Life and Works

生平與作品

Plato was born into a wealthy family in the last days of the Athenian Empire.?

柏拉圖出生于雅典帝國(guó)末期的一個(gè)富裕家庭。

When the Peloponnesian war ended in 405 he was in his early twenties, just old enough to have fought in it, as his brothers certainly did. His uncles, Critias and Charmides, were two of the Thirty Tyrants. Socrates’ execution in 399 under a restored democracy gave Plato a lifelong distrust of demagogues, and a distaste for a political career in Athens.

當(dāng)伯羅奔尼撒戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)在公元前405年結(jié)束時(shí)，他才二十出頭，剛剛有資格參戰(zhàn)，他的兄弟們也肯定是如此。他的叔叔克里提亞斯和查爾米德斯是三十人僭主集團(tuán)中的兩位。在恢復(fù)民主的情況下，蘇格拉底在公元前399年被處決，這使得柏拉圖終生對(duì)暴民煽動(dòng)家們不信任，并對(duì)在雅典從政感到厭惡。

When he was forty Plato went to Sicily and formed a close association with Dion, the brother-in-law of the reigning monarch Dionysius I. On his return to Athens he founded a school, the Academy, in a private grove beside his own house. It was modelled on the Pythagorean communities in Italy, a group of like-minded thinkers interested in mathematics, metaphysics, morality and mysticism ?At the age of sixty Plato was invited back to Sicily as an adviser to Dion’s nephew, who had now succeeded to the throne as Dionysius II. His career as a royal adviser was not successful, either politically or philosophically, and in 360 he returned home. He died peacefully at a wedding-feast in Athens, himself unmarried, in his eighty-first year (347).?

當(dāng)他四十歲時(shí)，柏拉圖去了西西里島，并與統(tǒng)治者狄?jiàn)W尼修斯一世的姐夫狄昂建立了密切的聯(lián)系。回到雅典后，他在自己的房子旁邊的一片私人樹(shù)林里建立了一所學(xué)校，即學(xué)園(Academy)。它是以意大利的畢達(dá)哥拉斯社團(tuán)為模型，是一群對(duì)數(shù)學(xué)、形而上學(xué)、道德和神秘主義感興趣的志同道合的思想家。在六十歲時(shí)，柏拉圖受邀再次回到西西里島，作為狄昂的侄子、現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)繼承王位的狄?jiàn)W尼修斯二世的顧問(wèn)。他作為皇家顧問(wèn)的職業(yè)生涯并不成功，無(wú)論是從政治上還是哲學(xué)上。公元前360年，他回到了家鄉(xiāng)。他在雅典的一場(chǎng)婚宴上安詳?shù)厝ナ?，自己未婚，享年八十一歲（公元前347年）。

Apart from these few facts, which were embroidered by fiction writers in later antiquity, we know little about Plato’s life. However, unlike Socrates, Plato left behind many writings on philosophy, all of which survive today. But these works are in dialogue form, and Plato himself never appears in them as a speaker.?

除了這些少數(shù)事實(shí)，它們被后來(lái)的古代小說(shuō)家們加以渲染之外，我們對(duì)柏拉圖的生活知之甚少。然而，不像蘇格拉底，柏拉圖留下了許多關(guān)于哲學(xué)的著作，這些著作都保存至今。但是這些作品都是以對(duì)話形式呈現(xiàn)的，柏拉圖自己從未作為一個(gè)說(shuō)話者出現(xiàn)在其中。

Hence, it is difficult to be sure which of the varied and often conflicting philosophical positions propounded by the characters in the dialogues are ones to which Plato was himself committed. When we seek to discover his own philosophical standpoint, we can achieve little certainty; but commentators have reached a tentative consensus about the general lines along which his thought developed.?

