拉丁語翻譯筆記 神學大全 論題2 論神，神是否存在
說明
1. 譯者并非古典學或哲學專業(yè)學生，只是業(yè)余拉丁語愛好者。翻譯本文時譯者無宗教信仰。本文只提供翻譯和必要的注解，不做箋注和考證，不評價原作者的觀點。
2. 本文選擇的這個論題在不僅在基督教神學中有重要的基礎意義，在哲學史上也是古已有之的經(jīng)典論題，希望能幫到初學者。
3. 一些人名、書名、專名和原文的翻譯采用廣為人知的譯法，或者盡可能通俗的直譯，而并非拘泥于某個教派的譯法。
QUAESTIO II
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De Deo, an Deus sit
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Quia igitur principalis intentio huius sacrae doctrinae est Dei cognitionem tradere, et non solum secundum quod in se est, sed etiam secundum quod est principium rerum et finis earum, et specialiter rationalis creaturae, ut ex dictis est manifestum; ad huius doctrinae expositionem intendentes, primo tractabimus de Deo; secundo, de motu rationalis creaturae in Deum; tertio, de Christo, qui, secundum quod homo, via est nobis tendendi in Deum.
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試：Therefore, because the first intention of these sacred instructions is to convey the knowledge of God, and it is not only in accordance with what in itself, but also with what the origin of things and the purpose of them is, and especially of rational creatures, as it is clear from what has been said; aiming at the exposing of these sacred instructions, we will first deal with God; second, with the motion of rational creatures to God; third, with Christ, who, in accordance with what human is, is the road for us of going to God.
1. secundum quod是阿奎那作品中的常見描述，從字面上看可將其理解為介詞secundum+省略先行詞的關系代詞quod（原形quid因為介詞而變成了n..c），直譯可以是：in accordance with one thing, that...。
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試（中）：那么，因為這種神圣教導的首要意圖是傳達神的知識，這（知識）不僅在于它本身，也在于世間萬物的起源與目的，特別是理性造物的起源與目的，正如前文清楚描述的那樣；我們的目的是展示這些教導，我們將首先討論神，第二討論理性造物向神的運動，第三討論基督，他（既）有人性，（又）是我們通向神的道路。
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Consideratio autem de Deo tripartita erit. Primo namque considerabimus ea quae ad essentiam divinam pertinent; secundo, ea quae pertinent ad distinctionem Personarum; tertio, ea quae pertinent ad processum creaturarum ab ipso.
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試：However, the contemplation on God will be divided into three parts. For we will first contemplate things that concerns the divine essence; second, things that concerns the difference of characters; third, things that concerns the progress of creatures made by itself.
1. Persona按慣例譯為“位格”，不知有無更通俗貼切的譯法。
2. ab ipso應該是施事奪格，其中的反身代詞指神。
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試（中）：而對于神的思考將分為三個部分。我們將首先考慮有關神圣本質(zhì)的那方面內(nèi)容；第二考慮有關位格區(qū)別的；第三考慮有關神的所造之物的進展的。
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Circa essentiam vero divinam, primo considerandum est an Deus sit; secundo, quomodo sit, vel potius quomodo non sit; tertio considerandum erit de his quae ad operationem ipsius pertinent, scilicet de scientia et de voluntate et potentia.
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試：In fact, about the divine essence, first it should be contemplated that whether God exists; second, in what manner it exists, or rather, how it doesn’t exist; third, it shall be contemplated on the things which concerns its work, evidently, on knowledge, will, and power.
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試（中）：事實上關于神圣本質(zhì)，首先應考慮神是否存在；其次，考慮祂以何種方式存在，或者相反地，祂以何種方式不存在；第三，要考慮那些關于祂的作為的事物，直白地說，要考慮（祂的）知識、意志和權能。
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Circa primum quaeruntur tria.
Primo: utrum Deum esse sit per se notum.
Secundo: utrum sit demonstrabile.
Tertio: an Deus sit.
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試：About the first, these three are asked.
First: whether “God exists” is well-known through itself.
Second: whether it is demonstrable.
Third: whether God exists.
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試（中）：關于第一個（考慮的），可提出這三個問題：
1. “神存在”這件事是否是（不證）自明的。
2. （“神存在”）這件事是否是可證明的。
3. 神是否存在。
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ARTICULUS I
Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse sit per se notum.
1. Illa enim nobis dicuntur per se nota, quorum cognitio nobis naturaliter inest, sicut patet de primis principiis. Sed, sicut dicit Damascenus in principio libri sui, omnibus cognitio existendi Deum naturaliter est inserta. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.
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試：Article I
Whether “God exists” is well-known through itself
To the first part it is presented as follows. It seems that “God exists” is well-known through itself.
1. Those things are indeed said to be well-known through itself to us, of which the conception naturally belongs to us, just as the conception on first principles is open. But, just as Damascenus says in the beginning of his book, the conception of “God exists” has been naturally inserted in all people. Therefore “God exists” is well-known through itself.
1. existendi Deum實際上不符合拉丁語語法，出現(xiàn)這一現(xiàn)象的原因見
https://latindiscussion.org/threads/omnibus-cognitio-existendi-deum-naturaliter-est-inserta.19308/?第17樓
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試（中）：小節(jié)1
“神存在”是否是自明的。
對于第一個問題將作如下闡述。似乎，“神存在”是自明的。
1. 我們自然地擁有一些事物的概念，它們對我們來說當然是自明的，比如關于基本法則（的概念）是清楚明白的。但是，如大馬士革的約翰在他著作的開頭中所說，“神存在”自然地根植于所有人中。因此“神存在”是自明的。
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2. Praeterea, illa dicuntur esse per se nota, quae statim, cognitis terminis, cognoscuntur: quod Philosophus attribuit primis demonstrationis principiis, in I Poster.: scito enim quid est totum et quid pars, statim scitur quod omne totum maius est sua parte. Sed intellecto quid significet hoc nomen Deus, statim habetur quod Deus est. Significatur enim hoc nomine id quo maius significari non potest: maius autem est quod est in re et intellectu, quam quod est in intellectu tantum: unde cum, intellecto hoc nomine Deus, statim sit in intellectu, sequitur etiam quod sit in re. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.
