>? Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne

> September 17, 2013

## Abstract

我們研究了容易被計算機(jī)化的敏感工作，為了對此進(jìn)行評估，我們首先使用高斯過程分類器實現(xiàn)了一個新的方法去評估702種詳細(xì)工作被計算機(jī)化的概率?；谶@些估計，我們研究了未來電腦化對美國勞動力市場結(jié)果的預(yù)期影響，主要目的是分析面臨風(fēng)險的工作崗位數(shù)量以及職業(yè)電腦化概率、工資和教育程度之間的關(guān)系。根據(jù)我們的估計，全美國有百分之四十七的的職業(yè)暴露在風(fēng)險之中。我們進(jìn)一步提供的證據(jù)表明，工資和教育程度與職業(yè)的計算機(jī)化概率呈強(qiáng)烈的負(fù)相關(guān)。

We examine how susceptible jobs are to computerisation. To assess this, we begin by implementing a novel methodology to estimate the probability of computerisation for 702 detailed occupations, using a Gaussian process classifier. Based on these estimates, we examine expected impacts of future computerisation on US labour market outcomes, with the primary objective of analysing the number of jobs at risk and the relationship between an occupation’s probability of computerisation, wages and educational attainment. According to our estimates, about 47 percent of total US employment is at risk. We further provide evidence that wages and educational attainment exhibit a strong negative relationship with an occupation' s probability of computerisation.

## I. Introduction

在這篇論文中，我們要解決的問題是：工作對計算機(jī)化的影響有多大？在現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上我們有兩種方式。第一種是使用機(jī)器學(xué)習(xí)和移動機(jī)器人。我們開發(fā)了一種新的方法依據(jù)各個職業(yè)對計算機(jī)化的敏感性去對職業(yè)進(jìn)行分類。其次，我們采用這種方法來估計702個詳細(xì)職業(yè)的計算機(jī)化概率，并研究未來計算機(jī)化對美國勞動力市場結(jié)果的預(yù)期影響。

In this paper, we address the question: how susceptible are jobs to computerisation? Doing so, we build on the existing literature in two ways. First, drawing upon recent advances in Machine Learning (ML) and Mobile Robotics (MR), we develop a novel methodology to categorise occupations according to their susceptibility to computerisation.1 Second, we implement this methodology to estimate the probability of computerisation for 702 detailed occupations, and examine expected impacts of future computerisation on US labour market outcomes.

我們的論文的動機(jī)是約翰·梅納德·凱恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）經(jīng)常被引用的關(guān)于普遍技術(shù)失業(yè)的預(yù)測，“因為我們發(fā)現(xiàn)了節(jié)約勞動力使用的方法，超過了我們發(fā)現(xiàn)勞動力新用途的速度”（Keynes，1933，第3頁）。事實上，在過去的幾十年里，計算機(jī)已經(jīng)取代了許多工作，包括記帳員、收銀員和電話接線員的職能（Bresnahan，1999；MGI，2013）。最近，發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體勞動力市場的糟糕表現(xiàn)加劇了經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家之間關(guān)于技術(shù)失業(yè)的爭論。盡管人們對持續(xù)高失業(yè)率背后的驅(qū)動力仍存在分歧，但許多學(xué)者指出，計算機(jī)控制的設(shè)備可能是最近失業(yè)率增長的一種解釋（例如，見 Brynjolfsson 和McAfee，2011）。

Our paper is motivated by John Maynard Keynes’s frequently cited prediction of widespread technological unemployment “due to our discovery of means of economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour” (Keynes, 1933, p. 3). Indeed, over the past decades, computers have substituted for a number of jobs, including the functions of bookkeepers, cashiers and telephone operators (Bresnahan, 1999;MGI, 2013). More recently, the poor performance of labour markets across advanced economies has intensified the debate about technological unemployment among economists. While there is ongoing disagreement about the driving forces behind the persistently high unemployment rates, a number of scholars have pointed at computer-controlled equipment as a possible explanation for recent jobless growth (see, for example, Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011).

計算機(jī)化對勞動力市場結(jié)果的影響在文獻(xiàn)中得到了證實，記錄了常規(guī)密集型職業(yè)的就業(yè)率下降，即主要由遵循明確程序的任務(wù)組成的職業(yè)，這些程序可以通過復(fù)雜的算法輕松執(zhí)行。例如，Charles等人（2013）以及Jaimovich和Siu（2012）的研究強(qiáng)調(diào)，制造業(yè)就業(yè)的持續(xù)下降和其他常規(guī)工作的消失導(dǎo)致了目前的低就業(yè)率。

The impact of computerisation on labourmarket outcomes is well-established in the literature, documenting the decline of employment in routine intensive occupations – i.e. occupationsmainly consisting of tasks followingwell-defined procedures that can easily be performed by sophisticated algorithms. For example, studies by Charles, et al. (2013) and Jaimovich and Siu (2012) emphasise that the ongoing decline in manufacturing employment and the disappearance of other routine jobs is causing the current low rates of employment.

除了常規(guī)制造任務(wù)的計算機(jī)化外，Autor和Dorn（2013）還記錄了勞動力市場的結(jié)構(gòu)性轉(zhuǎn)變，工人將勞動力供應(yīng)從中等收入制造業(yè)重新分配到低收入服務(wù)業(yè)?？梢哉f，這是因為服務(wù)職業(yè)的手工任務(wù)不太容易被計算機(jī)化，因為它們需要更高程度的靈活性和身體適應(yīng)性（Autor等人，2003；Goos 和Manning，2007年；Autor和Dorn，2013年）。

In addition to the computerisation of routine manufacturing tasks, Autor and Dorn(2013) document a structural shift in the labour market, with workers reallocating their labour supply from middle-income manufacturing to low-income service occupations. Arguably, this is because the manual tasks of service occupations are less susceptible to computerisation, as they require a higher degree of flexibility and physical adaptability (Autor, et al., 2003; Goos and Manning, 2007; Autor and Dorn, 2013).

