{"ops":[{"insert":"印度陸軍元帥(Field Marshal Manekshaw)向印度總理英迪拉·甘地(Prime Minister Indira Gandhi)匯報(bào)，1972年2月25日在莫斯科，他接受蘇聯(lián)國防部長格里奇科元帥(the Soviet DM Marshal Grechko)關(guān)于蘇聯(lián)海軍太平洋艦隊(duì)核潛艇在印度洋上浮趕走美英特混艦隊(duì)的事件詳細(xì)通報(bào)過程中，蘇聯(lián)國防部長說了這么一句意味深長的特別重要的話：如果我們兩國結(jié)盟，蘇聯(lián)可以從核武庫中撥出50枚洲際導(dǎo)彈劃歸印度名下，專門用于滿足印度威懾東土神州赤縣的國防需求(“If we have an alliance, I shall earmark 50 Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) to your defence against China.”)\n聽到這話，英迪拉·甘地一笑置之，印度只想擁有核威懾力。而蘇聯(lián)要的是引誘印度加入蘇聯(lián)陣營，和西方搞對抗。這是印度不能答應(yīng)的，因?yàn)橛《葘?shí)行不結(jié)盟政策，在東西方之間印度不想選邊站，因?yàn)閮蛇叾嫉米锊黄穑《戎幌胱笥曳暝?，夾縫求生。所以這個提議政治上不可行。\n但是蘇聯(lián)的建議(the potential silo keepers for the nuclear war-heads programme)深化了英迪拉·甘地對核威懾力的理解，她認(rèn)識到如果不考慮到建設(shè)一個完整的核威懾系統(tǒng)的所有方方面面，僅僅是集中全力搞一次核爆炸，其實(shí)沒有什么多大意思(without all the other elements that are needed for completing the deterrence system – merely carrying out one nuclear explosion would achieve nothing)。說白了就是必須發(fā)展出實(shí)戰(zhàn)化的核兵力才能唬人。\n經(jīng)過與蘇聯(lián)方面在核問題上的互動，印度總理英迪拉甘地對于印度發(fā)展核威懾力的態(tài)度逐漸明確。她最終成為印度核計(jì)劃的最大推動者。\n1972年11月15日，英迪拉甘地總理在印度國會宣布，印度政府決定開展一次和平的核爆炸(Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE))。同時對潛艇核動力推進(jìn)的設(shè)計(jì)方案進(jìn)行。\n1974年，人民海軍首次發(fā)表了第一艘核潛艇SSN，印度政府立即在同年5月8日悍然下令實(shí)施第一次核試驗(yàn)(Pokhran I PNE)，作為回?fù)簟n而關(guān)于潛艇核動力推進(jìn)論證研究計(jì)劃，真正開始啟動從1976年1月算起。因?yàn)檫@時印度政府內(nèi)閣政治事務(wù)委員會正式?jīng)Q策批準(zhǔn)了它。當(dāng)時的印度海軍后勤部長海軍中將貪蹲和印度海軍總部的海洋工程局堅(jiān)決維護(hù)這個項(xiàng)目。計(jì)劃安排用至少四年的時間論證研究核動力推進(jìn)裝置和潛艇設(shè)計(jì)方案。\nThe nuclear propulsion project took off in earnest in January 1976, after the approval of the Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs. Vice Admiral Tandon, the then Chief of Material, who along with the DME(The Director of Marine Engineering (DME) NHQ), was defending the case, had made it abundantly clear that at least a four-year lead time would need to be catered for – between the design/development of a nuclear plant and the s/m design.\n按照印度核潛艇計(jì)劃，印度的核潛艇研制按照三條平行的戰(zhàn)線展開。它們分別是核動力推進(jìn)，作為武器平臺的潛艇艇體，潛射彈道導(dǎo)彈。\nThe programme was, thereafter, initiated on three parallel tracks – the nuclear propulsion, the s/m as a weapons platform and the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM).\n1976年，印度與蘇聯(lián)民用核能合作計(jì)劃正式啟動。\n1976年1月22日，在印度海軍后勤部長貪蹲中將(V Admiral Tandon)的促使下，印度聯(lián)邦政府計(jì)劃委員會批準(zhǔn)向壓水反應(yīng)堆計(jì)劃(the Pressure Water Reactor (PWR) project)提供財(cái)政撥款。\n在核動力推進(jìn)的研究開發(fā)階段，沒有明確核動力裝置最終應(yīng)用的平臺是什么。但是在工作層級（At the working level），人們的理解是，它的終極目標(biāo)為核威懾或者說用于彈道導(dǎo)彈核潛艇nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)。\n根據(jù)印度戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃者的論述，北極熊和瞇瞇眼水師不約而同地采取了相似的循序漸進(jìn)的發(fā)展路線，即從常規(guī)潛艇，到巡航導(dǎo)彈潛艇到核攻擊型核潛艇，最后到核動力彈道導(dǎo)彈核潛艇(conventional attack s/m (SS) > Cruise missile armed conventional s/m (SSG) > nuclear s/m with cruise missile (SSGN) > nuclear attack s/m (SSN) and finally to ballistic missile armed nuclear s/m (SSBN).)。所以印度海軍也只能走同樣的路。尤其是考慮到要突破國際上核技術(shù)防擴(kuò)散體制的難度和搞核試驗(yàn)可能受到經(jīng)濟(jì)制裁可能性。\n1978年在印度巴巴原子能研究中心成立了一個核潛艇動力包研究小組。\nNuclear propulsion technology was inescapable if Indiawas not to be left too far behind by the end of the century,when atomic energy would be a major source for bothpropulsion and energy requirements. A small nucleus ofengineers was located in BARC as early as 1978.\n\n\"Seeing the advent of nuclear propulsion in submarinesof other navies, a study was undertaken by BARC tostudy a nuclear propulsion package for naval ships andsubmarines. A stage arose when it became necessary to trainserving personnel in this very important area of propulsiontechnology.