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【請(qǐng)求校對(duì)】海德格爾簡(jiǎn)述

2022-11-20 12:15 作者:阿圖爾_施納貝爾  | 我要投稿

機(jī)翻,哲學(xué)水平不太足以支撐進(jìn)一步翻譯,求大神校對(duì)。

https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1HW4y1W7PN/?vd_source=9448a4535fa43cb616423b8819763be7


Heidegger


1. The most fundamental philosophical question is: "Why does anything exist at all?"


Other ways to phrase the question are: "What are the conditions of existence?", "What does it mean to exist at all?", "What does it mean to 'be' something?". The study of this question Heidegger sometimes terms "existential ontology", where "ontology" means "the study of how something exists"; therefore, "existential ontology" means "the study of how existence itself exists".


Heidegger argues, rather straightforwardly, that this ought to be the most fundamental question because it presupposes everything else we could possible talk about, insofar as everything we could possible talk about is an existing thing; that is, exists within the set of existing things. This is obviously an excruciatingly difficult subject to articulate, especially because the majority of western philosophy has completely neglected the issue, forcing Heidegger to contort himself oddly and invent new words and language to investigate the issue.?


Heidegger is willing to do this, however, because he recognized that any attempt to become conscious of one truth necessarily makes other aspects of truth obscure, just as a camera lens can only bring into focus one layer of an image at a time, while necessarily blurring all the others. For example, an explanation of one's motivations in terms of Jungian Typology necessarily leaves unclear those parts of the motivation that Typology cannot talk about. By revealing one thing and emphasizing its importance, one necessarily conceals and devalues another. This is especially evident in language, and Heidegger resigns himself to the fact that by inquiring into existential ontology he necessarily makes a lot of things we're used to seeing clearly quite the opposite of that.


This leads directly into the next point:


2. The answer to the question is: "Because we bring things into our present view."


For Heidegger, the reason things exist, as far as human beings can or reasonably should be concerned, is simply because we perceive them to be. Heidegger is thus a highly psychological and existential philosopher, regarding the perceiving subject as the center of everything. Things can only exist from our point of view, and whatever existence they have apart from us is utterly irrelevant, and even nonsensical to mention. Things are, and are the way they are, because that is how we represent them to ourselves, and things change in their nature for us depending on the point of view from which we view them, and which traits we emphasize in them at a given point.?


And that last sentence leads directly into Heidegger's further point, that the most fundamental condition of a thing's existence for us is time. In other words, in order for a thing to exist for us, in order for us to bring it out of concealment and into existence for our subject, we are making it present to us by bringing it into our view in the present moment. That is, as I had just said: we emphasize certain traits or aspects of reality to ourselves at a given point in time. Truth is revealed and concealed to us because we can only view one thing at a time. Hence, the title of Heidegger's magnum opus: Being and Time -- because for Heidegger, being only occurs in terms of time.


3. To be human is to retain in present view one's identity as a truth-revealing subject.


In other words, when one is not just aware of objects, but adds to this the awareness of one's own subject as the means by which these objects have their being, and even the means by which one's own subject has being for oneself -- in short, when one focuses their camera lens on themselves, placing themselves into focus through the mirror of existential ontology, revealing themselves and concealing all else, and thus understand that the reason anything exists is because they themselves exist as a perceiving subject -- that is when one is authentically human. Inasmuch as the true nature of being is being present in time for one's own subject, then to be human is to present oneself to oneself as a being who does just this (not unlike a television screen displaying a live feed of itself). One becomes ontologically aware of one's own pure existence, and with that, the immense capacity and responsibility one has towards oneself as the revealer/concealer of their own world.?


This awareness is brought about by the awareness of one's own mortality, i.e. inevitable death. For this is what awakens us to the nature of time: suddenly there is a reference point, an end, towards which every other moment of existence or presence is counting down. The contrast of death (nonexistence) brings the nature of one's own existence into sharp relief. One is thus placed in a position already described by Kierkegaard as "anxiety" or "angst": one suddenly realizes that there is an infinitude of concealed things one might experience, but only a finitude of moments in which to reveal them. We all in some way or other flee from this revealing of our own nature by revealing other objects instead. Heidegger calls this "being-in-the-world", the opposite of authenticity, where one's subject is concealed by the continual revelation of objects. One loses oneself in the dance of external necessity, and refuses to face the fact that they are responsible for themselves, not anyone or anything else.