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試：Besides, those things are said to be well-known through itself, which are immediately known with the boundaries known: what Philosopher has assigned to the first principles of demonstration in Poster I: in fact, when what the whole and what the part is known, the fact that the whole is larger than its part is immediately known. But when what the name “God” means realized, the fact that God exists is considered. For it is shown in this name, than which thing cannot be shown larger; but, what is in matter and in comprehension is larger than what is only in comprehension; from the place where the name “God” is realized, and it is immediately in comprehension, it also follows that it is in matter. Therefore “God exists” is well-known by itself.
1. 此段中大多數(shù)quod從句是帶直陳式的、表達事實的實詞性從句。但結尾處quod sit in re的虛擬式不太好理解，可能是從句嵌套的結果？
2. Significatur enim...中id應當是指代“神存在”，而quo的先行詞是nomine。
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試（中）：此外，有些事物，只要理解了它們的定義，就能立即理解它們（本身），它們被稱為是自明的：如亞里士多德在《分析后篇》卷1中認為這一點屬于證明的首要原則：事實上，當知道了什么是整體與什么是部分時，立刻就知道整體大于其部分這一事實。但是，當“神”這個名字的意義被理解時，就會立刻想到神存在這一事實。因為沒有事物可以表現(xiàn)得比這個名字更大，“神存在”這件事就在這個名字中被顯現(xiàn)出來：而且，那些存在于物質(zhì)與理念中的事物要比只存在于理念中的事物更大：從“神”這個名字被理解起，祂就存在于理念中，之后祂也存在于物質(zhì)中（譯注：此處的邏輯是：根據(jù)“神”這個名字的定義，既然神存在于理念中，神也要存在于物質(zhì)中，因為同時存在于兩者之中的事物才是更大的。換言之，如果神只存在于理念中，就會與自己的定義矛盾）。因此“神存在”是自明的。
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3. Praeterea, veritatem esse est per se notum: quia qui negat veritatem esse, concedit veritatem esse: si enim veritas non est, verum est veritatem non esse. Si autem est aliquid verum, oportet quod veritas sit. Deus autem est ipsa veritas, Io. 14,6: Ego sum via, veritas et vita. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.
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試：3. Besides, “truth exists”?is well-known by itself: because one who denies that truth exists admits that truth exists: in fact, if truth doesn’t exist, it is true that truth does not exist. However, if there is anything true, it is right that truth exists. However God is truth itself, John 14:6:"I am road, truth and life."?Therefore “God exists”?is well-known by itself.
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試（中）：此外，“真理存在”是自明的：因為一個否定真理存在的人承認了真理存在：事實上，如果真理不存在，那么就有“真理不存在”這個真命題。然而，如果有任何真實的事物，就應該說真理存在。而神是真理本身，如《約翰福音》14：6：“我是道路，真理和生命?！币虼恕吧翊嬖凇笔亲悦鞯摹?/p>
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Sed contra, nullus potest cogitare oppositum eius quod est per se notum, ut patet per Philosophum, in IV Metaphys. et I Poster., circa prima demonstrationis principia. Cogitari autem potest oppositum eius quod est Deum esse, secundum illud Psalmi 52,1: Dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus. Ergo Deum esse non est per se notum.
試：But on the contrary, no one can think the opposite of the thing which is well-known by itself, as it is open through Philosopher in Metaphys 4, and Poster 1, about the first principles of demonstration. However, the opposite of the thing, which is “God”?exists, can be thought, it is in accordance with that of Psalm 52:1: The fool has said in his heart, there is no God. Therefore “God exists”?is not well-known by itself.
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試（中）：但相反地，對于一個自明的事物，沒人能設想它的反面，如亞里士多德的《形而上學》4和《分析后篇》1中，關于證明的最初原則所揭示的那樣。然而“神存在”這件事的反面是可以被設想的，就像《詩篇》52：1（所說的那樣）：“愚頑人心里說，沒有神。”因此“神存在”不是自明的。
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Respondeo dicendum quod contingit aliquid esse per se notum dupliciter: uno modo, secundum se et non quoad nos; alio modo, secundum se et quoad nos. Ex hoc enim aliqua propositio est per se nota, quod praedicatum includitur in ratione subiecti, ut homo est animal: nam animal est de ratione hominis. Si igitur notum sit omnibus de praedicato et de subiecto quid sit, propositio illa erit omnibus per se nota: sicut patet in primis demonstrationum principiis, quorum termini sunt quaedam communia quae nullus ignorat, ut ens et non ens, totum et pars, et similia. Si autem apud aliquos notum non sit de praedicato et subiecto quid sit, propositio quidem quantum in se est, erit per se nota: non tamen apud illos qui praedicatum et subiectum propositionis ignorant. Et ideo contingit, ut dicit Boetius in libro De hebdomadibus, quod quaedam sunt communes animi conceptiones et per se notae, apud sapientes tantum, ut incorporalia in loco non esse.
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試：I answer the saying, that, it turns out that something is well-known by itself on two accounts: in one way, it is in accordance with itself, and not as far as with us; in the other way, it is in accordance with itself, and also with us. From this some proposition is indeed well-known by itself, given that assertion is included in the theory of subject, as human is living being: for living being is from the theory of human. Therefore, if what is from the assertion and what is from the subject is well-known to all, the preposition is well-known to all by itself: just as it is open in the first principles of demonstrations, of which the terms are something common that no one is ignorant of, as being and non-being, the whole and the part, and such like. However, if what is from the assertion and object is not well-known to any people, as far as the preposition is indeed in itself, it will be well-known by itself, but not to those who are ignorant of the assertion and the subject of the preposition. And for that reason, it turns out that, as Boetius says in the book On Seven Days, some conceptions of mind are common and well-known by themselves, only to the wise people, as “incorporeal things are not in a place.”
