The?Theaetetus?and the Sophist?

《泰阿泰德篇》和《智者篇》

The Theaetetus begins in the manner of an early dialogue. The question set is ‘What is knowledge?’, and Socrates offers to act as midwife to enable the bright young mathematician Theaetetus to bring the answer to birth.?

《泰阿泰德篇》以一種早期對話的方式開始。所提出的問題是“什么是知識？”，蘇格拉底提出要充當助產(chǎn)士，幫助聰明的年輕數(shù)學家泰阿泰德產(chǎn)生答案。

The first suggestion is that knowledge consists of things like geometry and carpentry; but this will not do as a definition, for the word ‘knowledge’ itself would turn up if we tried to give definitions of geometry and carpentry. What Socrates is looking for is what is common to all these different kinds of knowledge.?

第一個建議是，知識由幾何學和木工之類的東西組成；但這不能作為一個定義，因為如果我們試圖給出幾何學和木工的定義，‘知識’這個詞本身就會出現(xiàn)。蘇格拉底所尋找的是所有這些不同種類的知識所共享的東西。

Theaetetus’ second proposal is that knowledge is perception: to know something is to encounter it with the senses.?

泰阿泰德的第二個提議是，知識就是感知：知道某件事就是用感官與之相遇。

Socrates observes that different people’s senses are differently affected: the same wind may be felt by one person as warm and by another as chilly.?

蘇格拉底觀察到，不同人的感官受到不同的影響：同一陣風可能被一個人感覺為溫暖，而被另一個人感覺為寒冷。

‘It feels cold’ means ‘it seems cold’, so that perceiving is the same thing as seeming.

‘它感覺冷’意味著‘它看起來冷’，所以感知就是看起來的東西。

Only what is true can be known, so if knowledge is perceiving, we will have to accept the doctrine of Protagoras that whatever seems is true, or at least that what seems to a particular person is true for him.?

只有真實的東西才能被知道，所以如果知識是感知，我們就必須接受普羅泰戈拉的斷言，即無論看起來什么都是真實的，或者至少對于一個特定的人來說，看起來什么都是對他而言真實的。

Behind Protagoras lies Heraclitus. If it is true that everything in the world is constantly undergoing change, then the colours we see and the qualities we feel cannot be objective, stable realities.?

在普羅泰戈拉背后是赫拉克利特。如果世界上的一切都在不斷地變化，那么我們看到的顏色和我們感覺到的品質就不能是客觀的、穩(wěn)定的現(xiàn)實。

Rather, each is the offspring of a momentary meeting between one of our senses and some corresponding transitory item in the universal flux.?

相反，每一個都是我們感官之一和普遍流變中某個相應的瞬間事物之間短暫相遇的產(chǎn)物。

When an eye, for instance, comes into contact with an appropriate visible counterpart, the eye begins to see whiteness and the object begins to look white.

例如，當一只眼睛與一個合適的可見對應物接觸時，眼睛開始看到白色，而物體開始顯現(xiàn)白色。

The whiteness itself is generated by the intercourse between these two parents, the eye and the object.?

白色本身是由這兩個來源，眼睛和物體之間的交互產(chǎn)生的。

The eye and its object, no less than the whiteness they beget, are themselves involved in the universal flux; they are not motionless, but their motion is slow by comparison with the speed with which the sense-impressions come and go.?

眼睛和它的對象本身也參與了普遍的流變，和他們所產(chǎn)生的白色并無兩樣；它們并不是靜止的，但它們的運動與感覺印象來去的速度相比是緩慢的。

The eye’s seeing of the white object, and the whiteness of the object itself, are two twins which are born and die together.?

眼睛對白色物體的看見，以及物體本身的白色，是一對共生共死的雙胞胎。

A similar story can be told of the other senses: and thus we can see, at least in the realm of the sensation, why Protagoras should say that whatever seems, is; for the existence of a quality, and its appearance to the appropriate sense, are inseparable from each other.?

其他感官也可以講一個類似的故事：因此我們可以看到，至少在感覺的領域里，為什么普羅泰戈拉應該說無論看起來什么都是；因為一個品質的存在，和它對適當?shù)母泄俚娘@現(xiàn)，是不可分割的。

But life is not all sensation. We have dreams, in which we have wings and fly; madmen suffer delusions in which they feel themselves gods. Surely these are seemings which do not accord with reality??