與此同時，隨著計算機(jī)價格的下跌，解決問題的技能變得相對高效，這解釋了在涉及認(rèn)知任務(wù)的職業(yè)中，熟練勞動力具有相對優(yōu)勢，就業(yè)人數(shù)大幅增長，以及教育回報率持續(xù)增加（Katz和Murphy，1992；Acemoglu，2002年；Autor和Dorn，2013年）。Goos和Manning（2007）最近的一篇文章的標(biāo)題“糟糕而可愛的工作”抓住了當(dāng)前勞動力市場兩極分化趨勢的本質(zhì)，高收入認(rèn)知工作和低收入體力工作的就業(yè)人數(shù)不斷增加，同時中等收入日常工作也被掏空。

At the same time, with falling prices of computing, problem-solving skills are becoming relatively productive, explaining the substantial employment growth in occupations involving cognitive tasks where skilled labour has a comparative advantage, as well as the persistent increase in returns to education (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Acemoglu, 2002; Autor and Dorn, 2013). The title “Lousy and Lovely Jobs”, of recent work by Goos and Manning (2007), thus captures the essence of the current trend towards labour market polarization, with growing employment in high-income cognitive jobs and low-income manual occupations, accompanied by a hollowing-out of middle-income routine jobs.

Brynjolfsson 和 McAfee（2011）認(rèn)為，技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的步伐仍在加快，更復(fù)雜的軟件技術(shù)通過裁員擾亂了勞動力市場。他們書中的例子引人注目的是，計算機(jī)化不再局限于日常制造任務(wù)。谷歌開發(fā)的自動駕駛無人駕駛汽車提供了一個例子，說明運輸和物流中的手動任務(wù)可能很快就會實現(xiàn)自動化。在“一個領(lǐng)域接一個領(lǐng)域，計算機(jī)領(lǐng)先”一節(jié)中，他們強(qiáng)調(diào)了這些發(fā)展的速度有多快。不到十年前，Levy和Murnane（2004）在“為什么人仍然重要”一章中指出了復(fù)制人類感知的困難，斷言在車流中駕駛不受自動化影響：“但在迎面而來的車流中執(zhí)行左轉(zhuǎn)涉及到如此多的因素，很難想象會發(fā)現(xiàn)一套可以復(fù)制駕駛員行為的規(guī)則[…]”。六年后的2010年10月，谷歌宣布已將幾輛豐田普銳斯改裝為全自動駕駛（Brynjolfsson和McAfee，2011）。

According to Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011), the pace of technological innovation is still increasing, with more sophisticated software technologies disrupting labour markets by making workers redundant. What is striking about the examples in their book is that computerisation is no longer confined to routine manufacturing tasks. The autonomous driverless cars, developed by Google, provide one example of how manual tasks in transport and logistics may soon be automated. In the section “In Domain After Domain, Computers Race Ahead”, they emphasise how fast moving these developments have been. Less than ten years ago, in the chapter “Why People Still Matter”, Levy and Murnane (2004) pointed at the difficulties of replicating human perception, asserting that driving in traffic is insusceptible to automation: “But executing a left turn against oncoming traffic involves so many factors that it is hard to imagine discovering the set of rules that can replicate a driver’s behaviour [. . . ]”. Six years later, in October 2010, Google announced that it had modified several Toyota Priuses to be fully autonomous (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011).

據(jù)我們所知，尚未有研究量化近期技術(shù)進(jìn)步對未來就業(yè)可能意味著什么。 本研究旨在彌補文獻(xiàn)中的這一空白。 盡管確實存在有用的框架來檢查計算機(jī)對職業(yè)就業(yè)構(gòu)成的影響，但它們似乎不足以解釋超出日常任務(wù)計算機(jī)化范圍的技術(shù)趨勢的影響。 Autor 等人的開創(chuàng)性工作（2003）。 例如，一方面區(qū)分了認(rèn)知任務(wù)和體力任務(wù)，另一方面區(qū)分了常規(guī)任務(wù)和非常規(guī)任務(wù)。 雖然計算機(jī)對認(rèn)知和手動例行任務(wù)的替代是顯而易見的，但非常規(guī)任務(wù)涉及從法律寫作、卡車駕駛和醫(yī)療診斷到說服和銷售的一切。?

在目前的研究中，我們將認(rèn)為法律寫作和卡車駕駛很快就會自動化，而例如說服這種技能則不會。根據(jù)工程科學(xué)的最新發(fā)展，特別是ML領(lǐng)域的進(jìn)展，包括數(shù)據(jù)挖掘、機(jī)器視覺、計算統(tǒng)計學(xué)和人工智能的其他子領(lǐng)域，以及MR，我們得出了理解工作對計算機(jī)化的易感性所需的額外維度。

不用說，許多因素正在推動決策自動化，而我們無法全面了解這些因素。相反，從技術(shù)能力的角度來看，我們的目標(biāo)是確定工程師需要解決哪些問題才能實現(xiàn)特定職業(yè)的自動化。通過強(qiáng)調(diào)這些問題、它們的困難以及它們所涉及的職業(yè)，我們根據(jù)它們對計算機(jī)化的易感性對工作進(jìn)行了分類。利用O*NET數(shù)據(jù)，這些問題的特征與不同的職業(yè)特征相匹配，使我們能夠從技術(shù)變革對勞動力市場職業(yè)構(gòu)成的影響以及這些技術(shù)實現(xiàn)后面臨風(fēng)險的工作崗位數(shù)量的角度來研究技術(shù)變革的未來方向。

To our knowledge, no study has yet quantified what recent technological progress is likely to mean for the future of employment. The present study intends to bridge this gap in the literature. Although there are indeed existing useful frameworks for examining the impact of computers on the occupational employment composition, they seem inadequate in explaining the impact of technological trends going beyond the computerisation of routine tasks. Seminal work by Autor, et al. (2003), for example, distinguishes between cognitive and manual tasks on the one hand, and routine and non-routine tasks on the other. While the computer substitution for both cognitive and manual routine tasks is evident, non-routine tasks involve everything from legal writing, truck driving and medical diagnoses, to persuading and selling.?

In the present study, we will argue that legal writing and truck driving will soon be automated, while persuading, for instance, will not. Drawing upon recent developments in Engineering Sciences, and in particular advances in the fields of ML, including Data Mining, Machine Vision, Computational Statistics and other sub-fields of Artificial Intelligence, as well as MR, we derive additional dimensions required to understand the susceptibility of jobs to computerisation.

Needless to say, a number of factors are driving decisions to automate and we cannot capture these in full. Rather we aim, from a technological capabilities point of view, to determine which problems engineers need to solve for specific occupations to be automated. By highlighting these problems, their difficulty and to which occupations they relate, we categorise jobs according to their susceptibility to computerisation. The characteristics of these problems were matched to different occupational characteristics, using O?NET data, allowing us to examine the future direction of technological change in terms of its impact on the occupational composition of the labour market, but also the number of jobs at risk should these technologies materialise.

