Military Service, Military Lands, and the Status of Soldiers: Current Problems and Interpretations Author(s): John Haldon
敦巴頓橡樹園論文，1993 年
翻譯：神尾智代

IX. SOME CONCLUSIONS

一些結(jié)論

Let me sum up the main points, as I see them, about the evolution of Byzantine military institutions in their social and political context, especially those concerned with the recruitment and maintenance of soldiers, from the seventh to the eleventh centuries.

????????? 讓我總結(jié)一下我所看到的關(guān)于拜占庭軍事機構(gòu)在其社會和政治背景下的演變的要點，特別是那些與招募和維持士兵有關(guān)的方面，從 7 世紀到 11 世紀。

To begin with, there is no doubt that there always existed a number of parallel modes of recruiting and maintaining soldiers. What varied across time was the emphasis placed upon different modes, according to the needs of the state and the economic and fiscal exigencies which constrained imperial policy. In the second place, it is clear that both the themata as administrative regions and the connection between military service and the private or family income of soldiers (land) have their roots in the crisis period of the second half of the seventh century. But I would stress that there is no evidence for any deliberately planned, institutional connection between them. The withdrawal of armies into Asia Minor, and the consequent development of territorial themata, certainly entailed a localization of recruitment which led to the evolution of a connection between the possession of land, and the obligation to support military service, for certain soldiers and their heirs. But it is important to see that this was a historically evolved relationship, not one that was planned by some guiding authority. We should stop thinking of the "theme system" and the "military lands" in this way once and for all. When cash resources and manpower were in short supply, these two complementary developments were the best the rump of the late Roman state could offer in managing its military and its fiscal needs. Side by side with the provincial soldiers supported wholly or partially by their own resources, and registered in the state muster lists, there existed both mercenary soldiers recruited from outside the empire or from among warlike groups within the empire, as well as mercenary (i.e., full-time) regular soldiers in each theme (note that I employ the term "mercenary" in a value-free sense, to refer simply to "professional," paid soldiers who enlist individually or in groups for specific campaigns or a specific number of years). Most of these points are not disputed. But as most of this article has shown, there still remains considerable disagreement over the actual functioning of the strateia and its relationship to both land and people, as well as over the origins of the institution in the first place.

????????? 首先，毫無疑問，一直存在著許多平行的招募和維持士兵的模式。不同時期不同的是，根據(jù)國家需要以及限制帝國政策的經(jīng)濟和財政緊急情況，對不同模式的重視程度有所不同。其次，很明顯，無論是作為行政區(qū)域的軍區(qū)，還是兵役與士兵（土地）的私人或家庭收入之間的聯(lián)系，都源于七世紀下半葉的危機時期。但我要強調(diào)的是，沒有證據(jù)表明它們之間存在任何蓄意計劃的制度聯(lián)系。軍隊撤入小亞細亞，以及隨之而來的軍區(qū)領(lǐng)土的發(fā)展，當然需要本地化征兵，這導(dǎo)致了某些士兵及其繼承人擁有土地和支持服兵役的義務(wù)之間的聯(lián)系演變.但重要的是要看到這是一種歷史演變的關(guān)系，而不是由某個指導(dǎo)當局計劃的關(guān)系。我們應(yīng)該一勞永逸地停止這樣思考“軍區(qū)系統(tǒng)”和“軍事土地”。當現(xiàn)金資源和人力短缺時，這兩個互補的發(fā)展是羅馬晚期國家在管理其軍事和財政需求方面所能提供的最好的。與全部或部分依靠自己的資源支持并登記在國家征兵名單上的省士兵并列，還有從帝國外部或帝國內(nèi)部的好戰(zhàn)團體中招募的雇傭兵，以及雇傭軍（即，全職）每個主題的正規(guī)士兵（請注意，我使用術(shù)語“雇傭兵”是在沒有價值的意義上，簡單地指代“專業(yè)的”有償士兵，他們單獨或成組參加特定的戰(zhàn)役或特定數(shù)量的年）。這些觀點中的大多數(shù)都沒有爭議。但正如本文的大部分內(nèi)容所表明的那樣，對于戰(zhàn)略的實際運作及其與土地和人民的關(guān)系，以及該制度的起源，仍然存在相當大的分歧。

In addition, I would henceforth hesitate to speak of a theme "system" or a "system “of military lands. What the sources in fact permit us to describe is a fairly open-ended network of context-bound, institutional practices, which represent a rather more fluid set of relationships than the word "system" allows.