但生活并不全是感覺。我們有夢，夢里我們長著翅膀飛翔；瘋子們遭受妄想癥，覺得自己是神。這些難道不是與現(xiàn)實不符的看起來的東西嗎？

Half our life is spent asleep, and perhaps we can never be sure whether we are awake or dreaming; so how can any of us say that whatever seems to him at any given moment is true??

我們一半的生活是在睡眠中度過的，也許我們永遠不能確定我們是清醒還是在做夢；那么我們怎么能說無論在任何給定的時刻看起來什么對他來說都是真的呢？

For answer, Protagoras can again appeal to Heraclitus. Suppose Socrates falls ill and sweet wine begins to taste sour to him. On the account given above, the sourness is the offspring of two parents, the wine and the taster.?

為了回答，普羅泰戈拉可以再次訴諸赫拉克利特。假設蘇格拉底生病了，甜酒開始對他嘗起來酸。根據(jù)上面給出的說法，酸味是兩個來源，酒和品嘗者的產(chǎn)物。

But Socrates sick is a different taster from Socrates healthy, and with a different parent the offspring is naturally different.?

但是生病的蘇格拉底和健康的蘇格拉底是不同的品嘗者，有了不同的來源，結果自然也不同。

As every perceiver is constantly changing, each perception is a unique, unrepeatable experience.?

由于每一個感知者都在不斷地變化，每一個感知都是一個獨一無二、不可重復的經(jīng)驗。

It may not be true that the wine is sour, but it is true that it is sour for Socrates.?

酒可能并不是酸的，但對蘇格拉底來說它是酸的，這是真的。

No one else is in a position to correct the sick Socrates on this point, and so here too Protagoras is vindicated: whatever seems to me, is true for me.?

沒有別人有資格在這一點上糾正生病的蘇格拉底，所以在這里普羅泰戈拉也得到了證明：無論看起來什么對我來說都是真的。

Theaetetus can continue to maintain that perception is knowledge.?

泰阿泰德可以繼續(xù)堅持認為感知就是知識。

But is all knowledge perception? Knowing a language, for instance, is more than just hearing the sounds uttered, which we can do in a language we do not know.?

但所有的知識都是感知嗎？比如說，知道一種語言，不僅僅是聽到發(fā)出的聲音，這是我們在一種我們不懂的語言中也可以做到的。

It is true, of course, that I often learn something – say that the Parthenon is on the Acropolis – by seeing it with my own eyes.?

當然，這是真的，我經(jīng)常通過親眼看到而學到一些東西——比如說帕特農(nóng)神廟就在雅典衛(wèi)城上。

But even after I shut my eyes, or go away, I continue to know that the Parthenon is on the Acropolis.?

但即使我閉上眼睛或離開了，我還是知道帕特農(nóng)神廟在雅典衛(wèi)城上。

So memory provides an example of knowledge without perception.?

所以記憶提供了一個沒有感知的知識的例子。

But perhaps Theaetetus is not yet beaten: Protagoras might come to his aid by replying that it is possible to know and not know something at the same time, just as, if you clap your hand over one of your eyes, you can both see and not see the same thing at the same time.?

但也許泰阿泰德還沒有被打?。浩樟_泰戈拉可能會來幫助他，回答說有可能同時知道和不知道某件事，就像如果你用手捂住一只眼睛，你可以同時看到和看不到同一件事。

Socrates seems to be reduced to an ad hominem riposte. How can Protagoras claim to be a teacher, and charge fees, if no one is in a better position than anyone else with regard to knowledge, since what appears to each man is true for him??

蘇格拉底似乎被迫降低到了對人不對事的反駁。如果沒有人在知識方面比別人更有優(yōu)勢，因為對每個人來說看起來什么都是真的，普羅泰戈拉怎么能聲稱自己是一位老師，并收取費用呢？

Protagoras would reply that while there is no such thing as teaching someone to give up false thoughts for true thoughts, a teacher can make him give up bad thoughts for good thoughts.?

