Executives, Let Stakeholders Drive Your Strategy

CEO及其高管團(tuán)隊(duì)如何制定戰(zhàn)略？公認(rèn)的過程就像是讓等式的兩邊相等起來一樣。一邊是組織的外部環(huán)境及其所有變化和趨勢(shì)；另一邊是組織及其所有內(nèi)部能力。戰(zhàn)略就是設(shè)法使兩邊保持一致。 How do CEOs and their executive teams develop strategy? The accepted process is like coupling two sides of an equation. On one side sits the organization’s?

external

?environment, with all its changes and trends. On the other side sits the organization with all of its?

internal?

capabilities. Strategy is about how you align the two. 自1965年商業(yè)戰(zhàn)略的概念提出以來，這種“制定”戰(zhàn)略的分析性，甚至是機(jī)械的方式就是它的構(gòu)思和教授方式，也是戰(zhàn)略管理教科書上展示的方式。作為一名曾經(jīng)的管理學(xué)教授，我一直為自己曾經(jīng)遵循這種方法而感到內(nèi)疚。 This analytic, even mechanical, way to “develop” strategy is how it has been conceived and taught since?business strategy’s conception in 1965, and it’s the way?strategic management textbooks lay things out to this day. As a former professor of management, I’ve been guilty of following this approach myself. 問題是這種“分兩邊”的方法不會(huì)產(chǎn)生戰(zhàn)略；它只是對(duì)之加以解釋。打個(gè)比方，解釋畫家如何將顏料涂在畫布上與創(chuàng)作藝術(shù)作品并不是一回事。管理人員要做的是戰(zhàn)略創(chuàng)建，而不是戰(zhàn)略解釋。但前者可能具有挑戰(zhàn)性。 The problem is that this “two sides” approach doesn’t?

produce

?strategy; it?

explains?

it. To use an analogy, explaining how a painter puts paint on a canvas is not the same as creating the work of art. Managers are in the strategy creation business, not in the strategy explanation business. But the former can be challenging. 例如，我最近為一位CEO和他來自美國(guó)各地的11名高管團(tuán)隊(duì)成員主持了一個(gè)戰(zhàn)略會(huì)議。這個(gè)組織，我稱之為Combine，他們?yōu)槭称凤嬃?、水和化學(xué)品等一系列行業(yè)的公司制造泵。我們作了有關(guān)于行業(yè)變化和趨勢(shì)的陳述，他們討論了公司的使命、愿景和價(jià)值觀。 For example, I recently facilitated a strategy session for a CEO and his 11 executive team members from across the U.S. The organization, I’ll call Combine, makes pumps for companies in a range of industries including food and beverage, water, and chemicals. We had presentations about industry changes and trends, and they’d discussed the company’s mission, vision, and values. 早期的會(huì)議很熱鬧，參與度很高。但當(dāng)談到戰(zhàn)略和未來方向時(shí)，團(tuán)隊(duì)突然陷入了沉默。 The early sessions were boisterous and participation was high. But when the time came to talk strategy and future direction, the group came to an abrupt silence. 是因?yàn)樗麄冊(cè)诘菴EO講話嗎？不，我環(huán)顧四周后得出結(jié)論。這是某種特殊時(shí)刻嗎？不，也不是。原來，這是因?yàn)樗麄儾恢榔髽I(yè)應(yīng)該如何為未來的成功定位自己。然后坐在后面的“弗蘭克”插話道：“我不知道我們?yōu)槭裁疵磕甓歼@樣做。結(jié)果總是一切如常?！?Was it because they were waiting for the CEO to speak? No, I concluded looking around. Was it the time of day? No that wasn’t it either. It became clear that it was because they didn’t have a clue about how the business should position itself for future success. Then “Frank” piped up from the back of the room with: “I don’t know why we do this each year. It always turns out to be business-as-usual.” 雖然房間里的許多人都認(rèn)為“這只是弗蘭克”的想法，但他說得很對(duì)。與一群高管一起制定由內(nèi)而外的戰(zhàn)略可能更多是運(yùn)營(yíng)層面而非戰(zhàn)略層面的，更可能重復(fù)過去而非創(chuàng)新。 While the comment was dismissed by many in the room as “that’s just Frank,” he was spot on. Developing strategy inside-out with a group of executives is likely to be more operational than strategic, more continue-as-before than innovative.

