A New Ethical System

一個新的道德體系

In 1904, the German pioneering sexologist Iwan Bloch published, under the pseudonym of Dr Eugène Dühren, the first ever edition of Sade’s mammoth Les cent vingt journées de Sodome (The Hundred-and-Twenty Days of Sodom), the manuscript of which had been deemed lost after Sade’s transfer from his cell in the royal jail of the Bastille to the asylum of Charenton on 4 July 1789, shortly after the outbreak of the French Revolution and ten days before the most formidable bastion of royal despotism was seized and plundered (Pauvert & Beuchot, 1999, p. 101). Both in his preface and in his extended ‘scientific annotations’ to the book, Dühren repeatedly emphasized the striking similarity between Sade’s fictional heroes and the clinical cases described by Richard von Krafft-Ebing, the most famous sexologist at the time, in his celebrated (and constantly updated) Psychopathia Sexualis (Sade, 1904, p. 3, p. 534—notes 70/71, p. 535—note 90; Krafft-Ebing, 1901). Twenty-five years later, a Lyonese medical doctor by the name of Salvator Sarfati devoted the first doctoral thesis to Sade, in which he endorsed Dühren’s view by saying that Sade’s writings were ‘illustrated monuments of sexual psychopathology which have contributed to science, before Krafft-Ebing did, the full range of perversions’ (Sarfati, 1930, p. 1). Yet Sarfati also extended their ‘scientific’ value by identifying in them the seeds of a doctrine ‘that would be developed, one-hundredand-twenty-five years later, by the Vienna School’ (Sarfati, 1930, p. 117)—to be read as: ‘by Freud’. This is the point that was picked up by the French medical doctor, journalist and Sade-connoisseur Maurice Heine in a review of Sarfati’s work (Heine, 1950a, pp. 107–108), and it emboldened him to promote the hybrid paradigm of ‘freudo-sadism’, which was received with great enthusiasm by the French surrealists.1 In his influential Anthology of Black Humour, the founder of the surrealist movement André Breton accordingly wrote: ‘[P]sychologically speaking, it [Sade’s writing] can be considered the most authentic precursor of Freud’s work’ (Breton, 2009, p. 46). ? 1904 年，德國性學家先驅(qū)伊萬·布洛赫 (Iwan Bloch) 以尤金·杜倫 (Eugène Dühren) 博士的筆名出版了薩德巨著《所多瑪?shù)囊话俣臁返牡谝话妫涫指逶?1789 年 7 月 4 日，法國大革命爆發(fā)后不久，距離皇家專制主義最強大的堡壘被奪取和掠奪前十天，薩德從巴士底獄皇家監(jiān)獄的牢房轉(zhuǎn)移到夏朗頓庇護所，之后被認為丟失了（Pauvert & Beuchot，1999 年，第 101 頁）。 在他的序言和對該書的擴展“科學注釋”中，杜倫反復強調(diào)薩德虛構(gòu)的英雄與當時最著名的性學家理查德·馮·克拉夫特·埃賓（Richard von Krafft-Ebing）在他著名的著作中描述的臨床病例之間驚人的相似性。 并不斷更新）Psychopathia Sexualis（Sade，1904，第 3 頁，第 534 頁—注釋 70/71，第 535 頁—注釋 90；Krafft-Ebing，1901）。 二十五年后，一位名叫薩爾瓦托·薩爾法蒂（Salvator Sarfati）的里昂醫(yī)生將第一篇博士論文獻給了薩德，他在其中贊同杜倫的觀點，稱薩德的著作是“性精神病理學的例證性紀念碑，在克拉夫特-埃賓之前，它們對科學做出了貢獻，對各種變態(tài)做出了貢獻”（Sarfati，1930，第1頁）。（Sarfati，1930，第 1 頁）。 然而，薩法蒂還通過在其中識別出“一百二十五年后維也納學派將發(fā)展起來”的學說的種子來擴展它們的“科學”價值（薩法蒂，1930，第117頁）—— 讀作：“弗洛伊德所著”。法國醫(yī)生、記者和薩德鑒賞家莫里斯·海涅（Maurice Heine）在評論薩法蒂的著作時指出了這一點（Heine，1950a，第 107-108 頁），這使他有勇氣推廣“薩德”的混合范式。超現(xiàn)實主義運動的創(chuàng)始人安德烈·布勒東在他頗具影響力的《黑色幽默選集》中寫道：“[P]從心理學角度來說，[薩德的寫作]可以是 被認為是弗洛伊德著作最真實的先驅(qū)”（Breton，2009，第 46 頁）。 ? After World War II, the idea that Sade’s libertine novels foreshadowed Freudian psychoanalysis reappeared in Jean Paulhan’s ‘Le Marquis de Sade et sa complice ou les revanches de la pudeur’, which was originally published in 1945 (Paulhan, 1945), and later reprinted in numerous editions under the title ‘La douteuse Justine ou les revanches de la pudeur’, as a preface to Sade’s Les infortunes de la vertu (Paulhan, 1959).2 In the fifth section of this essay, Paulhan opined, not without deliberate hyperbole: ‘Reiterating them through ten volumes and supporting them with a thousand examples, a Krafft-Ebing was to consecrate the categories and distinctions the Divine Marquis traced. Later, a Freud was to adopt Sade’s very method and principle. There has not, I think, been any other example, in our Letters, of a few novels providing the basis, fifty years after their publication, for a whole science of man’ (Paulhan, 1990, p. 18). In his deposition at the court case against Pauvert on 15 December 1956, Paulhan reiterated the intellectual synergies between Sade and Freud on three separate occasions (Gar?on, 1963, pp. 48–50), but by that time other key figures within the new wave of French Sade-scholarship had also ascertained Sade’s proto-freudianism. For example, in his seminal 1949 article ‘La raison de Sade’, Blanchot had identified a number of themes in Sade’s work that could be easily interpreted as anticipating Freud (Blanchot, 2004, p. 39), whereas in 1957 even Sade’s biographer Gilbert Lely had rekindled Heine’s ‘insight’, quoting the same passage from Sade’s Justine ou les malheurs de la vertu as Blanchot had used, in support of the thesis that in 1791 the Marquis was already professing some of the ideas that would later become cornerstones of the Freudian edifice (Lely, 1957, p. 333, p. 555, footnote 1). And in ‘Must We Burn Sade?’, de Beauvoir had written that in Philosophy in the Boudoir, Sade had clearly anticipated Freud’s ‘pan-sexuality’ (de Beauvoir, 1990, p. 38). ? 第二次世界大戰(zhàn)后，薩德的放蕩小說預示了弗洛伊德精神分析的觀點再次出現(xiàn)在讓·保蘭 (Jean Paulhan) 的《薩德侯爵及其同謀或復仇者》中，該書最初出版于 1945 年 (Paulhan, 1945)，后來重印于 以“La douteuse Justine ou les revanches de la pudeur”為標題的許多版本，作為薩德的《Les infortunes de la vertu》的序言（Paulhan，1959）。2 在本文的第五部分，保蘭不無故意夸張地指出：克拉夫特-埃賓通過十卷書重申了它們，并用一千個例子來支持它們，克拉夫特-埃賓將神圣侯爵所追蹤的類別和區(qū)別神圣化。 后來，弗洛伊德也采用了薩德的方法和原則。 我認為，在我們的書信中，沒有任何其他例子表明，幾部小說在出版五十年后為整個人類科學提供了基礎”（Paulhan，1990，第 18 頁）。 在 1956 年 12 月 15 日針對波維爾的法庭案件的證詞中，保蘭在三個不同的場合重申了薩德和弗洛伊德之間的智力協(xié)同作用（Gar?on，1963，第 48-50 頁），但到那時，法國薩德學術(shù)新浪潮中的其他關(guān)鍵人物也確定了薩德的原始弗洛伊德主義。例如，在1949年發(fā)表的開創(chuàng)性文章“薩德的存在理由”中，布朗肖指出了薩德作品中的許多主題，這些主題很容易被解釋為對弗洛伊德的預見（Blanchot，2004，第 39 頁），而在 1957 年，甚至薩德的傳記作者吉爾伯特 萊利重新點燃了海涅的“洞察力”，引用了布朗肖所用的薩德的《賈斯汀或有害的健康》中的同一段話，以支持這樣的論點：侯爵在 1791 年就已經(jīng)提出了一些思想，這些思想后來成為了自由主義理論的基石。弗洛伊德大廈（Lely，1957，第333頁，第555頁，腳注1）。 德·波伏瓦在《要焚毀薩德嗎？》中寫道，在《閨房里的哲學》中，薩德顯然預見到了弗洛伊德的“泛性論”（德·波伏瓦，1990，第38頁）。 ? In the opening paragraph of ‘Kant with Sade’, Lacan designated this recurrent portrayal of Sade as a precursor of Freud as nothing more nothing less than ‘a(chǎn) stupidity’ (une sottise), which is endlessly repeated in certain works of ‘literary criticism’ (les lettres) (p. 645). Although he did not clarify his reasons nor his precise target, one plausible explanation could be that for Lacan the analogies that had been drawn between Sade and Freud (and Krafft-Ebing) should not be taken