ECONOMETRICA?2023年第3期

MAY, 2023,VOLUME 91,?ISSUE3

——更多動態(tài)，請持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨

Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency

薪酬透明度的均衡效應(yīng)

Zo? B. Cullen, Bobak Pakzad‐Hurson
The discourse around pay transparency has focused on partial equilibrium effects: how workers rectify pay inequities through informed renegotiation. We investigate how employers respond in equilibrium. We study a model of bargaining under two‐sided incomplete information. Our model predicts that transparency reduces the individual bargaining power of workers, leading to lower average wages. A key insight is that employers credibly refuse to pay high wages to any one worker to avoid costly renegotiations with others. When workers have low individual bargaining power, pay transparency has a muted effect. We test our model with an event‐study analysis of U.S. state‐level laws protecting the right of private sector workers to communicate salary information with their coworkers. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, transparency laws empirically lead wages to decline by approximately 2%, and wage declines are smallest in magnitude when workers have low individual bargaining power.

圍繞薪酬透明度的討論集中在部分均衡效應(yīng)上:工人如何通過知情的重新談判來糾正薪酬不平等。我們調(diào)查雇主如何在平衡中作出反應(yīng)。研究了一個雙方不完全信息下的議價模型。我們的模型預(yù)測，透明度降低了工人的個人議價能力，導(dǎo)致平均工資降低。一個關(guān)鍵的觀點是，雇主拒絕向任何一名工人支付高工資，以避免與其他工人進行代價高昂的重新談判，這是可信的。當員工的個人議價能力較低時，薪酬透明度的影響不大。我們對美國各州保護私營部門員工與同事溝通工資信息權(quán)利的法律進行了事件研究分析，以檢驗我們的模型。與我們的理論預(yù)測一致，透明度法在經(jīng)驗上導(dǎo)致工資下降約2%，當工人的個人議價能力較低時，工資下降的幅度最小。

Equilibrium Effects of Food Labeling Policies

食品標簽政策的均衡效應(yīng)

Nano Barahona, Cristóbal Otero, Sebastián Otero
We study a regulation in Chile that mandates warning labels on products whose sugar or caloric concentration exceeds certain thresholds. We show that consumers substitute from labeled to unlabeled products—a pattern mostly driven by products that consumers mistakenly believe to be healthy. On the supply side, we find substantial reformulation of products and bunching at the thresholds. We develop and estimate an equilibrium model of demand for food and firms' pricing and nutritional choices. We find that food labels increase consumer welfare by 1.8% of total expenditure, and that these effects are enhanced by firms' responses. We then use the model to study alternative policy designs. Under optimal policy thresholds, food labels and sugar taxes generate similar gains in consumer welfare, but food labels benefit the poor relatively more.

我們研究了智利的一項法規(guī)，該法規(guī)要求在糖或熱量濃度超過一定閾值的產(chǎn)品上貼上警告標簽。我們表明，消費者從有標簽的產(chǎn)品轉(zhuǎn)向無標簽的產(chǎn)品——這種模式主要是由消費者錯誤地認為是健康的產(chǎn)品驅(qū)動的。在供給方面，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)了產(chǎn)品的大量重組和閾值的聚集。我們開發(fā)并估計了食品需求和企業(yè)定價和營養(yǎng)選擇的均衡模型。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，食品標簽使消費者福利增加了總支出的1.8%，而這些效應(yīng)因企業(yè)的反應(yīng)而增強。然后，我們使用該模型來研究備選政策設(shè)計。在最優(yōu)政策閾值下，食品標簽和糖稅在消費者福利方面產(chǎn)生類似的收益，但食品標簽對窮人的好處相對更多。

Financial Frictions and the Wealth Distribution

金融摩擦與財富分配

Jesús Fernández‐Villaverde, Samuel Hurtado, Galo Nu?o
We postulate a continuous‐time heterogeneous agent model with a financial sector and households to study the nonlinear linkages between aggregate and financial variables. In our model, the interaction between the supply of bonds by the financial sector and the precautionary demand for bonds by households produces significantendogenous aggregate risk. This risk makes the economy transition between a high‐leverage region and a low‐leverage region, which, in turn, creates state dependence in impulse responses: the same shock starting from the high‐leverage region gets propagated and amplified more than when the shock arrives when leverage is low. State dependence in impulse responses generates a time‐varying aggregate precautionary savings motive that, by moving the risk‐free rate, justifies the leverage level of the financial sector in each region. Finally, we illustrate the usefulness of neutral networks to solve for the nonlinear perceived law of motion of the model, and the importance of household heterogeneity in driving its quantitative properties.