從“開發(fā)”轉(zhuǎn)向“發(fā)現(xiàn)”

Move From Develop to Discover

對(duì)于Combine和許多其他公司而言，大部分問題在于，團(tuán)隊(duì)不知道該采取何種方式來面對(duì)環(huán)境的快速變化——向在線業(yè)務(wù)的轉(zhuǎn)變、快速啟動(dòng)的創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)的崛起、引入數(shù)字營(yíng)銷、消費(fèi)者通過社交媒體施加的巨大壓力，以及新商業(yè)模式的出現(xiàn)等。這些并不是1965年商業(yè)戰(zhàn)略概念被提出時(shí)的情況。 Much of the problem, for Combine and many other firms, is that executive teams don’t know which way to turn in the face of rapid change?— the shift to online business, the rise of swift-footed start-ups, the introduction of digital marketing, the intense pressure from consumers via social media, and the emergence of new business models. These were not the conditions under which business strategy was conceived in 1965. 因此，如果你打算在戰(zhàn)略領(lǐng)域取得突破，我鼓勵(lì)你改變方法。停止猜測(cè)，開始詢問。按照我們最終在Combine上采取的做法進(jìn)行吧。 So, I encourage you to shift your method if you intend to make breakthroughs in the strategy space. Stop guessing and start inquiring. Follow the path we eventually took at Combine. 我們首先列出了企業(yè)的主要利益相關(guān)者，以便從他們那里發(fā)現(xiàn)一些線索。名單中包括最終用戶、經(jīng)銷商、供應(yīng)商、員工和股東。從外面看，利益相關(guān)者非常擅長(zhǎng)提供想法。作為客戶，他們會(huì)問這樣的問題：“你不認(rèn)為他們會(huì)……？”“他們?cè)趺礇]有……？”“他們?yōu)槭裁床弧?？”這些問題的答案真是戰(zhàn)略變革的建議。這是你可以利用的資源。 We started by listing the business’s?key stakeholders?in order to discover some pointers?

from them

. The list was end users, distributors, suppliers, employees, and owners. Stakeholders, being on the outside looking in, are very good at providing ideas. As customers they ask questions like: “Wouldn’t you think they’d … [fill in the blank]?,” “How come they haven’t …?,” “Why don’t they …?” The answers to these questions are suggestions for strategic change. This is a resource you can tap. 然后，Combine高管的任務(wù)是向確定下來的利益相關(guān)者組織的代表提出一系列問題。這些問題涉及每個(gè)利益相關(guān)者群體如何決定使用Combine而不是競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，他們?nèi)绾味x產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量等“戰(zhàn)略因素”，他們?nèi)绾卧u(píng)價(jià)Combine在這些方面的表現(xiàn)，以及Combine可能為提高競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力而做出的任何改變等。 Combine’s executives were then tasked with asking a series of questions of representatives from the identified stakeholder organizations. These questions concerned how each stakeholder group came to the decision to use Combine rather than the competition, how they defined these?“strategic factors”?such as product quality, how they rated Combine’s performance on these and any changes Combine might make to improve competitiveness. 重要的是，被指派進(jìn)行訪談的是高管。這些數(shù)據(jù)不是通過電子郵件問卷收集的，也不是由市場(chǎng)研究公司整理的。這是為了避免對(duì)消息進(jìn)行任何過濾。 Importantly,?

it was the executives who were assigned to do the interviewing.

?The data wasn’t gathered via an emailed questionnaire or conducted by a market research company. This was to avoid any filtering of messages. 根據(jù)我的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，很少有高管團(tuán)隊(duì)愿意放下他們的驕傲去這樣做。相反，他們想根據(jù)直覺和猜測(cè)來推行戰(zhàn)略“制定”，害怕承認(rèn)他們不知道利益相關(guān)者真正想要什么。 In my experience, very few executive teams are willing to swallow their pride and do this. Instead, they want to press on “developing” strategy based on gut feel and guesswork, afraid to admit that they don’t know what their stakeholders really want. 在Combine，關(guān)鍵發(fā)現(xiàn)涉及其與經(jīng)銷商和最終用戶的關(guān)系。在內(nèi)部，Combine的高管團(tuán)隊(duì)在定價(jià)問題上感受到了壓力，主要是由于從海外進(jìn)口的產(chǎn)品價(jià)格較低。來自經(jīng)銷商的消息是，Combine需要在價(jià)格上能與進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品匹敵。然而，Combine的產(chǎn)品顯然質(zhì)量更高。 At Combine, the key discovery involved its relationships with its distributors and end-users. Internally, Combine’s executive team felt pressured on price, largely caused by cheaper imports from overseas. The message?

from distributors

?was that Combine needed to match the imports on price. Yet Combine’s product was clearly of higher quality. 該研究首次讓Combine與最終用戶深入互動(dòng)。他們以前依靠經(jīng)銷商來告訴他們最終用戶的需求。令Combine驚訝的是，對(duì)最終用戶的訪談發(fā)現(xiàn)，價(jià)格對(duì)他們來說并不重要，但泵的可靠性（產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量）才是重要的。正如一位最終用戶所說：“價(jià)格并不重要，因?yàn)槿魏我淮芜\(yùn)行中斷的每小時(shí)成本都超過了泵的價(jià)格?！?The research had Combine engaging deeply with end-users for the first time. They’d previously relied on distributors to tell them about end-user needs. To Combine’s surprise, the?end-user interviews?uncovered that price wasn’t major for them but that the reliability (product quality) of the pumps was. As one end-user put it “price is not critical because the cost per hour of any outage outweighs that.”