1. 第一句中的quod從句是表事實的實詞性從句，不是dicendum的定語從句。
2. quorum termini...中quorum的先行詞是前文中的principiis。quaedam communia(n.p.)是termini(m.p.)的同位語，注意：中性名詞直接用作同位語不算違反一致規(guī)則。
3. 最后一個ut從句中的不定式較難理解，應該是直接引用原文的結果。
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試（中）：我回答這（類）說法：事實上，一種事物是經(jīng)由兩種方式（之一）自明的：一種方式是，它和自身一致，但和我們不一致；另一種方式是，它和自身一致，也和我們一致。根據(jù)這一點，一個表述是自明的，只要（它的）斷言被包含在（它的）主體的理論中，比如“人類是動物”：因為“動物”（這個屬性）來源于“人類”（這個主體）的理論。因此，如果來自于斷言的內(nèi)容和來自于主體的內(nèi)容對于所有人是自明的，（所涉及的）那個表述對于所有人就是自明的：正如證明的基本原理中揭示的那樣，那些原理的用詞是一些公有的、無人不知的事物，如存在之物和不存在之物，整體和部分，以及（其他）類似的。然而，如果來自于斷言的內(nèi)容和來自于主體的內(nèi)容對于某些人來說不明白，（雖然）就這個表述確實
存在于自身之中而言，它是自明的，但對那些不知道這個表述的斷言和主體的人來說不是。而且因此，有這樣的說法成立，正如波伊修斯在《論七天創(chuàng)造工程》中說的，一些思想上的概念只對有智慧的人來說是公有的、自明的，如“無形體的東西不處于一個位置”。
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Dico ergo quod haec propositio, Deus est, quantum in se est, per se nota est: quia praedicatum est idem cum subiecto: Deus enim est suum esse, ut infra patebit. Sed quia nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota: sed indiget demonstrari per ea quae sunt magis nota quoad nos, et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus.
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試：Therefore I say that, this proposition, God exists, as far as it is in itself, is well-known by itself: because the assertion is the same as the subject: God is indeed its own being, as it will be open below. But because we don’t know what is from God, it is not well-known by itself to us: but it needs that we are demonstrated through those things which are more known, as far as the nature is demonstrated less known, it is clear through the effect.
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試（中）：因此我說，“神存在”這個表述，就它存在于自身之中而言，它是自明的：因為（它的）斷言和主體是相同的（譯注：指“神存在”和“神”是同義的）：神實際上是祂自己的存在，正如后文將揭示的那樣。但因為我們不知道來自于神的內(nèi)容，這（表述）對我們來說不是自明的：而這需要用那些更為熟知的事物來向我們證明，正因為（這個表述的）本性更不為我們所知；經(jīng)由（神的）效果，這（表述）是清楚的。
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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi, sub quadam confusione, est nobis naturaliter insertum, inquantum scilicet Deus est hominis beatitudo: homo enim naturaliter desiderat beatitudinem, et quod naturaliter desideratur ab homine, naturaliter cognoscitur ab eodem. Sed hoc non est simpliciter cognoscere Deum esse; sicut cognoscere venientem, non est cognoscere Petrum, quamvis sit Petrus veniens: multi enim perfectum hominis bonum, quod est beatitudo, existimant divitias; quidam vero voluptates; quidam autem aliquid aliud.
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試：Therefore, to the first saying, the fact is that to know “God exists”?in some common way, under some confusion, is naturally inserted in us, certainly inasmuch as God is happiness of human: human indeed naturally longs for happiness, and since it is naturally longed for by human, it is naturally known by him. But this is not to know “God exists”?simply; just as to know one is coming, is not to know Peter is coming, even though it is Peter coming: many people estimate the perfect good of human, which is happiness, is wealth; some in fact pleasures; some however some other thing.
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試（中）：因此對于第一種說法，事實是：用某種公有的方式、處在某種疑惑之中去知道神存在，這種事自然地根植于我們中，顯然是因為神是人的幸福：人自然地渴望幸福，而因為幸福自然地被人渴望，幸福自然地被人所知。但這不是說（可以）簡單地知道神存在；正如知道某個人走來，不是說知道彼得走來，即使那就是彼得走來：許多人認為人的完全的美善，即幸福，是財富；一些人事實上認為是快感；而另一些人認為是其他的事物。
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Ad secundum dicendum quod forte ille qui audit hoc nomen Deus, non intelligit significari aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, cum quidam crediderint Deum esse corpus. Dato etiam quod quilibet intelligat hoc nomine Deus significari hoc quod dicitur, scilicet illud quo maius cogitari non potest; non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod intelligat id quod significatur per nomen, esse in rerum natura; sed in apprehensione intellectus tantum. Nec potest argui quod sit in re, nisi daretur quod sit in re aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest: quod non est datum a ponentibus Deum non esse.
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試：To the second saying, the fact is that it happens that a man who hears the name “God”, doesn’t realize that something is shown than that one thing cannot be thought larger, since some people believed that God is a body. Also, given that anyone realizes that in this name “God”, this thing that is said is shown, certainly, the thing than that one thing cannot be thought larger; from this it is still not followed that anyone realizes this that is shown by name exists in the nature of matter; but this is only realized in understanding. Nor it can be proved that it exists in matter, unless it is given that something exists in matter than that one thing cannot be thought larger: which has not been given by those who assumes God doesn’t exist.
