Journal of Economic Theory 2023年第2期

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——更多動(dòng)態(tài)，請(qǐng)持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh，理想主義的百年孤獨(dú)

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1.Evolutionary foundation for heterogeneity in risk aversion

風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避異質(zhì)性的進(jìn)化基礎(chǔ)

Yuval Heller, Ilan Nehama

We examine the evolutionary basis for risk aversion with respect to aggregate risk. We study populations in which agents face choices between alternatives with different levels of aggregate risk. We show that the choices that maximize the long-run growth rate are induced by a heterogeneous population in which the least and most risk-averse agents are indifferent between facing an aggregate risk and obtaining its linear and harmonic mean for sure, respectively. Moreover, approximately optimal behavior can be induced by a simple distribution according to which all agents have constant relative risk aversion, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion is uniformly distributed between zero and two.

我們從總體風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的角度考察了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的進(jìn)化基礎(chǔ)。我們研究的群體中，行為者面臨著不同程度的總風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的選擇。我們證明，使長(zhǎng)期增長(zhǎng)率最大化的選擇是由異質(zhì)人口誘導(dǎo)的，其中風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡程度最低和最高的個(gè)體分別在面對(duì)總風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和獲得其線性和調(diào)和均值之間是無(wú)所謂的。此外，近似最優(yōu)行為可以由一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的分布來(lái)誘導(dǎo)，根據(jù)該分布，所有主體都具有恒定的相對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡，相對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡系數(shù)均勻分布在0到2之間。

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2.Mediated talk: An experiment

調(diào)解談話:一個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)

Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai, Wooyoung Lim

We experimentally compare mediated (cheap) talk with direct (cheap) talk. Theory, guided by a characterization of equilibria in both environments, suggests that mediated talk has the potential to improve information sharing and welfare relative to direct talk. We sharpen the theory prediction by invoking Crawford's (2003) language-anchored level-k?analysis. In the experiment, we find that mediated talk can indeed facilitate information transmission. We also find, however, that this requires that the language employed conforms with the mediation mechanism: mediation mechanisms improve information sharing for a variety of conforming languages, but fail to do so with a nonconforming language. These experimental findings match the predictions from the language-anchored level-k?analysis. Strikingly, this is the case even when a whole array of alternative selection criteria (including iterative deletion of dominated strategies, strict equilibrium, Pareto efficiency, etc.) make a unique common prediction that sharply disagrees with the language-anchored level-k?prediction.

我們實(shí)驗(yàn)地比較了間接(廉價(jià))談話和直接(廉價(jià))談話。以兩種環(huán)境的平衡特征為指導(dǎo)的理論表明，與直接對(duì)話相比，中介對(duì)話有可能改善信息共享和福利。我們通過調(diào)用Crawford(2003)的語(yǔ)言錨定k級(jí)分析來(lái)增強(qiáng)理論預(yù)測(cè)。在實(shí)驗(yàn)中，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)中介談話確實(shí)可以促進(jìn)信息傳遞。然而，我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，這要求所使用的語(yǔ)言與中介機(jī)制一致:中介機(jī)制改善了各種符合規(guī)范的語(yǔ)言的信息共享，但對(duì)于不符合規(guī)范的語(yǔ)言卻無(wú)法做到這一點(diǎn)。這些實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果與語(yǔ)言錨定水平k分析的預(yù)測(cè)相吻合。引人注目的是，即使當(dāng)一系列備選選擇標(biāo)準(zhǔn)(包括優(yōu)勢(shì)策略的迭代刪除、嚴(yán)格均衡、帕累托效率等)做出一個(gè)獨(dú)特的共同預(yù)測(cè)，與語(yǔ)言錨定的k級(jí)預(yù)測(cè)嚴(yán)重不一致時(shí)，情況也是如此。

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3.Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests

排名競(jìng)賽中獎(jiǎng)懲的最優(yōu)編排

Bin Liu, Jingfeng Lu

We allow negative prizes and investigate effort-maximizing prize design in rank-order contests with incomplete information. Endogenous participation arises due to less-efficient types' incentive to avoid punishments. The optimum features winner-take-all for the best performer and at most one punishment for the worst performer among all potential contestants, whenever they enter the competition. Based on this, we then (1) provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of pure winner-take-all without punishment; and (2) show that the optimal entry threshold increases with the total number of contestants and converges to the Myerson cutoff in the limit. Finally, we characterize the optimal entry-dependent prize structure, allowing the prize sequence to vary with the number of entrants. The optimal design must entail endogenous entry, and it harmonically integrates both winner-take-all and egality.