普羅泰戈拉會回答說，雖然沒有教某人放棄錯誤的思想而接受正確的思想這樣的事情，但一個老師可以讓他放棄壞的思想而接受好的思想。

For though all seemings are equally true, not all seemings are equally good.?

因為雖然所有的看起來都是同樣真實的，但并不是所有的看起來都是同樣好的。

A sophist like Protagoras can bring a pupil into a better state, just as a doctor might cure Socrates of the illness that affected his palate, so that the wine would come to taste sweet again.?

像普羅泰戈拉這樣的詭辯家可以把一個學生帶入一個更好的狀態(tài)，就像一個醫(yī)生可能治愈蘇格拉底影響他味覺的疾病，使酒再次嘗起來甜美。

In response to this, Socrates draws on the argument of Democritus to show that Protagoras’ doctrine is self-refuting.?

為了回應這一點，蘇格拉底借用了德謨克利特的論證，以顯示普羅泰戈拉的斷言是自相矛盾的。

It seems true to all men that some men know better than others about various matters of skill and expertise; if so, that must be true for all men.?

對所有人來說，有些人在各種技能和專業(yè)知識方面比其他人更懂，這似乎是真的；如果是這樣，那么對所有人來說都必須是真的。

It seems to the majority of people that Protagoras’ thesis is false; if so then his thesis must be more false than true, since the unbelievers outnumber the believers.?

對大多數(shù)人來說，普羅泰戈拉的論題是錯誤的，這似乎也是真的；如果是這樣，那么他的論題必須比真實的更加錯誤，因為不信者比信者多。

Protagoras’ theory may seem on a firm footing as applied to sense-perception, but it is quite implausible if applied to medical diagnosis or political prediction.?

普羅泰戈拉的理論在應用于感知時可能看起來很穩(wěn)固，但如果應用于醫(yī)學診斷或政治預測，就相當不合理。

Each man may be the measure of what is, but even in the case of sensations he is not the measure of what will be: a physician knows better than a patient whether he will feel hot, and a vintner will know better than a drinker whether a wine will turn out sweet or dry.?

每個人可能是存在的尺度，但即使在感覺的情況下，他也不是將來會怎樣的尺度：一個醫(yī)生比一個病人更知道他是否會感覺到熱，一個釀酒師比一個飲酒者更知道一種酒會變得甜還是干。

But even at its strongest, in the realm of sensation, Protagoras’ claim is vulnerable, Socrates argues, for it depends on the thesis of the universal flux, which is itself incoherent.?

但即使在它最強大的領域——感覺領域，蘇格拉底認為普羅泰戈拉的主張也是脆弱的，因為它依賴于普遍流變的論題，而這個論題本身就是不連貫的。

According to the Heracliteans, everything is always changing, in respect both of local motion (movement from place to place) and qualitative alteration (such as the change from white to black).?

根據(jù)赫拉克利特派的說法，一切都在不斷地變化，無論是在局部運動（從一個地方到另一個地方的運動）還是在質量變化（比如從白色到黑色的變化）方面。

Now if something stayed put, we could describe how it changed in quality, and if we had a patch of constant colour, we could describe how it moved from place to place.?

現(xiàn)在如果有什么東西保持不動，我們就可以描述它在質量上是如何變化的，如果我們有一塊恒定的顏色，我們就可以描述它是如何從一個地方移動到另一個地方的。

But if both kinds of change are taking place simultaneously, we are reduced to speechlessness; we cannot say what is moving, or what is altering.?

但如果兩種變化同時發(fā)生，我們就無話可說了；我們不能說什么在移動，或什么在改變。

Senseperception itself will be in flux: an episode of seeing will turn instantly into an episode of non-seeing; hearing and not hearing will follow each other incessantly.?

感知本身也會處于流變中：看見的一瞬間會立刻變成不看見的一瞬間；聽見和不聽見會不斷地相互交替。

This is so unlike what we take knowledge to be, that if knowledge is identical with perception, knowledge will not be knowledge any more than non-knowledge.?

這與我們認為的知識是什么樣的相去甚遠，以至于如果知識與感知是相同的，知識就不會比非知識更像知識。

Socrates finally moves in for the kill by turning to examine the bodily organs of the senses: the eyes and ears, the channels through which we see colours and hear sounds.?