seriously, since they had primarily served the purpose of rendering Sade more palatable, and the publication of his work more justifiable.3 Instead of seeing Sade as presaging Freud, Lacan aligned the Sadean boudoir with the famous locations (the Platonic Academy, Aristotle’s Lyceum and the covered walkway called Stoa, from which the Stoic tradition derived its name), where the ancient philosophers had debated the meaning of life, and where eager young citizens had received instruction into the ethical principles underpinning the establishment of a sustainable social system (p. 645).4 Rather than calling him a precursor of Freud, Lacan suggested that Sade should thus be recognized as a (moral) philosopher, and that his works should be situated within the history of ethics. If there is a link at all between Sade and Freud, it has nothing to do, then, with the former anticipating the latter, but merely with the latter being able to formulate his fundamental ‘scientific’ concept of the ‘pleasure principle’ and especially its ostensible contradictions—the fact that one can experience pleasure in one’s own and someone else’s pain—because Sade had somehow prepared the ethical ground for it (p. 645). Indeed, Sade’s libertine heroes relentlessly insisted on the ‘natural fact’ that human beings are driven by but one ‘moral’ principle, notably that of the selfish pursuit of pleasure, whereas Freud argued—in a scientific rather than an ethical vein —that unconscious mental processes are governed by the sole aim of obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain (Freud, 1958, p. 219). In addition, for Sade’s libertines, there should be no limit to a human being’s compliance with this natural ‘moral’ principle. Even when someone only derives pleasure from inflicting pain, torturing and killing others, or from his or her own suffering, the acts are legitimate on account of their being authentic and truthful. Towards the latter part of his career, Freud too realized that the pleasure principle by no means excludes the existence of a primary (erotogenic) masochism, which is tantamount to human beings finding ‘pleasure in pain’, and which may be reinforced by outward-facing destructive impulses being redirected towards the ego (Freud，1955c, pp. 54–55; 1961a, pp. 161–170).5 Hence, if Freud came up with his own psychoanalytic ‘pleasure principle’—without therefore running the risk of being misunderstood as defending Rousseau’s belief in the virtuous, uncorrupted state of human nature—it was, according to Lacan, because Sade had somehow cleared the ethical path for it, roughly 100 years before Freud, and because throughout the nineteenth century the theme of ‘delight in evil’ (bonheur dans le mal) had gradually gained momentum (p. 645).6 Lacan was no doubt alluding, here, to how the idea of someone feeling good about committing an evil act had slowly yet steadily entered the literary imagination during the nineteenth century, insofar as it had been celebrated by Romantic decadent writers such as Baudelaire, Huysmans, Mirbeau, d’Annunzio, Swinburne and Lautréamont—those, one could say, who had explored the ‘depths of taste’ (p. 645), often in direct allegiance to Sade’s libertine novels. In