因此，很難確定對(duì)話中的人物所提出的各種不同且往往相互矛盾的哲學(xué)立場(chǎng)中，哪些是柏拉圖自己所堅(jiān)持的。當(dāng)我們?cè)噲D發(fā)現(xiàn)柏拉圖自己的哲學(xué)觀點(diǎn)時(shí)，我們很難有什么把握；但是評(píng)論家們已經(jīng)對(duì)他的思想發(fā)展的大致軌跡達(dá)成了一個(gè)初步的共識(shí)。

Plato’s dialogues fall into three classes. The first group, commonly thought to have been written earliest, are called ‘Socratic’ dialogues because in each of them Socrates appears in his historic role as the questioner and deflater of spurious claims to knowledge. The Euthyphro illustrates the pattern common to most of these dialogues: some person, usually the one named in the title, professes to be knowledgeable about a particular art or virtue or excellence, and Socrates’ cross questioning shows up the pretended knowledge as mere prejudice. In this manner the topic of courage is treated in the Laches, temperance in the Charmides, friendship in the Lysis, beauty in the Hippias Major and poetic recitation in the Ion, just as piety was in the Euthyphro. The Hippias Minor, another dialogue of this period, addresses the Socratic theme of intentional and unintentional wrongdoing.?

柏拉圖的對(duì)話分為三類。第一類，通常認(rèn)為是最早寫成的，被稱為“蘇格拉底式”的對(duì)話，因?yàn)樵诿恳徊繉?duì)話中，蘇格拉底都以他歷史上的角色出現(xiàn)，即質(zhì)疑和揭穿虛假的知識(shí)主張。《尤提弗羅篇》說(shuō)明了這些對(duì)話中大多數(shù)所共有的模式：某個(gè)人，通常是標(biāo)題中提到的那個(gè)人，聲稱對(duì)某種藝術(shù)或美德或優(yōu)秀之事有所了解，而蘇格拉底的盤問(wèn)則揭示了這種假裝的知識(shí)只不過(guò)是偏見(jiàn)。用這種方式，《Laches》討論了勇氣，《Charmides》討論了節(jié)制，《Lysis》討論了友誼，《大希庇阿斯篇》討論了美，《Ion》討論了詩(shī)歌朗誦，就像《尤提弗羅篇》討論了虔誠(chéng)一樣?！缎∠１影⑺蛊罚硪徊窟@一時(shí)期的對(duì)話，涉及了蘇格拉底式的主題：有意和無(wú)意的錯(cuò)誤行為。

n the central group of dialogues, dating from Plato’s maturity, Socrates is again the principal figure; but he is no longer simply an attorney prosecuting prejudices that masquerade as knowledge. He now appears as a teacher in his own right, expounding elaborate philosophical ideas. The dialogues are longer, and their content is more difficult to master. We have already met one dialogue of this group, the Phaedo. Others are the Gorgias, the Protagoras, the Meno, the Symposium, the Phaedrus, and, best known of all, the Republic. Common to most of these is a preoccupation with the famous Theory of Ideas, which we must shortly explain. 在這一組對(duì)話中，蘇格拉底再次是主要人物；但他不再僅僅是一個(gè)檢舉偽裝成知識(shí)的偏見(jiàn)的律師。他現(xiàn)在以自己的權(quán)威出現(xiàn)，闡述精妙的哲學(xué)思想。這些對(duì)話更長(zhǎng)，內(nèi)容也更難掌握。我們已經(jīng)遇到了這一組對(duì)話中的一部，《斐多篇》。其他的有《戈?duì)柤獊喥?、《普羅塔戈拉篇》、《門諾篇》、《會(huì)飲篇》、《費(fèi)德魯斯篇》，以及最著名的《理想國(guó)》。這些對(duì)話中大多數(shù)都關(guān)注著著名的理型論，我們不久就要解釋它。

In the final group of dialogues, the role of Socrates diminishes; sometimes he is only a minor figure, and sometimes he does not appear at all. A bridge between the middle and the later dialogues is given by the Theaetetus, which seeks a definition of knowledge: Socrates is still to be seen in his familiar role as the midwife of thought. In the Parmenides Socrates appears as a young man in awe of the aged Parmenides while dense and complicated arguments are presented against the Theory of Ideas. In the Philebus, whose topic is pleasure, Socrates once again has the chief part; in the Sophist, on Being and Unbeing, and in the Statesman, about the best form of government, he is present, but takes no effective part in the discussion. In the latest and longest of this group, The Laws, which sets out a detailed constitution for an imaginary state, Socrates does not appear at all.?