本研究涉及兩篇文獻(xiàn)。首先，我們的分析建立在關(guān)于就業(yè)任務(wù)內(nèi)容的勞動經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上（Autor，et al.，2003；Goos和Manning，2007；Autor和Dorn，2013）?；谟嬎銠C(jī)工作的定義前提，本文獻(xiàn)考察了計算機(jī)化對勞動力市場職業(yè)構(gòu)成的歷史影響。然而，計算機(jī)的作用范圍最近有所擴(kuò)大，并將不可避免地繼續(xù)擴(kuò)大（Brynjolfsson和McAfee，2011；MGI，2013）。根據(jù)ML的最新進(jìn)展，我們擴(kuò)展了計算機(jī)現(xiàn)在和將來適合完成的任務(wù)的前提。這樣，我們就以前瞻性的方式建立在任務(wù)內(nèi)容文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上。此外，盡管這些文獻(xiàn)主要集中在1991年修訂的《職業(yè)頭銜詞典》（DOT）中的任務(wù)衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)上，但我們依賴于2010年版的DOT繼任者O\*NET——一項為美國勞工部開發(fā)的在線服務(wù)。因此，O\*NET的優(yōu)勢在于提供有關(guān)職業(yè)工作活動的最新信息。

The present study relates to two literatures. First, our analysis builds on the labour economics literature on the task content of employment (Autor, et al., 2003; Goos and Manning, 2007; Autor and Dorn, 2013). Based on defined premises about what computers do, this literature examines the historical impact of computerisation on the occupational composition of the labour market. However, the scope of what computers do has recently expanded, and will inevitably continue to do so (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011; MGI, 2013). Drawing upon recent progress in ML, we expand the premises about the tasks computers are and will be suited to accomplish. Doing so, we build on the task content literature in a forward-looking manner. Furthermore, whereas this literature has largely focused on task measures from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), last revised in 1991, we rely on the 2010 version of the DOT successor O?NET – an online service developed for the US Department of Labor. Accordingly, O?NET has the advantage of providing more recent information on occupational work activities.

其次，我們的研究涉及研究基于信息的任務(wù)向外國工作場所轉(zhuǎn)移的文獻(xiàn)（Jensen和Kletzer，2005；Blinder，2009年；Jensen和Kletzer，2010年；奧爾登斯基，2012年；Blinder和Krueger，2013）。這些文獻(xiàn)包括不同的方法，根據(jù)職業(yè)對離岸外包的易感性對其進(jìn)行排名和分類。例如，Blinder（2009）利用關(guān)于不同職業(yè)工作性質(zhì)的O*NET數(shù)據(jù)估計，在未來一二十年內(nèi)，美國22%至29%的工作可以或?qū)⒖梢噪x岸外包。這些估計是基于不能外包的工作的兩個明確特征：（a）工作必須在特定的工作地點進(jìn)行；以及（b）該工作需要面對面的個人交流。自然，可以離岸的職業(yè)的特征與可以自動化的職業(yè)的特點不同。例如，收銀員的工作在很大程度上被自助服務(wù)技術(shù)所取代，必須在特定的工作地點進(jìn)行，并且需要面對面的接觸。因此，計算機(jī)化的程度很可能超出離岸外包的范圍。因此，盡管我們的方法實施與Blinder（2009）的方法類似，但我們依賴于不同的職業(yè)特征。

Second, our study relates to the literature examining the offshoring of information-based tasks to foreign worksites (Jensen and Kletzer, 2005; Blinder, 2009; Jensen and Kletzer, 2010; Oldenski, 2012; Blinder and Krueger, 2013). This literature consists of different methodologies to rank and categorise occupations according to their susceptibility to offshoring. For example, using O?NET data on the nature of work done in different occupations, Blinder (2009) estimates that 22 to 29 percent of US jobs are or will be offshorable in the next decade or two. These estimates are based on two defining characteristics of jobs that cannot be offshored: (a) the job must be performed at a specific work location; and (b) the job requires face-to-face personal communication. Naturally, the characteristics of occupations that can be offshored are different from the characteristics of occupations that can be automated. For example, the work of cashiers, which has largely been substituted by self- service technology, must be performed at specific work location and requires face-to-face contact. The extent of computerisation is therefore likely to go beyond that of offshoring. Hence, while the implementation of our methodology is similar to that of Blinder (2009), we rely on different occupational characteristics.

本文的其余部分結(jié)構(gòu)如下。在第二節(jié)中，我們回顧了有關(guān)技術(shù)進(jìn)步與就業(yè)之間歷史關(guān)系的文獻(xiàn)。第三節(jié)介紹了最近和預(yù)期的未來技術(shù)發(fā)展。在第四節(jié)，我們描述了我們的方法，在第五節(jié)，我們研究了這些技術(shù)發(fā)展對勞動力市場結(jié)果的預(yù)期影響。最后，在第六節(jié)中，我們得出了一些結(jié)論。

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we review the literature on the historical relationship between technological progress and employment. Section III describes recent and expected future technological developments. In Section IV, we describe our methodology, and in Section V, we examine the expected impact of these technological developments on labour market outcomes. Finally, in Section VI, we derive some conclusions.

## II. A HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS AND EMPLOYMENT

對技術(shù)失業(yè)的擔(dān)憂并不是最近才出現(xiàn)的現(xiàn)象?？v觀歷史，技術(shù)發(fā)明之后的創(chuàng)造性破壞過程創(chuàng)造了巨大的財富，但也造成了不希望的破壞。正如熊彼特（1962）所強(qiáng)調(diào)的那樣，并不是缺乏創(chuàng)造性的想法為經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展設(shè)定了界限，而是強(qiáng)大的社會和經(jīng)濟(jì)利益推動了技術(shù)現(xiàn)狀。威廉·李（William Lee）的例子很好地說明了這一點，他在1589年發(fā)明了襪架針織機(jī)，希望它能減輕工人手工編織的負(fù)擔(dān)。為了尋求他的發(fā)明的專利保護(hù)，他前往倫敦，在那里他租了一棟大樓讓伊麗莎白女王一世觀看他的機(jī)器。令他失望的是，女王更關(guān)心他的發(fā)明對就業(yè)的影響，拒絕授予他專利，聲稱：“李大師，你的目標(biāo)很高。想想這項發(fā)明能給我可憐的臣民帶來什么。它肯定會剝奪他們的就業(yè)機(jī)會，從而使他們成為乞丐，從而給他們帶來毀滅”（引用于Acemoglu和Robinson，2012年，第182f頁）。女王的擔(dān)憂很可能是因為騎士團(tuán)擔(dān)心這項發(fā)明會使其工匠成員的技能過時。5騎士團(tuán)的反對確實如此強(qiáng)烈，以至于威廉·李不得不離開英國。