addition, he could have been thinking also about how, in the course of the nineteenth century, forensic psychiatrists had insisted on the disjunction between the nature of the criminal act and the nature of the person committing it: an evil act, they argued, is not necessarily committed by an evil person, and can stem from madness rather than badness. The literary work which most closely echoes Lacan’s ‘delight in evil’ (bonheur dans le mal) is Barbey d’Aurevilly’s short story ‘Le bonheur dans le crime’ (Barbey d’Aurevilly, 1985), but the expression bonheur du Mal had also already been used by Blanchot in ‘La raison de Sade’ (Blanchot 1986, p. 28; 2004, p. 18), where it has been translated as ‘the pleasures of Evil’. ? 在《康德同薩德》的開頭一段中，拉康將這種反復出現(xiàn)的薩德是弗洛伊德的先驅(qū)的描述，稱之為“愚蠢”（une sottise），這在某些“文學批評”作品中不斷地重復。（第645頁）。 盡管他沒有澄清他的理由也沒有明確的目標，但一種合理的解釋可能是，對于拉康來說，薩德和弗洛伊德（以及克拉夫特-埃賓）之間的類比不應被認真對待，因為它們主要是為了使薩德更容易被接受，他的作品的出版也更合理。3拉康并沒有將薩德視為弗洛伊德的預言，而是將薩德的閨房與著名的地點（柏拉圖學院、亞里士多德學園和名為斯托亞的有蓋走道，斯多葛學派傳統(tǒng)由此得名），古代哲學家在這里辯論生命的意義，熱切的年輕公民在這里接受指導，了解支撐建立可持續(xù)社會體系的道德原則（第645頁）。4與其把薩德稱作弗洛伊德的先驅(qū)，拉康更建議薩德因此應被視為一位（道德）哲學家，并且他的著作應置于倫理學歷史之中。如果薩德和弗洛伊德之間有任何聯(lián)系，那么，這與前者對后者的預期無關(guān)，而僅僅與后者能夠闡述他的“快樂原則”的基本“科學”概念，尤其是它表面上的矛盾——一個人可以從自己的痛苦和他人的痛苦中體驗到快樂——因為薩德以某種方式為此準備了道德基礎（第645頁）。事實上，薩德筆下的放蕩英雄無情地堅持這一“自然事實”，即人類只受一種“道德”原則驅(qū)動，特別是自私地追求快樂，而弗洛伊德以科學而非倫理的方式主張，無意識心理過程的唯一目標是獲得快樂和避免痛苦（Freud，1958，p.219）。 此外，對于薩德的浪蕩子來說，人類對這種自然“道德”原則的遵守應該是沒有限制的。即使某人僅從施加痛苦、折磨和殺害他人或從他或她自己的痛苦中獲得快樂，這些行為也是合法的，因為它們是真實的和誠實的。在他職業(yè)生涯的后半段，弗洛伊德也意識到，快樂原則絕不排除原發(fā)性（性欲）受虐狂的存在，這相當于人類在痛苦中尋找快樂，并且可以通過外在的外在強化。 -面對被重定向到自我的破壞性沖動（Freud，1955c，第 54–55 頁；1961a，第 161–170 頁）。5因此，如果弗洛伊德提出了他自己的精神分析“快樂原則”，那么就不必冒被誤解為捍衛(wèi)盧梭對人性善良、純潔狀態(tài)的信仰的風險——根據(jù)拉康的說法，這是因為薩德以某種方式為盧梭掃清了道德道路，大約比弗洛伊德早了 100 年，而且因為整個 19 世紀的主題 “惡中之樂”（bonheur dans le mal）逐漸獲得了動力（第 645 頁）。6 拉康在這里無疑是在暗示，某人對犯下惡行感到高興的想法是如何緩慢而穩(wěn)定地進入文學想象的，在 19 世紀受到波德萊爾、于斯曼、米爾博、鄧南遮、斯溫伯恩和洛特雷阿蒙等浪漫主義頹廢作家的推崇——可以說，他們探索了“品味的深度”（第645頁），通常直接效忠薩德的放蕩小說。此外，他也可能在思考，在十九世紀的過程中，法醫(yī)精神病學家如何堅持將犯罪行為的性質(zhì)與實施犯罪者的性質(zhì)分開：他們認為，這是一種邪惡的行為，并不一定是邪惡之人所為，也可能源于瘋狂而不是邪惡。最接近拉康的“惡中之樂”（bonheur dans le mal）的文學作品是巴貝·德奧勒維利的短篇小說《Le bonheur dans lecrime》（犯罪中的幸福）（Barbey d'Aurevilly，1985），但“bonheur du Mal”這個表達被布朗肖已經(jīng)在《薩德的存在理由》（La raison de Sade）中使用過（Blanchot 1986，第 28 頁；2004 年，第 18 頁），其中它被翻譯為“邪惡的享樂”。 ? For Lacan, Sade had thus been the first to formulate, through the mouth of his libertines, a new ethical system that does not take its bearings from common principles of moral goodness, and that does not aim to secure a set of socially sanctioned values about mutual support, benevolence, courtesy and respect. Yet for this in itself to have been possible, he asserted, Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason would have been the necessary turning point, if only because Kant had set out to propose a comprehensive theory of morality which does not rely on conventional distinctions between good and bad, which regards emotional factors of sympathy and compassion as ‘pathological’, which deems the anticipated consequences of one’s actions to be irrelevant with regard to human beings proceeding to fulfil their moral duty, and which constructs the moral law as simultaneously subjective and universal. Without seeing Sade as the literary extension