我們假設(shè)一個連續(xù)時間的具有金融部門和家庭的異構(gòu)代理模型來研究總量變量和金融變量之間的非線性聯(lián)系。在我們的模型中，金融部門的債券供給與家庭對債券的預(yù)防性需求之間的相互作用產(chǎn)生了顯著的內(nèi)生總風險。這種風險使得經(jīng)濟在高杠桿地區(qū)和低杠桿地區(qū)之間轉(zhuǎn)換，這反過來又在脈沖響應(yīng)中產(chǎn)生狀態(tài)依賴:與杠桿低時的沖擊相比，從高杠桿地區(qū)開始的相同沖擊得到傳播和放大。脈沖響應(yīng)中的國家依賴性產(chǎn)生了時變的總體預(yù)防性儲蓄動機，通過移動無風險利率，證明了每個地區(qū)金融部門的杠桿水平是合理的。最后，我們說明了中性網(wǎng)絡(luò)在解決模型的非線性感知運動規(guī)律方面的有用性，以及家庭異質(zhì)性在驅(qū)動其定量特性方面的重要性。

Searching for Job Security and the Consequences of Job Loss

尋找工作保障和失業(yè)的后果

Gregor Jarosch
Job loss comes with large present value earnings losses which elude workhorse models of unemployment and labor market policy. I propose a parsimonious model of a frictional labor market in which jobs differ in terms of unemployment risk and workers search off‐ and on‐the‐job. This gives rise to a job ladder with slippery bottom rungs where unemployment spells beget unemployment spells. I allow for human capital to respond to time spent out of work and estimate the framework on German Social Security data. The model captures the joint response of wages, employment, and unemployment risk to job loss which I measure empirically. The key driver of the “unemployment scar” is the loss in job security and its interaction with the evolution of human capital and, in particular, the search for better employment.

失業(yè)伴隨著大量的現(xiàn)值收入損失，這是失業(yè)和勞動力市場政策的主力模型所無法做到的。我提出了一個摩擦勞動力市場的簡約模型，在這個模型中，工作在失業(yè)風險方面是不同的，工人在工作之外和工作中尋找工作。這就產(chǎn)生了一個底部很滑的工作階梯，失業(yè)期會引發(fā)失業(yè)期。我允許人力資本對失業(yè)時間做出反應(yīng)，并根據(jù)德國社會保障數(shù)據(jù)估計框架。該模型捕捉了工資、就業(yè)和失業(yè)風險對失業(yè)的共同反應(yīng)，我對此進行了實證測量。“失業(yè)傷疤”的關(guān)鍵驅(qū)動因素是工作保障的喪失及其與人力資本演變的相互作用，特別是與尋找更好就業(yè)的相互作用。

A?Sieve-SMM Estimator for Dynamic Models

動態(tài)模型的Sieve?- smm估計

Jean‐Jacques Forneron
This paper proposes a Sieve Simulated Method of Moments (Sieve‐SMM) estimator for the parameters and the distribution of the shocks in nonlinear dynamic models where the likelihood and the moments are not tractable. An important concern with SMM, which matches sample with simulated moments, is that a parametric distribution is required. However, economic quantities that depend on this distribution, such as welfare and asset prices, can be sensitive to misspecification. The Sieve‐SMM estimator addresses this issue by flexibly approximating the distribution of the shocks with a Gaussian and tails mixture sieve. The asymptotic framework provides consistency, rate of convergence, and asymptotic normality results, extending existing results to a new framework with more general dynamics and latent variables. An application to asset pricing in a production economy shows a large decline in the estimates of relative risk aversion, highlighting the empirical relevance of misspecification bias.