\"\n\n印度巴巴原子能研究中心，在1980年就搞出了設(shè)計(jì)方案但是被海軍否決。\n\n\nApril 1980\nThe Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) submits a proposal to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to build a nuclearreactor for a nuclear submarine at a cost of approximately 1.5 billion rupees. The BARC proposal is reviewed by anaval team led by Captain Bharat Bhushan and his deputy Subbarao. The Indian Navy identifies 14 design flaws inthe proposed reactor design, and points to violations of some basic safety requirements observed in nuclear\nsubmarines. The Navy's assessment is reviewed by the prime minister who declines BARC's request. Subsequent tothe rejection, BARC begins working on its fourth reactor design.\n-Raj Chengappa, \"Do You Want Our Skulls Cracked,\" Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be aNuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), pp. 248-249.\n\n印度核潛艇計(jì)劃是印度總理英迪拉甘地決策，是個自上而下推進(jìn)的，貪大求洋的項(xiàng)目。對印度海軍有些超前太多了，印度海軍內(nèi)部其實(shí)并沒有意愿和能力搞這個玩意。\n印度海軍領(lǐng)導(dǎo)都是英國人訓(xùn)練出來的老人，他們信奉英國人制定的1947印度海軍發(fā)展計(jì)劃。英國人沒說過印度海軍要用核潛艇。想都不要想，就覺得這肯定不對。\n\nThe naval acquisitions from the Soviet Union had started in 1965 when the Navy's\ntraditional supplier, the British Navy, because of its own constraints, was unable to meetthe Navy's requirements for more powerful destroyers and the latest conventionallypropelled submarines.\nThe initial acquisitions of ships and submarines from Russia had been designed for theRussian Navy, which operated in a cold and dry climate and in cold, low salinity seas.They had not been designed to operate in the hot humid climate and the warm, salineand highly corrosive seas typical of the tropics. As the Navy gained experience of\noperating Russian vessels in tropical conditions, it identified the essential alterations andadditions required to 'tropicalise' the Russian designs.\n\n\n蘇聯(lián)潛艇在高溫高濕高鹽的印度水域使用遇到許多問題，同時潛艇維修也讓印度海軍焦頭爛額。\n\nThe Submarine Arm had started with eight submarines from Russia - four Kalvari class in1968-69 and four Vela class in 1973-74. Due to the increased corrosion experienced inwarm saline tropical waters and the deferment of 6-yearly refits because the repair\nfacilities in Visakhapatnam Dockyard were not ready, the deterioration in the materialstate of the first four submarines was tackled on two fronts:\nSubmarines started being sent back to Russia for 6-yearly repairs. Concurrently,6-yearly repairs were commenced in Visakhapatnam with Russian assistance,using whatever limited facilities were available. It took some years for the\nsituation to stabilise. Between 1975 and 1992, five submarines underwent 6-yearly repairs in Russia and six submarines underwent 6-yearly repairs inVisakhapatnam.\nDiscussions were initiated with the Soviet side for successors to the earlier eightsubmarines. These culminated in the acquisition of the eight 877 EKMsubmarines between 1986 and 1990.\nSubmarine Arm projects were not restricted to Europe and Russia. A landmark deal wasthe VLF transaction, with an American firm. When submerged, submarines can only\nreceive wireless messages on Very Low Frequency (VLF). The discussions that had beenin progress with the Soviet Union and the United States culminated in 1984 with the\nselection of an American company, in collaboration with an Indian company, to design,manufacture, install and commission the VLF transmitting station; it was commissionedin 1990\n\n\n\n\n在七，八十年代，印度海軍還是潛艇專業(yè)的小學(xué)生。學(xué)習(xí)任務(wù)很重，它的精力根本不夠用。\n1980年10月，印度海軍召開司令員年度大會，會上海軍高級軍官們對于建造核潛艇計(jì)劃發(fā)生分歧。