of Kant, Lacan posited quite firmly that Sade’s work—here, Philosophy in the Boudoir—in a sense completed Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, and even revealed its truth (p. 646). This is indeed one of the most important theses of ‘Kant with Sade’: in Philosophy in the Boudoir Sade presented the disturbing truth of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, a truth which Kant himself had failed to recognize and disclose, as Horkheimer and Adorno had already suggested when they claimed that Kant was not nearly as rational a philosopher as he had wished to be. How Sade did this, and how this truth should be understood, is what Lacan set out to explain in the rest of his paper, although it is fair to say that he never really clarified the precise status of this truth. Should it be restricted to its literary qualities, or should it also be recognized in its philosophical, moral and political dimensions? Is this truth merely a matter of Sade indulging in an act of limitless creative freedom, or does it have concrete implications for the development of an ethical system? Is it a factual or a mere fictional truth? And what is the function of writing when it comes to giving shape to this truth in its relation to fantasy, desire and the law? These questions remain very much on the horizon of Lacan’s discourse, and do not receive a satisfactory answer within the space of ‘Kant with Sade’. 7 ? 因此，對于拉康來說，薩德是第一個通過他的浪蕩子之口制定了一種新的倫理體系的人，該體系并不以道德善良的共同原則為基礎，也不旨在確保一套社會認可的價值觀 相互支持、仁慈、禮貌和尊重。然而，他斷言，要使這一點本身成為可能，康德的《實踐理性批判》將成為必要的轉(zhuǎn)折點，僅僅因為康德提出了一種全面的道德理論，該理論不依賴于傳統(tǒng)的善惡區(qū)分。它將同情和同情的情感因素視為“病態(tài)的”，認為一個人的行為的預期后果與人類繼續(xù)履行其道德義務無關(guān)，并將道德法則構(gòu)建為同時主觀和普遍的。拉康沒有將薩德視為康德的文學延伸，而是相當堅定地認為薩德的作品——這里是《閨房里的哲學》——在某種意義上完成了康德的《實踐理性批判》，甚至揭示了它的真理（第646頁）。這確實是《康德同薩德》中最重要的論點之一：薩德在《閨房里的哲學》中提出了康德《實踐理性批判》中令人不安的真理，而康德本人未能像霍克海默和阿多諾那樣認識和揭示這一真理。當他們聲稱康德并不像他所希望的那樣理性的哲學家時，已經(jīng)暗示過。 薩德是如何做到這一點的，以及應該如何理解這個真理，是拉康在他的論文的其余部分中著手解釋的，盡管可以公平地說，他從未真正澄清過這個真理的確切地位。它應該僅限于其文學品質(zhì)，還是也應該在其哲學、道德和政治維度上得到承認？這個真理僅僅是薩德沉迷于無限創(chuàng)作自由的行為，還是對道德體系的發(fā)展有具體的影響？這是事實還是虛構(gòu)的事實？當要在幻想、欲望和法律的關(guān)系中塑造這一真理時，寫作的作用是什么？這些問題很大程度上仍然停留在拉康的話語視野中，并且在《康德同薩德》的空間內(nèi)沒有得到令人滿意的答案。7 ? In order to show, then, how Kant’s work was already highly subversive in and of itself, Lacan summarized two of Kant’s‘postulates (presuppositions) of pure practical reason’ (Kant, 1997b, pp. 102–111). The first postulate is that of the immortality of the soul (Unsterblichkeit der Seele). For Kant, the ultimate object(ive) of the moral law is the realization of the ‘highest good’ (Bewirkung des h?chsten Guts), which is the moment when supreme virtuousness and supreme happiness coincide. For this highest good to be achieved, a rational being’s will would need to be in ‘complete conformity’ (v?llige Angemessenheit) with the moral law, that is to say, a rational being would need to attain a state of ‘holiness’(Heiligkeit). Since no rational being will ever be capable of holiness during his or her earthly existence, and because the moral law should neither be adjusted nor imposed unrealistically, Kant argued that the immortality of the soul needs to be postulated in order to understand why a rational being would never give up trying to comply with the moral law. Endless progress towards perfect compliance is possible if it is presupposed that the soul is immortal, and that holiness can still be achieved after the rational being’s phenomenological death. In this way, rational beings should also be prepared to relinquish or postpone all the temporary satisfactions that they derive from their virtuous compliance with the law, in order to achieve higher stages of moral perfection. ? 