我們?cè)试S負(fù)獎(jiǎng)品，并研究在信息不完全的排序競(jìng)賽中努力最大化獎(jiǎng)品設(shè)計(jì)。由于效率較低的類型有避免懲罰的動(dòng)機(jī)，因此產(chǎn)生了內(nèi)生參與。最優(yōu)方案是表現(xiàn)最好的選手獲得贏家通吃，而表現(xiàn)最差的選手在所有潛在選手參加比賽時(shí)最多受到一次懲罰。在此基礎(chǔ)上，我們(1)給出了無(wú)懲罰的純贏家通吃最優(yōu)的充要條件;(2)表明，最優(yōu)進(jìn)入閾值隨著參賽人數(shù)的增加而增加，并在極限處收斂于Myerson截?cái)帱c(diǎn)。最后，我們描述了最佳的與進(jìn)入者相關(guān)的獎(jiǎng)項(xiàng)結(jié)構(gòu)，允許獎(jiǎng)項(xiàng)序列隨著進(jìn)入者的數(shù)量而變化。優(yōu)化設(shè)計(jì)必須包含內(nèi)生進(jìn)入，它和諧地融合了贏家通吃和平等。

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4.Optimal contingent delegation

最優(yōu)或有委托

Tan Gan, Ju Hu, Xi Weng

This paper investigates a two-agent mechanism design problem without transfers, where the principal must decide one action for each agent. In our framework, agents only care about their own adaptation, and any deterministic dominant incentive compatible decision rule is equivalent to contingent delegation: the delegation set offered to one agent depends on the other's report. By contrast, the principal cares about both adaptation and coordination. We provide sufficient conditions under which contingent interval delegation is optimal and solve the optimal contingent interval delegation under fairly general conditions. Remarkably, the optimal interval delegation is completely determined by combining and modifying the solutions to a class of simple single-agent problems, where the other agent is assumed to report truthfully and choose his most preferred action.

本文研究了一個(gè)沒有轉(zhuǎn)移的雙代理機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)問題，其中委托人必須為每個(gè)代理決定一個(gè)動(dòng)作。在我們的框架中，智能體只關(guān)心自己的適應(yīng)性，任何確定性的主導(dǎo)激勵(lì)兼容決策規(guī)則都等價(jià)于或有授權(quán):提供給一個(gè)智能體的授權(quán)集取決于另一個(gè)智能體的報(bào)告。相比之下，校長(zhǎng)既關(guān)心適應(yīng)又關(guān)心協(xié)調(diào)。給出了或有區(qū)間委托最優(yōu)的充分條件，并求解了一般條件下的最優(yōu)或有區(qū)間委托。值得注意的是，最優(yōu)區(qū)間委托完全是通過組合和修改一類簡(jiǎn)單單代理問題的解來(lái)確定的，其中另一個(gè)代理假設(shè)如實(shí)報(bào)告并選擇他最喜歡的操作。

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5.Legislative informational lobbying

立法信息游說

Arnaud Dellis

Whom should an interest group lobby in a legislature? I develop a model of informational lobbying, in which a legislature must decide on the allocation of district-specific goods and projects. An interest group chooses to search and provide information on districts' valuations of the goods. The setting is one of distributive politics, where the proposed allocation of goods and projects is endogenous to the information provided by the interest group. I characterize the information search strategy of the interest group. I furthermore establish that the relationship between informational lobbying and legislative majority requirement is non-monotonic. I also determine who gains and who loses from lobbying, identifying circumstances in which legislators would unanimously prefer to ban informational lobbying. Finally, I provide an informational rationale for why interest groups sometimes lobby legislative allies (friendly lobbying).

