The Indian economy is being rewired. The opportunity is immense

印度經濟正在重組。機會巨大

And so are the stakes

風險也很大

May 13th 2022Over the past three years India has endured more than its share of bad news and suffering. The pandemic has killed between 2.2m and 9.7m people. Lockdowns caused the economy to shrink temporarily by a quarter and triggered the largest internal migrations since partition in 1947, as city workers fled to their villages. Religious tensions have been simmering, stoked by the anti-Muslim chauvinism of the Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp), in power since 2014 under the strongman prime minister, Narendra Modi. Now a heatwave is baking the north of the country and the global oil- and food-price shock is battering the poor.

【1】chauvinism 沙文主義

【2】simmer 即將爆發(fā)

在過去的三年里，印度忍受了太多的壞消息和痛苦。這場大流行已導致220萬至970萬人死亡。封鎖導致經濟暫時萎縮了四分之一，并引發(fā)了自1947年分裂以來規(guī)模最大的內部遷移，城市工人紛紛逃往他們的農村。由于反穆斯林沙文主義的印度人民黨自2014年以來在鐵人總理納倫德拉·莫迪的領導下掌權，宗教緊張局勢一觸即發(fā)?，F(xiàn)在，一股熱浪襲向該國北部，而全球石油和食品價格的沖擊正重創(chuàng)著窮人。

Yet as our Briefing explains, if you take a step back, a novel confluence of forces stands to transform India’s economy over the next decade, improving the lives of 1.4bn people and changing the balance of power in Asia. Technological leaps, the energy transition and geopolitical shifts are creating new opportunities—and new tools to fix intractable problems. The biggest threat to all this is India’s incendiary politics.

【1】confluence 匯集

【2】incendiary 煽動性的

然而，正如本刊《Briefing》欄目所解釋的那樣，如果你退一步看，一股新的力量匯集在一起，并將在未來10年改變印度經濟，改善14億人的生活，改變亞洲的力量平衡。技術飛躍、能源轉型和地緣政治變化正在創(chuàng)造新的機會，新工具可以用于解決棘手問題。對這一切的最大威脅是印度煽動性的政治。

Since India opened up in 1991, its economy has prompted both euphoria and despair. One minute it is the next China: a rising superpower bursting with enterprising geniuses. The next it is a demographic time-bomb unable to generate hope for its young people; or a Wild West where Vodafone and other naive multinationals are fleeced. Over the past decade India has outgrown most other big countries, yet this has been overshadowed by a sense of disappointment. It has not engineered the manufacturing surge that enriched East Asia nor built enough big companies to marshal capital for development. Its fragmented markets and informal firms create few good jobs.

【1】marshal 引領；召集；組織安排

自1991年開放以來，印度的經濟既讓人欣喜，也讓人絕望。前一刻，它還是下一個中國：一個充滿創(chuàng)新精神的天才的崛起中的超級大國。下一刻，它就像一顆人口定時炸彈，無法為年輕人帶來希望；或者像蠻荒的西部，欺騙了沃達豐和其他天真的跨國公司。在過去的十年里，印度的經濟增長已經超過了大多數(shù)其他大國，然而這一點卻被一種失望的情緒所掩蓋。它既沒有謀劃出讓東亞富裕起來的制造業(yè)熱潮，也沒有建立足夠多的大公司來為發(fā)展籌集資金。其分散的市場和非正規(guī)企業(yè)幾乎沒有創(chuàng)造好的就業(yè)機會。

As the country emerges from the pandemic, however, a new pattern of growth is visible. It is unlike anything you have seen before. An indigenous tech effort is key. As the cost of technology has dropped, India has rolled out a national “tech stack”: a set of state-sponsored digital services that link ordinary Indians with an electronic identity, payments and tax systems, and bank accounts. The rapid adoption of these platforms is forcing a vast, inefficient, informal cash economy into the 21st century. It has turbocharged the world’s third-largest startup scene after America’s and China’s.