????????? 此外，今后我會猶豫談?wù)撥妳^(qū)“系統(tǒng)”或“軍事土地系統(tǒng)”。事實上，資料來源允許我們描述的是一個相當開放的受上下文約束的制度實踐網(wǎng)絡(luò)，它代表 一組比“系統(tǒng)”一詞所允許的更流暢的關(guān)系。

This network of modes of recruiting and maintaining soldiers worked comparatively well in the situation which engendered it, but once conditions changed, the nature of the demands made upon it changed also. And it must be stressed that conditions changed fairly rapidly from the middle of the eighth century. A first stage in this process of transformation is marked by the tactical organizational reforms undertaken by Constantine V, then by the policies of emperor Nicephorus I, as recorded, however biased and slanted the report, by Theophanes. Other hints as to how these structures evolved appear in sources of the middle and later ninth century, particularly associated with the reign of Basil I, but also with that of Theophilus; and there is a real watershed with the legislation of the Macedonian emperors. For the imperial promulgations of the tenth century represent not just the rulers' concern with the welfare of the peasantry and the soldiers drawn from them, nor with the increasing threat posed by the dynatoi to the resources at the state's disposal, nor again the structure of a complex and relatively efficient state apparatus. On the contrary, I would argue that this legislation rep-resents the last, failed efforts of the central administration to shore up a mode of recruiting and maintaining soldiers which was already obsolete-by reason of circumstances vastly different from those in which it was first made possible, and be-cause of the demands of the expansive warfare and campaigning necessitated by imperial policy with regard to both the Caliphate and the empire's western neighbors in the tenth century. The reign of Nicephorus II Phocas, as has generally been recognized, marks the key moment: the massive increase and redistribution of the burden of maintaining soldiers attributed to this emperor can only reflect an increase in the use of mercenary, that is to say, professional, full-time forces on a large scale.

????????? 這種招募和維持士兵的模式網(wǎng)絡(luò)在產(chǎn)生它的情況下運作得比較好，但是一旦條件發(fā)生變化，對其提出的要求的性質(zhì)也發(fā)生了變化。必須強調(diào)的是，從 8 世紀中葉開始，情況發(fā)生了相當迅速的變化。這一轉(zhuǎn)變過程的第一個階段是君士坦丁五世進行的戰(zhàn)術(shù)組織改革，然后是尼西弗魯斯一世皇帝的政策，正如 Theophanes 的報告所記錄的那樣，盡管該報告有偏見和傾斜。關(guān)于這些結(jié)構(gòu)如何演變的其他提示出現(xiàn)在九世紀中后期的資料中，特別是與巴西爾一世的統(tǒng)治有關(guān)，但也與提奧菲勒斯的統(tǒng)治有關(guān)；馬其頓皇帝的立法是一個真正的分水嶺。因為 10 世紀的皇朝頒布不僅代表了統(tǒng)治者對農(nóng)民和從農(nóng)民中抽出的士兵的福利的關(guān)注，也代表了強權(quán)對國家可支配資源構(gòu)成的日益增加的威脅，也代表了統(tǒng)治者的結(jié)構(gòu)。一個復(fù)雜且相對有效的國家機器。相反，我認為這項立法代表了中央政府最后一次失敗的努力，以支持一種已經(jīng)過時的招募和維持士兵的模式——原因是與最初的情況大不相同。之所以成為可能，是因為 10 世紀帝國對哈里發(fā)國和帝國西部鄰國的政策所要求的擴張性戰(zhàn)爭和戰(zhàn)役的需要。眾所周知，尼斯福魯斯二世的統(tǒng)治標志著關(guān)鍵時刻：大量增加和重新分配歸咎于這位皇帝的維持士兵負擔只能反映雇傭兵使用的增加，也就是說，職業(yè)，大規(guī)模的全職力量。

