The DPE framework consists of four concepts: (1) Digital User Citizenship (DUC), ?which includes users on the demand side and the supply side; (2) Digital Technology ?Entrepreneurship (DTE), which includes app developers and various agents that ?contribute to entrepreneurial innovation, experimentation, and value cre-ation on ?platforms; (3) Digital Multi-sided Platforms (DMP), which orchestrate social and ?economic activities between users and agents; and (4) Digital Technology ?Infrastructure (DTI), which pertains to all regulations that govern technical, social, and ?economic activities of the digital technology .

DPE 框架由四個(gè)概念組成: (1)數(shù)字公民(DUC) ，包括需求方和供應(yīng)方的用戶; (2)數(shù)字技術(shù)創(chuàng)業(yè)(DTE) ，包括應(yīng)用程序開發(fā)人員和各種代理人，他們?yōu)槠脚_(tái)上的創(chuàng)業(yè)創(chuàng)新、實(shí)驗(yàn)和價(jià)值創(chuàng)造做出貢獻(xiàn); (3)數(shù)字多邊平臺(tái)(DMP) ，它協(xié)調(diào)用戶和代理人之間的社會(huì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng); (4)數(shù)字技術(shù)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施(DTI) ，它涉及管理數(shù)字技術(shù)的技術(shù)、社會(huì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)的所有法規(guī)。

It is immediately clear that the US and China dominate the platform landscape. Based on these top companies’ market value, the US alone represents 66% of the world platform economy and 41% in terms of numbers. ?European platform-based companies play a marginal role, only 3% of the market ?value. Moreover, the distribution of the top 100 platform-based companies is ?uneven; the first 15 companies represent around 75% of the entire market value.

美國(guó)和中國(guó)主導(dǎo)著平臺(tái)經(jīng)濟(jì)。基于這些頂級(jí)公司的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值，僅美國(guó)就代表了世界平臺(tái)經(jīng)濟(jì)的 66% ，41家躋身Top100。歐洲的平臺(tái)型公司只占市場(chǎng)價(jià)值的 3% ，處于邊緣地位。此外，前 100 家基于平臺(tái)的公司的分布是不均衡的; 前15 家公司代表了大約 整個(gè)市場(chǎng)價(jià)值的75%。

The other interesting statistic is the number of startups valued at more than $1 ?billion, which are called unicorns.1 As of February 2021, there were 546 unicorns, ?most of them technology-oriented and platform-based companies. The US dominates these rankings, with more than 50% of all unicorns, followed by China with ?22%. Europe has 67 unicorns (12.2%) and the European Union is home to 36 ?(6.6%). Because of Brexit, the EU lost 26 unicorns.?

另一個(gè)有趣的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)是估值超過 10 億美元的創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的數(shù)量，這些公司被稱為“獨(dú)角獸”。截至 2021 年 2 月，共有 546 家“獨(dú)角獸”公司，其中大多 數(shù)是技術(shù)型和平臺(tái)型公司。美國(guó)以超過 50% 的獨(dú)角獸企業(yè)位居榜首，中國(guó)以 22% 緊隨其后。歐洲有 67 家獨(dú)角獸(12.2%) ，歐盟有 36 家(6.6%)。由于英國(guó)退歐(Brexit) ，歐盟失去了 26 只獨(dú)角獸。

While the UK is a leader in digital entrepreneurship, ?Germany is a follower. This weaker position is holding Germany back from fully?embracing a digital future. For example, as the engine of Europe, Germany’s lack ?of startups has hindered it, especially in the area of information and digital ?technolo-gies. The auto industry is a clear example: existing firms will not ?introduce new technologies, and Tesla’s entry into Berlin (the information capital ?of Europe) is a shot across the bow of the European auto empire.

英國(guó)是數(shù)字創(chuàng)業(yè)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，而德國(guó)是一個(gè)追隨者。 這種弱勢(shì)地位阻礙了德國(guó)去迎接數(shù)字化的未來。例如，作為歐洲的發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)，德國(guó)缺乏創(chuàng)業(yè)公司阻礙了它的發(fā)展，特別是在信息和數(shù)字技術(shù)領(lǐng)域。汽車工業(yè)就是一個(gè)明顯的例子: 現(xiàn)有的公司不會(huì)引進(jìn)新技術(shù)，而特斯拉進(jìn)入柏林(歐洲的信息之都)則是對(duì)歐洲汽車帝國(guó)的一次打擊。

The German auto industry dominates the world in many respects, from the ?mass market to the luxury market and even the racing world. ?Hobijn and ?Jovanovic (2001) sug-gested that existing firms will not implement new ?technologies because of a lack of awareness and skill, vintage capital, and vested ?interests. The German auto industry fits this analysis like a glove. The industry has ?a huge investment in skills in the metal industry, engine transmissions, ?suspensions, and steering but a shortage of computer skills. The huge investment ?in vintage capital prevents it from easily writ-ing off this investment. Finally, the ?heavy investment in governance of codetermina-tion between labor, business, and ?government work councils makes meaningful restructuring almost impossible. ?This is reinforced by the top-down rules of the European Union.

