正文翻譯

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評(píng)論翻譯

Sun Tzu’s statement: Know yourself and know the enemy, in hundred battles you will be not be afraid. This is just an advice that more completely and correctly you know about your and other side’s strengths and weaknesses, you will be better be able to make informed decisions. But historically, there is no way you can completely know other side’s situations before the war. How capable are the other’s commanders? How well disciplined is other’s organization? What is other side hiding? How good are enemy’s weapons? And lots of other factors. A wise commander would err on the side of caution.
As Sun Tzu said, weaker force, however resilient, will be captured. So if you are weak, better avoid and make peace. This is what Fabius of Romans did against Hannibal.Mao and the Eighth Route Army retreated on the Long March, then reassembled its strength.
But too much caution also ties the opportunity for victory. Scipio showed that by boldly attacking Carthage, despite Fabius and other Senators obxtions, it forced Hannibal to return to Carthage and face him in the battle of Zama.

孫子說(shuō)過(guò)：知己知彼，百戰(zhàn)不殆。 這只是一個(gè)建議，更全面和正確地了解你和對(duì)方的優(yōu)勢(shì)和缺點(diǎn)，你將更好地作出明智的決定。 但從歷史上看，你不可能完全了解戰(zhàn)前對(duì)方的情況。 對(duì)方指揮官的能力如何？ 對(duì)方的組織紀(jì)律性如何？ 對(duì)方隱藏著什么？ 對(duì)方的武器有多好？還有很多其他因素。 明智的指揮官寧可謹(jǐn)慎行事。
正如孫子所說(shuō)，弱小的軍隊(duì)，無(wú)論如何抵抗，最終都會(huì)被俘虜。 所以如果你很軟弱，最好避開并且和平相處。羅馬人的法比尤斯就是這樣對(duì)付漢尼拔的。毛和八路軍在長(zhǎng)征中撤退，然后重新集結(jié)力量反擊。
但過(guò)于謹(jǐn)慎也會(huì)束縛勝利的機(jī)會(huì)。 西庇阿不顧法比尤斯和其他參議員的反對(duì)，勇敢地攻擊迦太基，迫使?jié)h尼拔返回迦太基，并在扎馬戰(zhàn)役中與他對(duì)抗。

Sun Tzu lived in a time when the warfare was not based on a continuous front wars. Also, technology and industrial capacity plays much crucial role now days. As weapons become more advanced and complicated to make, it is harder for the country to replace them quickly. And race to a more advanced technology, is what nations pursue nowadays.
In my opinion, Sun Tzu’s emphasis on meticulous planning, study of strategy and tactics, are timeless tenants for the officers and leaders. But I am more impressed of his humanism: Anger may turn into gladness and vexation to joy. But a defeated nation can not be restored.

孫子所處的時(shí)代，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)并不是建立在連續(xù)不斷的前線戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上。 此外，現(xiàn)代的技術(shù)和工業(yè)能力發(fā)揮了重要作用。隨著武器變得越來(lái)越先進(jìn)和復(fù)雜，國(guó)家很難迅速更換它們。 競(jìng)相采用更先進(jìn)的技術(shù)，是當(dāng)今各國(guó)追求的目標(biāo)。
在我看來(lái)，孫子強(qiáng)調(diào)周密的計(jì)劃、重視戰(zhàn)略戰(zhàn)術(shù)的研究，永遠(yuǎn)是軍官和領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的必讀書本。 但我對(duì)他的人文主義印象更深刻：憤怒可以變得高興，生氣可以變得喜悅，但國(guó)家滅亡了就不存在了，人戰(zhàn)死了就不可復(fù)生了（怒可以復(fù)喜，慍可以復(fù)悅；亡國(guó)不可復(fù)存，死者不可以復(fù)生）。