The concern over technological unemployment is hardly a recent phenomenon. Throughout history, the process of creative destruction, following technological inventions, has created enormous wealth, but also undesired disruptions. As stressed by Schumpeter (1962), it was not the lack of inventive ideas thatset the boundaries for economic development, but rather powerful social and economic interests promoting the technological status quo. This is nicely illustrated by the example of William Lee, inventing the stocking frame knitting machine in 1589, hoping that it would relieve workers of hand-knitting. Seeking patent protection for his invention, he travelled to London where he had rented a building for his machine to be viewed by Queen Elizabeth I. To his disappointment, the Queen was more concerned with the employment impact of his invention and refused to grant him a patent, claiming that: “Thou aimest high, Master Lee. Consider thou what the invention could do to my poor subjects. It would assuredly bring to them ruin by depriving them of employment, thus making them beggars” (cited in Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, p. 182f). Most likely the Queen’s concern was a manifestation of the hosiers’ guilds fear that the invention would make the skills of its artisan members obsolete.5 The guilds’ opposition was indeed so intense that William Lee had to leave Britain.

Kellenbenz（1974年，第243頁）有說服力地認(rèn)為，行會系統(tǒng)地試圖削弱作為聚合者的市場力量，以維持技術(shù)現(xiàn)狀，并指出“行會保護(hù)其成員的利益不受外來者的影響，其中包括發(fā)明者，他們用新的設(shè)備和技術(shù)威脅要擾亂其成員的經(jīng)濟(jì)地位。正如Mokyr（1998年，第11頁）所指出的：“除非所有人都接受市場結(jié)果的“判決”，否則是否采用創(chuàng)新的決定很可能會受到失敗者通過非市場機(jī)制和政治激進(jìn)主義的抵制?！币虼?，工人可能會抵制新技術(shù)，因為它們會使他們的技能過時，并不可逆轉(zhuǎn)地減少他們的預(yù)期收入。因此，就業(yè)保護(hù)和技術(shù)進(jìn)步之間的平衡在很大程度上反映了社會權(quán)力的平衡，以及技術(shù)進(jìn)步的收益是如何分配的。

That guilds systematically tried to weaken market forces as aggregators to maintain the technological status quo is persuasively argued by Kellenbenz (1974, p. 243), stating that “guilds defended the interests of their members against outsiders, and these included the inventors who, with their new equipment and techniques, threatened to disturb their members’ economic status.”As pointed out by Mokyr (1998, p. 11): “Unless all individuals accept the“verdict” of the market outcome, the decision whether to adopt an innovation is likely to be resisted by losers through non-market mechanism and political activism.” Workers can thus be expected to resist new technologies, insofar that they make their skills obsolete and irreversibly reduce their expected earnings. The balance between job conservation and technological progress therefore, to a large extent, reflects the balance of power in society, and how gains from technological progress are being distributed.

英國工業(yè)革命生動地說明了這一點。盡管英國的工藝協(xié)會仍然廣泛存在于歐洲大陸，但到1688年光榮革命時，它已經(jīng)衰落并失去了大部分政治影響力（Nef，1957，第26和32頁）。隨著議會凌駕于王室之上，1769年通過了一項立法，規(guī)定破壞機(jī)械可判處死刑（Mokyr，1990，第257頁）?？梢钥隙ǖ氖?，機(jī)械化仍然存在阻力。1811年至1816年間的“盧德派”騷亂在一定程度上反映了工人對技術(shù)變革的恐懼，因為議會撤銷了1551年禁止在羊毛加工行業(yè)使用零工廠的法律。然而，英國政府對試圖阻止技術(shù)進(jìn)步的團(tuán)體采取了越來越嚴(yán)厲的態(tài)度，并部署了12000人對抗暴徒（Mantoux，2006，第403-8頁）。1779年蘭開夏郡騷亂后通過的一項決議解釋了政府對破壞機(jī)械的情緒，指出：“大騷亂的唯一原因是棉花生產(chǎn)中使用的新機(jī)器；盡管如此，該國從這些機(jī)器的安裝中受益匪淺，在這個國家摧毀這些機(jī)器只會成為將它們轉(zhuǎn)移到另一個國家的手段，損害英國的貿(mào)易”（引用于Mantoux，2006年，第403頁）。

The British Industrial Revolution illustrates this point vividly. While still widely present on the Continent, the craft guild in Britain had, by the time of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, declined and lost most of its political clout (Nef, 1957, pp. 26 and 32). With Parliamentary supremacy established over the Crown, legislation was passed in 1769 making the destruction of machinery punishable by death (Mokyr, 1990, p. 257). To be sure, there was still resistance to mechanisation. The “Luddite” riots between 1811 and 1816 were partly a manifestation of the fear of technological change among workers as Parliament revoked a 1551 law prohibiting the use of gig mills in the wool-finishing trade. The British government however took an increasingly stern view on groups attempting to halt technological progress and deployed 12,000 men against the rioters (Mantoux, 2006, p. 403-8). The sentiment of the government towards the destruction of machinery was explained by a resolution passed after the Lancashire riots of 1779, stating that: “The sole cause of great riots was the new machines employed in cotton manufacture; the country notwithstanding has greatly benefited from their erection [and] destroying them in this country would only be the means of transferring them to another [. . . ] to the detriment of the trade of Britain” (cited in Mantoux, 2006, p. 403).