那么，為了表明康德的著作本身已經(jīng)具有高度顛覆性，拉康總結(jié)了康德的兩個“純粹實踐理性的假設（預設）”（Kant，1997b，第102-111頁）。 第一個假設是靈魂不朽（Unsterblichkeit der Seele）。對于康德來說，道德法則的最終目標是實現(xiàn)“至善”（Bewirkung des h?chsten Guts），即至高無上的美德與至高無上的幸福相一致的時刻。為了實現(xiàn)這一至善，一個理性存在者的意志需要與道德法則“完全一致”（v?llige Angemessenheit），也就是說，一個理性存在者需要達到一種“神圣”（Heiligkeit）狀態(tài)。 由于沒有一個理性存在在其塵世存在期間能夠成為圣潔，而且道德律既不應該被不切實際地調(diào)整或強加，康德認為，靈魂的不朽需要被假設，以便理解為什么一個理性存在永遠不會放棄遵守道德法則的努力。 如果假設靈魂是不朽的，并且在理性存在現(xiàn)象性死亡后仍然可以實現(xiàn)圣潔，那么朝著完美順從的無盡進步是可能的。 這樣，理性的人也應該準備好放棄或推遲他們從道德遵守法律中獲得的所有暫時的滿足，以達到道德完美的更高階段。 ? Kant’s second postulate of practical reason is the existence of God, who is designated as a ‘supreme intelligence’ and the ‘supreme cause of nature’, and whose existence needs to be presupposed in order to render the highest good altogether possible (conceivable, thinkable and achievable). In the absence of God, the ultimate object(ive) of the moral law cannot be guaranteed, which will inevitably affect a rational being’s will to promote the realization of the highest good. In other words, the existence of God needs to be postulated, because the object(ive) of the moral law needs to appear as a consistent, intelligible and feasible achievement to the rational being, whose duty it is to comply with the law. In the last paragraph of Section 1 of ‘Kant with Sade’, Lacan did not refer to Kant’s God, but simply highlighted the Critique’s ‘need for a [divine] will to which the object that the law concerns [i.e., the highest good] is intelligible’ (p. 646). Lacan did not say anything, here, about Kant’s third postulate—that of a rational being’s freedom from the sensible world (Kant, 1997b, p. 110)— but he pointed out how in the Critique Kant had gone so far as to completely eradicate the function of ‘usefulness’ or ‘utility’ (das Nützliche) as a possible good in itself (Kant, 1997b, p. 51), a function which he had still included, albeit only as a ‘setting’ (Einfassung) of the will, in his first treatise on moral theory, the 1785 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant, 2012, p. 10).8 Following all of this, Lacan could not resist telling his readers (and apparently he shared his elation with everyone else in his environment) how, in studying Kant’s work, he had experienced ‘incredible exaltation’ (p. 646) (Miller, 2003, p. 27). ? 康德關(guān)于實踐理性的第二個假設是上帝的存在，上帝被指定為“最高智慧”和“自然的最高原因”，并且需要預先假定其存在，以便使最高的善完全成為可能（可想象的、可想象的，并可實現(xiàn)）。 如果沒有上帝，道德律的最終目標就無法得到保證，這必然會影響理性存在促進至高善實現(xiàn)的意志。換句話說，上帝的存在需要被假設，因為道德法則的目標需要表現(xiàn)為對理性存在來說是一致的、可理解的和可行的成就，而理性存在的責任就是遵守法律。 在《康德同薩德》第一節(jié)的最后一段中，拉康沒有提到康德的上帝，而只是強調(diào)了批判的“需要一種[神圣的]意志，而法律所關(guān)注的對象[即最高善]” 是可以理解的”（第 646 頁）。 在這里，拉康沒有提及康德的第三個假設——理性存在擺脫感性世界的自由（Kant，1997b，第110頁）——但他指出康德在批判中是如何走得如此之遠，以至于完全根除 “有用”或“效用”（das Nützliche）的功能本身是一種可能的善（康德，1997b，第 51 頁），他仍然將這一功能包括在內(nèi)，盡管只是作為一種“設置”（Einfassung）的意志。 