruce Palling asked Chhit Do, a former Khmer Rouge officer, if his forces had used the bombing as anti-American propaganda. Chhit replied: Every time after there had been bombing, they would take the people to see the craters, to see how big and deep the craters were, to see how the earth had been gouged out and scorched. . . . The ordinary people sometimes literally shit in their pants when the big bombs and shells came. Their minds just froze up and they would wander around mute for three or four days. Terrified and half crazy, the people were ready to believe what they were told. It was because of their dissatisfaction with the bombing that they kept on co-operating with the Khmer Rouge, joining up with the Khmer Rouge, sending their children off to go with them.... Sometimes the bombs fell and hit little children, and their fathers would be all for the Khmer Rouge.

戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束后，記者布魯斯·帕林詢問前紅色高棉領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人 Chhit Do，他的部隊是否將轟炸用作反美宣傳。Chhit Do回答：”每次轟炸后，他們都會帶人去看隕石坑那么大的蛋坑，看看蛋坑有多大，有多深，看看焦土是怎樣的。. . . 當(dāng)大炸彈和炮彈來襲時，普通人有時會尿褲子。他們的頭腦只是僵住了，他們會在安靜的地方徘徊三四天。人們嚇壞了，半瘋了。因為對轟炸的不滿，他們更加與紅色高棉合作，加入紅色高棉，送他們的孩子一起去。. . . 有時炸彈掉下來擊中小孩子，他們的父親會全力支持紅色高棉?！?/span>

Stated one survivor: “The people were angry with the US, and that is why so many of them joined the Khmer Communists.”

一位轟炸幸存者說：“人們對美國感到憤怒，這就是為什么這么多人加入了高棉共產(chǎn)黨?！?/span>

The Nixon administration knew that the Khmer Rouge was winning over peasants. The cia’s Directorate of Operations, after investigations south of Phnom Penh, reported in May 1973 that the Communists were “using damage caused by B-52 strikes as the main theme of their propaganda.” But this does not seem to have registered as a primary strategic concern.

尼克松政府知道紅色高棉正在爭取農(nóng)民。美國中央情報局行動局在金邊以南進(jìn)行調(diào)查后，于 1973 年 5 月報告說，共產(chǎn)黨人“將B-52 空襲造成的破壞作為他們宣傳的主題”。但他們似乎沒有把這個作為首要戰(zhàn)略關(guān)注點。

The Nixon administration kept the air war secret for so long that debate over its impact came far too late. It wasn’t until 1973 that Congress, angered by the destruction the campaign had caused and the systematic deception that had masked it, legislated a halt to the bombing of Cambodia. By then, the damage was already done. Having grown to more than two hundred thousand troops and militia forces by 1973, the Khmer Rouge captured Phnom Penh two years later.

尼克松政府長期對地毯式轟炸保密，以至于關(guān)于其影響的辯論為時已晚。直到1973 年，國會對這場運(yùn)動造成的破壞和掩蓋它的系統(tǒng)性欺騙感到憤怒，才形式上停止地毯式轟炸柬埔寨。到那時，傷害已經(jīng)造成。到1973 年，紅色高棉已發(fā)展到超過 20萬軍隊和民兵，兩年后占領(lǐng)了金邊。

原文地址：https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/544210370

一些自己想說的

轟炸帶來的傷亡，紅高自己的反動之處先不論——美國空軍在化為焦土的農(nóng)田中種下了饑荒的種子，柬埔寨人不幸地收獲了這一慘痛的果實。這我想從上面這一系列觸目驚心的數(shù)據(jù)和記錄中便能看出來了，各位目田在借著紅高攻擊他，攻擊馬主義之余，倒也可以想想是誰把柬埔寨人逼到紅高那邊，也想想柬埔寨人間慘案的首要罪人是誰