1. Dato etiam quod...potest應該是作原因奪格的被動分詞dato支配了一個實詞性從句，因此這本質(zhì)上是一個短語。hoc nomine是奪格，Deus是直接引用名字的主格。hoc quod dicitur是指上文所說的“不能設想有事物比它更大”的那個事物，illud quo...potest是它的同位語。
2. rerum natura的實際含義在nature of matter這個直譯中會被誤解：它不是“物質(zhì)本性”，而是“物質(zhì)自然界”或者“宇宙”。題外話，De Rerum Natura的正確譯名是《論宇宙》而不是《物性論》。
3. argui在文中應該沒有“爭辯”、“詰問”或“反駁”的意思，因為后文又說“......不被認為神不存在的人所承認”。
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試（中）：對于第二種說法，事實是，會發(fā)生有人聽到“神”這個名字而沒有意識到某個“不能設想有事物比它更大”的事物被表示出來，因為有些人相信神是一個物質(zhì)實體。而且，（即使）假設任何人意識到在“神”這個名字中，上述這一點被表示出來，即，那個“不能設想有事物比它更大”的事物；從中仍不能推出，任何人意識到這個被表示出來的事物存在于物質(zhì)自然界中（譯注：此處及上文的“意識到”不是指“邏輯推論”，而更接近“感知”。如前文所說，邏輯推論和自身一致，但不一定和我們?nèi)祟愐恢拢?；而是這個事物只在理念中被（任何人）意識到。也不能（從中）證明，這個事物存在于物質(zhì)中，除非假設某個“不能設想有事物比它更大”的事物存在于物質(zhì)中：這是認為神不存在的人所不承認的。（譯注：最后一句的邏輯是：“‘神存在于物質(zhì)中’對于任何人是自明的”需要任何人意識到“神”這個名字的實質(zhì)，也需要任何人承認這個實質(zhì)在物質(zhì)界中的正確性。但認為神不存在的人不承認它在物質(zhì)界中的正確性。）
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Ad tertium dicendum quod veritatem esse in communi, est per se notum: sed primam veritatem esse, hoc non est per se notum quoad nos.
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試：To the third saying, the fact is that “truth exists in general”?is well-known by itself: but this thing, “the first truth exists”, is not well-known to us.
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試（中）：對于第三種說法，事實是，“真理總體上存在”是自明的：但“第一真理存在”這件事對我們來說不是自明的。
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ARTICULUS 2
Utrum Deum esse sit demonstrabile
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse non sit demonstrabile.
1. Deum enim esse est articulus fidei. Sed ea quae sunt fidei, non sunt demonstrabilia: quia demonstratio facit scire, fides autem de non apparentibus est, ut patet per Apostolum, ad Heb. 11,1. Ergo Deum esse non est demonstrabile.
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試：Article 2
Whether “God exists”?is demonstrable.
To the second part it is presented as follows. It seems that “God exists”?is not demonstrable.
1. In fact “God exists”?is the part of faith. But those things that are of faith, are not demonstrable: because demonstration causes to know, but faith is not from the things that are apparent, as it is open by Apostle, at Hebrews 11:1. Therefore “God exists”?is not demonstrable. ?
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試（中）：小節(jié)2
“神存在”是否是可證明的。
對于第二個問題將作如下闡述。似乎“神存在”是不可證明的。
1. 事實上“神存在”是信仰的一部分。但那些屬于信仰的事物是不可證明的：因為證明導致知識，但信仰并不來自明顯的事物，如使徒在希伯來書11：1中揭示的。因此“神存在”是不可證明的。
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2. Praeterea, medium demonstrationis est quod quid est. Sed de Deo non possumus scire quid est, sed solum quid non est, ut dicit Damascenus. Ergo non possumus demonstrare Deum esse.
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試：Besides, the middle of demonstration is what it is. But from God we cannot know what it is, but only what it is not, as Damascenus says. Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.
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試（中）：此外，證明的中詞是“它是什么”。但從神之中我們不能知道祂是什么，只能知道祂不是什么，如大馬士革的約翰所說。因此我們不能證明神存在。
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3. Praeterea, si demonstraretur Deum esse, hoc non esset nisi ex effectibus eius. Sed effectus eius non sunt proportionati ei: cum ipse sit infinitus et effectus finiti: finiti autem ad infinitum non est proportio. Cum ergo causa non possit demonstrari per effectum sibi non proportionatum, videtur quod Deum esse non possit demonstrari.
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試：Besides, if “God exits”?were demonstrated, this could not be unless it is from its effects. But its effects are not proportionate to it: since it is infinite and its effects are finite: but there is no symmentry of the finite to the infinte. Therefore since the cause cannot be demonstrated by the effect which is not propotionate to itself, it seems that “God exists”?cannot be demonstrated.
1. finiti autem...中finiti應該是單數(shù)屬格，按照復數(shù)主格或單數(shù)位置格理解都不合語法。
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試（中）：此外，如果“神存在”被證明了，此證明的成立必然是來源于神的效果。但祂的效果和祂（本身）不成比例：既然祂本身是無限的，而（祂的）效果是有限的：而對于無限之物，有限之物無法與之對稱。因此，既然起因不能被與它自己不成比例的效果證明，似乎“神存在”是不可證明的。
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Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit, ad Rom. 1,20:?invisibilia?Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur. Sed hoc non esset, nisi per ea quae facta sunt, posset demonstrari Deum esse: primum enim quod oportet intelligi de aliquo, est an sit.
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試：But on the contrary, the fact is that Apostle says at Romans 1:20: the invisible things of God, realized by things that have been made, come in sight. But this would not be, unless by things that have been made, it could be demonstrated that God exists: in fact, the first thing which should be realized about something, is whether it exists.
1. primum enim...中primum是名詞做主語而不是副詞做狀語，quod oportet是它的定語從句。
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試（中）：但相反地，事實是使徒在羅馬書1：20中說：神的不可見之物，（因為）藉著所造之物可以曉得，（所以）出現(xiàn)在人眼前。但這一點不成立，除非藉著所造之物可以證明神存在：事實上，關于一件事物，首先應該意識到的事情是它是否存在。
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Respondeo dicendum quod duplex ex demonstratio. Una quae est per causam, et dicitur propter quid: et haec est per priora simpliciter. Alia est per effectum, et dicitur demonstratio quia: et haec est per ea quae sunt priora quoad nos: cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est manifestior quam sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem causae. Ex quolibet autem effectu potest demonstrari propriam causam eius esse (si tamen eius effectus sint magis noti quoad nos): quia, cum effectus dependeant a causa, posito effectu necesse est causam praeexistere. Unde Deum esse, secundum quod non est per se notum quoad nos, demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos.