然而，隨著該國擺脫新冠，一種新的增長模式正在顯現(xiàn)。這和你以前見過的任何模式都不一樣。本土技術是它的關鍵。隨著技術成本的下降，印度推出了國家“技術?！保阂惶子蓢屹Y助的數(shù)字服務，可以將普通印度人與電子身份、支付和稅收系統(tǒng)以及銀行賬戶聯(lián)系起來。這些平臺的迅速普及，正迫使一個龐大、低效、非正式的現(xiàn)金經濟進入21世紀。它推動了第三大創(chuàng)業(yè)場景，僅次于美國和中國。

Alongside that, global trends are creating bigger business clusters. The it-services industry has doubled in size in a decade, helped by the cloud and a worldwide shortage of software workers. Where else can Western firms find half a million new engineers a year? There is a renewable-energy investment spree: India ranks third for solar installations and is pioneering green hydrogen. As firms everywhere reconfigure supply chains to lessen their reliance on X, India’s attractions as a manufacturing location have risen, helped by a $26bn subsidy scheme. Western governments are keen to forge defence and technology links. India has also found a workaround to redistribute more to ordinary folk who vote but rarely see immediate gains from economic reforms: a direct, real-time, digital welfare system that in 36 months has paid $200bn to about 950m people.

除此之外，全球趨勢正在創(chuàng)造更大的商業(yè)集群。在云計算和全球軟件工人短缺的情況下，IT服務業(yè)的規(guī)模在十年內翻了一番。西方公司每年還能在哪里找到50萬名新工程師？可再生能源投資熱潮正在興起：印度在太陽能安裝方面排名第三，并且在綠色氫氣方面領先。隨著世界各地的企業(yè)重新配置供應鏈，以減少對X的依賴，印度作為制造業(yè)基地，在一項260億美元的補貼計劃的幫助下，其吸引力有所上升。西方政府熱衷于建立國防和技術聯(lián)系。印度還找到了一個變通辦法，將更多財富重新分配給那些有投票權但很少能從經濟改革中即時獲益的普通民眾：即一個直接、實時的數(shù)字福利系統(tǒng)，該系統(tǒng)在36個月內為大約9.5億人支付了2000億美元。

These changes will not lead to a manufacturing boom as big as those in South Korea or China, which created enough jobs to empty the fields of farmers. They do not solve deep problems such as extreme weather or clogged courts. But they do help explain why India is forecast to be the world’s fastest-growing big economy in 2022 and why it has a chance of holding on to that title for years. Growth generates more wealth to invest in the country’s human capital, particularly hospitals and schools.

這些變化不會帶來像韓國或中國那樣大的制造業(yè)繁榮，因為韓國或中國創(chuàng)造了足夠多的就業(yè)機會，讓農民的田地空無一人。不過它們不能解決諸如極端天氣或妨礙法庭等深層次問題。但它們確實有助于解釋為什么印度預計將在2022年成為世界上增長最快的大型經濟體，以及為什么它有機會在數(shù)年內保持這一頭銜。經濟增長可以產生更多財富，用于投資該國的人力資本，特別是醫(yī)院和學校。

Who deserves the credit? Chance has played a big role: India did not create the X-American split or the cloud, but benefits from both. So has the steady accumulation of piecemeal reform over many governments. The digital-identity scheme and new national tax system were dreamed up a decade or more ago.

誰值得贊揚？機會發(fā)揮了很大作用：印度沒有制造xx沖突或創(chuàng)造云計算平臺，但其卻從中受益。對許多政府來說，它們也有漸進式改革的穩(wěn)步積累。數(shù)字身份認證方案和新的國家稅收系統(tǒng)十多年前就構想出來了。

Mr Modi’s government has also got a lot right. It has backed the tech stack and direct welfare, and persevered with the painful task of shrinking the informal economy. It has found pragmatic fixes. Central-government purchases of solar power have kick-started renewables. Financial reforms have made it easier to float young firms and bankrupt bad ones. Mr Modi’s electoral prowess provides economic continuity. Even the opposition expects him to be in power well after the election in 2024.