這是在他關(guān)于道德理論的第一篇論文《1785 年道德形而上學的基礎》中的（康德，2012 年，第 10 頁）。8 在這一切發(fā)生之后，拉康忍不住告訴了他的讀者（顯然，他在那個教學環(huán)境中與每個人分享了他的喜悅），在研究康德的著作時，他如何經(jīng)歷了“難以置信的興奮”（第646頁）（Miller，2003，第27頁）。 ? ? ? ? 8The sentence in which Lacan articulated this point is quite ambiguous. Fink translates ‘perdant même le plat appui de la fonction d’utilité où Kant les confinait’ as ‘losing even the lifeless support of the function of utility to which Kant confined them’, which is generally accurate, but which does not resolve the question as to what the ‘them’ actually refers to. In an endnote attached to this paragraph (p. 831, note 766, 2) Fink interprets the ‘them’ as referring to Kant’s postulates, and he goes on to speculate that they lose their function of utility in Philosophy in the Boudoir. However, one of the things that Lacan will endeavour to show in ‘Kant with Sade’ is precisely that Kant’s postulates do not lose their usefulness in Sade’s work, inasmuch as some of Sade’s libertine heroes, such as the minister Saint-Fond and the Italian Cordelli in Juliette, also continue to presuppose the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. In all likelihood, Lacan’s ‘them’ refers to ‘will’ and ‘object’ (and possibly even to ‘law’) in the previous part of the sentence, so that Lacan can indeed be seen as commenting, here, on a sentence in the first section of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals—published three years before the Critique (hence also Lacan’s use of the past tense in ‘to which Kant confined them’) and drawing on lectures delivered by Kant in 1780 (Kant, 1997a, p. xvii)—whose French translation preceded the Barni-translation of the Critique Lacan was using. In this particular sentence, Kant’s term Einfassung was rendered as ‘encadrement’ by Barni (like the frame of a painting) (Kant, 1848, p. 15), which Lacan seems to have retranslated here (on the basis of the standard German Vorl?nder-edition of Kant’s works, which he also had in front of him) as ‘plat appui’ (literally ‘flat support’), and which Gregor and Timmermann have rendered in English as ‘setting’ (like a jeweller’s setting, which keeps a precious stone in a ring). Immediately after this part of the sentence, Lacan referred (in French) to the Critique’s ‘diamant de subversion’—a diamond, one could say, which has been released on account of Kant removing the ‘setting’ of utility ... 8 拉康闡明這一點的句子是相當含糊的。 芬克將“perdant même le plat appui de la fonction d'utilité où Kant les confinait”翻譯為“甚至失去了康德所限制的效用功能的死氣沉沉的支持”，這通常是準確的，但并沒有解決問題 至于“他們”實際上指的是什么。 在本段所附的尾注中（第 831 頁，注 766, 2），芬克將“它們”解釋為指康德的假設，他接著推測它們在《閨房哲學》中失去了效用功能。 然而，拉康在《康德同薩德》中力圖展示的一件事恰恰是，康德的假設在薩德的作品中并沒有失去其用處，因為薩德的一些放蕩英雄，例如部長圣豐和意大利人 科代利在《朱麗葉》中，也繼續(xù)預設靈魂的不朽和上帝的存在。很可能，拉康的“他們”在句子的前一部分中指的是“意志”和“對象”（甚至可能是“法律”），因此拉康在這里確實可以被視為評論康德《道德形而上學基礎》的第一部分——在批判之前三年出版（因此拉康在“康德將他們限制在其中”中使用了過去時態(tài)），并借鑒了康德在 1780 年發(fā)表的講座（Kant，1997a， p. xvii）——其法文譯本早于拉康批判所使用的巴尼譯本。在這個特定的句子中，康德的術(shù)語 Einfassung 被巴尼（Barni）翻譯為“encadrement”（就像一幅畫的框架）（Kant，1848，第 15 頁），拉康似乎在這里重新翻譯了它（基于標準的德語 Vorl?nder） - 康德作品的版本，他面前也有）作為“plat appui”（字面意思是“平面支撐”），格雷戈爾和蒂默曼將其翻譯成英語“設置”（就像珠寶商的放置一樣，它固定了戒指中的寶石）。在這部分句子之后，拉康（用法語）立即提到了批判的“diamant de subversion”——可以說是一顆鉆石，由于康德消除了功利的“設置”而被釋放......