利益集團(tuán)應(yīng)該在立法機(jī)構(gòu)游說誰(shuí)?我開發(fā)了一種信息游說模式，在這種模式下，立法機(jī)構(gòu)必須決定特定地區(qū)商品和項(xiàng)目的分配。一個(gè)利益集團(tuán)選擇搜索和提供有關(guān)地區(qū)對(duì)商品的估價(jià)的信息。這是一種分配政治，其中提議的商品和項(xiàng)目分配是由利益集團(tuán)提供的信息所內(nèi)生的。我描述了興趣群體的信息搜索策略。我進(jìn)一步證明了信息游說與立法多數(shù)要求之間的關(guān)系是非單調(diào)的。我還確定誰(shuí)從游說中獲益，誰(shuí)從游說中損失，確定立法者一致傾向于禁止信息游說的情況。最后，我提供了一個(gè)信息的基本原理，為什么利益集團(tuán)有時(shí)游說立法盟友(友好游說)。

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6.The Luce model with replicas

帶有復(fù)制品的盧斯模型

José Heleno Faro

We propose the notion of replicas in the context of discrete choices and introduce axioms that characterize the?Luce model with replicas. This model does not fall prey to the well-known “red bus-blue bus” example originally proposed by Debreu (1960) and later made famous by McFadden. Our model satisfies regularity, strong stochastic transitivity, and is a random utility model. Due to its simplicity, this model is more parsimonious than others aimed at overcoming the “duplicates problem”.

我們?cè)陔x散選擇的背景下提出了副本的概念，并引入了帶有副本的Luce模型的特征公理。這個(gè)模型不像Debreu(1960)最初提出的著名的“紅巴士-藍(lán)巴士”模型那樣，后來(lái)由McFadden推廣開來(lái)。該模型滿足正則性，具有較強(qiáng)的隨機(jī)傳遞性，是一種隨機(jī)實(shí)用新型。由于其簡(jiǎn)單性，該模型比其他旨在克服“重復(fù)問題”的模型更加節(jié)儉。

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7.On the foundations of competitive search equilibrium with and without market makers

在有無(wú)做市商的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)搜索均衡的基礎(chǔ)上

James Albrecht, Xiaoming Cai, Pieter Gautier, Susan Vroman

The literature offers two interpretations of competitive search equilibrium, one based on a Nash approach and the other on a market-maker approach. When each buyer visits only one seller, the two approaches are equivalent. However, when each buyer visits multiple sellers, this equivalence can break down. We present a model in which every buyer visits 2 sellers. A buyer who trades with one seller receives a value of?s, while a buyer who trades with 2 sellers receives value 1. Letting?s?vary from 0 (perfect complements) to 1 (perfect substitutes) we characterize the competitive search equilibrium under the two interpretations. We show that for low values of?s, the Nash and market-maker competitive search equilibria coincide, but the common equilibrium is inefficient. For intermediate values of?s, the two equilibria again coincide and are efficient. Finally, for high values of?s, the Nash and market-maker equilibria differ, and only the latter is efficient.

文獻(xiàn)對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)搜索均衡提供了兩種解釋，一種基于納什方法，另一種基于做市商方法。當(dāng)每個(gè)買家只拜訪一個(gè)賣家時(shí)，這兩種方法是等價(jià)的。然而，當(dāng)每個(gè)買家訪問多個(gè)賣家時(shí)，這種等價(jià)性就會(huì)被打破。我們提出了一個(gè)模型，每個(gè)買家訪問2個(gè)賣家。與一個(gè)賣家交易的買家得到的價(jià)值是s，而與兩個(gè)賣家交易的買家得到的價(jià)值是1。設(shè)s從0(完全互補(bǔ))到1(完全替代)，我們描述了兩種解釋下的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)搜索均衡。我們證明，當(dāng)s值較低時(shí)，納什均衡和做市商競(jìng)爭(zhēng)搜索均衡重合，但普通均衡是無(wú)效的。對(duì)于s的中間值，兩個(gè)平衡再次重合并且有效。最后，對(duì)于高s值，納什均衡和做市商均衡是不同的，只有后者是有效的。

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8.Rational inattention in the frequency domain

頻域的理性疏忽

Kyle Jurado

This paper solves a dynamic rational inattention problem by formulating it in the frequency domain. The main result is a rational inattention version of the classical Wiener-Kolmogorov filter. This filter permits an infinite-dimensional state vector, provides a new line of attack for obtaining closed-form solutions, and can be implemented numerically using a simple iterative algorithm. The frequency-domain approach also sheds new light on why rational inattention produces forward-looking behavior: inattentive agents are willing to accept more uncertainty about the timing of disturbances in exchange for less uncertainty about fluctuations at the most important frequencies.