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試：I answer the saying, that the demonstration is two-fold. One, which is through the cause, and is said “because of something”: and this is simply through the former things. The other is through the effect, and is said “the demonstration because”: and this is through things that are former to us: since some effect is indeed clearer to us than its cause, we proceed to the knowlege of the cause through the effect. However, from whatever effect it can be demonstrated that its proper cause exists (as long as its effects are still better known to us): because, since the effects depend on the cause, with the effect set, it is necessary that the cause appears before. Whence God is, is in accordance with fact that is not well-known by itself to us, is demonstrable by the effects which are well-known to us.
1. duplex ex demonstratio中ex另有版本作est，此處從est版本，否則不合語法。
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試（中）：我回答這（類）說法：證明有兩種方式。第一種是經(jīng)由起因的，被稱為“因為某物”：這種方式簡單地依據(jù)先前的事物。另一種是經(jīng)由效果的，而被稱為“此證明是因為”：這種方式依據(jù)對我們而言是先前的事物：既然某種效果對我們而言確實比它的起因更清楚，我們經(jīng)由效果而接近起因的知識。然而，無論根據(jù)何種效果，（總）可以證明它存在恰當?shù)钠鹨颍ㄖ灰男Ч匀桓鼮槲覀兯阂驗?，既然效果取決于起因，如果效果得到顯現(xiàn)，起因就需要在此前顯現(xiàn)。神的來源，其事實對我們來說不是自明的，（但）可以經(jīng)由對我們來說明顯的效果而被證明。
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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deum esse, et alia huiusmodi quae per rationem naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo, ut dicitur Rom. 1,19, non sunt articuli fidei, sed praeambula ad articulos: sic enim fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia naturam, et perfectio perfectibile. Nihil tamen prohibet illud quod secundum se demonstrabile est et scibile, ab aliquo accipi ut credibile, qui demonstrationem non capit.
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試：Therefore to the first saying, the fact is that “God exists”, and other things of this manner about God, which can be known through natural reason, as it is said in Romans 1:19, are not parts of faith, but are walkers before the parts: thus faith indeed puts the natural knowledge before, just as grace puts the nature before, and perfection puts something that can be perfected before. However nothing prevents the thing that is demonstrable and knowable according to itself to be accepted by someone as it is credible, who doesn’t grasp the demonstration.
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試（中）： 因此對于第一種說法，事實是，“神存在”以及其他按照這種方式和神有關的，可以經(jīng)由自然理性被知曉的表述，如羅馬書1：19所說，不屬于信仰的部分，而是那些部分的先行者：如此，信仰事實上把自然知識設為前置，正如恩典把（人的）天性設為前置，成就把可成就之物設為前置。然而沒有東西阻止一個可證明、可認知的事物，被某個沒有理解（它的）證明的人，因為它可信仰而接受。
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Ad secundum dicendum quod cum demonstratur causa per effectum, necesse est uti effectu loco definitionis causae, ad probandum causam esse: et hoc maxime contingit in Deo. Quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse est accipere pro medio quid significet nomen, non autem quod quid est: quia quaestio quid est, sequitur ad quaestionem an est. Nomina autem Dei imponuntur ab effectibus, ut postea ostendetur: unde, demonstrando Deum esse per effectum, accipere possumus pro medio quid significet hoc nomen Deus.
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試：To the second saying, the fact is that when the cause is demonstrated through the effect, it is necessary that the effect uses the place of the cause’s definition, to prove the cause exists: and this
greatly happens in the case of God. Because to prove something exists, it is necessary to accept what the name shows as the middle, however not the thing that what it is: because the question, what it is, follows the question, whether it exists. However titles of God are set by the effects, as it is revealed afterwards: whence, in demonstrating that God exists through the effect, we can accept what this name, God, shows as the middle.
1. quia quaestio quid est中quid est是quaestio的同位語，之后ad quaestionem an est也是類似結構
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試（中）：對于第二種說法，事實是，當起因經(jīng)由效果被證明時，讓效果占用起因的定義從而證明起因的存在，是有必要的：而這種情況在關于神的話題中表現(xiàn)得非常明顯。因為要證明某物存在，需要接受“（它的）名字表示什么”作為中詞，而并不是“它是什么”作為中詞：因為“它是什么”這個問題，跟隨在“它是否存在”這個問題之后。然而神的稱號是根據(jù)（祂的）效果被設定的，如同之后展示的那樣：由此，在經(jīng)由效果證明神存在時，我們可以接受“‘神’這個名字表示什么”作為中詞。
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Ad tertium dicendum quod per effectus non proportionatos causae, non potest perfecta cognitio de causa haberi: sed tamen ex quocumque effectu potest manifeste nobis demonstrari causam esse, ut dictum est. Et sic ex effectibus Dei potest demonstrari Deum esse: licet per eos non perfecte possimus eum cognoscere secundum suam essentiam.
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試：To the third saying, the fact is that, through the effects which are not proportionate to the cause, the perfect knowledge can not be gotten from the cause: but from whatever effect it can still clearly demonstrated to us, that the cause exists, as it has been said. And thus, from the effects of God it can be demonstrated that God exists: it is allowed that through those, we can not perfectly know the thing in accordance with its essence. ?
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試（中）：對于第三種說法，事實是，（如果）經(jīng)由與起因不成比例的效果，（就）無法從起因中取得完全的知識：但無論根據(jù)何種效果，“神存在”這件事對我們來說依然可以清楚地被證明，這一點已經(jīng)說過了。而如此，根據(jù)神的效果，“神存在”可以被證明：盡管經(jīng)由那些（效果），我們無法完全知道符合祂的本質(zhì)的事物。
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ARTICULUS 3
Utrum Deus sit
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit.
1. Quia si unum contrariorum fuerit infinitum, totaliter destruetur aliud. Sed hoc intelligitur in hoc nomine Deus, scilicet quod sit quoddam bonum infinitum. Si ergo Deus esset, nullum malum inveniretur. Invenitur autem malum in mundo. Ergo Deus non est.