對于人們對技術(shù)進(jìn)步態(tài)度的轉(zhuǎn)變，至少有兩種可能的解釋。首先，在議會凌駕于王室之上之后，擁有財產(chǎn)的階層在英國政治上占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位（North and Weingast，1989）。由于各種制造技術(shù)的擴(kuò)散并沒有對其資產(chǎn)的價值造成風(fēng)險，而且一些財產(chǎn)所有者將從制成品的出口中受益，工匠們根本沒有壓制他們的政治權(quán)力。其次，發(fā)明者、消費者和非熟練工廠工人在很大程度上受益于機(jī)械化（Mokyr，1990，第256和258頁）。甚至有人認(rèn)為，盡管對機(jī)械化的就業(yè)問題感到擔(dān)憂，但非熟練工人一直是工業(yè)革命的最大受益者（Clark，2008）。7盡管有相互矛盾的證據(jù)表明，資本所有者最初積累的國民收入份額越來越大（Allen，2009a），同樣有證據(jù)表明實際工資在增長（Lindert和Williamson，1983；Feinstein，1998年）。這意味著，盡管制造技術(shù)使工匠的技能過時，但技術(shù)進(jìn)步帶來的收益的分配方式逐漸使越來越多的勞動力受益。

There are at least two possible explanations for the shift in attitudes towards technological progress. First, after Parliamentary supremacy was established over the Crown, the property owning classes became politically dominant in Britain (North and Weingast, 1989). Because the diffusion of various manufacturing technologies did not impose a risk to the value of their assets, and some property owners stood to benefit from the export of manufactured goods, the artisans simply did not have the political power to repress them. Second, inventors, consumers and unskilled factory workers largely benefited from mechanisation (Mokyr, 1990, p. 256 and 258). It has even been argued that, despite the employment concerns over mechanisation, unskilled workers have been the greatest beneficiaries of the Industrial Revolution (Clark, 2008).7 While there is contradictory evidence suggesting that capital owners initially accumulated a growing share of national income (Allen, 2009a), there is equally evidence of growing real wages (Lindert and Williamson, 1983; Feinstein, 1998). This implies that although manufacturing technologies made the skills of artisans obsolete, gains from technological progress were distributed in a manner that gradually benefited a growing share of the labour force.

十九世紀(jì)制造技術(shù)的一個重要特征是，它們在很大程度上是“去中心化”的，即通過簡化任務(wù)來取代技能（Braverman，1974；Hounshell，1985；James和Skinner，1985；Goldin和Katz，1998）。隨著工廠系統(tǒng)開始取代手工作坊，去填充過程也隨之發(fā)生，隨著蒸汽動力的采用，生產(chǎn)越來越機(jī)械化，這一過程加快了步伐（Goldin和Sokoloff，1982；阿塔克等人，2008a）。以前由工匠完成的工作現(xiàn)在被分解成更小的、高度專業(yè)化的序列，需要更少的技能，但需要更多的工人來完成。9一些創(chuàng)新甚至被設(shè)計為去毛刺。例如，可互換零件的先驅(qū)伊萊·惠特尼（Eli Whitney）將這項技術(shù)的目標(biāo)描述為“用正確有效的機(jī)械操作來代替藝術(shù)家只有通過長期實踐和經(jīng)驗才能獲得的技能；這種技能在這個國家在很大程度上是不具備的”（Habakkuk，1962，第22頁）。

An important feature of nineteenth century manufacturing technologies is that they were largely “deskilling” – i.e. they substituted for skills through the simplification of tasks (Braverman, 1974; Hounshell, 1985; James and Skinner, 1985; Goldin and Katz, 1998). The deskilling process occurred as the factory system began to displace the artisan shop, and it picked up pace as production increasingly mechanized with the adoption of steam power (Goldin and Sokoloff, 1982; Atack, et al., 2008a). Work that had previously been performed by artisans was now decomposed into smaller, highly specialised, sequences, requiring less skill, but more workers, to perform.9 Some innovations were even designed to be deskilling. For example, Eli Whitney, a pioneer of interchangeable parts, described the objective of this technology as “to substitute correct and effective operations of machinery for the skill of the artist which is acquired only by long practice and experience; a species of skill which is not possessed in this country to any considerable extent” (Habakkuk, 1962, p. 22).

再加上連續(xù)流生產(chǎn)的發(fā)展，使工人能夠在不同的任務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)移到他們身上時保持靜止，正是相同的可互換零件使復(fù)雜的產(chǎn)品能夠通過使用高度專業(yè)化的機(jī)床按照一系列操作從大規(guī)模生產(chǎn)的單個部件組裝而成。然而，盡管第一條裝配線記錄于1804年，但直到19世紀(jì)末，連續(xù)流工藝才開始被更大規(guī)模地采用，這使得福特汽車公司等公司能夠以足夠低的價格生產(chǎn)T-Ford，使其成為人們的汽車（Mokyr，1990，第137頁）。至關(guān)重要的是，福特于1913年推出的新裝配線是專門為非熟練工人操作的機(jī)械而設(shè)計的（Hounshell，1985，第239頁）。此外，以前的一人工作變成了29人的工作，使總工作時間減少了34%（Bright，1958）。因此，福特汽車公司的例子突出了19世紀(jì)觀察到的一般模式，實物資本為非熟練勞動力提供了相對的補充，同時取代了相對熟練的工匠（James和Skinner，1985；Louis和Paterson，1986；Brown和Philips，1986；Atack等人，2004年）。因此，正如Acemoglu（2002年，第7頁）所指出的：“技術(shù)進(jìn)步有利于更多技術(shù)工人的想法是20世紀(jì)的現(xiàn)象?！睋Q言之，經(jīng)濟(jì)歷史學(xué)家的傳統(tǒng)觀點表明，資本深化對技術(shù)勞動力相對需求的影響在19世紀(jì)和20世紀(jì)之間是不連續(xù)的。

Together with developments in continuous-flow production, enabling workers to be stationary while different tasks were moved to them, it was identical interchangeable parts that allowed complex products to be assembled from mass produced individual components by using highly specialised machine tools to a sequence of operations. Yet while the first assembly-line was documented in 1804, it was not until the late nineteenth century that continuous-flow processes started to be adopted on a larger scale, which enabled corporations such as the Ford Motor Company to manufacture the T-Ford at a sufficiently low price for it to become the people’s vehicle (Mokyr, 1990, p. 137). Crucially, the new assembly line introduced by Ford in 1913 was specifically designed for machinery to be operated by unskilled workers (Hounshell, 1985, p. 239). Furthermore, what had previously been a one-man job was turned into a 29-man worker operation, reducing the overall work time by 34 percent (Bright, 1958). The example of the Ford Motor Company thus underlines the general pattern observed in the nineteenth century, with physical capital providing a relative complement to unskilled labour, while substituting for relatively skilled artisans (James and Skinner, 1985; Louis and Paterson, 1986; Brown and Philips, 1986; Atack, et al., 2004). Hence, as pointed out by Acemoglu (2002, p. 7):“the idea that technological advances favor more skilled workers is a twentieth century phenomenon.” The conventional wisdom among economic historians, in other words, suggests a discontinuity between the nineteenth and twentieth century in the impact of capital deepening on the relative demand for skilled labour.