However, if one faces and overcomes this angst, one becomes resolved to make the most of oneself as a perceiving subject, by remaining open to the infinitude of possible views that might reveal themselves, instead of willingly concealing them through dogmatic focus on one comfortable view. One embraces their alienation from everything as part and parcel of being human, of being a being-perceiving being. In a sense, Heidegger concludes along with Socrates that "the unexamined life is not worth living."


To help people take ownership of their lives by remaining open to new views of the world is Heidegger's philosophy in a nutshell.



海德格爾


1. 最基本的哲學(xué)問(wèn)題是:"為什么任何東西都會(huì)存在?"


這個(gè)問(wèn)題的其他表述方式有: "存在的條件是什么?","存在到底意味著什么?","'是'什么東西意味著什么?"。對(duì)這個(gè)問(wèn)題的研究,海德格爾有時(shí)稱(chēng)之為 "存在本體論",其中 "本體論 "是指 "對(duì)某物如何存在的研究";因此,"存在本體論 "意味著 "對(duì)存在本身如何存在的研究"。


海德格爾相當(dāng)直截了當(dāng)?shù)卣J(rèn)為,這應(yīng)該是最基本的問(wèn)題,因?yàn)樗晕覀兛赡苷務(wù)摰钠渌磺袨榍疤幔灰覀兛赡苷務(wù)摰囊磺惺且粋€(gè)存在的事物;也就是說(shuō),存在于現(xiàn)有事物的集合之中。這顯然是一個(gè)極難闡述的話題,尤其是因?yàn)榇蠖鄶?shù)西方哲學(xué)完全忽視了這個(gè)問(wèn)題,迫使海德格爾古怪地扭曲自己,發(fā)明新的詞匯和語(yǔ)言來(lái)研究這個(gè)問(wèn)題。


然而,海德格爾愿意這樣做,因?yàn)樗J(rèn)識(shí)到,任何試圖意識(shí)到一種真理的嘗試都必然使真理的其他方面變得模糊不清,就像照相機(jī)鏡頭每次只能使圖像的某一層成為焦點(diǎn),而必然使所有其他方面模糊不清。例如,用榮格類(lèi)型學(xué)來(lái)解釋一個(gè)人的動(dòng)機(jī),必然使類(lèi)型學(xué)無(wú)法談?wù)摰哪切﹦?dòng)機(jī)部分變得不清楚。通過(guò)揭示一件事并強(qiáng)調(diào)其重要性,人們必然會(huì)掩蓋和貶低另一件事。這在語(yǔ)言中尤其明顯,海德格爾認(rèn)命了,通過(guò)探究存在本體論,他必然使很多我們習(xí)慣于看清楚的東西變得恰恰相反。


這直接導(dǎo)致了下一個(gè)觀點(diǎn)。


2. 這個(gè)問(wèn)題的答案是:"因?yàn)槲覀儼咽挛飵胛覀儸F(xiàn)在的視野"。


對(duì)海德格爾來(lái)說(shuō),就人類(lèi)能夠或合理地應(yīng)該關(guān)注的事物而言,事物存在的原因僅僅是因?yàn)槲覀兏兄剿鼈兊拇嬖?。因此,海德格爾是一個(gè)高度心理學(xué)和存在主義的哲學(xué)家,把感知主體視為一切的中心。事物只能從我們的角度存在,無(wú)論它們?cè)谖覀冎庥惺裁创嬖冢际峭耆幌喔傻?,甚至是毫無(wú)意義的提法。事物是這樣的,也是這樣的,因?yàn)槟鞘俏覀儗?duì)自己的表述,而事物的性質(zhì)對(duì)我們來(lái)說(shuō)是變化的,這取決于我們從哪個(gè)角度看它們,以及我們?cè)谀骋稽c(diǎn)上強(qiáng)調(diào)了它們的哪些特征。