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試：Article 3
Whether God exists
To the third part it is presented as follows. It seems that God doesn’t exist.
1. Because if one of the contraries should be infinite, the other would be totally destroyed. But this is realized in the name “God”, certainly that it is some infinite goodness. Therefore if God existed, nothing evil would be discovered. However evil is discovered in the world. Therefore God doesn’t exist.
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試（中）：小節(jié) 3
神是否存在
對于第三個問題將作如下闡述。似乎神不存在。
1. 因為如果（兩個）沖突之物中的一個是無限的，另一個就會被完全摧毀。但在“神”這個名字中可以意識到一點，即它是某種無限的善。因此如果神存在，任何惡就不會被發(fā)現(xiàn)。然而這個世界上有惡被發(fā)現(xiàn)。因此神不存在。
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2. Praeterea, quod potest compleri per pauciora principia, non fit per plura. Sed videtur quod omnia quae apparent in mundo, possunt compleri per alia principia, supposito quod Deus non sit: quia ea quae sunt naturalia, reducuntur in principium quod est natura; ea vero quae sunt a proposito, reducuntur in principium quod est ratio humana vel voluntas. Nulla igitur necessitas est ponere Deum esse.
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試：2. Besides, the thing which can be completed by less foundations, is not be made by more foundations. But it seems that all things that appear in the world, can be completed by other foundations, supposed that God doesn’t exist: because those things which are natural, are reduced to a foundation which is nature; those things which are from the purpose, are reduced to a foundation which is human reason or will. Therefore there is no necessity to regard that God exists.
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試（中）：2. 此外，一個能夠由較少基礎元素完成的事物，不被更多基礎元素建成。但似乎出現(xiàn)在世界上的一切事物，在假設神不存在的情況下，可由其他基礎元素完成：因為那些自然的事物，被規(guī)約到“自然”這個基礎元素；那些來自于目的的事物，被規(guī)約到“人類理性”或“意志”這個基礎元素。因此沒有必要認為神存在。
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Sed contra est quod dicitur Exodi 3,14, ex persona Dei: Ego sum qui sum.
Respondeo dicendum quod Deum esse quinque viis probari potest. Prima autem et manifestior via est, quae sumitur ex parte motus. Certum est enim, et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo. Omne autem quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur: movet autem aliquid secundum quod est actu. Movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere aliquid de potentia in actum: de potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu: sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc movet et alterat ipsum. Non autem est possibile ut idem sit simul in actu et potentia secundum idem, sed solum secundum diversa: quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest simul esse calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia. Impossibile est ergo quod, secundum idem et eodem modo, aliquid sit movens et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum. Omne ergo quod movetur, oportet ab alio moveri. Si ergo id a quo movetur, moveatur, oportet et ipsum ab alio moveri; et illud ab alio. Hic autem non est procedere in infinitum: quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens; et per consequens nec aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda non movent nisi per hoc quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut baculus non movet nisi per hoc quod est motus a manu. Ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo movetur: et hoc omnes inelligunt Deum
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試：But on the contrary, the fact is that, it is said in Exodus 3:14, from the character of God: I am who I am.
I answer the saying that “God exists”?can be proved by five ways. The first and clearer way is, which is assumed, from the part of motion. It is certain, and agrees with the sense, that some things are moved in the world. However every thing that is moved, is moved by another thing. Nothing is indeed moved, unless it is in accordance with what is towards that thing in ability, towards which it is moved: something still moves in accordance with what is in performance. Indeed, to move is nothing other than to lead something from ability to performance: however anything can not be led back from ability to performance, unless by some being in performance: just as heat in performance, as fire, makes wood, which is heat in ability, to be heat in performance, and by this it moves and changes itself. However, it is impossible that one thing simultaneously exists in performance and ability in accordance with itself, but only in accordance with different things: which is heat in performance, can not simultaneously be heat in ability, but is simultaneously coldness in ability. Therefore it is impossible that, in accordance with something and in the same way, the same thing is moving and has been moved, or that it moves itself. Therefore everything which is moved, it must be moved by another. Therefore if one thing by which another thing is moved, were moved, this thing must be moved by another, and the latter is moved by another. However this is not to proceed to infinity: because thus there were no first thing which is moving; and by the following nothing moves another, because the next moving things don’t move unless by reason of this, by reason of that they have been moved by the first moving thing, just as a stick doesn’t move unless by reason of this, by reason of which it has been moved by hand. Therefore it is inevitable to come to some first moving thing, which is moved by nothing: and all people understand this to be God. ?