The early stages of this process of decreasing relevance and increasing inefficiency (defined functionally in relation to the aims and methods of state policy) of the locally recruited and part-time thematic forces can be seen already in the eighth century. The increasing reliance on full-time, "tagmatic" units from the 780s and 790s, the increasing deployment of mercenary forces through the ninth and into the tenth century, reflect not simply the expansion of warfare in the tenth century. Rather, it reflects the increasing relative inefficiency of the system of relying on armies largely consisting of part-time peasant conscripts which had developed under one set of circumstances, in a very different political and economic context in which the state was not only taking the offensive militarily on a long-term basis, but could once more afford to pay substantial cash sums for professional warriors.

????????? 這一過程的早期階段已經(jīng)在八世紀看到了當?shù)卣心己图媛氒妳^(qū)力量的相關(guān)性降低和效率增加（在功能上與國家政策的目標和方法相關(guān)的定義）。 從 780 年代和 790 年代開始越來越依賴全職的“戰(zhàn)術(shù)”部隊，從 9 世紀到 10 世紀雇傭軍的部署越來越多，這不僅僅反映了 10 世紀戰(zhàn)爭的擴展。 相反，它反映了依賴軍隊的體系越來越低效率，這種體系主要由兼職農(nóng)民征兵組成，這種情況是在一種非常不同的政治和經(jīng)濟背景下發(fā)展起來的，在這種情況下，國家不僅采取了攻勢軍事上的長期基礎(chǔ)，但可以再次為職業(yè)戰(zhàn)士支付大量現(xiàn)金。

The state always continued to maintain professional troops, as we have seen. The seventh and early eighth centuries should perhaps be regarded, therefore, not as the period in which a "new" system was planned, evolved, and established, but rather as a period in which the state's financial situation made the provincialization of recruitment and maintenance of the armies unavoidable, not because the state wanted its armies to become a sort of part-time "militia," but because that is the effect which the exigencies of the situation produced in the old structures. On the contrary, it is clear that the state continued to treat its thematic armies as regular forces, even when they were no longer able to respond as such; so that the increasing reliance on ever-larger numbers of paid, professional soldiers, as soon as economic conditions permitted, is quite predictable, a development which is paralleled exactly by the increasing provincialization and devaluation of the thematic conscript armies. Beginning with the reforms of Nicephorus I, which to my mind reflect the continuing efforts of the state to minimize direct state financing of the armies as far as possible, the period up to the reign of Nicephorus II marks the progressive, if piecemeal, response of successive generations of state officials and rulers to a pattern of recruitment and maintenance of field armies generated in and tailored to the situation of the second half of the seventh century. While it may once have represented the only adequate functional response to a particular situation, it was already in the middle of the eighth century showing signs of strain; by the middle of the tenth century it is clear that it could no longer adequately meet the demands placed upon it. In this particular context, it is also important to emphasize that, in the later ninth and tenth centuries at least, those who held a strateia in respect of furnishing a soldier or the resources to maintain a soldier did not compose a homogeneous social group. On the contrary, there were very considerable variations in the individual fortunes of such stratiotai, so that to consider them as either a peasant militia or a class of well-to-do rural estate-holders would be, in my view, incorrect.

