Global technopolitics--The new grand bargain?

Without teaming up, democracies will not be able to establish a robust alternative to China’s autocratic technosphere

we will rock you?

Some of the EU’s member states have also begun defending their right to rule their own digital roost, something now called “digital sovereignty”. There is talk of creating a European cloud within the American one. GAIA-X is a step down that road a federation of clouds, launched by Germany and France in June, whose members agree to certain rules, such as allowing customers to choose where their data are stored and move freely to providers’ competitors if they wish. There is more to come: a “data strategy” on the table in Brussels would, if fully implemented, create data spaces ruled by European law and give people more rights on how their data are used.

sovereignty /?s?vr?nti/ n. 主權(quán)；主權(quán)國家；君主；獨(dú)立國

GAIA ?n. /?ɡa??/ 蓋婭（被視為能進(jìn)行自我規(guī)劃與控制的巨大自然體系的地球）,指地球

These disputes offer ample?space for?mutually?beneficial trade-offs. If America and its allies can reach good enough accommodations on the most?contentious issues notably privacy and competition and find ways to live with the smaller contradictions and conflicts which remain, they can become a force to be reckoned with?one that others will need little encouragement to join.?An insular America can remain a technology superpower. A connected America cemented?into the rest of the world by means of a grand technopolitical bargain could be the hub of something truly unsurpassable.

ample adj. ??/??mpl/ ?1.足夠的；豐裕的??ample opportunity/evidence/space/proof 充分的機(jī)會(huì)；足夠的證據(jù)；寬敞的空間；充足的證明?2.(人的體形)豐滿的；碩大的??an ample bosom 豐滿的胸脯

Mutually /?mju?t?u?li/ adv. 互相地；互助

Contentious??adj./k?n?ten??s/ ?

1.可能引起爭論的??a contentious issue/topic/subject 有爭議的問題╱話題╱主題；2.愛爭論的；充滿爭吵的??a contentious meeting 爭論不休的會(huì)議

be reckoned with?被加以考慮 ?They were already a political force to be reckoned with. 他們已經(jīng)成為一支不容忽視的政治力量。

Insular??adj. /??nsj?l?(r)/ ?1.只關(guān)心本國利益的；思想褊狹的；保守的??The British are often accused of being insular. 英國人常被指責(zé)為思想褊狹。2.(術(shù)語) 海島的；島嶼的?the coastal and insular areas 沿海和島嶼區(qū)域

Cemented??/s??ment?d/ adj. 滲碳的；注水泥的；粘合的；v. 鞏固；接合；粘合（cement的過去分詞形式）

There is a range of ideas about how to do this. In a recent report for the Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank, Robert Knake imagines such a grand bargain taking the form of a “digital trade zone”, complete with a treaty organisation.?America would “weaponise its digital trade relationships” in order to promote such things as cyber-security, privacy protection and democratic values on the internet. Only countries that comply with the organisation’s rules on such matters would be able to become members and only members would be allowed fully to trade with each other digitally. Violations would be dealt with by imposing sanctions and tariffs. “If the digital trade zone grows strong enough, China might see more benefit to co-operative engagement than to continued disruptive behaviour,” writes Mr Knake.?

sanction ?/?s??k?n/ ?

名詞?1.~ (against sb) 制裁??The economic sanctions have been lifted. 經(jīng)濟(jì)制裁業(yè)已取消。 2. （正式）許可，批準(zhǔn)??These changes will require the sanction of the court. 這些變更須經(jīng)法院認(rèn)可。3.~ (against sth) 制裁；約束；處罰

動(dòng)詞1.許可；準(zhǔn)許；準(zhǔn)予?The government refused to sanction a further cut in interest rates. 政府拒絕批準(zhǔn)進(jìn)一步降低利率。 2.(術(shù)語)懲罰；實(shí)施制裁

Others prefer to imagine something less formal, rules-based and punitive. In October three other think-tanks the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS), MERICS of Germany and the Asia-Pacific Initiative of Japan outlined a less?exclusive?construction. They propose that democratic countries form a technology alliance not subject to a formal treaty. It would be like the G7, which consists of America, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan, and could one day, perhaps, include India and other countries from the Global South. It would hold regular meetings, as the IMF and World Bank do, and issue consensus opinions, and it would invite other stakeholders-?from NGOs to tech firms -to?pitch?in.

Punitive??adj. /?pju?n?t?v/ 1. 懲罰性的；刑罰的；處罰的?There are calls for more punitive measures against people who drink and drive. 有人呼吁對(duì)酒后駕車的人要有更具處罰性的措施。2.（租稅等）苛刻的??punitive taxes 懲罰性征稅

MERICS：墨卡托中國研究中心

Exclusive /?k?sklu?s?v/?adj. 獨(dú)有的；排外的；專一的n. 獨(dú)家新聞；獨(dú)家經(jīng)營的項(xiàng)目；排外者

pitch?in?投入；作出貢獻(xiàn)??Donors will pitch in extra cash.?捐助者還將投入額外的資金。

譯文

We will rock you

Some of the EU’s member states have also begun defending their right to rule their own digital roost, something now called “digital sovereignty”. There is talk of creating a European cloud within the American one. GAIA-X is a step down that road a federation of clouds, launched by Germany and France in June, whose members agree to certain rules, such as allowing customers to choose where their data are stored and move freely to providers’ competitors if they wish. There is more to come: a “data strategy” on the table in Brussels would, if fully implemented, create data spaces ruled by European law and give people more rights on how their data are used.