在最后一組對(duì)話中，蘇格拉底的角色重要性減弱了；有時(shí)他只是一個(gè)次要人物，有時(shí)他根本不出現(xiàn)?！短┌⑻┑缕肥侵衅诤秃笃趯?duì)話之間的橋梁，它尋求知識(shí)的定義：蘇格拉底仍然以他熟悉的角色出現(xiàn)，作為思想的助產(chǎn)士。在《巴門尼德篇》中，蘇格拉底作為一個(gè)敬畏年邁的巴門尼德的年輕人出現(xiàn)，而針對(duì)理型論的密集而復(fù)雜的論證被提出。在《Philebus》中，主題是快樂(lè)，蘇格拉底再次扮演了主要角色；在《智者篇》中，關(guān)于存在與非存在，在《政治家篇》中，關(guān)于最佳政府形式，他都在場(chǎng)，但沒(méi)有參與有效的討論。在這一組中最晚和最長(zhǎng)的《法律篇》中，它制定了一個(gè)虛構(gòu)國(guó)家的詳細(xì)憲法，蘇格拉底根本沒(méi)有出現(xiàn)。

Scholars do not agree how to interpret the cool and critical view which these late dialogues take of the Theory of Ideas. Are the arguments against it meant to be convincing, and did Plato abandon the theory in mid-life? Or did he think the arguments were only sophistries, and simply leave it as an exercise for the reader to work out how they could be refuted? The uncertainty here is compounded by the existence of another dialogue, the Timaeus, which sets out Plato’s cosmology, and which, until the Renaissance, was the best known of all his dialogues. In the Timaeus the Theory of Ideas appears unchallenged in all its original glory; what is in question is whether the dialogue belongs to the middle or the later period of Plato’s life. Plato’s philosophical development is easier to understand if we place the Timaeus with dialogues like the Republic; but if we compare the dialogues on the basis of style, it seems to resemble more the group containing the Sophist. The question of its dating is unresolved, and will no doubt continue to be debated among scholars.?

學(xué)者們對(duì)這些后期對(duì)話對(duì)理型論所持的冷靜和批判的態(tài)度如何解釋并不一致。反對(duì)它的論證是否意在令人信服，柏拉圖是否在中年時(shí)放棄了這一理論？或者他認(rèn)為這些論證只是詭辯，而只是把它留給讀者作為一個(gè)練習(xí)，讓他們自己想出如何反駁它們？這里的不確定性還因?yàn)榱硪徊繉?duì)話《提邁歐篇》的存在而加劇，它闡述了柏拉圖的宇宙論，直到文藝復(fù)興時(shí)期，它都是他所有對(duì)話中最著名的一部。在《提邁歐篇》中，理型論以其原始的輝煌毫無(wú)爭(zhēng)議地出現(xiàn)；問(wèn)題是這部對(duì)話是屬于柏拉圖生命中期還是后期。如果我們把《提邁歐篇》和像《理想國(guó)》這樣的對(duì)話放在一起，柏拉圖的哲學(xué)發(fā)展就更容易理解；但如果我們根據(jù)風(fēng)格來(lái)比較這些對(duì)話，它似乎更像是包含《智者篇》的那一組。它的年代問(wèn)題尚未解決，毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)將繼續(xù)在學(xué)者之間爭(zhēng)論。

But let us look more closely at the Theory of Ideas which underpins the middle dialogues and provides the bone of contention concerning the later dialogues. We have already met it briefly, when Socrates spoke of absolute beauty and absolute goodness in the Phaedo. But I tried to expound the arguments of that dialogue so far as possible without elaborating on the nature of Ideas. It is now time to fill that gap.?

但讓我們更仔細(xì)地看看支撐中期對(duì)話并成為后期對(duì)話爭(zhēng)論焦點(diǎn)的理型論。我們已經(jīng)簡(jiǎn)單地接觸過(guò)它，當(dāng)蘇格拉底在《斐多篇》中談到絕對(duì)美和絕對(duì)善時(shí)。但我盡可能地闡述了那部對(duì)話的論證，而沒(méi)有詳細(xì)說(shuō)明理型的本質(zhì)?，F(xiàn)在是時(shí)候填補(bǔ)這個(gè)空白了。

The Theory of Ideas

理型論

Plato’s theory arises as follows. Socrates, Simmias, and Cebes are all called ‘men’; they have it in common that they are all men. Now when we say ‘Simmias is a man’ does the word ‘man’ stand for something in the way that the word ‘Simmias’ stands for the individual man Simmias? If so, what? Is it the same thing as the word ‘man’ stands for in the sentence ‘Cebes is a man’? Plato’s answer is yes: in each case in which such an expression occurs it stands for the same thing, namely, that which makes Simmias, Cebes, and Socrates all men. This is given by Plato various designations, Greek phrases corresponding for instance to ‘the man himself ’, or ‘that very thing which is man’. Because, in calling Socrates a man, Plato meant not that he was male, but that he was human, the common thing meant by ‘man’ can be called – by analogy with Plato’s use in other cases – ‘humanity’. But its best known designation is ‘The Idea (or Form) of Man’.?