????????? 正如我們所看到的，國家始終繼續(xù)維持專業(yè)部隊。因此，七世紀和八世紀初或許不應(yīng)被視為一個“新”制度被規(guī)劃、演變和建立的時期，而應(yīng)被視為國家財政狀況使招聘和維護的省級化的時期。軍隊不可避免，不是因為國家希望它的軍隊成為一種兼職的“民兵”，而是因為這是舊結(jié)構(gòu)中緊急情況所產(chǎn)生的效果。相反，很明顯，國家繼續(xù)將其軍區(qū)軍隊視為正規(guī)部隊，即使他們不再能夠如此回應(yīng)；因此，在經(jīng)濟條件允許的情況下，對越來越多的有償職業(yè)士兵的日益依賴是完全可以預(yù)見的，這一發(fā)展與主題征兵部隊的日益地方化和貶值完全平行。從尼斯弗魯斯一世的改革開始，在我看來，這反映了國家不斷努力盡量減少國家對軍隊的直接資助，直到尼斯弗魯斯二世統(tǒng)治時期標志著進步的，如果是零碎的，回應(yīng)一代又一代的國家官員和統(tǒng)治者采用了一種在七世紀下半葉產(chǎn)生并根據(jù)情況量身定制的野戰(zhàn)軍隊的招募和維持模式。雖然它可能曾經(jīng)代表了對特定情況的唯一適當?shù)墓δ芊磻?yīng)，但它已經(jīng)在 8 世紀中葉顯示出緊張的跡象。到了 10 世紀中葉，它顯然不能再充分滿足對其提出的要求。在這種特殊的背景下，同樣重要的是要強調(diào)，至少在 9 世紀后期和 10 世紀，那些在提供士兵或維持士兵資源方面持有戰(zhàn)略的人并沒有構(gòu)成一個同質(zhì)的社會群體。相反，這些階層的個人命運差異很大，因此，將他們視為農(nóng)民民兵或農(nóng)村富裕階層，在我看來是不正確的。

The effects of the long-term structural incapacity referred to above were expressed in what we can identify as a clear move away from reliance on armies made up of locally recruited conscripts supported by local resources, and the transformation of those resources into fiscalized revenues. As a result, resources for the maintenance of armies were once more routed through and concentrated at the center of imperial power. The "theme" armies disappear, to be replaced by units of full-time soldiers recruited from all the provinces of the empire as well as from outside, paid and maintained through central government agents and the imposition on the provincial populations of a wide range of extraordinary demands and corv6es. These changes had, of course, a direct effect on the political power struggles within the dominant social elite of the empire.

????????? 上述長期結(jié)構(gòu)的無能的影響體現(xiàn)在我們可以確定為明顯擺脫對由當?shù)刭Y源支持的當?shù)卣鞅M成的軍隊的依賴，以及將這些資源轉(zhuǎn)化為財政收入的轉(zhuǎn)變。 結(jié)果，維持軍隊的資源再次通過并集中在帝國權(quán)力的中心。 “軍區(qū)”軍隊消失了，取而代之的是從帝國所有省份以及從外部招募的全職士兵，通過中央政府代理人支付和維持，并強加給各省人口非同尋常的要求和corv6es（未知）。 當然，這些變化對帝國占主導(dǎo)地位的社會精英內(nèi)部的政治權(quán)力斗爭產(chǎn)生了直接影響。

I have presented a highly selective discussion of recent debates on Byzantine military administration. I hope I have been able to demonstrate the central importance of the study of its army and related institutions for the history of the later Roman and Byzantine state and the society which it embraced.

?????????? 我對最近關(guān)于拜占庭軍事管理的辯論進行了高度選擇性的討論。 我希望我能夠證明研究其軍隊和相關(guān)機構(gòu)對于后來的羅馬和拜占庭國家的歷史以及它所接受的社會的核心重要性。

The University of Birmingham

伯明翰大學(xué)

?

Finally, on the term thema, see the discussion by J. Koder, "Zur Bedeutungsentwicklung des byzantinischen Terminus Thema," JOB 40 (1990), 155-65. Koder's analysis suggests that the term may have been used before the middle of the seventh century to refer to any "designated area," coming as a result of the withdrawal of the armies into Anatolia to refer also to the latter, now established in specific areas. If his results are accepted, this would be further corroboration for the suggestion made above (see pp. 7-8) that the armies were distributed according to the ability of specific regions to support them.

????????? 最后，關(guān)于 thema 一詞，參見 J. Koder 的討論，“Zur Bedeutungsentwicklung des byzantinischen Terminus Thema”，JOB 40 (1990), 155-65。 Koder 的分析表明，該術(shù)語可能在 7 世紀中葉之前用于指代任何“指定區(qū)域”，這是由于軍隊撤入安納托利亞而出現(xiàn)的，也指后者，現(xiàn)在已在特定區(qū)域建立。如果他的結(jié)果被接受，這將進一步證實上述建議（參見第 7-8 頁），即軍隊是根據(jù)特定地區(qū)支持他們的能力分配的。

完????? 結(jié)