【1】kick-start 推動

莫迪政府也做了很多正確的事情。它支持技術堆棧和直接福利，并堅持完成縮小非正規(guī)經濟的痛苦任務。它已經找到了務實的解決辦法。中央政府對太陽能的采購推動了可再生能源。金融改革使得年輕的公司更容易上市，而不好的公司更容易破產。莫迪先生的選舉能力提供了經濟的連續(xù)性。就連反對派也希望他在2024年大選后能很好地掌權。

The danger is that over the next decade this dominance hardens into autocracy. One risk is the bjp’s abhorrent hostility towards Muslims, which it uses to rally its political base. Companies tend to shrug this off, judging that Mr Modi can keep tensions under control and that capital flight will be limited. Yet violence and deteriorating human rights could lead to stigma that impairs India’s access to Western markets. The bjp’s desire for religious and linguistic conformity in a huge, diverse country could be destabilising. Were the party to impose Hindi as the national language, secessionist pressures would grow in some wealthy states that pay much of the taxes.

【1】secessionist 分離主義者；支持脫離的

危險在于，在接下來的十年里，這種主導地位會變成獨裁統(tǒng)治。風險之一是印度人民黨對穆斯林懷有敵意，它利用這種敵意來團結自己的政治基礎。企業(yè)往往對此不以為意，它們認為莫迪能夠控制緊張局勢，資本外逃將受到限制。然而，暴力和日益惡化的人權可能會導致污名，損害印度進入西方市場的機會。在一個龐大而多元的國家，印度人民黨渴望宗教和語言的一致性，這可能會造成不穩(wěn)定。如果該黨強行將印地語作為國家語言，那么在一些支付大部分稅收的富裕邦，分離主義的壓力將會增加。

The quality of decision-making could also deteriorate. Prickly and vindictive, the government has co-opted the bureaucracy to bully the press and the courts. A botched decision to abolish bank notes in 2016 showed Mr Modi’s impulsive side. A strongman lacking checks and balances can eventually endanger not just democracy, but also the economy: think of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, whose bizarre views on inflation have caused a currency crisis. And, given the bjp’s ambivalence towards foreign capital, the campaign for national renewal risks regressing into protectionism. The party loves blank cheques from Silicon Valley but is wary of foreign firms competing in India. Today’s targeted subsidies could degenerate into autarky and cronyism—the tendencies that have long held India back.

【1】Prickly 易怒的；棘手的

【2】co-opt 指定

【3】banknote 鈔票

【4】checks and balances 制衡制度

決策的質量也可能惡化。脾氣暴躁、報復心強的政府利用官僚機構來恐嚇媒體和法庭。2016年廢除紙幣的拙劣決定顯示了莫迪沖動的一面。一個缺乏制衡制度的強人最終不僅會危及民主，還會危及經濟：想想土耳其總統(tǒng)雷杰普?塔伊普?埃爾多安，他對通貨膨脹的怪異觀點引發(fā)了一場貨幣危機。而且，鑒于印度人民黨對外資的矛盾態(tài)度，民族復興運動有倒退到貿易保護主義的風險。該黨喜歡來自硅谷的空白支票，但對外國公司在印度的競爭持謹慎態(tài)度。今天的有針對性的補貼可能會退化為自給自足和任人唯親，這是長期以來阻礙印度發(fā)展的趨勢。

For India to grow at 7% or 8% for years to come would be momentous. It would lift huge numbers of people out of poverty. It would generate a vast new market and manufacturing base for global business, and it would change the global balance of power by creating a bigger counterweight to X in Asia. Fate, inheritance and pragmatic decisions have created a new opportunity in the next decade. It is India’s and Mr Modi’s to squander.

對印度來說，在未來幾年保持7%或8%的增長率將是非常重要的。它將使大量人口擺脫貧困。它將為全球企業(yè)創(chuàng)造一個巨大的新市場和制造基地，并將通過在亞洲創(chuàng)造一個更大的制衡X的力量，改變全球力量平衡。命運、繼承和務實的決定在未來十年創(chuàng)造了一個新的機會。這是印度的機會，也是莫迪可以揮霍的機會。