1. potentia在權威字典中并無potential或proficiency的釋義，盡管此處如此翻譯更好理解。因此選擇了折中的翻譯ability。
2. inelligunt疑似intelligunt的筆誤，否則查無此詞。
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試（中）：但相反地，事實是，在《出埃及記》3：14中神的一個位格說：“我是自有永有的?！?/p>
我回答這（類）說法，“神存在”可以被五種方法證明。設定的第一種且較明顯的一種方法是屬于運動的部分。世界上有些事物是被推動的，這一點是確定的、且與（我們的）感受相符的。然而每個被推動的事物，都是被另一個事物所推動的。沒有事物真正被推動，除非它屬于那種出于能力朝向某物的東西，也就是說它出于能力朝向那個事物移動：而且某個事物是符合它的行為移動的。事實上，移動不過是把某物從能力導出到行為：然而任何事物都不能從能力被引導回行為，除非憑借某個處于行為中的存在：例如處于行為中的熱，即火，使得木頭這一處于能力中的熱，成為處于行為中的熱。然而，不可能有一個事物同時存在于行為與和自身一致的能力中，它只能同時存在于行為與和不同事物一致的能力中：它是處于行為中的熱，就不能同時是處于能力中的熱，但可以同時是處于能力中的冷。因此某物不可能在與自身一致地移動的同時，以相同的方式被推動，或者說某物不可能自己推動自己。因此每個被推動的事物都必須是被另一個事物推動的。因此如果一個推動了他者的事物被推動了，這個事物必須是被另一個事物推動的，而后者也是被另一個事物推動的。但這種推論不能無限進行：因為這樣的話就不存在第一個運動的事物了；而之后沒有一物推動另一物，因為之后運動的事物若不是因為被第一個運動的事物推動，就不會運動（譯注：同時容易意識到，對于有限個事物（或者說物質(zhì)），無限推動論的本質(zhì)是自己推動自己，因為在有限個事物中進行無限次追溯必然會產(chǎn)生某個循環(huán)。），正如一根棍子不會移動，除非是因為它被一只手帶動。因此不可避免地會想到有某個第一個移動的事物，它不被任何事物推動：而所有人意識到它是神。
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Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem causarum efficientium: nec tamen invenitur, nec est possibile, quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius; quia sic esset prius seipso, quod est impossibile. Non autem est possibile quod in causis efficientibus procedatur in infinitum. Quia in omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii, et medium est causa ultimi, sive media sint plura sive unum tantum: remota autem causa, removetur effectus: ergo, si non fuerit primum in causis efficientibus, non erit ultimum nec medium. Sed si procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus, non erit prima causa efficiens: et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causae efficientes mediae: quod patet esse falsum. Ergo est necesse ponere aliquam causam efficientem primam: quam omnes Deum nominant.
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試：The second way is from the theory of effective cause. We indeed find that in those sensible things there is an order of effective causes: however it is neither found, nor is possible, that something is the effective cause of its own; because thus it had existed before itself, which is impossible. And it is not possible that in effective causes it is advanced to infinity. Because in all effective causes which are in order, the first is the cause of middle, and the middle is the cause of the last, whether the middle causes are many or only one: and with the cause withdrawn, the effect is withdrawn: therefore, if there is no first cause in the effective causes, there will be no last nor middle. But if it is advanced into infinity in effective causes, there will be no first effective cause: and thus there will be no last effect, nor middle effective causes: it is open that it is false. Therefore it is necessary to set some first effective cause: which all people name God.
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試（中）：第二種方法是根據(jù)有效果的原因的理論。在那些可感知的事物中我們確實可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，有效果的原因具有一種秩序：然而未曾發(fā)現(xiàn)，也不可能有某物是它自己的有效原因；因為這樣的話此物就先于自己而存在，這是不可能的。而在有效果的原因中，某物也不可能被無限推論。因為在所有有秩序的有效原因中，最先的（部分）是中間的（部分）的原因，而中間的（部分）是最后的（部分）的原因，無論中間原因是復數(shù)個還是只有一個：而當原因被撤下時，效果也會被撤下：因此，如果在有效原因中沒有第一原因，就不會有最后原因或中間原因。但如果某物在有效果的原因中被無限推論，就不會有第一個有效原因：而這樣也不會有最后效果，或中間的有效原因：很明顯這是假的。因此有必要設定某個最先的有效原因：所有人稱其為神。
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Tertia via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario: quae talis est. Invenimus enim in rebus quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse: cum quaedam inveniantur generari et corrumpi, et per consequens possibilia esse et non esse. Impossibile est autem omnia quae sunt talia, semper esse: quia quod possibile est non esse, quandoque non est. Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset: quia quod non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod est: si igitur nihil fuit ens, impossibile fuit quod aliquid inciperet esse, et sic modo nihil esset: quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo omnia entia sunt possibilia: sed oportet aliquid esse necessarium in rebus. Omne autem necessarium, vel habet causam suae necessitatis aliunde, vel non habet. Non est autem possibile quod procedatur in infinitum in necessariis, quae habent causam suae necessitatis sicut nec in causis efficientibus, ut probatum est. Ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis: quod omnes dicunt Deum.
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Ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis: quod omnes dicunt Deum.
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試：The third way has been supposed from the possible thing and the necessary thing: which is such. We indeed find some things in matters that are possible to exist and not exist: since some things are found to be born and to be destroyed, and by the consequence they are possible to exist and not exist. However, it is impossible that all things that are such, always exists: because it, which is possible to not exists, doesn’t exist at some time. Therefore if all things are possible to not exist, nothing will exist in matters at some time. But if this were true, nothing would exist even now: because it which doesn’t exist, doesn’t begin to exist, unless through something that exists: therefore if nothing was existing, it would have been impossible that something have begun to exist, and in this way nothing would have existed: it is open that it is false. Therefore not all beings are possible: but it should be that something is necessary in matters. However every necessary thing, either has cause of its own necessity from some place, or doesn’t. However it is not possible that it is advanced to infinity in necessities, which have cause of its own necessity, just as it neither possible in the effective causes, as it has been proved.
Therefore it is necessary to set something that exists by its own necessity, not having cause of necessity from other place, but the thing which is the cause of necessity for others: that all call God.
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試（中）：設定的第三種方法是根據(jù)可能之物和必需之物：方法如此。我們確實發(fā)現(xiàn)物質(zhì)界中有些事物有可能存在與不存在：因為可發(fā)現(xiàn)某些事物被創(chuàng)生與被毀滅，而由于（這種）結果，它們有可能存在與不存在。然而，不可能所有這些事物總是存在：因為一個可能不存在的事物，在某些時候不存在。因此如果所有事物都有可能不存在，物質(zhì)界中某時刻將無物存在。然而如果這一點正確，甚至現(xiàn)在也會無物存在：因為一個不存在的事物不會開始存在，除非是借助某個存在的事物。因此如果無物存在，就不可能有某物開始存在，由此無物存在：很明顯這是假的。因此不是所有存在物都是可能的：而應該是有某物在物質(zhì)界中是必需的。然而每一個必需的事物，或是從某個地方獲得自己必要性的原因，或是沒有獲得。然而不可能在這些擁有各自必要性的理由的必要性中進行無限推論，正如不可能在有效原因中進行一樣，這一點已經(jīng)證明過了。
因此有必要設定某個由于自身必要性存在的事物，它沒有來自其他地方的必要性的原因，而為其他事物提供必要性的原因：所有人稱之為神。
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Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile; et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Sed magis et minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est: sicut magis calidum est, quod magis appropinquat maxime calido. Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens: nam quae sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metapys. Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis: sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis: et hoc dicimus Deum.