最后一句話直接引出了海德格爾的進(jìn)一步觀點(diǎn),即一個(gè)事物對(duì)我們來(lái)說(shuō)存在的最基本條件是時(shí)間。換句話說(shuō),為了讓一個(gè)事物為我們而存在,為了讓我們把它從隱藏中帶出來(lái)并為我們的主體而存在,我們通過(guò)把它帶到我們的視野中的當(dāng)下而使它呈現(xiàn)出來(lái)。也就是說(shuō),正如我剛才所說(shuō):我們?cè)谀硞€(gè)特定的時(shí)間點(diǎn)向自己強(qiáng)調(diào)了現(xiàn)實(shí)的某些特征或方面。真理對(duì)我們來(lái)說(shuō)是顯露和隱藏的,因?yàn)槲覀冊(cè)谕粫r(shí)間只能觀看一件事。因此,海德格爾的巨著的標(biāo)題是:存在與時(shí)間--因?yàn)閷?duì)海德格爾來(lái)說(shuō),存在只發(fā)生在時(shí)間方面。


3. 3.做人就是在當(dāng)下的視野中保留自己作為揭示真理的主體的身份。


換句話說(shuō),當(dāng)一個(gè)人不只是意識(shí)到對(duì)象,而是在此基礎(chǔ)上增加了對(duì)自己主體的意識(shí),即這些對(duì)象擁有其存在的手段,甚至是自己的主體為自己擁有存在的手段--簡(jiǎn)而言之,當(dāng)一個(gè)人將其相機(jī)鏡頭對(duì)準(zhǔn)自己,通過(guò)存在論的鏡子將自己置于焦點(diǎn)之中,揭示自己并掩蓋其他一切,從而理解任何東西之所以存在,是因?yàn)樗麄冏约鹤鳛橐粋€(gè)感知主體而存在--這時(shí)人才是真正的人類(lèi)。只要存在的真正性質(zhì)是為自己的主體及時(shí)存在,那么做人就是把自己作為一個(gè)存在呈現(xiàn)給自己,而這個(gè)存在就是這樣做的(與電視屏幕顯示自己的實(shí)時(shí)畫(huà)面不一樣)。一個(gè)人在本體論上意識(shí)到自己的純粹存在,并由此意識(shí)到自己作為自己世界的揭示者/遮蔽者對(duì)自己所具有的巨大能力和責(zé)任。


這種意識(shí)是由對(duì)自己的死亡率,即不可避免的死亡的意識(shí)帶來(lái)的。因?yàn)檫@是喚醒我們對(duì)時(shí)間本質(zhì)的認(rèn)識(shí):突然有了一個(gè)參考點(diǎn),一個(gè)終點(diǎn),每一個(gè)其他的存在或存在的時(shí)刻都在向這個(gè)終點(diǎn)倒數(shù)。死亡(不存在)的對(duì)比使人對(duì)自己的存在的性質(zhì)產(chǎn)生了強(qiáng)烈的認(rèn)識(shí)。因此,人們被置于克爾凱郭爾已經(jīng)描述為 "焦慮 "或 "苦惱 "的位置:人們突然意識(shí)到,有無(wú)窮無(wú)盡的隱藏的東西可以讓人體驗(yàn),但只有有限的時(shí)刻可以揭示它們。我們都以某種方式逃避這種對(duì)我們自己本性的揭示,而去揭示其他對(duì)象。海德格爾稱(chēng)這為 "存在于世界",與真實(shí)性相反,在那里,一個(gè)人的主體被對(duì)象的不斷揭示所掩蓋。一個(gè)人在外部必然性的舞蹈中失去了自我,拒絕面對(duì)這樣一個(gè)事實(shí):他們要對(duì)自己負(fù)責(zé),而不是對(duì)任何人或任何東西負(fù)責(zé)。


然而,如果一個(gè)人面對(duì)并克服了這種焦慮,他就會(huì)決心最大限度地發(fā)揮自己作為一個(gè)感知主體的作用,對(duì)可能顯露出來(lái)的無(wú)窮無(wú)盡的觀點(diǎn)保持開(kāi)放,而不是通過(guò)教條式地專(zhuān)注于一個(gè)舒適的觀點(diǎn)而甘愿掩蓋它們。人們接受他們與一切事物的疏離,作為作為人類(lèi)的一部分,作為一個(gè)感知的存在者。在某種意義上,海德格爾與蘇格拉底一起得出結(jié)論:"未經(jīng)審視的生活是不值得過(guò)的"。


通過(guò)對(duì)世界的新觀點(diǎn)保持開(kāi)放,幫助人們掌握自己的生活,這就是海德格爾的哲學(xué),簡(jiǎn)而言之。


【請(qǐng)求校對(duì)】海德格爾簡(jiǎn)述的評(píng)論 (共 條)

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