本文通過在頻域中建立有理不注意問題的表達(dá)式來(lái)解決動(dòng)態(tài)有理不注意問題。主要結(jié)果是經(jīng)典維納-柯爾莫戈羅夫?yàn)V波器的理性不注意版本。該濾波器允許無(wú)限維的狀態(tài)向量，為獲取閉合形式的解提供了新的攻擊線，并可以使用簡(jiǎn)單的迭代算法進(jìn)行數(shù)值實(shí)現(xiàn)。頻域方法還揭示了為什么理性的不注意會(huì)產(chǎn)生前瞻性行為:不注意的個(gè)體愿意接受更多關(guān)于干擾時(shí)間的不確定性，以換取更少關(guān)于最重要頻率波動(dòng)的不確定性。

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9.Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: Contracting with non-exponential discounting

再協(xié)商與動(dòng)態(tài)不一致:非指數(shù)折扣契約

Doruk Cetemen, Felix Zhiyu Feng, Can Urgun

This paper studies a continuous-time, finite-horizon contracting problem with renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency arising from non-exponential discounting. The problem is formulated as a dynamic game played among the agent, the principal and their respective future “selves”, each with their own discount function. We identify the principal optimal renegotiation-proof contract as a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of the game, prove that such an MPE exists, and characterize the optimal contract via an extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system. We solve the optimal contract in closed-form when discounting is a function of the time-difference only and demonstrate the applicability of the results in several different settings.

本文研究了一個(gè)由非指數(shù)折現(xiàn)引起的具有再協(xié)商和動(dòng)態(tài)不一致性的連續(xù)時(shí)間有限界收縮問題。該問題被描述為代理人、委托人和他們各自的未來(lái)“自我”之間的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈，每個(gè)人都有自己的貼現(xiàn)函數(shù)。摘要將主最優(yōu)重協(xié)商保證契約確定為博弈的一個(gè)馬爾可夫完美均衡(MPE)，證明了該MPE的存在，并通過一個(gè)擴(kuò)展的Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman系統(tǒng)刻畫了該最優(yōu)契約。在折現(xiàn)率僅為時(shí)差函數(shù)時(shí)，我們用封閉形式求解了最優(yōu)契約，并證明了結(jié)果在幾種不同情況下的適用性。

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10.A new approach to the uniqueness of equilibrium with CRRA preferences

具有CRRA偏好的均衡唯一性的新方法

Dong Chul Won

This paper investigates the uniqueness of equilibrium in the economy where agents have preferences with possibly distinct levels of relative risk aversion. Equilibrium prices exist in a price range determined by micro and macroeconomic information. Macroeconomic information is inferred from two representative-agent economies, which provide lower and upper bounds on aggregate demand, respectively. Analysis of the first and second-order price effects shows that individual demand has a unique inflection point at which the income effect maximally dominates the substitution effect. In contrast, aggregate demand may have multiple inflection points, which creates multiple equilibria. Sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of equilibrium are characterized by the local behavior of individual demand at the inflection point. They require that aggregate demand must have no more than two inflection points in the equilibrium price range. The result of this paper sheds light on the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theory that has negative implications for the uniqueness of equilibrium.

本文研究了在個(gè)體具有不同相對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡程度偏好的經(jīng)濟(jì)中均衡的唯一性。均衡價(jià)格存在于由微觀和宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)信息決定的價(jià)格范圍內(nèi)。宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)信息是由兩個(gè)代表性-代理人經(jīng)濟(jì)體推導(dǎo)出來(lái)的，它們分別提供了總需求的下限和上限。對(duì)一階和二階價(jià)格效應(yīng)的分析表明，個(gè)體需求存在一個(gè)獨(dú)特的拐點(diǎn)，此時(shí)收入效應(yīng)最大程度地主導(dǎo)替代效應(yīng)。相反，總需求可能存在多個(gè)拐點(diǎn)，從而產(chǎn)生多個(gè)均衡。均衡唯一性的充分條件由個(gè)體需求在拐點(diǎn)的局部行為表征。它們要求總需求在均衡價(jià)格范圍內(nèi)不得超過兩個(gè)拐點(diǎn)。本文的結(jié)果揭示了Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu理論，該理論對(duì)平衡的唯一性有負(fù)面影響。