柏拉圖的理論是這樣產(chǎn)生的。蘇格拉底、西米亞斯和塞貝斯都被稱為“人”；他們有一個(gè)共同點(diǎn)，就是他們都是人?，F(xiàn)在當(dāng)我們說(shuō)“西米亞斯是一個(gè)人”時(shí)，單詞“人”是否代表了某種東西，就像單詞“西米亞斯”代表了個(gè)別的人西米亞斯一樣？如果是這樣，那是什么？它是否與句子“塞貝斯是一個(gè)人”中單詞“人”所代表的東西相同？柏拉圖的回答是肯定的：在每一種這樣的表達(dá)出現(xiàn)的情況下，它都代表了同一件事，即使西米亞斯、塞貝斯和蘇格拉底都成為人的那個(gè)東西。柏拉圖給它起了各種名字，希臘語(yǔ)短語(yǔ)對(duì)應(yīng)于例如“人本身”，或者“就是那個(gè)人的東西”。因?yàn)?，在稱蘇格拉底為人時(shí)，柏拉圖的意思不是他是男性，而是他是人類，所以用“人”表示的共同之物可以稱為——類比于柏拉圖在其他情況下的用法——“人性”。但它最著名的名稱是“人的理型（或理式）”。

Generalizing, in any case where A,B,C, are all F, Plato is likely to say that they are related to a single Idea of F. Sometimes he states the principle universally, sometimes, in particular cases, he hesitates about applying it. In various places he lists Ideas of many different types, such as the Idea of Good, the Idea of Bad, the Idea of Circle, the Idea of Being, the Idea of Sameness. And as long as he held the theory at all Plato seems to have continued to believe in the Ideas of Good and Beauty and Being. But he seems to have been unsure whether there was an Idea of Mud.?

一般化地說(shuō)，在任何A、B、C都是F的情況下，柏拉圖可能會(huì)說(shuō)他們與一個(gè)單一的F的理型有關(guān)。有時(shí)他把這個(gè)原則普遍地陳述出來(lái)，有時(shí)在特定的情況下，他對(duì)是否應(yīng)用它猶豫不決。在不同的地方，他列舉了許多不同類型的理型，例如善的理型、惡的理型、圓的理型、存在的理型、相同的理型。只要他還堅(jiān)持這個(gè)理論，柏拉圖似乎一直相信善、美和存在的理型。但他似乎不確定是否有泥巴的理型。

If we search through the Platonic texts, we discover a number of theses about Ideas and their relations to ordinary things in the world.?

(1) Wherever several things are F, this is because they participate or imitate a single Idea of F.?

(2) No Idea is a participant or imitator of itself.?

(3) (a) The Idea of F is F. (b) The Idea of F is nothing but F.?

(4) Nothing but the Idea of F is really and truly altogether F.?

(5) Ideas are not in space or time, they have no parts and do not change, they are not perceptible to the senses.?

如果我們搜索柏拉圖的文本，我們會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)關(guān)于理型及其與世界上普通事物的關(guān)系的一些論題。?

（1）無(wú)論哪里有幾件事物都是F，這是因?yàn)樗鼈儏⑴c或模仿了一個(gè)單一的F的理型。?

（2）沒(méi)有一個(gè)理型是自己的參與者或模仿者。?

（3）（a）F的理型就是F。（b）F的理型只不過(guò)是F。?

（4）除了F的理型之外，沒(méi)有什么東西真正地、完全地是F。?