蘇格拉底最后發(fā)起致命一擊，轉而檢查感官的身體器官：眼睛和耳朵，我們通過它們看到顏色和聽到聲音的渠道。

The objects of one sense cannot be perceived with another: we cannot hear colours or see sounds.?

一個感官的對象不能用另一個感官來感知：我們不能聽到顏色或看到聲音。

But in that case, the thought that a sound and a colour are not the same as each other, but two different things, cannot be the product of either sight or hearing.?

但在這種情況下，聲音和顏色不是彼此相同，而是兩種不同的東西，這樣的想法不能是視覺或聽覺的產(chǎn)物。

Theaetetus has to concede that there are no organs for perceiving sameness and difference or unity and multiplicity; the mind itself contemplates the common terms which apply to everything.

泰阿泰德不得不承認，沒有感知相同和差異或統(tǒng)一和多樣性的器官；心靈本身思考著適用于一切的共同術語。

But the truth about the most tangible bodily properties can only be reached by the use of these common terms, which belong not to the senses but to the mind.?

但關于最有形的身體屬性的真理只能通過使用這些共同術語來達到，這些術語不屬于感官，而屬于心靈。

Knowledge resides not in the sense-impressions but in the mind’s reflection upon them.?

知識不在于感覺印象，而在于心靈對它們的反思。

At last Theaetetus gives up the thesis that knowledge is perception: he proposes instead that it consists in the judgements of the reflecting mind.?

最后，泰阿泰德放棄了知識是感知的論題：他提出，知識是由心靈反思的判斷組成。

Socrates approves of this change of course. When the mind is thinking, he says, it is as if it were talking to itself, asking questions and answering them, saying yes or no.?

蘇格拉底贊成這種轉變。當心靈在思考時，他說，就好像它在跟自己說話，問問題并回答它們，說是或否。

When it concludes its internal discussion with itself, and comes out silently with its answer, that is a judgement.?

當它結束了與自己的內部討論，并默默地給出答案時，那就是一個判斷。

Knowledge cannot be identified outright with judgement, because there is such a thing as false judgement as well as true judgement.?

知識不能直接地與判斷相等同，因為有錯誤的判斷和正確的判斷這樣的東西。

It is not easy to give an account of false judgement: how can I make the judgement that A = B unless I know what A is and what B is, and if I know that, how can I get the judgement wrong??

要解釋錯誤的判斷并不容易：除非我知道A是什么，B是什么，否則我怎么能做出A = B的判斷呢？如果我知道了，我怎么會判斷錯呢？

The possibility of false judgement seems to threaten us with having to admit that someone can know and not know the same thing at the same time.?

錯誤判斷的可能性似乎迫使我們不得不承認，有人可以同時知道和不知道同一件事。

Let us suppose, Socrates now suggests, that the mind is a wax tablet. When we want to commit something to memory we stamp an impression or an idea on this tablet, and so long as the stamp remains we remember.?

讓我們假設，蘇格拉底現(xiàn)在建議，心靈是一塊蠟板。當我們想要記住某件事時，我們就在這塊蠟板上印上一個印象或一個想法，只要印記還在，我們就記得。

False judgement may occur in the following way. Socrates knows Theaetetus and his tutor Theodorus and he has images of each of them stamped on the tablet of his memory; but seeing Theaetetus at a distance, he mistakenly matches him not to his own image, but to the image of Theodorus.?

錯誤的判斷可能以以下方式發(fā)生。蘇格拉底認識泰阿泰德和他的導師泰奧多羅斯，他在他的記憶蠟板上印有他們每個人的形象；但是從遠處看到泰阿泰德時，他錯誤地把他與自己的形象不匹配，而是與泰奧多羅斯的形象匹配。

The more indistinct the images on the wax become, the more possible it is that such mistakes are made.?

蠟板上的圖像越模糊，這樣的錯誤就越有可能發(fā)生。

False judgement, then, comes about through a mismatch between perception and thought.?