資本-技能互補的現(xiàn)代模式在19世紀(jì)末逐漸出現(xiàn)，因為制造業(yè)生產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)向了日益機(jī)械化的裝配線。這種轉(zhuǎn)變可以追溯到從蒸汽和水力轉(zhuǎn)向電力，再加上連續(xù)工藝和批量生產(chǎn)方法，減少了對許多搬運、運輸和組裝任務(wù)中非熟練體力工人的需求，但增加了對技能的需求（Goldin和Katz，1998）。簡言之，盡管工廠裝配線分工極端，需要大量的人工操作，但電氣化使生產(chǎn)過程的許多階段實現(xiàn)了自動化，這反過來又增加了對相對熟練的藍(lán)領(lǐng)生產(chǎn)工人操作機(jī)器的需求。此外，電氣化使白領(lǐng)非生產(chǎn)工人的比例不斷增加（Goldin和Katz，1998）。在19世紀(jì)，隨著蒸汽和水力技術(shù)的改進(jìn)，企業(yè)規(guī)模越來越大，使它們能夠采用動力機(jī)械，通過加強(qiáng)勞動分工和提高資本密集度來實現(xiàn)生產(chǎn)力增長（Atack等人，2008a）。此外，隨著基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的普及和改善，運輸革命降低了國內(nèi)外貨物運輸成本（Atack等人，2008b）。早期的手工藝品市場主要局限于周邊地區(qū)，因為運輸成本相對于生產(chǎn)的商品價值來說很高。然而，隨著運輸革命，市場規(guī)模擴(kuò)大，從而侵蝕了當(dāng)?shù)氐膲艛嗔α?，這反過來又增加了競爭，迫使企業(yè)通過機(jī)械化提高生產(chǎn)力。隨著企業(yè)規(guī)模的擴(kuò)大和服務(wù)于地理位置擴(kuò)展的市場，管理任務(wù)的數(shù)量和復(fù)雜性都在增加，需要更多的管理和職員（Chandler，1977）。到20世紀(jì)之交，電氣化強(qiáng)化了這種模式，電氣化不僅增加了相對熟練的藍(lán)領(lǐng)勞動力的比例，還增加了對白領(lǐng)工人的需求（Goldin和Katz，1998），他們往往具有更高的教育程度（Allen，2001）。

The modern pattern of capital-skill complementarity gradually emerged in the late nineteenth century, as manufacturing production shifted to increasingly mechanised assembly lines. This shift can be traced to the switch to electricity from steam and water-power which, in combination with continuous-process and batch production methods, reduced the demand for unskilled manual workers in many hauling, conveying, and assembly tasks, but increased the demand for skills (Goldin and Katz, 1998). In short, while factory assembly lines, with their extreme division of labour, had required vast quantities of human operatives, electrification allowed many stages of the production process to be automated, which in turn increased the demand for relatively skilled blue-collar production workers to operate the machinery. In addition, electrification contributed to a growing share of white-collar nonproduction workers (Goldin and Katz, 1998). Over the course of the nineteenth century, establishments became larger in size as steam and water power technologies improved, allowing them to adopt powered machinery to realize productivity gains through the combination of enhanced division of labour and higher capital intensity (Atack, et al., 2008a). Furthermore, the transport revolution lowered costs of shipping goods domestically and internationally as infrastructure spread and improved (Atack, et al., 2008b). The market for artisan goods early on had largely been confined to the immediate surrounding area because transport costs were high relative to the value of the goods produced. With the transport revolution, however,market size expanded, thereby eroding local monopoly power, which in turn increased competition and compelled firms to raise productivity through mechanisation. As establishments became larger and served geographically expended markets, managerial tasks increased in number and complexity, requiring more managerial and clerking employees (Chandler, 1977). This pattern was, by the turn of the twentieth century, reinforced by electrification, which not only contributed to a growing share of relatively skilled blue-collar labour, but also increased the demand for white-collar workers (Goldin and Katz, 1998), who tended to have higher educational attainment (Allen, 2001).

自電氣化以來，二十世紀(jì)的故事一直是教育和技術(shù)之間的競賽（Goldin和Katz，2009）。美國高中運動恰逢辦公室的第一次工業(yè)革命（Goldin和Katz，1995）。雖然打字機(jī)是在19世紀(jì)60年代發(fā)明的，但直到20世紀(jì)初，它才被引入辦公室，當(dāng)時它進(jìn)入了一個機(jī)械化的浪潮，出現(xiàn)了口述錄音機(jī)、計算器、模擬機(jī)、地址機(jī)和計算機(jī)的前身——按鍵機(jī)（Beniger，1986；Cortada，2000）。重要的是，這些辦公機(jī)器降低了信息處理任務(wù)的成本，并增加了對補充因素的需求，即受過教育的上班族。然而，在高中運動之后，受過教育的上班族的供應(yīng)增加，與書記員職業(yè)相對于生產(chǎn)工人的工資溢價大幅下降有關(guān)（Goldin和Katz，1995）。然而，這并不是取消計費技術(shù)變革的結(jié)果。文書工作人員確實受過相對的教育。相反，這是受過教育的工人的供應(yīng)超過了對其技能的需求，導(dǎo)致教育工資差距縮小的結(jié)果。

Since electrification, the story of the twentieth century has been the race between education and technology (Goldin and Katz, 2009). The US high school movement coincided with the first industrial revolution of the office (Goldin and Katz, 1995). While the typewriter was invented in the 1860s, it was not introduced in the office until the early twentieth century, when it entered a wave of mechanisation, with dictaphones, calculators, mimeo machines, address machines, and the predecessor of the computer – the keypunch (Beniger, 1986; Cortada, 2000). Importantly, these office machines reduced the cost of information processing tasks and increased the demand for the complementary factor – i.e. educated office workers. Yet the increased supply of educated office workers, following the high school movement, was associated with a sharp decline in the wage premium of clerking occupations relative to production workers (Goldin and Katz, 1995). This was, however, not the result of deskilling technological change. Clerking workers were indeed relatively educated. Rather, it was the result of the supply of educated workers outpacing the demand for their skills, leading educational wage differentials to compress.