?

這一令人瞠目的結(jié)果給Combine帶來了回旋空間，讓他們得以教育其分銷鏈了解其產(chǎn)品的真正價(jià)值?，F(xiàn)在，它可以向最終用戶證明，多付一點(diǎn)錢，使用更高質(zhì)量的產(chǎn)品可以大大提高過程的可靠性。它可以提供一個(gè)商業(yè)案例，表明Combine產(chǎn)品的整體成本效益比競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的產(chǎn)品更好。它可以談?wù)勔约夹g(shù)建議和幫助的形式提供的客戶服務(wù)。它可以將其互補(bǔ)產(chǎn)品范圍告知最終用戶。它可以提高其品牌的知名度?？傮w結(jié)果是，最終用戶在與經(jīng)銷商的合同中指定了Combine的產(chǎn)品，然后經(jīng)銷商開始增加Combine的系列產(chǎn)品的庫(kù)存了。 This eye-opening result provided Combine with the wriggle room to educate its distribution chain about the real value of its products. It can now demonstrate to end-users that, by paying a little extra, process reliability is greatly enhanced by employing a higher-quality product. It can provide a business case which shows that overall cost effectiveness is better with Combine’s products than with competitors’ products. It can talk up the customer service it provides in the form of technical advice and assistance. It can inform end-users about its complementary product range. And it can boost awareness of its brand. The overall result is that end-users specify Combine’s products in its contracts with distributors and, as a consequence, distributors stock Combine’s product range.

是時(shí)候進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)略轉(zhuǎn)變了？

Time for a Strategy Shift?

引入外部利益相關(guān)者改變了Combine的戰(zhàn)略制定狀況。Combine的高管們并沒有搶著表現(xiàn)自己，提一些中規(guī)中矩的想法，而是開始質(zhì)疑他們所相信的東西，并開始以新的方式看待世界。由此導(dǎo)致的是，他們對(duì)新的想法更加開放。他們不再將戰(zhàn)略制定視為用數(shù)據(jù)繪圖，而是將其視為真正的創(chuàng)造性過程。 Bringing in external stakeholders transformed strategy-making at Combine. Instead of competing to look smart and impose their ideas within the bubble, Combine’s executives started to question what they believed and came to look at the world in a new way. As a result, they became more open to new ideas. They stopped treating strategy-making as painting by numbers and came to see it as a genuinely creative process. 如果你對(duì)戰(zhàn)略制定過程產(chǎn)生的結(jié)果感到滿意，那請(qǐng)繼續(xù)。但我很確定你不會(huì)期待那些重分析、輕創(chuàng)造力的戰(zhàn)略評(píng)論。 If you’re happy with the results that your strategy process is producing, then press on. But I’m pretty sure you don’t look forward to those strategy reviews?— heavy on analysis, short on creativity. 我的建議是改變方向。停止嘗試做所有繁重的工作吧，那是沒有生產(chǎn)力。相反，訪談你們組織的利益相關(guān)者，讓他們?nèi)コ恍┢D苦的工作。然后做一名法醫(yī)科學(xué)家，像我們?cè)贑ombine所做的那樣調(diào)查你的結(jié)果。尋找意料之外的斷開之處；這些發(fā)現(xiàn)可以使你的戰(zhàn)略朝著新的成功方向 發(fā)展。 My suggestion is to change direction. Stop trying to do all the heavy lifting; it’s not productive. Instead, get your organization’s stakeholders to remove some of the hard work by interviewing them. Then become a forensic scientist to investigate your results like we did at Combine. Look for disconnects that come as surprises; these discoveries could tip your strategy in a new and successful direction. 格雷厄姆·肯尼是KMS Education and Strategic Factors 的CEO、公認(rèn)的戰(zhàn)略和績(jī)效衡量專家，他在私營(yíng)、公共和非營(yíng)利部門幫助經(jīng)理、高管和董事會(huì)創(chuàng)建成功的組織。他曾在美國(guó)和加拿大的大學(xué)擔(dān)任管理學(xué)教授。 格雷厄姆·肯尼（Graham Kenny）|?文 時(shí)青靖 | 編輯