（5）理型不在空間或時(shí)間中，它們沒(méi)有部分，也不會(huì)改變，它們不能被感官所感知。

Theses (1), (2) and (3) make up an inconsistent triad. The difficulty to which they lead was first expounded by Plato himself in the Parmenides. Let us suppose we have a number of individuals each of which is F. Then, by (1), there is an Idea of F. This, by (3), is itself F. But now the Idea of F and the original F things make up a new collection of F things. By (1) again, this must be because they participate in an Idea of F. But, by (2), this cannot be the Idea first postulated. So there must be another Idea of F; but this in its turn, by (3), will be F; and so on ad infinitum. So, against (1), there will be not a single Idea but infinitely many. （1）、（2）和（3）構(gòu)成了一個(gè)不一致的三角關(guān)系。它們所導(dǎo)致的困難最早由柏拉圖自己在《巴門尼德篇》中闡述。讓我們假設(shè)我們有一些個(gè)體，每一個(gè)都是F。那么，根據(jù)（1），就有一個(gè)F的理型。這個(gè)，根據(jù)（3），本身就是F。但現(xiàn)在，F(xiàn)的理型和原來(lái)的F事物組成了一個(gè)新的F事物的集合。再次根據(jù)（1），這必須是因?yàn)樗鼈儏⑴c了一個(gè)F的理型。但是，根據(jù)（2），這不能是最初假設(shè)的那個(gè)理型。所以必須有另一個(gè)F的理型；但這個(gè)，依次根據(jù)（3），也會(huì)是F；如此無(wú)窮無(wú)盡。所以，反對(duì)（1），不會(huì)有一個(gè)單一的理型，而是無(wú)限多個(gè)。

The problem can be illustrated by substituting ‘Man’ for ‘F’ in the above pattern of argument. If there are a number of men, then, by (1) there is an Idea of Man. But this, by (3) is itself man. The Idea of Man, plus the original men, therefore form a new collection of men. By (1), therefore, there must be an Idea of Man to correspond to this collection. But, by (2) this cannot be the Idea we have already met; so it must be a new Idea. But this, in its turn, will be another man; and so on ad infinitum; we cannot stop just with one or two Ideas of Man.?

這個(gè)問(wèn)題可以通過(guò)用“人”代替“F”來(lái)說(shuō)明上面的論證模式。如果有一些人，那么，根據(jù)（1），就有一個(gè)人的理型。但這個(gè)，根據(jù)（3），這個(gè)理型本身就是人。人的理型加上原來(lái)的人，因此形成了一個(gè)新的人的集合。因此，根據(jù)（1），必須有一個(gè)人的理型來(lái)對(duì)應(yīng)這個(gè)集合。但是，根據(jù)（2），這不能是我們已經(jīng)遇到的那個(gè)理型；所以它必須是一個(gè)新的理型。但這個(gè)，依次，又會(huì)是另一個(gè)人；如此無(wú)窮無(wú)盡；我們不能只停留在一個(gè)或兩個(gè)人的理型上。

Aristotle was to call this refutation of the Theory of Ideas ‘The Third Man argument’. The problem was never resolved by Plato; and, as already said, it is a matter of dispute between scholars whether he shrugged the objection off or abandoned all or part of his theory as a consequence.?

亞里士多德把這種對(duì)理型論的反駁稱為“第三人論證”。這個(gè)問(wèn)題從未被柏拉圖解決；而且，正如前面已經(jīng)說(shuō)過(guò)的，學(xué)者們之間存在爭(zhēng)議，他是不是對(duì)這個(gè)反對(duì)意見(jiàn)不屑一顧，或者是因此放棄了他的理論的全部或部分。

The problem to which Plato’s theory is an inadequate solution is sometimes called ‘the problem of universals’. In modern discussions of this problem, four notions can be discerned which bear some resemblance to Plato’s Ideas.?

柏拉圖的理論所不能解決的問(wèn)題有時(shí)被稱為“共相問(wèn)題”。在現(xiàn)代對(duì)這個(gè)問(wèn)題的討論中，可以辨別出四個(gè)概念，它們與柏拉圖的理型有一些相似之處。

(A) Concrete Universals. In a sentence such as ‘water is fluid’ the word ‘water’ is treated by some philosophers as the name of a single scattered object, the aqueous part of the world, made up of puddles, rivers, lakes and so on. Such a concrete universal would have a certain similarity with Plato’s Ideas. It would explain Plato’s preference (not always shared by his commentators) for referring to his Ideas by a concrete mode of speech (e.g. ‘the beautiful’) rather than an abstract one (‘beauty’). It would give a clear sense to his theory that particulars participate in Ideas: this particular bottle of water is quite literally a part of allthe-water-in-the-world. Theses (2), (3a) and (4) are easily shown to be true. However, a concrete universal is very unlike a Platonic Idea in respect of (3b) and (5) – the water in the universe can be located and can change in quantity and distribution, it can be seen and touched, and has many other properties besides that of being water.?