Kartik Ayyar,
I personally think its a brilliant book and a must read for anyone interested in improving their personal efficiency and I've learnt some of the most useful practical things I know from reading it.Despite its title, the Art of War is actually a rather general purpose book that in this day and age would probably be more appropriately titled as "A philosophical approach to solving problems in the face of competing priorities."
The earliest I encountered the book was when I was reading strategy guides for real time strategy games about ~15 years ago, and it was often cited as must read.There are a number of wonderful nuggets of wisdom in the book, and while I don't really play much in the way of real time strategy games anymore, I do believe the book has taught me a number of small things that I've found highly useful.Some of the samples of useful things I learnt from it ( at the time ) were:Know your enemy and know yourself, and in a thousand battles will you be victorious.Understand the problem that you are trying to solve well, and also understand your strengths and weaknesses in terms of trying to tackle it.Win your victory off your battlefield.Doing your homework well goes a long way.For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.Don't take the shotgun approach to solving a problem.Strategy without tactics is the slowest path to victory.Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeatIdeally, you should have a solid understanding of both the big picture and the small picture of what you are doing, but the big picture is always more important.There is a lot more in the book than I could summarize here, and there are translations of the book available online , I suggest you leaf through it and get to experience its goodness first hand.

【回答】
我個(gè)人認(rèn)為這是一本非常棒的書，對(duì)于任何有興趣提高個(gè)人效率的人來(lái)說(shuō)都是必讀之書，而且我從里面學(xué)到了一些我認(rèn)為最有用的實(shí)用知識(shí)。 盡管書名是《孫子兵法》 ，但它實(shí)際上是一本相當(dāng)通用的書，在當(dāng)今時(shí)代，這本書的名字換成這個(gè)可能更合適: 《面對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí)，解決優(yōu)先問(wèn)題的哲學(xué)方法》。
我最早接觸這本書是在大約15年前，當(dāng)時(shí)我正在看戰(zhàn)略游戲的攻略指南，它經(jīng)常被引用為必讀書。 這本書里有很多金玉良言，雖然我現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)不怎么玩戰(zhàn)略游戲了，但我相信這本書教會(huì)了我一些我覺得非常有用的小知識(shí)。 我當(dāng)時(shí)從里面學(xué)到的一些有用的東西是：知己知彼，百戰(zhàn)不殆。了解你正在努力解決的問(wèn)題，也了解你在嘗試解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題時(shí)的優(yōu)勢(shì)和劣勢(shì)，對(duì)做好家庭作業(yè)會(huì)有很大幫助。百戰(zhàn)百勝，不是最高超的技巧，不用戰(zhàn)斗就能制服敵人才是最高超的技巧。
不要用散彈槍式的方法來(lái)解決問(wèn)題。沒有戰(zhàn)術(shù)的戰(zhàn)略是到達(dá)不了完全勝利的。而沒有戰(zhàn)略的戰(zhàn)術(shù)是失敗前的征兆。從理論上講，你應(yīng)該對(duì)你正在做的事情的全局和局部都有一個(gè)成熟的理解，但是大局總是更重要。這本書的內(nèi)容比我在這里總結(jié)的要多得多，而且網(wǎng)上也有這本書的英譯版本，我建議你快速瀏覽一下，親身體驗(yàn)一下它的益處。

John Carter, former Staff Sergeant at U.S. Army (2001-2012)
Taking out the specifics, such as the equipment of the time, and it is very relevant.
One of the first things he points out is the financial costs of a war. He uses dated equipment, but when he mentions that raising an army of one hundred thousand men, chariots, and supplying it costs a thousand pieces of silver a day (which was a large sum back then), he is saying that raising and maintaining an army is an expensive proposition.
His aphorisms about when and where to fight are still valid, even today. One should fight the enemy on ground of his choosing whenever possible, and one should see where the best places in the enemy’s forces to attack are.
As are his comments on using the opponent’s own psychology against him. Can you provoke him into attacking before he is ready? Do so. Can you use his own caution against him to force him to give up strategic advantages without a fight? Do so.
Things like maintaining the right amount of discipline while also not being overly harsh are very valid, even today.