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11.Fostering collusion through action revision in duopolies

在雙頭壟斷中通過行動(dòng)修正促進(jìn)共謀

Nilanjan Roy

We design an experiment to study the implications of allowing players to revise their actions in a Cournot duopoly game. Payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end in a real-time revision game. On the other hand, in a stochastic revision game, opportunities to adjust quantities arrive randomly, and the quantities selected at the last revision opportunity are implemented. Contrasting results emerge: while real-time revision results in choices that are more competitive than the static Cournot-Nash, significantly lower quantities are implemented when revisions are stochastic. The results hold for different arrival rates of revision opportunities. Our findings demonstrate that the ability to revise actions can sustain partial cooperation. Although quantity adjustment choices display substantial heterogeneity, the main implication of the theory of revision games put forth by Kamada and Kandori (2020) is supported.

我們?cè)O(shè)計(jì)了一個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)來(lái)研究在古諾雙寡頭博弈中允許玩家修改他們的行為的含義。在實(shí)時(shí)修正游戲中，收益只取決于最終選擇的數(shù)量。另一方面，在隨機(jī)修正博弈中，調(diào)整數(shù)量的機(jī)會(huì)隨機(jī)到達(dá)，并執(zhí)行在最后一次修正機(jī)會(huì)中選擇的數(shù)量。對(duì)比結(jié)果出現(xiàn)了:雖然實(shí)時(shí)修正的結(jié)果比靜態(tài)Cournot-Nash更有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，但當(dāng)修正是隨機(jī)的時(shí)，執(zhí)行的數(shù)量要低得多。該結(jié)果適用于不同的修訂機(jī)會(huì)到達(dá)率。我們的研究結(jié)果表明，修正行動(dòng)的能力可以維持部分合作。雖然數(shù)量調(diào)整選擇表現(xiàn)出實(shí)質(zhì)性的異質(zhì)性，但Kamada and Kandori(2020)修正博弈理論的主要含義得到了支持。

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12.The analogical foundations of cooperation

合作的類似基礎(chǔ)

Philippe Jehiel, Larry Samuelson

We offer an approach to cooperation in repeated games of private monitoring in which players construct models of their opponents' behavior by observing the frequencies of play in a record of past plays of the game in which actions but not signals are recorded. Players construct models of their opponent's behavior by grouping the histories in the record into a relatively small number of analogy classes for which they estimate probabilities of cooperation. The incomplete record and the limited number of analogy classes lead to misspecified models that provide the incentives to cooperate. We provide conditions for the existence of equilibria supporting cooperation and equilibria supporting high payoffs for some nontrivial analogy partitions.

我們提供了一種在私人監(jiān)控的重復(fù)博弈中合作的方法，在這種博弈中，玩家通過觀察過去博弈記錄中的博弈頻率來(lái)構(gòu)建對(duì)手行為的模型，在這些記錄中，行動(dòng)而不是信號(hào)被記錄下來(lái)。玩家通過將記錄中的歷史分組到相對(duì)較少的類比類中來(lái)構(gòu)建對(duì)手行為的模型，并據(jù)此估計(jì)合作的概率。不完整的記錄和有限的類比類數(shù)量導(dǎo)致了提供合作激勵(lì)的錯(cuò)誤指定模型。對(duì)于一些非平凡的類比劃分，給出了支持合作的均衡和支持高收益的均衡存在的條件。

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13.Rational inattention when decisions take time

當(dāng)決定需要時(shí)間時(shí)，理性的疏忽

Benjamin Hébert, Michael Woodford

Decisions take time, and the time taken to reach a decision is likely to be informative about the cost of more precise judgments. We formalize this insight using a dynamic model of optimal evidence accumulation. We provide conditions under which the resulting belief dynamics resemble either diffusion processes or processes with large jumps. We then consider the in which discounting effects are small relative to the opportunity cost of time, and show that the state-contingent choice probabilities predicted by our model are identical to those predicted by a static rational inattention model, providing a micro-foundation for such models. In the diffusion case, our model provides a normative foundation for a variant of the drift-diffusion model from mathematical psychology.