歐盟一些成員國也開始捍衛(wèi)自己管理自身數(shù)字家園的權(quán)利，現(xiàn)在被稱為“數(shù)字主權(quán)”。有傳言說要在美國云內(nèi)創(chuàng)建一個(gè)歐洲云。GAIA-X是在這條道路上邁出的一步，它是由德國和法國在6月發(fā)起的云聯(lián)盟，其成員同意某些規(guī)則，比如允許客戶選擇他們的數(shù)據(jù)存儲(chǔ)在哪里，如果他們?cè)敢猓梢宰杂傻剞D(zhuǎn)移到提供商的競爭對(duì)手那里。還會(huì)有更多的事情發(fā)生:布魯塞爾會(huì)議上提出的“數(shù)據(jù)戰(zhàn)略”如果得到全面實(shí)施，將創(chuàng)建受歐洲法律管轄的數(shù)據(jù)空間，并在如何使用自己的數(shù)據(jù)方面給予人們更多權(quán)利。

These disputes offer ample?space for?mutually?beneficial trade-offs. If America and its allies can reach good enough accommodations on the most?contentious issues notably privacy and competition and find ways to live with the smaller contradictions and conflicts which remain, they can become a force to be reckoned with?one that others will need little encouragement to join.?An insular America can remain a technology superpower. A connected America cemented?into the rest of the world by means of a grand technopolitical bargain could be the hub of something truly unsurpassable.

這些爭端為互惠互利的交易提供了充足的空間。如果美國與其盟友能在最具爭議的問題，明顯是隱私和競爭問題達(dá)成比較好的默契；在小的矛盾與沖突中找到比較合適的相處方式。他們將成為一股不容忽視的力量，其他國家無需鼓勵(lì)就會(huì)主動(dòng)加入。孤立的美國依舊是一個(gè)技術(shù)超級(jí)大國。通過宏大的技術(shù)政治談判方式接入世界的美國，鞏固與世界的聯(lián)系，它將成為一個(gè)真正不可逾越的中心。

There is a range of ideas about how to do this. In a recent report for the Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank, Robert Knake imagines such a grand bargain taking the form of a “digital trade zone”, complete with a treaty organisation.?America would “weaponise its digital trade relationships” in order to promote such things as cyber-security, privacy protection and democratic values on the internet. Only countries that comply with the organisation’s rules on such matters would be able to become members and only members would be allowed fully to trade with each other digitally. Violations would be dealt with by imposing sanctions and tariffs. “If the digital trade zone grows strong enough, China might see more benefit to co-operative engagement than to continued disruptive behaviour,” writes Mr Knake.?

關(guān)于如何做到這一點(diǎn)有很多想法。在最近提交給外交關(guān)系委員會(huì)(一個(gè)智囊團(tuán))的一份報(bào)告中，Robert Knake 設(shè)想了以“數(shù)字貿(mào)易區(qū)”的形式出現(xiàn)的大型交易，并配有條約組織。美國會(huì)采取“數(shù)字貿(mào)易關(guān)系武器化”，用于促進(jìn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全、隱私保護(hù)和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)民主價(jià)值觀的工作。只有遵守該組織在此類事務(wù)上的規(guī)則的國家才能成為成員國，而且只有成員國之間才能完全進(jìn)行數(shù)字貿(mào)易。違規(guī)行為將會(huì)通過制裁和征收關(guān)稅進(jìn)行處理。Knake表示如果數(shù)字交易區(qū)成長的足夠強(qiáng)大，中國可能會(huì)認(rèn)為合作加入帶來的利益更多，而不是采取持續(xù)的破壞行為。

Others prefer to imagine something less formal, rules-based and punitive. In October three other think-tanks the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS), MERICS of Germany and the Asia-Pacific Initiative of Japan outlined a less?exclusive?construction. They propose that democratic countries form a technology alliance not subject to a formal treaty. It would be like the G7, which consists of America, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan, and could one day, perhaps, include India and other countries from the Global South. It would hold regular meetings, as the IMF and World Bank do, and issue consensus opinions, and it would invite other stakeholders-?from NGOs to tech firms -to?pitch?in.

其他國家則更喜歡設(shè)想一些不那么正式、規(guī)則性不強(qiáng)和懲罰弱的東西。10月，另外三家智庫——新美國安全中心(CNAS)、德國的墨卡托中國研究中心（MERICS）和日本的亞太倡議概述了一個(gè)不那么排外的結(jié)構(gòu)。他們建議民主國家建立一個(gè)不受正式條約約束的技術(shù)聯(lián)盟。它將像G7一樣，由美國、英國、加拿大、法國、德國、意大利和日本組成，也許有一天，還會(huì)包括印度和其他來自南半球的國家。它將像國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)和世界銀行(World Bank)那樣定期召開會(huì)議，發(fā)布共識(shí)意見，并邀請(qǐng)非政府組織(ngo)的其他利益相關(guān)者到科技公司參加會(huì)議。