（A）具體普遍物。在像“水是流體”這樣的句子中，單詞“水”被一些哲學(xué)家視為一個(gè)單一的分散的對(duì)象的名字，即世界上的水分部，由水坑、河流、湖泊等組成。這樣一個(gè)具體共相與柏拉圖的理型有一定的相似性。它可以解釋柏拉圖偏愛(ài)用具體的說(shuō)法（例如“美”）而不是抽象的說(shuō)法（“美”）來(lái)指稱他的理型（并不總是被他的評(píng)論家所共享）。它可以給他的理論一個(gè)清晰的意義，即個(gè)別事物參與理型：這個(gè)特定的水瓶實(shí)際上就是全世界水分部的一部分。命題（2）、（3a）和（4）很容易被證明是正確的。然而，一個(gè)具體普遍物在（3b）和（5）方面與柏拉圖的理型非常不同——宇宙中的水可以被定位，并且可以在數(shù)量和分布上發(fā)生變化，它可以被看到和觸摸，并且除了作為水之外還有許多其他屬性。

(B) Paradigms. It has more than once been suggested that Platonic forms might be looked on as paradigms or standards: the relation between individuals and Ideas may be thought to be similar to that between particular metre-long objects and the Standard Metre in Paris by which the metre length was formerly defined. This brings out well the imitation and resemblance aspect of Plato’s theory: to be a metre long is, precisely, to resemble in length the Standard Metre; and if two things are each a metre long it is in virtue of this common resemblance to the paradigm. Like a concrete universal, a paradigm object fits those aspects of Plato’s ideas which make them seem substantial entities; like a concrete universal, it fails to have the properties by which Platonic Ideas transcend the sensible world. The Standard Metre is not in heaven, but in Paris, and is discerned not by intellectual vision but by the eyes in one’s head.?

（B）范例。有人不止一次地建議，柏拉圖的理型可能被看作是范例或標(biāo)準(zhǔn)：個(gè)體和理型之間的關(guān)系可能被認(rèn)為類似于特定的一米長(zhǎng)的物體和以前用來(lái)定義米長(zhǎng)的巴黎標(biāo)準(zhǔn)米之間的關(guān)系。這很好地突出了柏拉圖理論中的模仿和相似的方面：一米長(zhǎng)，就是準(zhǔn)確地說(shuō)，與標(biāo)準(zhǔn)一米在長(zhǎng)度上相似；如果兩件東西都是一米長(zhǎng)，那是因?yàn)樗鼈儗?duì)范例的共同相似。像一個(gè)具體普遍物一樣，一個(gè)范例對(duì)象符合柏拉圖理型的那些使它們看起來(lái)像實(shí)體的方面；像一個(gè)具體普遍物一樣，它沒(méi)有柏拉圖理型超越感覺(jué)世界的那些屬性。標(biāo)準(zhǔn)一米不在天堂，而是在巴黎，它不是通過(guò)智力視覺(jué)，而是通過(guò)人的眼睛來(lái)辨別的。

（C）Attributes and Properties. Logicians sometimes talk of attributes, such as humanity, or the property of being divisible by seven. These abstract entities share the more transcendental aspects of Plato’s ideas; humanity does not grow or die as human beings do, and nowhere in the world could one view or handle divisibility by seven. All men, we might say, are human by virtue of sharing a common humanity; this humanity, we might say, is the attribute for which the predicate ‘. . . is a man’ stands in the sentences ‘Peter is a man’ and ‘John is a man’. But if we think of Platonic ideas in this way as attributes, it is very hard to see how Plato could ever have thought that humanity itself, and only humanity itself, was really a human being. Is it not clear that humanity is an abstraction, and that only a concrete individual can be a human being??

