Free exchange--The?mop?that never stops?

How China revived and recast its economy at the same time?

經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人10月刊

Suppose, for example, that workers in every generation plough?a portion of their income into an intrinsically?useless asset,?such as an empty flat, which they plan?to sell when they retire. Because every cohort has the same plan, each will find buyers among their descendants for the asset they bought from their forefathers. Since another generation is “always coming along”, as Samuelson put it, this chain need never break.

Plough=plow n （農(nóng)機(jī)）犁或是像犁一樣的工具 v用犁耕地

Intrinsically?/?n?tr?nz?kli; ?n?tr?ns?kli/ adv. 本質(zhì)地；內(nèi)在地；固有地

cohort /?k??h??t/ ?n. 一群；步兵大隊(duì)；支持者；同生群

If the economy is growing, each generation will have more income to spend on the asset than the one preceding?it. That will allow the seller to earn a positive return. And if the economy’s growth rate exceeds the interest rate, this return will be higher than what other saving vehicles, such as bank deposits, can offer. This condition, known as dynamic inefficiency?, was once thought to be rare. But in an era of near-zero interest rates, it has come to seem almost familiar. China’s dynamic inefficiency was documented in 2006 by economists at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and has been confirmed by subsequent studies.

dynamic inefficiency：動態(tài)無效率（經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)術(shù)語）根據(jù)百科、學(xué)術(shù)、知網(wǎng)等文章，直觀來講，資本過度累積，高于其均衡水平，這種現(xiàn)象被稱為動態(tài)無效率。這表明老百姓存的錢太多，可以通過適當(dāng)?shù)拇胧?，比如發(fā)現(xiàn)國債等提高現(xiàn)在和未來的消費(fèi)水平。止于這種無效率為何產(chǎn)生，目前up主沒有查到。文中解釋是當(dāng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率超過利率時(shí)，房產(chǎn)投資的回報(bào)要高于儲蓄所得回報(bào)，這種情況被稱為流動無效率。

It may be that China’s interest rate understates the true return on capital in the country, thanks to?lingering financial repression. But even so, a long-lasting bubble could arise, according to a 2014 paper by Kaiji Chen of Emory University and Yi Wen of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. In their model, private capital earns impressive returns for as long as it can profit from cheap labour migrating from fields to factories and from state-owned enterprises to private firms. That gives entrepreneurs the financial means to venture large sums in the property market. At the same time, they know that the profitability of their businesses will eventually decline as labour becomes scarce. That gives them the motive to diversify their wealth into other stores of value, such as property.

lingering ?adj. /?l??ɡ?r??/ ?拖延的；纏綿的；緩慢消失的；遲遲不去的?? a painful and lingering death 痛苦而拖延時(shí)日的死亡

In this scenario, property prices will keep pace with the rate of return to?entrepreneurial capital, which is even higher than the growth rate of the economy as a whole. Then, as workers become harder to find, the returns to capital and to property steadily diminish in tandem. The later chapters of Mr Orlik’s book explain how China managed this slowdown. It entered 2016 in a?shaky state. Real-estate developers held?daunting?inventories of unsold flats and owed similarly daunting sums to shadow lenders. China also suffered from overcapacity in allied industries, such as steel, which threatened to?plunge the economy into deflation.

entrepreneurial capital：企業(yè)資本? ? ?tandem ?n.?/?t?nd?m/ 雙座自行車；雙人自行車

IN ?TANDEM (WITH SB/STH)?并行；并駕齊驅(qū)；同時(shí)實(shí)行

Daunting??/?d??nt??/ ?adj. 使人畏縮的；使人氣餒的；令人怯步的

Plunge··into··（用力的）投入、跳入? ? ? ?Deflation??n.通貨緊縮；放氣

shadow lender?相當(dāng)于shadow bank 影子銀行，指游離于銀行監(jiān)管體系之外、可能引發(fā)系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和監(jiān)管套利等問題的信用中介體系(包括各類相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)和業(yè)務(wù)活動)。影子銀行引發(fā)系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的因素主要包括四個(gè)方面:期限錯(cuò)配、流動性轉(zhuǎn)換、信用轉(zhuǎn)換和高杠桿。比如民間借貸，暴雷的P2P信貸等

How did China cope? The answer is what you might call the five r’s: reflating?and remixing the economy, as well as refinancing, rotating?and writing off assets and liabilities. China remixed the composition of activity without reducing its pace, spending less on new mines and steel plants, and more on infrastructure. Projects financed with short-term high-interest bank loans were refinanced with low-yielding bonds issued by provincial governments. Some debt?rotated?from?overstretched?developers onto the cleaner balance-sheets of households who were given easier access to mortgages.

