Global technopolitics--The new grand bargain??

Without teaming up, democracies will not be able to establish a robust alternative to China’s autocratic technosphere

It might not have to give all that much. European views on regulating platforms more strictly because of their tendency to become?quasi-natural monopolies?are not exactly mainstream in Washington, DC, but nor are they completely alien to the political debate there. A recent congressional report about how to limit big tech’s power included many ideas already?touted?in Brussels, such as banning tech giants from favouring their own services and refusing to connect to competing ones. Positions on regulating speech online are not that far apart either. As in Europe, there is growing agreement in America that legislation is needed to push social-media firms to do more to rid their services of hate speech and the like.

Quasi?/?kwe?za?; ?kwe?sa?; ?kwɑ?zi/ adj. 準(zhǔn)的；類似的；外表的?adv. 似是；有如

tout /ta?t/

1.~ sb/sth (as sth) 標(biāo)榜；吹捧；吹噓??She's being touted as the next leader of the party. 她被吹捧為該黨的下一任領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。

2.~ (for sth) 兜售；推銷???the problem of unlicensed taxi drivers touting for business at airports 沒有執(zhí)照的出租汽車司機(jī)在機(jī)場(chǎng)攬生意的問題

3.（尤指在劇院、體育場(chǎng)等外）倒賣高價(jià)票，賣黑市票

A deal on taxing tech firms seems within reach, too. The Trump administration resisted efforts to?compel?them to pay taxes where they do business rather than in tax havens, regarding this as a grab for the profits of American companies. A Biden administration is likely to be more open to the argument that more of the taxes on digital firms should go to places where their customers live. Expect negotiations on the matter at the OECD to be revived?--as they must be to keep countries from charging digital taxes?unilaterally.?Barring a compromise, France, Spain and Britain will start collecting such a?levy?early next year.

Compel??/k?m?pel/?vt. 強(qiáng)迫，迫使；強(qiáng)使發(fā)生

Unilaterally /?ju?n??l?tr?li/?adv. 單方面地

Levy?/?levi/?n. 征收；征兵，征稅；vt. 征收（稅等）；征集（兵等）；發(fā)動(dòng)（戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)）；vi. 征稅；征兵

In parts of the world’s international?bureaucracy?the grand bargaining has already begun. When Japan?presided over?the G20, a club of developing and rich countries, last year, it succeeded in getting the group to launch the “Osaka Track”, an attempt to come up with rules to regulate global data flows. This summer also saw the launch of the Global Partnership in AI, which is meant to come up with rules for the responsible use of AI, and of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, which brings together lawmakers from?18 countries. These new groups join a few established ones, such as the OECD and the Internet Governance Forum, which have long pushed for common rules in the digital realm.?NATO?has started to do the same for AI?and data-sharing among its members.

bureaucracy ?/bj???r?kr?si/?n. 官僚主義；官僚機(jī)構(gòu)；官僚政治

Preside??v. /pr??za?d/ ~ (at/over sth) 主持（會(huì)議、儀式等）；擔(dān)任（會(huì)議）主席?? the presiding judge 首席法官

NATO：North Atlantic Treaty Organization，北大西洋公約組織

One of the key parameters in the bargaining will be how formal a framework the parties want. In some ways, formal is better: everyone knows where they stand. In others, formal is worse: agreement is harder. Take the example of trade, thoroughly formalised within the WTO. Trade agreements take years to negotiate, often only to be blocked by legislatures at the last minute. This is why a Biden administration will probably aim for a much looser form of co-operation, at least initially. An idea discussed in foreign-policy circles close to Mr Biden is that, instead of agreeing on certain policies that then have to be implemented nationally, governments should?opt for?a division of labour within certain red lines. If Europe wants to go ahead with rules to regulate big tech which do not amount to?expropriation, America would not put up a fight thus allowing the EU regulation to become the global standard of sorts, rather as it has done with the?GDPR.

expropriation /?eks?pr??pri?e??n/ n. 征收，征用；沒收

GDPR：通用數(shù)據(jù)保護(hù)條例(General Data Protection Regulation)

opt for?：選擇，抉擇

譯文

It might not have to give all that much. European views on regulating platforms more strictly because of their tendency to become?quasi-natural monopolies?are not exactly mainstream in Washington, DC, but nor are they completely alien to the political debate there. A recent congressional report about how to limit big tech’s power included many ideas already?touted?in Brussels, such as banning tech giants from favouring their own services and refusing to connect to competing ones. Positions on regulating speech online are not that far apart either. As in Europe, there is growing agreement in America that legislation is needed to push social-media firms to do more to rid their services of hate speech and the like.