本文針對似然和矩不可處理的非線性動力模型中沖擊的參數(shù)和分布，提出了一種篩模擬矩法(Sieve‐SMM)估計方法。SMM的一個重要問題是，它將樣本與模擬矩相匹配，需要一個參數(shù)分布。然而，依賴于這種分配的經(jīng)濟數(shù)量，如福利和資產(chǎn)價格，可能對錯誤規(guī)范很敏感。篩- SMM估計器通過靈活地近似高斯和尾混合篩的沖擊分布來解決這個問題。漸近框架提供一致性、收斂速度和漸近正態(tài)性結(jié)果，將現(xiàn)有結(jié)果擴展到具有更一般動態(tài)和潛在變量的新框架。對生產(chǎn)經(jīng)濟中資產(chǎn)定價的應(yīng)用表明，相對風險厭惡的估計大幅下降，突出了錯誤規(guī)范偏差的經(jīng)驗相關(guān)性。

Decomposing the Growth of Top Wealth Shares

分解最高財富份額的增長

Matthieu Gomez
What drives the dynamics of top wealth inequality? To answer this question, I propose an accounting framework that decomposes the growth of the share of aggregate wealth owned by a top percentile into three terms: awithin?term, which is the average wealth growth of individuals initially in the top percentile relative to the economy; a?between?term, which accounts for individuals entering and exiting the top percentile due to changes in their relative wealth rankings; and a?demography?term, which accounts for individuals entering or exiting the top percentile due to death and population growth. I obtain closed‐form expressions for each term in a wide range of random growth models. Evidence from the?Forbes?400 list suggests that the between term accounts for half of the recent rise in top wealth inequality.

是什么導(dǎo)致了貧富差距拉大?為了回答這個問題，我提出了一個會計框架，該框架將最高百分位數(shù)所擁有的總財富份額的增長分解為三個術(shù)語:內(nèi)術(shù)語，即最初處于最高百分位數(shù)的個人相對于經(jīng)濟的平均財富增長;一個介于兩者之間的術(shù)語，指的是由于相對財富排名的變化而進入和退出前百分位的個人;還有一個人口統(tǒng)計學術(shù)語，它解釋了由于死亡和人口增長而進入或退出前百分位數(shù)的個人。我得到了各種隨機增長模型中每一項的封閉形式表達式?！陡２妓埂?Forbes) 400富豪榜的證據(jù)表明，在近期貧富差距加劇的原因中，“介于兩者之間”占了一半。

Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings

關(guān)系契約:公共儲蓄與私人儲蓄

Francesc Dilmé, Daniel F. Garrett
Work on relational employment agreements often predicts low payments or termination for poor performance. The possibility of saving can, however, limit the effectiveness of monetary incentives in motivating an employee with diminishing marginal utility for consumption. We study the role of savings and their observability in optimal relational contracts. We focus on the case where players are not too patient, and hence the constant first‐best effort cannot be implemented. If savings are hidden, the relationship eventually deteriorates over time. In particular, both payments and effort decline. On the other hand, if savings are public, consumption is initially high, so the agent's savings fall over time, and effort and payments to the agent increase. The findings thus suggest how tacit agreements on consumption can forestall the deterioration of dynamic relationships in which the agent can save.

關(guān)系型雇傭協(xié)議通常預(yù)示著低工資或因表現(xiàn)不佳而被解雇。然而，儲蓄的可能性會限制貨幣激勵在激勵邊際效用遞減的雇員進行消費方面的有效性。研究了最優(yōu)關(guān)系契約中儲蓄的作用及其可觀察性。我們關(guān)注的是玩家不太有耐心的情況，因此持續(xù)的第一最佳努力無法實現(xiàn)。如果儲蓄被隱藏起來，這種關(guān)系最終會隨著時間的推移而惡化。特別是，報酬和努力都會下降。另一方面，如果儲蓄是公共的，消費一開始就很高，因此代理的儲蓄會隨著時間的推移而下降，而付出的努力和支付給代理的費用會增加。因此，研究結(jié)果表明，關(guān)于消費的默契如何能夠防止代理人可以儲蓄的動態(tài)關(guān)系的惡化。

Pareto-improving tax reforms and the Earned Income Tax Credit

帕累托改進稅收改革和勞動所得稅抵免

Felix J. Bierbrauer, Pierre C. Boyer, Emanuel Hansen
We develop a new approach for the identification of Pareto‐improving tax reforms. This approach yields necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Pareto‐improving reform directions. A main insight is that “Two brackets are enough”: When the system cannot be improved by altering tax rates in one or two income brackets, then there is no continuous reform direction that is Pareto‐improving. We also show how to check whether a given tax reform is Pareto‐improving. We use these tools to study the introduction of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the United States in 1975. A robust finding is that, prior to the EITC, the U.S. tax‐transfer system was not Pareto‐efficient. Under plausible assumptions about behavioral responses, the 1975 reform was not Pareto‐improving. Qualitatively, though, it had the right properties: A similar reform with earnings subsidies made available to a broader range of incomes would have been Pareto‐improving.