德國(guó)汽車工業(yè)在許多方面統(tǒng)治著世界，從大眾市場(chǎng)到豪華車市場(chǎng)，甚至是賽車世界。Hobijn 和 Jovanovic (2001)認(rèn)為，由于缺乏意識(shí)和技能，資本和既得利益，現(xiàn)有的公司將不會(huì)實(shí)施新技術(shù)。德國(guó)汽車工業(yè)完全符合這一分析。汽車工業(yè)在金屬工業(yè)、發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)傳動(dòng)系統(tǒng)、懸掛系統(tǒng)和轉(zhuǎn)向系統(tǒng)方面有著巨大的投資，但是缺乏計(jì)算機(jī)技術(shù)。對(duì)復(fù)古資本的巨額投資使得它無法輕易地將這些投資注銷。最后，在勞工、企業(yè)和政府工作委員會(huì)之 間共同決策的管理上的大量投資使得有意義的重組幾乎不可能。歐盟自上而下的規(guī)則強(qiáng)化了這一點(diǎn)。

Tesla’s move to Berlin, the digital capital of Europe, is an indication that the ?future of the European auto industry may be with the startup and not the ?incumbent. Electric cars and self-driving vehicles are already here; however, they ?are not neces-sary evenly distributed. But, the direction of change is clear and the ?only unknown is the rate of change. However, once resource allocation decisions ?are redirected away from mechanical and diesel vehicles and toward electric ?vehicles, which are cleaner and in alignment with the issue of climate change, the ?rate of change could accelerate very quickly (Monsellato, 2016).?

特斯拉遷往歐洲數(shù)字之都柏林的舉動(dòng)表明，歐洲汽車業(yè)的未來可能取決于這家初創(chuàng)企業(yè)，而不是現(xiàn)有企業(yè)。電動(dòng)汽車和自動(dòng)駕駛汽車已經(jīng)在這里了; 然而，它們并不是必需的——均勻分布。但是，變化的方向是明確的，唯一未知的是變化的速度。然而，一旦資源分配決定從機(jī)械車輛和柴油車輛轉(zhuǎn)向更清潔和符合氣候變化問題的電動(dòng)車輛，變化速度可能會(huì)非常迅速地加快 (Monsellato，2016)。

A deeper analysis of Tesla’s global growth provides greater insight into the specific advantages of the company’s business model, why entrepreneurs like Elon Musk ?chose to incorporate in the US, and what obstacles stand in the way of German ?innovation and entrepreneurship. Tesla serves as an unprecedented case study because ?“different government regulations have made entrance to the sector harder, since there ?are different standards in safety, emissions and standards. Recent history has showed ?that, besides Tesla Motors, no new player has entered the auto-motive industry in a ?significant manner in the last decades”?

對(duì)特斯拉全球增長(zhǎng)進(jìn)行更深入的分析，可以讓我們更深入地了解該公司商業(yè)模式的優(yōu)勢(shì)、埃隆?馬斯克(Elon Musk)等企業(yè)家為何選擇在美國(guó)注冊(cè)公司， 以及德國(guó)創(chuàng)新和企業(yè)家精神面臨哪些障礙。特斯拉是一個(gè)前所未有的案例研究， 因?yàn)椤安煌恼?guī)定使得進(jìn)入該行業(yè)更加困難，因?yàn)樵诎踩?、排放和?biāo)準(zhǔn)方面有不同的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。歷史表明，除了特斯拉汽車，在過去的幾十年里沒有新的參與者以重要的方式進(jìn)入汽車工業(yè)”。

Indeed, the company has achieved what few previously thought was ?possible—it has turned a profit on a premium-priced electric vehicle with a developing supply chain that could bring affordable and sustainable high-tech cars to ?the middle class. If successful, such a profitable tech-driven business model would ?create a domino effect in innovation at Musk’s other companies, SpaceX and ?SolarCity. Naturally.

事實(shí)上，該公司已經(jīng)實(shí)現(xiàn)了以前很少有人認(rèn)為可能實(shí)現(xiàn)的目標(biāo)——通過發(fā)展供應(yīng)鏈，將價(jià)格低廉且可持續(xù)發(fā)展的高科技汽車帶給中產(chǎn)階級(jí)，該公司在一款高價(jià)電動(dòng)汽車上實(shí)現(xiàn)了盈利。如果成功，這種利潤(rùn)豐厚的技術(shù)驅(qū)動(dòng)型商業(yè)模式將對(duì)馬斯克的其他公司 SpaceX 和 SolarCity 的創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)生多米諾骨牌效應(yīng)。