【回答】前美國(guó)陸軍上士(2001-2012)
剔除細(xì)節(jié)，比如當(dāng)時(shí)的裝備。跟現(xiàn)代戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)是非常相關(guān)的。
他首先指出的事情之一就是戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)成本。召集一支十萬(wàn)人的軍隊(duì)、戰(zhàn)車，并且每天要花費(fèi)一千個(gè)銀幣來(lái)維持（這在當(dāng)時(shí)是一大筆錢），這是一項(xiàng)昂貴的開銷。
他關(guān)于何時(shí)何地作戰(zhàn)的格言至今仍然有效。只要有可能，就應(yīng)該在自己選擇的地方同敵人作戰(zhàn)，并且應(yīng)該看看敵人部隊(duì)的最佳攻擊地點(diǎn)在哪里。
同樣，他說(shuō)過(guò)：利用對(duì)手的心理來(lái)對(duì)付他自己。
你能在他還沒準(zhǔn)備好的時(shí)候，激怒他主動(dòng)攻擊嗎？那就這么做吧。
你能否利用他的謹(jǐn)慎，迫使他不戰(zhàn)而退，放棄戰(zhàn)略優(yōu)勢(shì)？那就這么做吧。
即使在今天，保持適當(dāng)?shù)募o(jì)律，同時(shí)不過(guò)分苛刻，這樣也是非常有效的。

His emphasis on using spies can easily be expanded to encompass all intelligence efforts, as well as the fact that he also stresses denying the enemy the same opportunities. Suborn the spies, root them out, control what the enemy knows.
But one of the biggest things he stresses is that war is not a desirable outcome and should be avoided. But if a war is to be fought, then you do so with the purpose of winning and winning quickly.

他對(duì)使用間諜的重視可以很容易地?cái)U(kuò)展到包括所有情報(bào)工作，以及他也強(qiáng)調(diào)不給敵人同樣的機(jī)會(huì)。收買間諜，鏟除他們，控制敵人的情報(bào)。
但他強(qiáng)調(diào)的最重要的一點(diǎn)是，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)不是一個(gè)理想的結(jié)果，應(yīng)該避免。 但是，如果要打一場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，那么你這樣做的目的只有一個(gè)：迅速贏得勝利。

Kriztofer Plitzkin, French Foreign Legion
Not much.
My personal reading of The Art Of War proved that while some general principles implied by Sun Tzu are more or less timeless and self-explanatory, the bulk of the text is very abstract and holds an almost philosophic and somewhat allegoric tone which makes it very difficult to decipher. Is it the effect of innacurate traduction or historico-cultural context and linguistic relativity ? Most probably.
I suppose that around the 5th to 6th century, Sun Tzu′s work might have held a similar status to modern classified military doctrines and hold much martial value in different regards but these days are long passed...

Overall, I would say that while it makes for an interesting read and enriching token of literacy ( "I have red The Art Of War." being a nice thing to be able to say in certain circles) one can also state safely that as of today this treatise does not hold much value as far as actual warfare is concerned. The nature of modern warfare differs too much from the time of Sun Tzu磗 strategic essay.

Obsolete.
Expect not to find the solutions to solve any strategic problem lixed to the nature of modern warfare anywhere in these pages.
But a fun read !

【回答】法國(guó)外籍兵團(tuán)
不是很多關(guān)聯(lián)的地方。
我個(gè)人對(duì)《孫子兵法》的解讀，盡管《孫子兵法》中的一些普遍原則或多或少是永恒的，不言而喻，但大部分文本是非常抽象的，幾乎帶有哲學(xué)和某種寓言色彩，因此很難解讀。這究竟是源于古老的傳統(tǒng)還是歷史文化背景的影響？ 很有可能。
我猜想，大約在5世紀(jì)到6世紀(jì)，孫子的著作可能與現(xiàn)代軍事學(xué)說(shuō)有相似的地位，并且在不同的方面具有很高的軍事價(jià)值，但是距離現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)很久了...
總的來(lái)說(shuō)，我想說(shuō)的是，雖然它是一部有趣的書籍和有豐富的文化象征(“我看過(guò)孫子兵法” 在某些圈子里，可以說(shuō)是有益處的）我們也可以有把握地說(shuō)，到今天為止，就實(shí)際戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)而言，這本書沒有多大的價(jià)值了?，F(xiàn)代戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的本質(zhì)與孫子兵法的時(shí)代有很大的不同。已經(jīng)過(guò)時(shí)了。
不要期望在這本書中找到解決任何與現(xiàn)代戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)性質(zhì)相關(guān)的戰(zhàn)略問(wèn)題的方法。但這是一本很有趣的讀物！

