Bankers have been blaming themselves for their troubles in public. Behind the scenes, they have been taking aim at someone else: the accounting standard-setters. Their rules, moan the banks, have forced them to report enormous losses, and it's just not fair. These rules say they must value some assets at the price a third party would pay, not the price managers and regulators would like them to fetch.

Unfortunately, banks' lobbying now seems to be working. The details may be unknowable, but the independence of standard-setters, essential to the proper functioning of capital markets, is being compromised. And, unless banks carry toxic assets at prices that attract buyers, reviving the banking system will be difficult.

After a bruising encounter with Congress, America's Financial Accounting Standards Board (F ASB) rushed through rule changes. These gave banks more freedom to use models to value illiquid assets and more flexibility in recognizing losses on long-term assets in their income statements. Bob Herz, the FASB's chairman, cried out against those who "question our motives." Yet bank shares rose and the changes enhance what one lobbying group politely calls "the use of judgment by management."

European ministers instantly demanded that the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) do likewise. The IASB says it does not want to act without overall planning, but the pressure to fold when it completes its reconstruction of rules later this year is strong. Charlie McCreevy, a European commissioner, warned the IASB that it did "not live in a political vacuum" but "in the real world" and that Europe could yet develop different rules.

It was banks that were on the wrong planet, with accounts that vastly overvalued assets. Today they argue that market prices overstate losses, because they largely reflect the temporary illiquidity of markets, not the likely extent of bad debts. The truth will not be known for years. But banks' shares trade below their book value, suggesting that investors are skeptical. And dead markets partly reflect the paralysis of banks which will not sell assets for fear of booking losses, yet are reluctant to buy all those supposed bargains.

To get the system working again, losses must be recognized and dealt with. America's new plan to buy up toxic assets will not work unless banks mark assets to levels which buyers find attractive. Successful markets require independent and even combative standard-setters. The FASB and IASB have been exactly that, cleaning up rules on stock options and pensions, for example, against hostility from special interests. But by giving in to critics now they are inviting pressure to make more concessions .

銀行家們公開把過失歸咎于他們自己。在幕后，他們已經(jīng)開始把目光轉(zhuǎn)向其他人：會計標(biāo)準(zhǔn)設(shè)定者。它們的裁決，抱怨銀行，已經(jīng)迫使他們報道了巨量的損失，這不公平。他們的裁決說他們必須以第三方愿意付出的價格評估一些資產(chǎn)的價值，而不是管理者們想要賣的價格。

不幸的是，銀行的說客現(xiàn)在看起來在工作。細節(jié)可能是不知道的，但是對主要市場功能的基本偏愛，會計標(biāo)準(zhǔn)設(shè)定者的獨立性正在妥協(xié)。并且，除非銀行以購買者想買的價格交易不良資產(chǎn)，否則復(fù)興銀行將會很困難。

在跟國會經(jīng)過一頓摩擦協(xié)商后，美國金融會計標(biāo)準(zhǔn)委員會匆匆改變了規(guī)則。這給了銀行更多自由使用模型去給固定資產(chǎn)估值，有更多靈活性去認識收入清單中長期資產(chǎn)的損失。FASB的主席，Bob Herz，向那些“質(zhì)疑我們的動機”的人哭訴。然而銀行股價的上升，某個游說團體美其名曰“管理層判斷的運用”。

歐洲打針直接要求國際會計標(biāo)準(zhǔn)委員會也這么做。IASB說他不想在沒有全盤計劃的情況下行動，但是當(dāng)他今年晚些時候完成規(guī)則重建時，妥協(xié)的壓力巨大。歐洲委員會成員，Charlie McCreevy，警告IASB他“不是活在政治真空中”，而是“在真實世界中”，并且歐洲還可以發(fā)展不同的規(guī)則。

銀行處在過高估值資產(chǎn)的錯誤的幻想中。今天他們認為市場價格夸大了損失，因為他們很大程度上反應(yīng)了市場的暫時不流動性，而不是壞賬的程度。真相好幾年不為人知。但是銀行的股份交易少于他們的紙面交易，這表明投資者持懷疑態(tài)度。并且死掉的市場很大程度上反映了銀行很多年不交易的資產(chǎn)紙面損失的分析，而不是勉強買下所有假定的利潤。

為了讓系統(tǒng)再次運轉(zhuǎn)，損失必須被認識和處理。美國收購不良資產(chǎn)的新計劃不會開始，除非銀行標(biāo)記購買者發(fā)現(xiàn)有吸引力的資產(chǎn)的級別。成功的市場要求獨立性，甚至與標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定者戰(zhàn)斗。例如，F(xiàn)ASB和IASB已經(jīng)確實清理股票選擇和退休金的規(guī)則，而不是對特定的生意持?jǐn)骋?。但是現(xiàn)在由于屈服于批評，他們正招致更多做出讓步的壓力。