題目：Why Do Firms Borrow Directly from Nonbanks?

摘要：analyzing hand-collected credit agreements for a sample of middle-market firms over 2010–2015, we find that one-third of all loans are directly extended by nonbank financial intermediaries. Two-thirds of such nonbank lending can be attributed to bank regulations that constrain banks’ ability to lend to unprofitable and highly levered borrowers. Firms with negative EBITDA and debt/EBITDA greater than six are 32% and 15% more likely to borrow from nonbanks. These firms pay significantly higher interest rates, especially following the 2013 leveraged loan guidance revisions. Nonbank borrowers also receive different nonprice terms compared to firms borrowing from banks.

研究動(dòng)機(jī)：

• The growth in nonbank lending has generated significant interest among industry participants, regulators, and academics, who want to understand its causes, as well as the costs and benefits of nonbank lending.

• While prior literature has shown that stricter bank regulation helps explain the increase in nonbank lending to individuals (Buchak et al. 2018; de Roure, Pelizzon, and Thakor 2021) and in nonbank participation in syndicated loans (Irani et al.2020), we know little about why firms borrow directly from nonbank lenders

研究問(wèn)題：

• Do nonbanks provide funding to firms in market segments less served by banks?

• Are nonbanks able to offer more favorable terms?

• What is the role of bank regulations in the importance of nonbanks in the commercial lending space?

研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：

• Overall, our findings show that nonbanks improve access to capital for firms that are observably risky and that are unable to borrow from banks because of bank regulations.

• Our analysis of interest rates shows that, when they face limited competition from banks, nonbanks charge higher interest rates.

• Furthermore, nonbanks’ lending technology appear to drive important nonprice terms, such as financial covenants and warrants.
  

研究貢獻(xiàn)：

• Our paper contributes to a growing empirical literature on the role of the shadow banking system in providing commercial loans to firms.

• More recent work has started studying direct C&I lending by nonbank financial intermediaries.We contribute to the literature by showing for the first time that bank regulations drive banks away from certain types of firms, in particular the ones with negative EBITDA

• Our paper provides strong evidence of bank regulations inducing market segmentation in the commercial loan market.