那么，錯誤的判斷就是通過感知和思想之間的不匹配而產(chǎn)生的。

But are there not cases where we make false judgements when no perception is in question: when we make a mistake in working out a sum in arithmetic, for instance?

但是，當沒有感知問題時，我們是否沒有做出錯誤判斷的情況：例如，當我們在算術中算錯一個和時？

In order to take account of these cases, Socrates says that it is possible to possess knowledge without holding it in your mind on a particular occasion, just as you can possess a coat without wearing it.?

為了考慮這些情況，蘇格拉底說，有可能擁有知識而不在特定場合把它放在心里，就像你可以擁有一件外套而不穿它一樣。

Think of the mind now not as a waxen tablet, but as an aviary. We are born with a mind which is an empty cage; as we learn new things we capture new birds, and knowing something is having the corresponding bird in our collection.?

現(xiàn)在把心靈想象成不是一塊蠟板，而是一個鳥舍。我們生來就有一個空籠子般的心靈；當我們學習新東西時，我們捕捉新鳥，知道某件事就是擁有相應的鳥在我們的收藏中。

But if you want to make use of a piece of knowledge, you have to catch the appropriate bird and hold him in your hand before letting him go again.?

但是如果你想利用一塊知識，你必須抓住合適的鳥，把它握在手里，然后再放它走。

Thus we explain mistakes in arithmetic: someone who knows no arithmetic has no number birds in his aviary; a person who judges that 7 + 5 = 11 has all the right birds fluttering around, but catches the eleventh bird instead of the twelfth bird.?

這樣我們就解釋了算術中的錯誤：不懂算術的人在他的鳥舍里沒有數(shù)字鳥；一個判斷7 + 5 = 11的人腦海中有所有正確的鳥在飛來飛去，但是他抓住了第十一只鳥，而不是第十二只鳥。

Whether or not these similes are sufficient to make clear the nature of false judgement, there is a difficulty, Socrates points out, with the thesis that knowledge is true judgement.?

無論這些比喻是否足以說明錯誤判斷的本質，蘇格拉底指出，知識是正確判斷的論題有一個困難。

If a jury is persuaded by a clever attorney to bring in a certain verdict, then even though the verdict accords with the facts, the jurors do not have the knowledge that an eye-witness would have.?

如果陪審團被一個聰明的律師說服做出某個裁決，那么即使裁決符合事實，陪審團也沒有目擊者所擁有的知識。

Theaetetus then modifies his definition so that knowledge is a judgement or belief which is not only true but articulate.?

于是泰阿泰德修改了他的定義，認為知識是一種不僅真實而且清晰的判斷或信念。

Socrates then explores three different ways in which a belief about something might be said to be articulate.?

蘇格拉底接著探討了關于某件事的信念可能被說成是清晰的三種不同的方式。

Most obviously, someone has an articulate belief if he can express it in words; but anyone with a true belief who is not deaf and dumb can do this, so it can hardly make the difference between true belief and knowledge.?

最明顯的是，如果一個人能用語言表達他的信念，他就有一個清晰的信念；但任何一個有真實信念的人，只要不是聾啞，都可以做到這一點，所以這幾乎不能構成真實信念和知識之間的區(qū)別。

The second way is the one which Socrates takes most seriously: to have an articulate belief about an object is to be able to offer an analysis of it.?

第二種方式是蘇格拉底最認真對待的一種：對一個對象有一個清晰的信念，就是能夠提供對它的分析。

Knowledge of a thing is acquired by reducing it to its elements.?

對一件事物的知識是通過把它分解成它的要素而獲得的。

But in that case there can be no knowledge of any of the ultimate, unanalysable elements.?

但在這種情況下，就不能有對任何最終、不可分析的要素的知識。

The elements which make up the substances of the world are like the letters which make up the words in a language, and analysing a substance may be compared with spelling a word.?

構成世界物質的要素就像構成語言中單詞的字母，分析一種物質可以比作拼寫一個單詞。

But while one can spell ‘Socrates’ one cannot spell the letter ‘S’. Just as a letter cannot be spelt, the elements of the world cannot be analysed and therefore cannot be known.?

但是雖然可以拼寫‘蘇格拉底’，卻不能拼寫字母‘S’。就像一個字母不能被拼寫一樣，世界的要素不能被分析，因此不能被知道。

But if the elements cannot be known, how can complexes made out of them be known??