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試：The forth way is supposed from the steps which are found in matters. Something that is more good and less good, and true, and noble is indeed found in matters; and thus it is about other things of this way. But the more and the less degree are said on different things, according as in different ways they approach to something that is of the greatest degree: as one thing is hotter, because it more approaches to the hottest. Therefore there is something that is the truest, the best, and the noblest, and by the consequence, the one existing most greatly: for things which are truest, are most greatly existing, as it is said in Metapys 2. Moreover it which is said greatly so in some kind, is the cause of all things which are of that kind: just as fire, which is the hottest, is the cause of all hot things, as it is said in that book. Therefore there is something that to all existing things is the cause to exist, and of goodness, and of whatever perfection: and we call this God.
1. diversimode的變格不明，原型據(jù)說為第二變格法的diversimodi，但此處理應是奪格。
2. sed magis...句中的magis，minus，maxime都是副詞，它們修飾的形容詞省略了。
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試（中）：設定的第四種方法是根據(jù)物質(zhì)界中發(fā)現(xiàn)的階梯。在物質(zhì)界中確實能發(fā)現(xiàn)某個好的程度較大的和好的程度較小的事物，以及真實的（程度較大和較?。?、高貴的（程度較大和較?。?；而關于這種方式的其他類型（的形容詞）也是如此。但關于不同（類型）事物所說的更大程度和更小程度，是根據(jù)它們按不同方式接近（各自的）某個最大程度來說的。因此有某個最真實、最好、最高貴，而根據(jù)（這個）結果，也是最大的存在：因為最真實的事物，就是最大的存在，如《形而上學》2所說。而且，某個被稱為在它的那一類里存在得最大的事物，是它所有同類事物的原因：比如最熱的事物，火，是所有熱的事物的原因，正如書中所說。因此有某個事物，它對于所有存在而言是它們存在的原因，也是善和任何完美之物的原因：我們稱其為神。
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Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum. Videmus enim quod aliqua quae cognitione carent, scilicet corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem: quod apparet ex hoc quod semper aut frequentius eodem modo operantur, ut consequantur id quod est optimum; unde patet quod non a casu, sed ex intentione perveniunt ad finem. Ea autem quae non habent cognitionem, non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem: et hoc dicimus Deum.
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試：The fifth way is supposed from the management of things. We indeed see that some things which are without knowledge, surely natural bodies, work because of a purpose: that is visible from this thing, that they always or frequently work in the same way, so as to reach the thing which is the best; from where it is open that they come to the purpose not by chance, but from an intent. Moreover, they which don’t have knowledge, don’t go to the purpose unless they have been directed by something that knows and understands, just as an arrow is directed by one who shoots. Therefore there is something which understands, by which all natural things are arranged to a purpose: and we call this God.
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試（中）：設定的第五種方法是根據(jù)事物的安排。我們確實看到一些東西，它們是沒有知識的，即自然物體，因為一個目的而運作：這件事可被看到，是因為它們總是或者經(jīng)常以相同的方式運作，以達到某個最好的結果；從中很明顯的一點是，它們達到目的不是因為偶然，而是來自于某個意圖。而且，沒有知識的物體不向目標移動，除非它們被某種有知識和理解力的東西引導，正如一支箭被射手所引導。因此存在某種有理解力的事物，所有自然物體被它安排朝向一個目的：我們稱其為神。 ??
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Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio: Deus, cum sit summe bonus, nullo modo sineret aliquid mali esse in operibus suis, nisi esset adeo omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de malo. Hoc ergo ad infinitam Dei bonitatem pertinet, ut esse permittat mala, et ex eis eliciat bona.
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試：Therefore to the first saying, the fact is that, as Augustine says in Enchiridion: God, since it is most highly good, by no means would it allow anything of evil to exist in its works, unless it is just omnipotent and good, so that it does correctly even from the evil. Therefore this suits the infinite goodness of God, as it permits evil things exists, and from those draws out good things.
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試（中）：因此對于第一種說法，事實是，如奧古斯丁在《論信望愛》中所說：神，既然是至善的，祂不可能允許任何惡存在于祂的事業(yè)中，除非祂正是全能與良善的，以至于祂甚至可以在惡事中正確地作為。因此這符合神的無限的善，因為祂允許惡的存在，且從中導引出善。
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Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum natura propter determinatum finem operetur ex directione alicuius superioris agentis, necesse est ea quae a natura fiunt, etiam in Deum reducere, sicut in primam causam. Similiter etiam quae ex proposito fiunt, oportet reducere in aliquam altiorem causam, quae non sit ratio et voluntas humana: quia haec mutabilia sunt et defectibilia; oportet autem omnia mobilia et deficere possibilia reduci in aliquod primum principium immobile et per se necessarium, sicut ostensum est.
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試：To the second saying, the fact is that, since nature works because of a fixed purpose by reason of the directing of some higher one who drives, it is necessary to reduce things which are made by nature, also to God, just as to the first cause. Similarly, it is also right to reduce things which are made from purpose to some higher cause, which is not human reason or will: because these things are changeable and failing easily; moreover all movable things and things that are possible to fail should be reduced to some first principle which is immovable and necessary by itself, as it has been shown.
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試（中）：對于第二種說法，事實是，既然自然根據(jù)某個更高的驅(qū)動者的指導，因為一個固定的目的而運轉(zhuǎn)，有必要把自然所造之物也歸約到神，正如規(guī)約到第一個原因。類似地，也應該把目的所造之物規(guī)約到某個更高的、不是人類理性或意志的原因：因為這些事物易變且易朽；此外一切可動的、可朽的事物應被規(guī)約到某個不動的、自身必需的第一原則，正如已經(jīng)展示的。