做出決定需要時(shí)間，而做出決定所花費(fèi)的時(shí)間很可能對(duì)做出更精確的判斷所花費(fèi)的成本有很大的影響。我們使用最優(yōu)證據(jù)積累的動(dòng)態(tài)模型將這一見解形式化。我們提供了條件，在這些條件下產(chǎn)生的信念動(dòng)力學(xué)類似于擴(kuò)散過程或具有大跳躍的過程。然后，我們考慮折現(xiàn)效應(yīng)相對(duì)于時(shí)間機(jī)會(huì)成本較小的情況，并表明我們的模型預(yù)測(cè)的狀態(tài)或有選擇概率與靜態(tài)理性不關(guān)注模型預(yù)測(cè)的狀態(tài)或有選擇概率相同，為此類模型提供了微觀基礎(chǔ)。在擴(kuò)散情況下，我們的模型為數(shù)學(xué)心理學(xué)中漂移-擴(kuò)散模型的一個(gè)變體提供了規(guī)范基礎(chǔ)。

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14.Schumpeterian competition in a Lucas economy

盧卡斯經(jīng)濟(jì)中的熊彼特競(jìng)爭(zhēng)

Daniel Andrei, Bruce I. Carlin

We model a rent-seeking game where agents experiment with a new technology and compete for claims to a consumption stream. We characterize how creative destruction affects risk, wealth, and asset prices. Competition not only imposes excessive disruption risk on existing assets and higher technological uncertainty, it also increases the wealth duration (the weighted-average maturity of wealth). Because of hedging motives, a complementarity between wealth duration and technological uncertainty decreases systematic risk. If competition is sufficiently intense, a negative risk premium may arise. The model generates price paths consistent with boom-bust patterns and transient episodes of negative expected excess returns. We show that Schumpeterian competition may worsen income inequality.

我們模擬了一個(gè)尋租游戲，在這個(gè)游戲中，代理人嘗試一種新技術(shù)，并爭(zhēng)奪消費(fèi)流的所有權(quán)。我們描述了創(chuàng)造性破壞如何影響風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、財(cái)富和資產(chǎn)價(jià)格。競(jìng)爭(zhēng)不僅給現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)帶來(lái)了過度的破壞風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和更高的技術(shù)不確定性，還增加了財(cái)富持續(xù)時(shí)間(財(cái)富的加權(quán)平均成熟度)。由于對(duì)沖動(dòng)機(jī)的存在，財(cái)富久期與技術(shù)不確定性之間的互補(bǔ)性降低了系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。如果競(jìng)爭(zhēng)足夠激烈，可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生負(fù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)。該模型生成的價(jià)格路徑與繁榮-蕭條模式和短暫的負(fù)預(yù)期超額回報(bào)事件一致。本文研究表明，熊彼特競(jìng)爭(zhēng)理論可能加劇收入不平等。

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15.Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion

與敲詐合謀的監(jiān)管機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)

Dilip Mookherjee, Masatoshi Tsumagari

We study regulatory mechanism design with collusion between a privately informed agent and a less well-informed supervisor, incorporating ‘extortion’ which permits redistribution of rents within the coalition. We show the Collusion Proof Principle holds, and that the allocation of bargaining power between the supervisor and agent matters. Specifically, the Principal does not benefit from hiring the supervisor if the latter has less bargaining power vis-a-vis the agent. We provide an example where hiring the supervisor is valuable if she has greater bargaining power. These results indicate the importance of anti-collusion strategies that augment bargaining power of supervisors vis-a-vis agents.

我們研究了監(jiān)管機(jī)制的設(shè)計(jì)，其中包括一個(gè)私下知情的代理人和一個(gè)不太知情的監(jiān)督者之間的勾結(jié)，其中包括”勒索”，這允許在聯(lián)盟內(nèi)重新分配租金。我們證明合謀證明原則是成立的，并且在監(jiān)事和代理人之間的議價(jià)權(quán)分配是重要的。具體而言，如果監(jiān)事對(duì)代理人的議價(jià)能力較低，則委托人不會(huì)從聘請(qǐng)監(jiān)事中獲益。我們提供了一個(gè)例子，如果主管有更大的議價(jià)能力，雇傭她是有價(jià)值的。這些結(jié)果表明，反共謀戰(zhàn)略的重要性，以提高議價(jià)能力的監(jiān)督者相對(duì)于代理人。

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16.Markets for financial innovation

金融創(chuàng)新市場(chǎng)

Ana Babus, Kinda Hachem

We develop a theory of financial innovation in which both market structure and the payoffs of the claims being traded are determined endogenously. Intermediaries use the cash flows of an underlying asset to design securities for investors. Demand for securities arises as investors choose markets then trade using strategies represented by quantity-price schedules. We show that intermediaries create increasingly riskier asset-backed securities when facing deeper markets in which investors trade more competitively. In turn, investors elicit less risky securities when they choose thinner markets, revealing a novel role for market fragmentation in the creation of safer securities.