但是如果要素不能被知道，那么由它們組成的復合物又怎么能被知道呢？

Moreover, while knowledge of elements may be necessary if we are to have knowledge of complexes, it is not sufficient; a child might know all his letters, and yet not be able to spell consistently.?

而且，雖然如果我們要有對復合物的知識，對要素的知識可能是必要的，但它并不充分；一個孩子可能知道所有的字母，但卻不能一貫地拼寫。

On the third interpretation someone has an articulate belief about an object if he can spell out a description which is uniquely true of it.?

在第三種解釋中，如果一個人能夠拼出一個對它來說唯一真實的描述，他就對一個對象有一個清晰的信念。

Thus, the sun may be described as the brightest of the heavenly bodies.?

因此，太陽可以被描述為天體中最明亮的。

But on this view, how can one have any idea at all of something without having an articulate belief about it?

但在這種觀點下，如果沒有對它有一個清晰的信念，一個人怎么能對某件事有任何想法呢？

I cannot really be thinking of Theaetetus himself if the only things I can say in description of him are things he has in common with others, like having a nose and eyes and a mouth.?

如果我能用來描述他的唯一東西是他和別人共有的東西，比如有鼻子、眼睛和嘴巴，那么我就不能真正地想到泰阿泰德本人。

Socrates concludes, a little precipitately, that Theaetetus’ third definition of knowledge is no better than his two previous ones.?

蘇格拉底有點倉促地得出結論，說泰阿泰德的第三個知識定義并不比他之前的兩個更好。

The dialogue ends in bafflement, like the Socratic dialogues of Plato’s early period.?

對話以困惑結束，就像柏拉圖早期時期的蘇格拉底式對話一樣。

But in fact, it has achieved a great deal.?

但事實上，它已經(jīng)取得了很大的成就。

The account which it gives of the nature of sense perception, modified by Aristotle, became standard until late in the Middle Ages.?

它給出的關于感知本質的描述，在亞里士多德的修改下，一直是中世紀晚期的標準。

The definition of knowledge as articulate true belief, interpreted as meaning justified true belief, was still accepted by many philosophers in the present century.?

知識被定義為清晰的真實信念，被解釋為意味著合理的真實信念，這一定義仍然被當代許多哲學家所接受。

But what Plato probably saw as the dialogue’s greatest achievement was the cure which it provided for the scepticism of Heraclitus, by showing that the doctrine of universal flux was self-refuting.?

但柏拉圖可能認為對話最大的成就是它為赫拉克利特的懷疑主義提供了藥方，通過顯示普遍流變的斷言是自相矛盾的。

In the Theaetetus Socrates expresses himself too much in awe to take on in argument the philosopher who stands at the opposite extreme from Heraclitus, the venerable Parmenides.?

在《泰阿泰德》中，蘇格拉底過于敬畏地表達了自己，不敢與赫拉克利特的對立極端的哲學家——尊敬的巴門尼德——進行爭論。

This task Plato undertakes in the dialogue The Sophist.?

這個任務柏拉圖在《智者篇》這部對話中承擔了。

In this dialogue, though Theaetetus and Socrates reappear, the chief speaker is not Socrates, but a stranger from Parmenides’ town of Elea.?

在這部對話中，雖然泰阿泰德和蘇格拉底重新出現(xiàn)，但主要的說話者不是蘇格拉底，而是來自巴門尼德的城鎮(zhèn)埃利亞的一個陌生人。

The ostensible purpose of the dialogue is to provide a definition of the sophist.?

對話的表面目的是提供智者的定義。

The definition is pursued by the method popular in our own day in the game of Twenty Questions.?

這個定義是通過我們當今流行的二十個問題游戲中的方法來追求的。

In that game the questioner divides the world into two portions, say animate and inanimate; if the object sought is animate, then the animate world is divided into two further portions, say plants and animals; and thus by further dichotomies the object is uniquely identified.?