Ben Brown, J.D. from University of Michigan Law School (2012)
The Art of War is an argument against a culture of "personal valor" in favor of a calculated, strategic approach to warfare, including the intentional avoidance of battles when the goals of a war can be achieved without engagement in battle. See Professor Andrew R. Wilson, "Masters of War: History's Greatest Strategic Thinkers: Course Guidebook" pp. 26-28 (The Great Courses, 2012) ("[The Art of War] presents a revolutionary ideal that is vastly superior to the aristocratic/heroic ideal that sees battle as ritual and to the Confucian disdain for military affairs.").By appreciating the innovative way that the author of The Art of War reacted to the conditions of his time, we can prepare ourselves to react to our own time and circumstance with better insight.

【回答】密歇根大學(xué)法學(xué)院法學(xué)博士(2012)
《孫子兵法》是對(duì)“個(gè)人英雄主義”文化的一種反對(duì)，這本書傾向于一種精心策劃的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略方法，包括當(dāng)目標(biāo)不需要戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)就能實(shí)現(xiàn)時(shí)，有意避免戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。參考安德魯 · R · 威爾遜教授的《戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)大師: 歷史上最偉大的戰(zhàn)略思想家: 課程指南》第26-28頁(yè)，《孫子兵法》提出了一種革命理想，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)優(yōu)于英雄主義的理想，后者將戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)視為儀式，而儒家對(duì)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)表示蔑視。
通過(guò)欣賞《孫子兵法》的作者孫子對(duì)那個(gè)時(shí)代的創(chuàng)新反應(yīng)，可以使我們對(duì)自己的時(shí)代和環(huán)境有更好的洞察力。

Richard Jones,
It's an interesting read, and not a big book at all so you can get through it quickly.It has some nice bits of transferrable wisdom, but also a fair amount of domain-specific / dated rules of thumb, like how many pieces of silver etc you have to pay your army.Here's an example of the less useful stuff: 1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men

【回答】
這是一本有趣的書，不會(huì)很厚，所以你可以很快地讀完它。它有一些很好的可轉(zhuǎn)化的智慧，但也有相當(dāng)數(shù)量的特定領(lǐng)域或過(guò)時(shí)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)規(guī)則，比如你需要支付你的軍隊(duì)多少銀幣等等。 這里有一個(gè)不太有用的例子：孫子說(shuō)，在戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上，有一千輛戰(zhàn)車和十萬(wàn)身穿盔甲的士兵，他們的糧食足以使他們行軍一千里，營(yíng)地和前線的開支，以及花在戰(zhàn)車和盔甲上的錢，每天總共將花一千兩銀子。 這就是召集一支十萬(wàn)大軍的代價(jià)。

Pedro Candeias, Software Developer @ Inpakt.com
The Art of War was written as a treaty on how to conduct yourself, manage your men and resources, and deal with ever changing adversaries and conditions in the military arena.The great thing about it is that it's written in such a way that makes it easy to abstract its tenets and apply them to pretty much any situation in social life - particularly competitive situations like business.If you haven't read it yet, do it.I recommend the Lionel Giles version; his own annotations are excellent, plus he includes notes from other ancient chinese warlords as well.

【回答】軟件開發(fā)者
《孫子兵法》是一部關(guān)于如何管理自己、管理你的雇員和資源，以及處理不斷變化的敵人和軍事領(lǐng)域的條約。 如果你還沒有讀過(guò)這本書，那就讀讀吧。我推薦萊昂內(nèi)爾 · 賈爾斯的版本，他自己的注釋非常好，而且他還收錄了其他中國(guó)古代軍隊(duì)的筆記。

Sam Eiji, art of war
It is very useful if you can learn something from it.
It is not very useful if you learn nothing from it.
The books would been particularly useful if you could grasp something from those books and it let you to defeat a much superior army.
Vietnam warAfghan warSomalia warIraq warYemen war911 attack.You could apply those theory in other field too.
Many people apply it in the field of business, share market, and politics.
Maybe Donald trumps are well versed in those Sun Tzu theory.
trumps beats all his competitor easily.
trumps make all kind of mistake, yet he can still prevail over his competitor.
The Media cant kill off his popularity.- smearing campaign, hatred.
The Media cant destroy him.