我們開發(fā)了一種新的方法來識別帕累托改進稅制改革。該方法給出了帕累托改進改革方向存在的充分必要條件。一個主要的觀點是“兩個等級就足夠了”:當系統(tǒng)不能通過改變一個或兩個收入等級的稅率來改善時，那么就沒有帕累托改進的持續(xù)改革方向。我們還展示了如何檢查給定的稅收改革是否具有帕累托改善性。我們使用這些工具來研究1975年美國引入的勞動所得稅抵免(EITC)。一個強有力的發(fā)現(xiàn)是，在EITC之前，美國的稅收轉(zhuǎn)移系統(tǒng)不是帕累托有效的。在行為反應(yīng)的合理假設(shè)下，1975年的改革并不是帕累托改進。然而，從質(zhì)量上講，它有正確的屬性:一個類似的改革，將收入補貼提供給更大范圍的收入，將是帕累托改進。

Distributional Synthetic Controls

分布式綜合控制

F. F. Gunsilius
The method of synthetic controls is a fundamental tool for evaluating causal effects of policy changes in settings with observational data. In many settings where it is applicable, researchers want to identify causal effects of policy changes on a treated unit at an aggregate level while having access to data at a finer granularity. This article proposes an extension of the synthetic controls estimator that takes advantage of this additional structure and provides nonparametric estimates of the heterogeneity within the aggregate unit. The idea is to replicate the quantile function associated with the treated unit by a weighted average of quantile functions of the control units. This estimator relies on the same mathematical theory as the changes‐in‐changes estimator and can be applied in both repeated cross‐sections and panel data with as little as a single pre‐treatment period. It also provides a unique counterfactual quantile function for any type of distribution.

綜合控制方法是利用觀測數(shù)據(jù)評估政策變化因果效應(yīng)的基本工具。在許多適用的情況下，研究人員希望在獲得更細粒度的數(shù)據(jù)的同時，在總體水平上確定政策變化對處理單元的因果影響。本文提出了綜合控制估計器的擴展，它利用了這種額外的結(jié)構(gòu)，并提供了聚合單元內(nèi)異質(zhì)性的非參數(shù)估計。這個想法是通過控制單元的分位數(shù)函數(shù)的加權(quán)平均值來復(fù)制與處理單元相關(guān)的分位數(shù)函數(shù)。該估計器依賴于與變化中的變化估計器相同的數(shù)學理論，可以應(yīng)用于重復(fù)的橫截面和面板數(shù)據(jù)，只需一個預(yù)處理周期。它還為任何類型的分布提供了一個獨特的反事實分位數(shù)函數(shù)。

Unemployment and Endogenous Reallocation over the Business Cycle

經(jīng)濟周期中的失業(yè)和內(nèi)生再分配

Carlos Carrillo‐Tudela, Ludo Visschers
This paper studies the extent to which the cyclicality of occupational mobility shapes that of aggregate unemployment and its duration distribution. We document the relation between workers' occupational mobility and unemployment duration over the long run and business cycle. To interpret this evidence, we develop a multisector business cycle model with heterogenous agents. The model is quantitatively consistent with several important features of the US labor market: procyclical gross and countercyclical net occupational mobility, the large volatility of unemployment and the cyclical properties of the unemployment duration distribution, among many others. Our analysis shows that occupational mobility due to workers' changing career prospects, and not occupation‐wide differences, interacts with aggregate conditions to drive the fluctuations of the unemployment duration distribution, and the aggregate unemployment rate.

本文研究了職業(yè)流動的周期性對總失業(yè)及其持續(xù)時間分布的影響程度。我們記錄了工人的職業(yè)流動性與長期失業(yè)持續(xù)時間和經(jīng)濟周期之間的關(guān)系。為了解釋這一證據(jù)，我們開發(fā)了一個具有異質(zhì)代理的多部門商業(yè)周期模型。該模型在數(shù)量上與美國勞動力市場的幾個重要特征相一致:順周期總凈職業(yè)流動性和逆周期凈職業(yè)流動性、失業(yè)率的巨大波動性和失業(yè)持續(xù)時間分布的周期性特征，以及其他許多特征。我們的分析表明，由于工人職業(yè)前景的變化而引起的職業(yè)流動性，而不是職業(yè)范圍的差異，與總體條件相互作用，驅(qū)動失業(yè)持續(xù)時間分布和總失業(yè)率的波動。