（C）屬性和性質(zhì)。邏輯學(xué)家有時(shí)會(huì)談到屬性，比如人性，或者能被七整除的性質(zhì)。這些抽象的實(shí)體與柏拉圖理型的更超越的方面有共同之處；人性不會(huì)像人類一樣生長(zhǎng)或死亡，也沒(méi)有任何地方可以看到或處理能被七整除的性質(zhì)。所有的人，我們可能會(huì)說(shuō)，都是因?yàn)楣蚕硪粋€(gè)共同的人性而成為人類；這個(gè)人性，我們可能會(huì)說(shuō)，是謂詞“……是一個(gè)人”在句子“彼得是一個(gè)人”和“約翰是一個(gè)人”中所代表的屬性。但如果我們把柏拉圖的理型以這種方式看作屬性，那么很難看出柏拉圖怎么會(huì)認(rèn)為人性本身，而且只有人性本身，才是真正的人類。難道不清楚，人性是一種抽象，而只有一個(gè)具體的個(gè)體才能成為一個(gè)人類嗎？

(D) Classes. Attributes serve as principles according to which objects can be collected into classes: objects which possess the attribute of humanity, for instance, can be grouped into the class of human beings. In some ways classes seem closer than attributes to Platonic Ideas: participation in an Idea can be understood without too much difficulty as membership of a class. Classes, like attributes, and unlike paradigms and concrete universals, resemble Ideas in their abstract properties.?

（D）類。屬性作為根據(jù)其可以將對(duì)象歸納到類中的原則：例如，具有人性屬性的對(duì)象可以被分組到人類的類中。在某些方面，類似乎比屬性更接近柏拉圖的理型：參與一個(gè)理型可以不太困難地理解為一個(gè)類的成員。類，像屬性一樣，不像范例和具體普遍物，與理型在它們的抽象屬性上相似。

However, there is an important difference between attributes and classes. Two classes with the same members (the same extension, as philosophers sometimes say) are identical with each other, whereas attribute A need not be identical with attribute B even though all and only those who possess A possess also B.?

然而，屬性和類之間有一個(gè)重要的區(qū)別。具有相同成員（哲學(xué)家有時(shí)說(shuō)的相同外延）的兩個(gè)類是彼此相同的，而即使所有擁有A的也擁有B的，屬性A也不一定與屬性B相同。

Being a human, for instance, is not the same attribute as being a featherless biped, though the class of featherless bipeds may well be the same class as the class of human beings.?

例如，作為一個(gè)人，與無(wú)羽毛兩足動(dòng)物的屬性不同，盡管無(wú)羽毛兩足類很可能與人類的類是同一類。

Philosophers express this difference by saying that classes are extensional, while attributes are not. It is not clear whether Plato’s Ideas are extensional like classes, or non-extensional like attributes.?

哲學(xué)家用類是外延的，而屬性不是這樣的說(shuō)法來(lái)表達(dá)這種區(qū)別。柏拉圖的理型是否像類一樣是外延的，還是像屬性一樣是非外延的，這一點(diǎn)并不清楚。

The difficulty in identifying Ideas with classes arises over theses (2) and (3). The class of men is not a man and we cannot say in general that the class of Fs is F; some classes are members of themselves and some are not. There are problems in this area which only became fully obvious more than two millennia later.?

把理念與類相等同的困難出現(xiàn)在命題（2）和（3）上。人類的類不是一個(gè)人，我們也不能一般地說(shuō)F的類就是F；有些類是它們自己的成員，有些則不是。這個(gè)地方的問(wèn)題一直存在，直到兩千多年后才完全顯現(xiàn)出來(lái)。

Concepts such as those of attribute and class are more or less sophisticated descendants of Plato’s notion; none of them, however, does justice to the many facets of his Ideas. If one wants to see how the theses (1) to (5) seemed plausible to Plato, it is better to take, not any modern logician’s technical concept, but some more unreflective notion.?

像屬性和類這樣的概念或多或少是柏拉圖概念的復(fù)雜的后裔；然而，它們都不能公正地體現(xiàn)他的理型的多方面。如果一個(gè)人想要看到命題（1）到（5）對(duì)柏拉圖來(lái)說(shuō)是如何看起來(lái)合理的，最好不要采用任何現(xiàn)代邏輯學(xué)家的技術(shù)概念，而是采用一些更不反思的概念。

Consider one of the points of the compass, North, South, West, and East. Take the notion of the East, for instance, not as one might try to explain it in virtue of an abstract notion, e.g. eastwardness, but as one might conceive it by naive reflection on the various locutions we in Britain use about the East.?