\n\nLate October 1980\nThe Indian Navy organizes a Commanders Conference at the port of Vishakhapatnam. The conference is attendedby all three chiefs of staff of the armed services, the Vice Chief of Naval Staff Tahliani, and the flag officers\ncommanding India's fleets. During conference proceedings, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Pereira opposes theproposal to build nuclear submarines. However, his deputies demur in favor of exploring the option.\n-Raj Chengappa, \"Do You Want Our Skulls Cracked,\" Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be aNuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000], pp. 249-250.\n\n\n當(dāng)時的印度海軍參謀長Pereira海軍上將一個人跳出來表示他反對建造核潛艇。其實(shí)這個老領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的意見也對，印度連常規(guī)潛艇都沒造過就想造核潛艇，真是癩蛤蟆想吃天鵝肉，好高騖遠(yuǎn)，異想天開。\n\nOctober 1980\nThe Indian Navy remains divided over the question of nuclear submarine acquisitions from the Soviet Union.\nOpponents of the proposal argue that such acquisitions will increase India's dependence on the Soviet Union. Chiefof Naval Staff Admiral Pereira reportedly remarks to his deputy R. Tahliani that it is premature for the IN to go fornuclear submarines when it still hasn't mastered the technology to build conventional submersibles.\n-Raj Chengappa, \"Do You Want Our Skulls Cracked,\" Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be aNuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), p. 249.\n\n\n但是英迪拉甘地決心已定，反對意見聽不進(jìn)。\n\n\nDecember 1981\nChief of Naval Staff Admiral Pereira writes to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi objecting to the nuclear submarinedeal. Pereira argues that the Soviet offer will make India dependent on the Soviet Union and prevent the IndianNavy from consummating the deal to purchase HDW diesel-electric boats from West Germany. However, theprime minister rebuts the naval chief's case arguing that monies for the HDW contract have already beensanctioned and would not be affected by the nuclear submarine deal.\n-Raj Chengappa, \"Do You Want Our Skulls Cracked,\" Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to beNuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), p. 253.\n\n過了不久，印度海軍參謀長換人，新參謀長又是個犟種，依然堅(jiān)決反對印度建造核潛艇。\nsanctioned and would not be affected by the nuclear submarine deal.\n-Raj Chengappa, \"Do You Want Our Skulls Cracked,\" Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to beNuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), p. 253.\n\n過了不久,印度海軍參謀長換人,新參謀長又是個翠種,依然反對印度建造核潛艇。\n\nMarch-April 1982\nAdmiral Dawson, who succeeds Pereira as the Naval Chief of Staff, also opposes the nuclear submarine project. Ateam of naval designers led by Captain Subbarao persuades Dawson to reject the Bhabha Atomic Research\nCenter's (BARC) nuclear reactor design in favor of the one designed by naval engineers. In subsequent meetingswith defense minister R. Venkataraman, Dawson opposes suggestions to get Soviet assistance in the design of anuclear reactor and complains that the Navy is not being kept abreast of the Soviet proposal. Dawson is alsosupported by BARC, which views the Soviet offer as a ploy to undermine indigenous efforts. However,\nVenkataraman overrules Dawson and informs him that the government has decided to seek Soviet assistance.-Raj Chengappa, \" Arsenal For The Gods,\" Weapans of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a NuclearPower (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), pp. 287-288.\n\n\n就在印度海軍有心無力，眼高手低，難成大事的尷尬時刻。1981年4月蘇聯(lián)老大哥派遣的高級軍事代表團(tuán)訪問印度，這次訪問意義重大印度核潛艇計(jì)劃得以涅槃重生。欲知詳情且聽下回分解。\n"}]}