雖然美國的教育工資差距從1915年到1980年有所縮?。℅oldin和Katz，2009），但自20世紀(jì)80年代以來，許多國家的教育工資差異和總體工資不平等都急劇增加（Krueger，1993；Murphy等人，1998年；阿特金森，2008年；Goldin和Katz，2009年）。盡管顯然有幾個變量在起作用，但人們普遍認(rèn)為，這可以歸因于計算機(jī)和信息技術(shù)的采用推動了資本-技能互補性的加速（Krueger，1993；Autor等人，1998年；Bresnahan等人，2002年）。通常所說的計算機(jī)革命始于1960年左右計算機(jī)的首次商業(yè)使用，并在20世紀(jì)90年代通過互聯(lián)網(wǎng)和電子商務(wù)的發(fā)展而持續(xù)。1945年至1980年間，由于每次計算的成本以年均37%的速度下降（Nordhaus，2007），電話運營商被裁掉，通用汽車公司在20世紀(jì)60年代推出了第一個工業(yè)機(jī)器人，20世紀(jì)70年代，航空公司預(yù)訂系統(tǒng)在自助服務(wù)技術(shù)方面處于領(lǐng)先地位（Gordon，2012）。在20世紀(jì)80年代和90年代，隨著計算能力的激增，計算成本下降得更快，平均每年下降64%（Nordhaus，2007）。13與此同時，條形碼掃描儀和提款機(jī)正在零售和金融行業(yè)普及，第一臺個人電腦于20世紀(jì)80初推出，其文字處理和電子表格功能消除了復(fù)印打字員的職業(yè)，并允許重復(fù)計算實現(xiàn)自動化（Gordon，2012）。這種對勞動力的替代標(biāo)志著另一個重要的逆轉(zhuǎn)。20世紀(jì)初的辦公機(jī)器增加了對職員的需求（Chandler，1977；Goldin和Katz，1995年）。以類似的方式，計算機(jī)化增加了對此類任務(wù)的需求，但也允許它們實現(xiàn)自動化（Autor等人，2003）。

While educational wage differentials in the US narrowed from 1915 to 1980 (Goldin and Katz, 2009), both educational wage differentials and overall wage inequality have increased sharply since the 1980s in a number of countries (Krueger, 1993; Murphy, et al., 1998; Atkinson, 2008; Goldin and Katz, 2009). Although there are clearly several variables at work, consensus is broad that this can be ascribed to an acceleration in capital-skill complementarity, driven by the adoption of computers and information technology (Krueger, 1993; Autor, et al., 1998; Bresnahan, et al., 2002). What is commonly referred to as the Computer Revolution began with the first commercial uses of computers around 1960 and continued through the development of the Internet and e-commerce in the 1990s. As the cost per computation declined at an annual average of 37 percent between 1945 and 1980 (Nordhaus, 2007), telephone operators were made redundant, the first industrial robot was introduced by General Motors in the 1960s, and in the 1970s airline reservations systems led the way in selfservice technology (Gordon, 2012). During the 1980s and 1990s, computing costs declined even more rapidly, on average by 64 percent per year, accompanied by a surge in computational power (Nordhaus, 2007).13 At the same time, bar-code scanners and cash machines were spreading across the retail and financial industries, and the first personal computers were introduced in the early 1980s, with their word processing and spreadsheet functions eliminating copy typist occupations and allowing repetitive calculations to be automated (Gordon, 2012). This substitution for labour marks a further important reversal.The early twentieth century office machines increased the demand for clerking workers (Chandler, 1977; Goldin and Katz, 1995). In a similar manner, computerisation augments demand for such tasks, but it also permits them to be automated (Autor, et al., 2003).

計算機(jī)革命可以在一定程度上解釋過去幾十年中日益嚴(yán)重的工資不平等。例如，Krueger（1993）發(fā)現(xiàn)，使用計算機(jī)的工人的收入比其他人高出約10%至15%，但計算機(jī)的使用在教育回報率的增長中占了很大一部分。此外，最近的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，計算機(jī)導(dǎo)致了勞動力市場職業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)的轉(zhuǎn)變。例如，Autor和Dorn（2013）表明，隨著計算機(jī)化侵蝕了執(zhí)行日常任務(wù)的勞動力的工資，工人將把他們的勞動力供應(yīng)重新分配給技能相對較低的服務(wù)職業(yè)。更具體地說，在1980年至2005年間，美國服務(wù)業(yè)的勞動時間份額在前三十年持平或下降后增長了30%。此外，美國就業(yè)的凈變化在技能水平上呈U形，這意味著最低和最高就業(yè)技能四分位數(shù)急劇擴(kuò)大，中間的相對就業(yè)下降。

The Computer Revolution can go some way in explaining the growing wage inequality of the past decades. For example, Krueger (1993) finds that workers using a computer earn roughly earn 10 to 15 percent more than others, but also that computer use accounts for a substantial share of the increase in the rate of return to education. In addition, more recent studies find that computers have caused a shift in the occupational structure of the labour market. Autor and Dorn (2013), for example, show that as computerisation erodes wages for labour performing routine tasks, workers will reallocate their labour supply to relatively low-skill service occupations. More specifically, between 1980 and 2005, the share of US labour hours in service occupations grew by 30 percent after having been flat or declining in the three prior decades. Furthermore, net changes in US employment were U-shaped in skill level, meaning that the lowest and highest job-skill quartile expanded sharply with relative employment declines in the middle of the distribution.