在那個游戲中，提問者把世界分成兩部分，比如說有生命的和無生命的；如果尋找的對象是有生命的，那么有生命的世界就被分成兩個更小的部分，比如說植物和動物；這樣通過進一步的二分法，對象就被唯一地確定了。

By similar methods the Eleatic stranger defines first the art of angling, and then, more than once, the art of the sophist.?

用類似的方法，埃利亞人先定義了釣魚的技巧，然后不止一次地定義了智者的技巧。

The account of sophistry which concludes the dialogue is this: ‘the art of contradiction-making, descended from an insincere kind of conceited mimicry, of the semblance-making breed, derived from image-making, distinguished as a portion, not divine but human, of production, that presents a shadow-play of words’.?

對話結束時對智者的詭辯術的描述是這樣的：“制造矛盾的技巧，源自一種不真誠的自負模仿，屬于制造外表的種類，來自于造像，作為一部分而區(qū)別于神圣而是人類的創(chuàng)造，呈現(xiàn)出一種文字的影子戲。”

This is, of course, a joke.?

這當然是一個笑話。

The serious business of the dialogue is carried out on the way.?

對話的嚴肅內容是在途中進行的。

One line of thought runs as follows.?

一條思路是這樣的。

Sophistry is bound up with falsehood; but how is it possible to talk about falsehood without falling foul of the revered Parmenides??

詭辯術與虛假密切相關；但是如何在不觸犯尊敬的巴門尼德的情況下談論虛假呢？

To say what is false is to say what is not: does that mean that it is tantamount to uttering Unbeing??

說出虛假就是說出不存在：這是否意味著它等同于說出非存在？

That would be nonsense, for the reasons Parmenides gave.?

那將是無意義的，因為巴門尼德給出了理由。

Shall we be more careful, then, and maintain that to say what is false is to say that what is, is not, or that what is not, is??

那么我們是否應該更加小心，并堅持認為說出虛假就是說存在者不存在，或者不存在者存在呢？

Will this avoid Parmenides’ strictures??

這樣能避免巴門尼德的限制嗎？

We have to disarm Parmenides by forcing him to agree that what is not, in some respect is, and what is, in a manner is not.?

我們必須解除巴門尼德的武裝，迫使他同意，在某些方面，不存在者存在，而存在者在某種方式上不存在。

Motion, for instance, is not rest; but that does not mean that motion is not anything at all.?

例如，運動不是靜止；但這并不意味著運動什么也不是。

There are many things which even Being is not: for instance, Being is not motion and Being is not rest.?

甚至存在者也有許多不是的東西：例如，存在者不是運動，也不是靜止。

When we speak of what is not, we are not talking of Unbeing, the contrary of Being; we are speaking simply of something which is different from one of the things there are.?

當我們說到不存在者時，我們不是在談論非存在，即存在的對立面；我們只是在談論一些與存在的某一種東西不同的東西。

The non-beautiful differs from the beautiful, and the unjust differs from the just; but the non-beautiful and the unjust are no less real than the beautiful and the just.?

非美與美不同，非正義與正義不同；但非美和非正義并不比美和正義更不真實。

If we lump together all the things which are non-something, or unsomething, then we get the category of non-being, and this is just as real as the category of Being.?

如果我們把所有的非某物或無某物的東西都歸在一起，那么我們就得到了非存在的范疇，這和存在的范疇一樣真實。

So we have blown open the prison into which Parmenides had confined us.?

所以我們已經(jīng)攻破了巴門尼德把我們關進去的監(jiān)獄。

We are now in a position to give an account of falsehood in thought and speech.?

我們現(xiàn)在有能力解釋思想和言語中的虛假。

The problem was that it was not possible to think or say what was not, because Unbeing was nonsense.?

問題是，不可能思考或說出不存在的東西，因為非存在是無意義的。

But now that we have found that non-being is perfectly real, we can use this to explain false thoughts and false sentences.?

但現(xiàn)在我們已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)非存在是完全真實的，我們可以用它來解釋錯誤的思想和錯誤的句子。

A typical sentence consists of a noun and a verb, and it says something about something.?

一個典型的句子由一個名詞和一個動詞組成，它說的是關于某件事的事情。

‘Theaetetus is sitting’ and ‘Theaetetus is flying’ are both sentences about Theaetetus, but one of them is true and one false.?