這有可能不需要美國付出很大的代價(jià)。歐盟將管制平臺(tái)越來越嚴(yán)格視為歐盟走向自然壟斷的趨勢(shì)表現(xiàn)，但并不是美國政界的主流，然而這種看法也非美國政界觀點(diǎn)的完全異類。一則最新的國會(huì)報(bào)告是關(guān)于如何限制大型科技公司權(quán)利，包括很多已經(jīng)推銷給布魯塞爾的觀點(diǎn)，比如禁止科技巨頭只使用自己的服務(wù)而拒絕與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手聯(lián)系。規(guī)范互聯(lián)網(wǎng)言論方面，美國與歐盟觀點(diǎn)相差不大。與歐洲一樣，美國越來越同意需要立法推動(dòng)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)傳媒企業(yè)提供更多的服務(wù)擺脫網(wǎng)絡(luò)仇恨言亂。

A deal on taxing tech firms seems within reach, too. The Trump administration resisted efforts to?compel?them to pay taxes where they do business rather than in tax havens, regarding this as a grab for the profits of American companies. A Biden administration is likely to be more open to the argument that more of the taxes on digital firms should go to places where their customers live. Expect negotiations on the matter at the OECD to be revived?--as they must be to keep countries from charging digital taxes?unilaterally.?Barring a compromise, France, Spain and Britain will start collecting such a?levy?early next year.

關(guān)于對(duì)科技企業(yè)征稅也在可商討范圍之內(nèi)。特朗普政府反對(duì)對(duì)科技企業(yè)在業(yè)務(wù)所在地強(qiáng)制征稅而不是在避稅天堂征稅，并將之視為搶奪美國企業(yè)利益。而拜登政府則對(duì)這個(gè)議題可能更加開放，信息企業(yè)的稅收更多應(yīng)該流向公司的客戶所在地。預(yù)期OECD會(huì)重啟這方面的談判--因?yàn)樗麄儽仨毝沤^各國單方面更改數(shù)字稅。若不能妥協(xié)，法國、西班牙和英國明年將會(huì)開始征收各自的數(shù)字稅。

In parts of the world’s international?bureaucracy?the grand bargaining has already begun. When Japan?presided over?the G2o, a club of developing and rich countries, last year, it succeeded in getting the group to launch the “Osaka Track”, an attempt to come up with rules to regulate global data flows. This summer also saw the launch of the Global Partnership in AI, which is meant to come up with rules for the responsible use of AI, and of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, which brings together lawmakers from?18 countries. These new groups join a few established ones, such as the OECD and the Internet Governance Forum, which have long pushed for common rules in the digital realm.?NATO?has started to do the same for AI?and data-sharing among its members.

世界部分的國際官僚機(jī)構(gòu)已經(jīng)啟動(dòng)規(guī)模宏大的交易。在日本主持G20（發(fā)展中國家與富有國家俱樂部）的時(shí)候，它成功使得G20啟動(dòng)“Osaka Track”，試圖為世界數(shù)據(jù)流動(dòng)制定規(guī)則。這個(gè)夏天也見證世界人工智能全球伙伴關(guān)系的落地，嘗試對(duì)人工智能的合理使用制定規(guī)則以及在中國建立議會(huì)交互聯(lián)盟，聚集了來自18個(gè)國家的法律制定者。這些新的組織加入了少量的已存在組織，比如OECD和互聯(lián)網(wǎng)管理論壇，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)管理論壇長期致力于數(shù)字領(lǐng)域的公共規(guī)則推廣。NATO也開始對(duì)成員國之間AI?和數(shù)據(jù)分析開展一樣的工作。

One of the key parameters in the bargaining will be how formal a framework the parties want. In some ways, formal is better: everyone knows where they stand. In others, formal is worse: agreement is harder. Take the example of trade, thoroughly formalised within the WTO. Trade agreements take years to negotiate, often only to be blocked by legislatures at the last minute. This is why a Biden administration will probably aim for a much looser form of co-operation, at least initially. An idea discussed in foreign-policy circles close to Mr Biden is that, instead of agreeing on certain policies that then have to be implemented nationally, governments should?opt for?a division of labour within certain red lines. If Europe wants to go ahead with rules to regulate big tech which do not amount to?expropriation, America would not put up a fight thus allowing the EU regulation to become the global standard of sorts, rather as it has done with the?GDPR.

這場(chǎng)交易中關(guān)鍵因素之一就是參與方想要什么樣正式程度的合作框架。在某些情況下，正式意味著優(yōu)質(zhì)：所有人都知道其位置。在另外一些情況下，正式意味著糟糕：達(dá)成統(tǒng)一更加困難。以貿(mào)易為例，在WTO的框架下完全規(guī)范化。貿(mào)易協(xié)議談判多年達(dá)成，結(jié)果最后一秒被立法斃掉。這也是為什么拜登政府至少最初有可能以寬松的合作方式為目標(biāo)。在外交政策圈討論的一個(gè)想法與拜登想法相近，這個(gè)想法認(rèn)為與其各國制定達(dá)成必須落地實(shí)施的明確政策，政府更應(yīng)該在紅線內(nèi)選擇勞動(dòng)分工。如果歐盟想要推進(jìn)對(duì)科技巨頭的監(jiān)管政策，其規(guī)則不是沒收這些企業(yè)的話，美國不應(yīng)該就此挑起戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，而是允許歐盟的監(jiān)管政策成為此類企業(yè)的國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，而不是如同（歐盟）通用數(shù)據(jù)保護(hù)條例一樣。

經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人2020年12月刊