reflate ?v. /?ri??fle?t/ (經(jīng) ) 通貨再膨脹，通貨復(fù)脹（增加貨幣供應(yīng)以刺激對商品等的需求）

Write-off：取消，注銷，勾銷

Overstretched??/???v??stret?t/ v. （使）勉強(qiáng)維持；過度伸展；對……需求過分（overstretch 的過去式及過去分詞） adj. 超出承受能力的；缺少（資金、人力等）的

mortgage /?m??ɡ?d?/ 1.房屋抵押貸款??an increase in mortgage rates. 房屋抵押貸款利率的上升。2. 抵押??They had to mortgage their home to pay the bills. 他們不得不抵押他們的房子來還賬。

Clean-up operation

China also wrote off?bad loans (including shadow loans) and many physical assets. Old mines were closed. Slums?were cleared. Displaced households?were given money to help buy newer flats. These efforts were often financed by targeted loans from the central bank. The clearances, closures and write-offs reduced the economy’s stock of wealth, but did not interrupt the flow of fresh activity. Indeed, the combination of new money injected into the economy and old capacity removed from it lifted prices and quickened the growth of nominal GDP. That restored the gap between growth and interest rates, making debt levels easier to sustain.

Slum?/sl?m/，貧民區(qū)，棚戶區(qū)

Displaced household：無家可歸的家庭，這里指拆遷戶

This clean-up took advantage of some of China’s unusual strengths, including the reach of its regulators and the flexibility of its labour force. When the mix of activity changed, workers followed suit. But it also conformed to some economic principles that could apply anywhere. The deflationary pressure China faced in this dangerous period showed that there was room to stimulate the economy. And because interest rates were lower than growth rates, it could afford to roll over?any liabilities it dared not write off.

roll over：翻滾；轉(zhuǎn)存；延緩付款

Will China never pop? Safer to say there is little it cannot mop.

譯文

Suppose, for example, that workers in every generation plough?a portion of their income into an intrinsically?useless asset,?such as an empty flat, which they plan?to sell when they retire. Because every cohort has the same plan, each will find buyers among their descendants for the asset they bought from their forefathers. Since another generation is “always coming along”, as Samuelson put it, this chain need never break.

舉個(gè)例子，假設(shè)每一代工人都將自己收入的一部分投資在本質(zhì)上沒啥用的資產(chǎn)上，例如準(zhǔn)備退休就賣的空房。因?yàn)槊咳喝擞?jì)劃一致，將從祖先買下來的房子賣給后代。由于“下一代”源源不斷，Samuelson說道，這鏈條將永遠(yuǎn)不會斷掉。

If the economy is growing, each generation will have more income to spend on the asset than the one preceding?it. That will allow the seller to earn a positive return. And if the economy’s growth rate exceeds the interest rate, this return will be higher than what other saving vehicles, such as bank deposits, can offer. This condition, known as dynamic inefficiency?, was once thought to be rare. But in an era of near-zero interest rates, it has come to seem almost familiar. China’s dynamic inefficiency was documented in 2006 by economists at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and has been confirmed by subsequent studies.

如果經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，每一代比上一代都有更多的錢投在這項(xiàng)資產(chǎn)上。這會讓賣家獲得正向回報(bào)（盈利）。但如果經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率超過利率，這項(xiàng)投資會比銀行利率工具如儲蓄利率回報(bào)高。這種情況，被稱作“動態(tài)無效率”，同時(shí)被認(rèn)為是比較少見的。但在接近零利率的今天，這種現(xiàn)象越來越普遍。2006年香港金融管理局的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們第一次記錄了中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)動態(tài)無效率，并被接下來的研究證實(shí)。

It may be that China’s interest rate understates the true return on capital in the country, thanks to?lingering financial repression. But even so, a long-lasting bubble could arise, according to a 2014 paper by Kaiji Chen of Emory University and Yi Wen of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. In their model, private capital earns impressive returns for as long as it can profit from cheap labour migrating from fields to factories and from state-owned enterprises to private firms. That gives entrepreneurs the financial means to venture large sums in the property market. At the same time, they know that the profitability of their businesses will eventually decline as labour becomes scarce. That gives them the motive to diversify their wealth into other stores of value, such as property.

因?yàn)槌掷m(xù)的金融管制，有可能中國的利率并不能反映國家真實(shí)的資本回報(bào)率。但即使這樣，根據(jù)2014年埃默里大學(xué)Kaiji Chen和圣路易斯聯(lián)邦儲蓄銀行的Yi Wen的論文，一個(gè)長期持續(xù)的泡沫也可能出現(xiàn)。在他們的模型中，私人資本將獲得可觀的回報(bào)，只要他們能從農(nóng)村轉(zhuǎn)移到工廠的廉價(jià)勞動力中獲利，或者從國企轉(zhuǎn)型成私企中獲利。這些為企業(yè)家們提供了金融手段，在房地產(chǎn)市場上進(jìn)行大量風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資。但同時(shí)他們知道自己的企業(yè)回報(bào)率最終會降低，因?yàn)閯趧恿倘薄＿@些激勵(lì)著企業(yè)對自己的財(cái)富多樣化，比如房地產(chǎn)進(jìn)行儲值。

In this scenario, property prices will keep pace with the rate of return to?entrepreneurial capital, which is even higher than the growth rate of the economy as a whole. Then, as workers become harder to find, the returns to capital and to property steadily diminish in tandem. The later chapters of Mr Orlik’s book explain how China managed this slowdown. It entered 2016 in a?shaky state. Real-estate developers held?daunting?inventories of unsold flats and owed similarly daunting sums to shadow lenders. China also suffered from overcapacity in allied industries, such as steel, which threatened to?plunge the economy into deflation.