‘泰阿泰德在坐著’和‘泰阿泰德在飛’都是關于苔阿泰德的句子，但其中一個是真的，另一個是假的。

They say different things about Theaetetus, and the true one says a thing about him which is among the things that he is, while the false one says a thing about him which is among the things that he is not.?

它們說的關于泰阿泰德的事情是不同的，真實的那個說的是關于他的一件事，它屬于他所是的事物之中，而虛假的那個說的是關于他的一件事，它屬于他不是的事物之中。

Flying is not Unbeing, it is a thing that is – there is quite a lot of it about – but it is a thing that is different from the things that Theaetetus is, the things that can be truly said of Theaetetus.?

飛行不是非存在，它是一種存在的東西——有很多這樣的東西——但它是一種與泰阿泰德所是的東西不同的東西，與可以真實地說出泰阿泰德的東西不同。

This account of the falsehood of a false sentence can be adapted to fit false thought and judgement also; for thinking is the silent inward utterance of the mind, and judgement is the mental equivalent of assertion and denial.?

這種對虛假句子的虛假性的解釋也可以適用于錯誤的思想和判斷；因為思考是心靈內部無聲的表達，而判斷是心理上斷言和否定的等價物。

When we speak of ‘seeming’ and ‘a(chǎn)ppearance’ we are referring to judgement which is caused by the operation of the senses, and the same treatment is appropriate here too.?

當我們說到‘似乎’和‘外表’時，我們指的是由感官運作引起的判斷，這里也適用同樣的處理方法。

The line of thought we have followed is just one strand in a dense web of argument in which the stranger seeks to trap the monists of his native city Elea.?

我們所遵循的思路只是一個密集的論證網(wǎng)中的一條線索，陌生人試圖用它來陷害他故鄉(xiāng)埃利亞城市中的一元論者。

The Theaetetus and Sophist, between them, enable Plato to take a middle road between the opposed and stultifying philosophies of Heraclitus and Parmenides.?

《泰阿泰德篇》和《智者篇》兩部對話使柏拉圖能夠在赫拉克利特和巴門尼德相對立而使人愚蠢的哲學之間走一條中間道路。

But what is remarkable about the Sophist is that among the philosophers who are criticized as inadequate are some called ‘the friends of the Forms’.?

但《智者篇》中值得注意的是，在被批評為不足的哲學家中，有些被稱為‘理型之友’。

These are described in such a way as to leave no doubt that they are proponents of Plato’s own Theory of Ideas.?

他們被描述成這樣一種方式，以至于毫無疑問他們是柏拉圖本人理型論的支持者。

The Stranger says that the true philosopher must refuse to accept from the champions either of the one or of the many Forms their doctrine that all reality is changeless, and he must turn a deaf ear to the other party who represent reality as everywhere changing.?

陌生人說，真正的哲學家必須拒絕接受來自一元論者或多元論者的教義，即所有的現(xiàn)實都是不變的，他必須對另一方代表現(xiàn)實處處變化的人充耳不聞。

Like a child who wants to have his cake and eat it he must say that Being, the sum of all, is both at once – all that is unchangeable, and all that is in change.?

就像一個想要擁有蛋糕又想吃掉它的孩子，他必須說存在，即一切的總和，是同時具有兩種性質的——所有不變的東西，和所有在變化的東西。

In this passage Heraclitus is the party of change, and Parmenides the champion of the one Form.?

在這段話中，赫拉克利特是變化的一方，巴門尼德是一元形式的捍衛(wèi)者。

The champion of the many Forms is none other than Plato himself in his younger days.

多元形式的捍衛(wèi)者不是別人，正是柏拉圖自己年輕時的樣子。

As we have said, we do not know for certain whether in later life Plato retained or abandoned his belief in the Ideas.

?正如我們所說的，我們不確定柏拉圖在晚年是否保留或放棄了他對理型的信仰。

But it is difficult to find any other philosopher in the history of the subject who has presented with similar clarity and eloquence such powerful arguments against his own most darling theories.?

但在這個學科的歷史上，很難找到另一個哲學家能夠以類似的清晰和雄辯提出如此有力的反對他自己最心愛的理論的論據(jù)。