【回答】
如果你能從中學(xué)到一些東西，那它就非常有用。
如果你從中學(xué)不到任何東西，那它就沒多大用處。
如果你能從書中學(xué)到一些東西，并且能夠打敗一支強(qiáng)大得多的軍隊(duì)，那么這書就特別有用。
越南戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)、阿富汗戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)、索馬里戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)、也門戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和911襲擊，你也可以把這些理論應(yīng)用到其他領(lǐng)域。
許多人將其應(yīng)用于商業(yè)、股票市場(chǎng)和政治領(lǐng)域。
也許唐納德特朗普精通孫子的理論。特朗普輕而易舉地?fù)魯×怂械母?jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手。
雖然特朗普犯了各種各樣的錯(cuò)誤，但他仍然可以戰(zhàn)勝他的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手。媒體抹殺不了他的聲望。媒體毀不了他。

Abu Kedem (Rechavia Berman), I translated the Sun Tzu into Hebrew
Many, but to pick two you may have heard of: Mao Tse Tung and Vo Nguyen Giap, the commander of the Viet Cong who defeated the mighty USA. Both utilized Master Sun’s principles and defeated opponents who were, on paper, far stronger than their own.
There’s an anecdote (true or apocryphal, it’s so good I have to share it) about an American retired general meeting with a Vietcong counterpart many years after the war had ended and both nations resumed relations. The two men shared a beverage and talked about the war.
The American said: You know, you guys never beat us in a battle. Not once.
The Vietnamese said: This is true. It’s also irrelevant.

【回答】我翻譯了希伯來(lái)語(yǔ)的《孫子兵法》
許多關(guān)聯(lián)，我選擇兩個(gè)你可能已經(jīng)聽說(shuō)過(guò): 毛和越共指揮官武元甲，他們都打敗了強(qiáng)大的美國(guó)。 兩人都運(yùn)用了孫子的原則，打敗了名義上比自己強(qiáng)大得多的對(duì)手。
有一則軼事(不管真假，我必須要分享)是關(guān)于一位美國(guó)退休將軍在戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)束兩國(guó)恢復(fù)關(guān)系的多年后，與一位越共同僚會(huì)面的。 這兩個(gè)人喝著酒，談?wù)撝鴳?zhàn)爭(zhēng)。
這個(gè)美國(guó)人說(shuō)：你知道，你們這些家伙從來(lái)沒有在戰(zhàn)斗中打敗過(guò)我們。 一次也沒有。
而那個(gè)越南人說(shuō)：這是事實(shí)，但也是無(wú)關(guān)緊要的事實(shí)。

Ricky Sng
In the past, most of the leaders in the Sengoku Jidai in Japan all used tactics based on or straight out from the book.
In modern times, some similarities in how IJA’s General Yamashita blustered and bluffed his way and cheated Malaya out of AE Perceivals and the British hands.
Many generals in WW2 used some tactics that were listed such as the use of spies for espionage etc. Would recommend this volume.

【回答】
在過(guò)去，日本四國(guó)時(shí)代的大部分領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都使用基于或直接從《孫子兵法》中出來(lái)的戰(zhàn)術(shù)。
在現(xiàn)代，日本帝國(guó)陸軍的山下將軍是如何虛張聲勢(shì)并欺騙馬來(lái)亞脫離英國(guó)人的手中的。
第二次世界大戰(zhàn)中的許多將軍使用了一些戰(zhàn)術(shù)，例如進(jìn)行間諜活動(dòng)等。 我推薦這本書。