我們發(fā)展了一個(gè)金融創(chuàng)新理論，其中市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)和交易債權(quán)的收益都是內(nèi)生的。中介機(jī)構(gòu)利用標(biāo)的資產(chǎn)的現(xiàn)金流為投資者設(shè)計(jì)證券。當(dāng)投資者選擇市場(chǎng)，然后使用數(shù)量-價(jià)格表代表的策略進(jìn)行交易時(shí)，對(duì)證券的需求就會(huì)增加。我們的研究表明，當(dāng)中介機(jī)構(gòu)面對(duì)更深層次的市場(chǎng)時(shí)，投資者在其中的交易更具競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，它們創(chuàng)造的資產(chǎn)支持證券風(fēng)險(xiǎn)越來(lái)越高。反過來(lái)，當(dāng)投資者選擇更薄的市場(chǎng)時(shí)，他們會(huì)得到風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更低的證券，這揭示了市場(chǎng)分割在創(chuàng)造更安全的證券方面的新作用。

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17.Ambiguous information and dilation: An experiment

模糊信息和膨脹:一個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)

Denis Shishkin, Pietro Ortoleva

With standard models of updating under ambiguity, new information may?increase?the amount of relevant ambiguity: the set of beliefs may ‘dilate.’ We experimentally test one sharp case: agents bet on a risky urn and get information that is truthful or not based on the draw from an Ellsberg urn. With common models, the set of beliefs dilates, and the value of bets decreases for ambiguity-averse agents and increases for ambiguity-seeking ones. Instead, we find that the value of bets does not change for ambiguity-averse individuals, while it increases substantially for ambiguity-seeking ones. We also test bets on ambiguous urns, in which case we find sizable reactions to ambiguous information.

在模糊狀態(tài)下更新的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)模型中，新的信息可能會(huì)增加相關(guān)模糊的數(shù)量:信念集可能會(huì)“膨脹”?！拔覀兺ㄟ^實(shí)驗(yàn)測(cè)試了一個(gè)尖銳的例子:代理人在一個(gè)有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的骨灰盒上押注，然后根據(jù)從艾爾斯伯格骨灰盒中提取的信息來(lái)判斷是否真實(shí)。在通用模型下，信念集會(huì)擴(kuò)大，對(duì)于不愿歧義的代理，賭注的價(jià)值會(huì)減少，而對(duì)于尋求歧義的代理，賭注的價(jià)值會(huì)增加。相反，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，對(duì)于不愿歧義的個(gè)體，賭注的價(jià)值沒有變化，而對(duì)于尋求歧義的個(gè)體，賭注的價(jià)值顯著增加。我們還測(cè)試了對(duì)模糊骨灰盒的押注，在這種情況下，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)了對(duì)模糊信息的大量反應(yīng)。

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18.Corrigendum to “Bubbles and constraints on debt accumulation” [J. Econ. Theory 57 (1992) 245–256]

對(duì)“泡沫與債務(wù)積累的制約”一文的勘誤

Narayana Kocherlakota, Alexis Akira Toda

Kocherlakota (1992) considers a deterministic economy with a finite number of immortal agents who trade a single asset subject to short-sales constraints. Proposition 4 shows that, in any equilibrium with a bubble, the present value of an agent's endowment is infinite if the agent's asset holdings do not converge over time to a limit. This note corrects an error in the proof of Proposition 4.

Kocherlakota(1992)認(rèn)為確定性經(jīng)濟(jì)中存在有限數(shù)量的不朽代理人，他們?cè)谫u空限制下交易單一資產(chǎn)。命題4表明，在任何有泡沫的均衡中，如果代理人的資產(chǎn)持有量不隨時(shí)間收斂到一個(gè)極限，那么代理人稟賦的現(xiàn)值是無(wú)窮大的。本文修正了命題4證明中的一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤。

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