在這種模式下，房地產(chǎn)價(jià)格會與企業(yè)資本的投資回報(bào)率同步，總體會比經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率高一些。隨著人工短缺，資本回報(bào)率和房地產(chǎn)回報(bào)率也會協(xié)同降低。Orlik先生書的后幾章解釋說明了中國如何處理這種經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩。進(jìn)入2016年，中國進(jìn)入經(jīng)濟(jì)動蕩時(shí)期，房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)商擁有讓人畏懼?jǐn)?shù)量的未售房產(chǎn)庫存，欠了影子銀行無法計(jì)數(shù)的貸款。同時(shí)還遭受重工業(yè)產(chǎn)能過剩的危機(jī)，比如鋼鐵，時(shí)刻準(zhǔn)備將國家拉入通貨緊縮的陷阱。

How did China cope? The answer is what you might call the five r’s: reflating?and remixing the economy, as well as refinancing, rotating?and writing off assets and liabilities. China remixed the composition of activity without reducing its pace, spending less on new mines and steel plants, and more on infrastructure. Projects financed with short-term high-interest bank loans were refinanced with low-yielding bonds issued by provincial governments. Some debt?rotated?from?overstretched?developers onto the cleaner balance-sheets of households who were given easier access to mortgages.

中國如何克服的？答案是5R：reflating（再通脹）并remixing（重組經(jīng)濟(jì)）、refinancing（重新融資發(fā)新債）、rotating（經(jīng)濟(jì)再輪轉(zhuǎn)）及writing-off（注銷資產(chǎn)與債務(wù)）。中國快速的重組了經(jīng)濟(jì)活動，減少煤炭、鋼鐵工業(yè)的投資，轉(zhuǎn)而大量投入基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)。銀行高貸款利率的貸款被省政府發(fā)行低收益?zhèn)偃谫Y。一些負(fù)債由不堪重負(fù)的開發(fā)商轉(zhuǎn)移到債務(wù)清白的家庭，其抵押融資渠道變得更加容易。

Clean-up operation

China also wrote off?bad loans (including shadow loans) and many physical assets. Old mines were closed. Slums?were cleared. Displaced households?were given money to help buy newer flats. These efforts were often financed by targeted loans from the central bank. The clearances, closures and write-offs reduced the economy’s stock of wealth, but did not interrupt the flow of fresh activity. Indeed, the combination of new money injected into the economy and old capacity removed from it lifted prices and quickened the growth of nominal GDP. That restored the gap between growth and interest rates, making debt levels easier to sustain.

中國也注銷了不良貸款（包括影子貸款）和許多實(shí)體資產(chǎn)。老煤礦關(guān)閉、拆遷棚戶區(qū)。拆遷的家庭獲得補(bǔ)償購買新的房子。這些經(jīng)濟(jì)活動主要由中央銀行支持，提供特定貸款。這一套清除、關(guān)閉和注銷措施減少了中國財(cái)富的存量，但卻沒有中斷新經(jīng)濟(jì)活動的流動性。實(shí)話實(shí)說，給經(jīng)濟(jì)注入新資金和拔出舊產(chǎn)能的組合，抬高價(jià)格并加速了名義GDP的增長。該舉措恢復(fù)了經(jīng)濟(jì)增長率與利率之間的差距，使得債務(wù)水平得以更容易持續(xù)。

This clean-up took advantage of some of China’s unusual strengths, including the reach of its regulators and the flexibility of its labour force. When the mix of activity changed, workers followed suit. But it also conformed to some economic principles that could apply anywhere. The deflationary pressure China faced in this dangerous period showed that there was room to stimulate the economy. And because interest rates were lower than growth rates, it could afford to roll over?any liabilities it dared not write off.

這項(xiàng)整頓措施利用了不少中國的特有優(yōu)勢，包括監(jiān)管者的可覆蓋范圍及勞動力的靈活性。當(dāng)經(jīng)濟(jì)重組措施改變，其勞動力緊跟其后。但他也面臨一些放之四海而皆準(zhǔn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)則。通貨緊縮壓力下的中國在疫情這危險(xiǎn)期間的表現(xiàn)表明她還有刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)的余地。也因?yàn)槠淅市∮诮?jīng)濟(jì)增長率，她可以玩轉(zhuǎn)所有不敢注銷的債務(wù)。

Will China never pop? Safer to say there is little it cannot mop.

中國經(jīng)濟(jì)泡沫永不破？更準(zhǔn)確的說法應(yīng)該是沒有中國不能清掃的。