Lawrence Wong, AI Blockchain Cloud Mobile
Absolutely! The numbers, venues and weapons may be obsolete, but the strategic considerations are as relevant today as in Sun Tzu's time. To think otherwise is to be ignorant of current affairs and business practices. Sadly, USA is paying the enormous costs of such monumental stupidity.
Compare and contrast the costs/benefits and consequences of the two Iraqi wars..
thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.。
Bush 41 isolated Saddam Hussein by skillfully exploiting internal Shiite, Kurdish divisions; building a UN-approved coalition such that even Russia abandoned Saddam. Attacking remotely, where Saddam least expect it, victory was swift and devastating. Saddam was already lost when he ordered a chaotic, withdrawal, leading to the biggest Turkey shoot in history. Desert Storm was universally applauded as a text-book case of overwhelming strategic and tactical success. US even made a nominal profit. Bush 41 wisely allowed Saddam to stay in power to maintain strategic balance in the region.
In contrast, Bush 43 made the worst decision to “besiege the city.” Drunk with misguided pride and missionary zeal after initial success against the Taliban in Afghanistan, he asserted that Saddam was behind the 911 attacks, sextively denying American intelligence reports that Al Qaeda, no friend of secular Saddam, was responsible. Then, failing to show credible proof of weapons of mass destruction and thus no UN resolution, he twisted arms to attack with only the “coalition of the willing.” Winning battle after battle but at enormous costs, and seeing no crowds bearing flowers and sweets. Instead, decade-long insurgencies and the rise of DAESH. The total tab is $2 trillions and counting, thus arguably losing the peace.
So indirectly, the path of China rising is cleared by strategic failure of Bush 43 administration in understanding Sun Tzu's philosophy.

【回答】AI區(qū)塊鏈云移動(dòng)
當(dāng)然！雖然數(shù)量、地點(diǎn)和武器可能已經(jīng)過(guò)時(shí)了，但戰(zhàn)略考慮在當(dāng)代和孫子的時(shí)代同樣重要。如果不這樣想的話，就會(huì)對(duì)時(shí)事和商業(yè)慣例一無(wú)所知。 可悲的是，美國(guó)正在為愚蠢透頂付出巨大的代價(jià)。
比較兩次伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的成本、收益和后果......
“故上兵伐謀，其次伐交，其次伐兵，其下攻城”
因此，將軍最高的謀略是阻止敵人的計(jì)劃，其次是阻止敵人的軍隊(duì)匯合，其次是在戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上攻擊敵人的軍隊(duì)，最糟糕的是圍攻有城墻的城市。
老布什通過(guò)巧妙地利用什葉派內(nèi)部的庫(kù)爾德人分裂孤立了薩達(dá)姆，建立了一個(gè)聯(lián)合國(guó)批準(zhǔn)的聯(lián)盟，甚至連俄羅斯也拋棄了薩達(dá)姆。在薩達(dá)姆最意想不到的地方進(jìn)行遠(yuǎn)程攻擊，這場(chǎng)勝利是迅速而毀滅性的。當(dāng)薩達(dá)姆下令進(jìn)行撤退時(shí)，導(dǎo)致了歷史上最大規(guī)模的土耳其槍擊事件，他已經(jīng)失敗了。“沙漠風(fēng)暴行動(dòng)”被普遍稱贊為戰(zhàn)略和戰(zhàn)術(shù)上取得壓倒性勝利的教科書案例。 美國(guó)甚至得到了名義利潤(rùn)。 老布什總統(tǒng)明智地允許薩達(dá)姆繼續(xù)掌權(quán)，以維持該地區(qū)的戰(zhàn)略平衡。
相比之下，小布什做出的最糟糕的決定是“圍攻城市”。在阿富汗打擊塔利班取得初步成功后，他帶著被誤導(dǎo)的驕傲和傳教士般的熱情，堅(jiān)稱薩達(dá)姆是9.11的幕后黑手，有選擇性地否認(rèn)美國(guó)情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)關(guān)于基地組織跟薩達(dá)姆沒有關(guān)系。然后，由于沒有大規(guī)模殺傷性武器的可靠證據(jù)，也就沒有聯(lián)合國(guó)的決議，他只好在“自愿聯(lián)盟”的支持下，進(jìn)行攻擊。贏得了一場(chǎng)又一場(chǎng)的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，但付出了巨大的代價(jià)，沒有看到人群捧著鮮花和糖果迎接。 相反，十年之久的叛亂和伊斯蘭國(guó)的崛起。 總賬單是2萬(wàn)億美元，而且還在增加中，因此可以說(shuō)失去了和平。
所以間接地，中國(guó)崛起道路的障礙被小布什掃清了，只因?yàn)樗蠢斫鈱O子的哲學(xué)。