Journal of Political Economy 2023年第7期

2023, Volume 131, Issue 7

?

?

——更多動態(tài)，請持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨(dú)

?

?

How Costly Are Markups?

價格加成的成本有多大
by?Chris Edmond & Virgiliu Midrigan & Daniel Yi Xu

We study the welfare costs of markups in a dynamic model with heterogeneous firms and endogenous markups. We provide aggregation results summarizing the macro implications of micro-level markup heterogeneity. We calibrate our model to US Census of Manufactures data and find that the costs of markups can be large. We decompose the costs into three channels: an aggregate markup that acts like a uniform output tax, misallocation of factors of production, and inefficient entry. We find that the aggregate-markup and misallocation channels account for most of the costs of markups and that the entry channel is much less important.

?

?

Optimal Deposit Insurance

最優(yōu)存款保險
by?Eduardo Dávila & Itay Goldstein

Every government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether to exploit it or conserve it and thereby let the subsequent government decide whether to exploit or conserve. This paper develops a positive theory of this situation and shows when a small change in parameter values has a multiplier effect on exploitation. The multiplier strengthens the influence of a lobby paying for exploitation and of a donor compensating for conservation. A successful donor pays every period for each unit; a successful lobby pays once. This asymmetry causes inefficient exploitation. A normative analysis uncovers when compensations are optimally offered to the party in power, to the general public, or to the lobby.

?

?

?

The Conservation Multiplier

保護(hù)乘數(shù)
by?B?rd Harstad

Every government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether to exploit it or conserve it and thereby let the subsequent government decide whether to exploit or conserve. This paper develops a positive theory of this situation and shows when a small change in parameter values has a multiplier effect on exploitation. The multiplier strengthens the influence of a lobby paying for exploitation and of a donor compensating for conservation. A successful donor pays every period for each unit; a successful lobby pays once. This asymmetry causes inefficient exploitation. A normative analysis uncovers when compensations are optimally offered to the party in power, to the general public, or to the lobby.

?

?

Learning and Money Adoption

學(xué)習(xí)和貨幣采用
by?Michael Choi & Fan Liang

We consider a dynamic monetary economy where agents gradually learn about the holding cost of a new asset and coordinate to adopt it as money or abandon it. We provide closed-form solutions for state-contingent asset prices and agents’ adoption decision. The transactional benefits of using money are endogenous and can convexify or concavify the payoff structure. Thus, the arrival of new information can raise or reduce the asset’s price, which is in sharp contrast to standard insights in experimentation models. Full disclosure of the asset type and an increase in the learning speed improve information but have different welfare implications.

?

?

Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion

保持聽眾參與:貝葉斯說服的動態(tài)模型
by?Yeon-Koo Che & Kyungmin Kim & Konrad Mierendorff

We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in a Markov perfect equilibrium of this game. However, for persuasion costs sufficiently small, a version of a folk theorem holds: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow’s sender-optimal persuasion as well as full revelation and everything in between are obtained in Markov perfect equilibrium as the cost vanishes.

?

?

Patent Publication and Innovation

專利發(fā)表與創(chuàng)新
by?Deepak Hegde & Kyle Herkenhoff & Chenqi Zhu

We measure how patent publication affects innovation by exploiting the American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA), which accelerated public disclosure of US patents by about 1.5 years. We obtain causal estimates by comparing US patents subject to AIPA with “twin” European patents that were not. Post-AIPA, US patents receive more and faster follow-on citations, indicating greater technology diffusion. Technological overlap increases between distant but related patents and decreases between highly similar patents, and patent applications are less likely to be abandoned, suggesting less duplicative R&D. Publicly listed firms exposed to 1 standard deviation longer patent grant delays increased R&D by 4% post-AIPA.

?

?

?

Pareto-Improving Optimal Capital and Labor Taxes

帕累托改進(jìn)最優(yōu)資本和勞動稅
by?Katharina Greulich & Sarolta Laczó & Albert Marcet

We study optimal Pareto-improving factor taxation when agents are heterogeneous in their labor productivity and wealth and markets are complete. Pareto-improving policies require a gradual reform: labor taxes should be cut, and capital taxes should remain high for a long time before reaching the limit. This policy redistributes wealth in favor of workers, promotes growth, and causes early deficits and government debt in the long run. We address several technical issues, such as sufficiency of Lagrangian solutions in a Ramsey problem, their relation to welfare functions, and solution algorithms. We also provide a proof that long-run capital taxes are zero.