高技能就業(yè)的擴(kuò)大可以解釋為通過計算機(jī)執(zhí)行日常任務(wù)的價格下降，這是對更抽象和創(chuàng)造性服務(wù)的補充。從生產(chǎn)函數(shù)的角度來看，日常信息投入供應(yīng)的向外轉(zhuǎn)移會增加所需工人的邊際生產(chǎn)力。例如，文本和數(shù)據(jù)挖掘提高了法律研究的質(zhì)量，因為不斷獲取市場信息提高了管理決策的效率，即由收入分配高端的技術(shù)工人執(zhí)行的任務(wù)。其結(jié)果是勞動力市場兩極分化加劇，高收入認(rèn)知工作和低收入體力工作的就業(yè)人數(shù)不斷增加，同時中等收入日常工作也被掏空。這種模式并非美國獨有，同樣適用于許多發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體（Goos等人，2009年）。

The expansion in high-skill employment can be explained by the falling price of carrying out routine tasks by means of computers, which complements more abstract and creative services. Seen from a production function perspective, an outward shift in the supply of routine informational inputs increases the marginal productivity of workers they are demanded by. For example, text and data mining has improved the quality of legal research as constant access to market information has improved the efficiency of managerial decision-making – i.e. tasks performed by skilled workers at the higher end of the income distribution. The result has been an increasingly polarised labour market, with growing employment in high-income cognitive jobs and low-income manual occupations, accompanied by a hollowing-out of middle-income routine jobs. This is a pattern that is not unique to the US and equally applies to a number of developed economies (Goos, et al., 2009).

21世紀(jì)的技術(shù)進(jìn)步將如何影響勞動力市場的結(jié)果，還有待觀察?？v觀歷史，技術(shù)進(jìn)步極大地改變了就業(yè)構(gòu)成，從農(nóng)業(yè)和手工藝品商店，到制造業(yè)和職員，再到服務(wù)業(yè)和管理業(yè)。然而，事實證明，對技術(shù)失業(yè)的擔(dān)憂被夸大了。這種擔(dān)憂沒有實現(xiàn)的明顯原因與 Ricardo 關(guān)于機(jī)械的著名章節(jié)有關(guān)，該章節(jié)認(rèn)為節(jié)省勞動力的技術(shù)減少了對無差別勞動力的需求，從而導(dǎo)致了技術(shù)失業(yè)（Ricardo，1819）。然而，正如經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家長期以來所理解的那樣，一項用機(jī)器取代工人的發(fā)明將對所有產(chǎn)品和要素市場產(chǎn)生影響。生產(chǎn)效率的提高降低了一種商品的價格，將增加實際收入，從而增加對其他商品的需求。因此，簡而言之，技術(shù)進(jìn)步對就業(yè)有兩個相互競爭的影響（Aghion和Howitt，1994）。首先，作為勞動力的技術(shù)替代品，存在破壞效應(yīng)，要求工人重新分配勞動力供應(yīng)；其次，還有資本化效應(yīng)，因為越來越多的公司進(jìn)入生產(chǎn)率相對較高的行業(yè)，導(dǎo)致這些行業(yè)的就業(yè)人數(shù)增加。

How technological progress in the twenty-first century will impact on labour market outcomes remains to be seen. Throughout history, technological progress has vastly shifted the composition of employment, from agriculture and the artisan shop, to manufacturing and clerking, to service and management occupations. Yet the concern over technological unemployment has proven to be exaggerated. The obvious reason why this concern has not materialised relates to Ricardo’s famous chapter on machinery, which suggests that laboursaving technology reduces the demand for undifferentiated labour, thus leading to technological unemployment (Ricardo, 1819). As economists have long understood, however, an invention that replaces workers by machines will have effects on all product and factor markets. An increase in the efficiency of production which reduces the price of one good, will increase real income and thus increase demand for other goods. Hence, in short, technological progress has two competing effects on employment (Aghion and Howitt, 1994). First, as technology substitutes for labour, there is a destruction effect, requiring workers to reallocate their labour supply; and second, there is the capitalisation effect, as more companies enter industries where productivity is relatively high, leading employment in those industries to expand.

盡管資本化效應(yīng)在歷史上一直占主導(dǎo)地位，但正如凱恩斯（1933）所指出的，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)的節(jié)約勞動力使用的方法可能超過我們發(fā)現(xiàn)勞動力新用途的速度。人類勞動占主導(dǎo)地位的原因與其通過教育采用和獲得新技能的能力有關(guān)（Goldin和Katz，2009）。然而，隨著計算機(jī)化進(jìn)入更多的認(rèn)知領(lǐng)域，這將變得越來越具有挑戰(zhàn)性（Brynjolfsson 和 McAfee，2011）。因此，最近的實證研究結(jié)果尤其令人擔(dān)憂。例如，Beaudry等人（2013）記錄了過去十年對技能的需求下降，盡管受過高等教育的工人的供應(yīng)持續(xù)增長。它們表明，高技能工人已經(jīng)從職業(yè)階梯上往下走，從事傳統(tǒng)上由低技能工人從事的工作，將低技能工人進(jìn)一步推向職業(yè)階梯，在某種程度上甚至脫離了勞動力隊伍。這引發(fā)了以下問題：（a）人類勞動通過教育贏得與技術(shù)競爭的能力；以及（b）技術(shù)失業(yè)的潛在程度，因為技術(shù)進(jìn)步速度的加快將導(dǎo)致更高的工作人員流動，從而導(dǎo)致更高自然失業(yè)率（Lucas和Prescott，1974；Davis和Haltiwanger，1992年；Pissarides，2000年）。雖然目前的研究僅限于研究技術(shù)的破壞效應(yīng)，但它提供了一個有用的指標(biāo)，表明未來幾十年平衡面臨風(fēng)險的工作所需的就業(yè)增長。

Although the capitalisation effect has been predominant historically, our discovery of means of economising the use of labour can outrun the pace at which we can find new uses for labour, as Keynes (1933) pointed out. The reason why human labour has prevailed relates to its ability to adopt and acquire new skills by means of education (Goldin and Katz, 2009). Yet as computerisation enters more cognitive domains this will become increasingly challenging (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011). Recent empirical findings are therefore particularly concerning. For example, Beaudry, et al. (2013) document a decline in the demand for skill over the past decade, even as the supply of workers with higher education has continued to grow. They show that high-skilled workers have moved down the occupational ladder, taking on jobs traditionally performed by low-skilled workers, pushing low-skilled workers even further down the occupational ladder and, to some extent, even out of the labour force. This raises questions about: (a) the ability of human labour to win the race against technology by means of education; and (b) the potential extent of technological unemployment, as an increasing pace of technological progress will cause higher job turnover, resulting in a higher natural rate of unemployment (Lucas and Prescott, 1974; Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Pissarides, 2000). While the present study is limited to examining the destruction effect of technology, it nevertheless provides a useful indication of the job growth required to counterbalance the jobs at risk over the next decades.

由于Bilibili字?jǐn)?shù)限制，完整版已放在 Github
https://github.com/soryu-ryouji/Don_Quixote_Project