考慮一下羅盤上的一個(gè)點(diǎn)，北、南、西、東。例如，不要把東方的概念看作是一個(gè)人可能試圖用一個(gè)抽象的概念來(lái)解釋的，比如向東性，而是把它看作是一個(gè)人通過(guò)對(duì)我們?cè)谟?guó)使用的關(guān)于東方的各種說(shuō)法的天真映象來(lái)構(gòu)思的。

There are many places which are east of us, e.g. Belgrade, Warsaw, and Hong Kong. Anything which is thus east is in the East, is indeed a part of The East (participation); or, if you prefer, it is in more or less the same direction as The East (imitation).?

有許多地方在我們的東邊，例如貝爾格萊德、華沙和香港。任何這樣在東邊的東西都在東方，實(shí)際上是東方的一部分（參與）；或者，如果你愿意，它與東方在同一個(gè)或大致相同的方向（模仿）。

It is by virtue of being in The East, or by virtue of being in the same direction as that point of the compass, that whatever is east of us is east (Thesis 1).?

凡是在我們東邊的東西都是因?yàn)樵跂|方，或者因?yàn)榕c那個(gè)羅盤上的點(diǎn)在同一個(gè)方向，才是東（命題1）。

Now The East cannot be identified with any of the places which are east of us: it is provincial to think that ‘The East’ means a place such as India, since from some other point of view, e.g. that of Beijing, India is part of The West (Thesis 2).?

現(xiàn)在，東方不能與我們東邊的任何地方相等同：認(rèn)為“東方”意味著像印度這樣的地方是偏狹的，因?yàn)閺牧硪粋€(gè)角度來(lái)看，例如北京的角度，印度是西方的一部分（命題2）。

The East itself, of course, is east of us – to walk towards The East you must walk eastwards – and The East is nothing but east; we may say ‘The East is red’ but we really mean that the eastern sky is red (Thesis 3).?

東方本身，當(dāng)然，是在我們的東邊——要走向東方，你必須向東走——而且東方只不過(guò)是東；我們可能會(huì)說(shuō)“東方是紅色的”，但我們真正的意思是東方的天空是紅色的（命題3）。

Nothing but The East is unqualifiedly east: the sun is sometimes east and sometimes west, India is east of Iran but west of Vietnam, but in every time and every place The East is east (Thesis 4).?

除了東方之外，沒(méi)有什么東西是無(wú)條件地是東：太陽(yáng)有時(shí)在東邊，有時(shí)在西邊，印度在伊朗的東邊，但在越南的西邊，但在每一個(gè)時(shí)間和每一個(gè)地方，東方都是東（命題4）。

Moreover, The East cannot be identified with any point in space, nor has it any history in time, nor can it be seen, handled, or parcelled out (Thesis 5).?

而且，東方不能與空間中的任何一點(diǎn)相等同，也沒(méi)有任何時(shí)間上的歷史，也不能被看到、觸摸或分割（命題5）。

I am not, of course, suggesting that points of the compass will supply an interpretation of Plato’s Ideas which will make all theses (1) to (5) come out true.?

我當(dāng)然不是在暗示羅盤上的點(diǎn)會(huì)提供一個(gè)對(duì)柏拉圖理型的解釋，使所有的命題（1）到（5）都成為真。

No interpretation could do this since the theses are not all compatible with each other. I am merely saying that this interpretation will make the theses look prima facie plausible in a way in which the interpretations previously considered will not.?

沒(méi)有一種解釋能做到這一點(diǎn)，因?yàn)檫@些命題并不都彼此相容。我只是說(shuō)，這種解釋會(huì)使這些命題看起來(lái)初看上去是合理的，而以前提過(guò)的解釋則不會(huì)。

Concrete universals, paradigms, attributes, and classes all raise problems of their own, as philosophers long after Plato discovered, and though we cannot go back to Plato’s solutions, we have yet to answer many of his problems in this area.?

具體普遍物、范例、屬性和類都引發(fā)了它們自己的問(wèn)題，正如柏拉圖之后很久的哲學(xué)家們發(fā)現(xiàn)的那樣，雖然我們不能回到柏拉圖的解決方案，但我們還有許多他在這個(gè)地方的問(wèn)題尚待回答。