《The Russian Civil War》漢化 #2

《蘇俄內(nèi)戰(zhàn)》 漢化 #第二部分

By Evan Mawdsley?

譯者：KoiSama

Bolsheviks and Soviets

布爾什維克和蘇維埃

The Bolshevik victory in the winter of 1917-1918 was neither a con-spiracy nor an accident.The hopes and fears of the mass of the Russian people were involved in it,and these hopes and fears were to some extent measurable through a unique national test of political attitudes, held at the decisive moment:the November 1917 elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

布爾什維克在1917-1918年冬季的勝利既不是陰謀，也不是偶然。俄羅斯廣大人民的一切希望和懷疑都牽涉到了那場風暴中，而這些希望和恐懼在某種程度上可以決定一切，最后通過1917年11月進行的全國性質(zhì)的意識形態(tài)測試即——全俄羅斯立憲會議表現(xiàn)出來人民對當前政治的態(tài)度。

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The overall voting in the Assembly elections showed,above all, peasant opinion;over two-thirds of the electorate were peasants.What was striking about these overall returns was the strength of the socialist vote.Some 40 percent of the total vote went to the main peasant socialist party(the SRs)and 27 percent to Marxists(nearly all Bolsheviks); popular ethnic-minority parties,often with a socialist element,took another 15 percent.In contrast to other countries,there was no strong non-socialist farmers'party.So about four voters out of five chose parties calling for radical land reform;this in turn reflected a basic fact of Russian politics-the peasant desire for land reform a the expense of the landowning nobility.

這場議會選舉十分需要俄羅斯農(nóng)民的態(tài)度;因為有三分之二以上的選民是農(nóng)民。投票結(jié)果中最令人驚訝的是選票投給社會主義者的票數(shù)。大約有40%的選票投給了主要的農(nóng)民社會黨(SRs)， 27%的選票投給了馬克思主義者(幾乎都是布爾什維克);和還有一些受歡迎的少數(shù)民族政黨，通常這些小政黨帶有一些社會主義元素，他們分走了另外15%的選票。與其他國家相比，俄羅斯沒有一個強大的非社會主義性質(zhì)的農(nóng)民政黨。可以看出，選舉中有大約五分之四的選民選擇了要求激進土地改革的政黨;這反過來反映了俄羅斯政治的一個基本事實——農(nóng)民普遍希望以犧牲擁有土地的貴族為代價來推行土地改革。

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//譯者注：從原文“社會主義”這個詞你可以看出作者的定義，這也是一般西方意識形態(tài)學者和真馬克思學者的區(qū)別，在作者眼中可能就不論是畢蘇斯基又或者彼得留拉好歹過去都是社會民主黨成員也有些平易近人的政策那自然就是”溫和左翼”支持社會主義，但是在“激進左翼“眼中這不就是一群”Cos左但實質(zhì)是代表小資產(chǎn)階級利益的工賊嗎？比孟什維克還孟什維克”

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Relatively few of the Empire's population lived in towns,perhaps 26 million out of 160 million.The main non-socialist party,the Constitu- tional Democrats(Kadets),polled only 24 percent of the urban vote(in sixty-eight of the largest towns);the socialist vote was 61 percent. Socialism was a deeper red in the towns than in the electorate as a whole.The extreme Left,the Bolsheviks,won 36 percent of the votes,making them the largest party.In Petrograd the Bolsheviks took 45 percent,in Moscow 50 percent.The urban Bolshevik votes accounted for only about 1.4 million of the 40 million civitian votes cast,but because power was based on the towns they represented crucial nuggets of strength.The radical nature of the urban electorate had several causes.The mix in the factories of experienced workers and people fresh from the countryside was an explosive one.Trade unions had had little base in Russia and could not act as a channel for discontent.The war brought special hardships to the towns.The unemployment and food shortages of late 1917 created a mood of desperation and a desire for maximalist solutions."Workers'control" was demanded,and the workers'militia(Red Guard)gave the physical force to back up demands.

前俄羅斯帝國的城鎮(zhèn)人口相對較少，1.6億人口中約有2600萬居民居住在城鎮(zhèn)。在選舉中主要的非社會主義政黨——立憲民主黨(Kadets)只獲得了24%的城市選票(在68個城鎮(zhèn)中間)，而其他各種社會主義政黨則獲得了61%的選票。社會主義的理念在城鎮(zhèn)中比在全國范圍中更受歡迎。其中極左翼的布爾什維克黨贏得了36%的選票，這使其也成為了城市區(qū)域的第一大黨。特別是在彼得格勒，投給布爾什維克的選票占了近45%，同時在莫斯科更是有近50%，但是布爾什維克全部的城市選票也只占4000萬俄羅斯公民選票中的140萬，不過國家權(quán)力建立在聚集的城鎮(zhèn)之上，所以布爾什維克還是擁有至關(guān)重要的力量。我想城市選民的激進有以下原因：

第一，在每個工廠里有長期經(jīng)驗的工人和剛從農(nóng)村來的人的混合帶來了爆炸性的沖突。同時在過去俄羅斯幾乎沒有工會基礎(chǔ)，所以每個人都沒有發(fā)泄不滿的渠道，導致了政治壓力的激增。

//譯者注：這也是“經(jīng)濟派”的悲傷，“開明者”想通過放出小利防止革命的手段被更反動的人物給回絕了，而俄羅斯工人在經(jīng)濟上的述求被轉(zhuǎn)變成政治上的訴求和這有很大關(guān)系

第二，戰(zhàn)爭給城鎮(zhèn)帶來了特殊的苦難。1917年底的大規(guī)模失業(yè)和食物短缺造成了一種絕望的情緒，人們渴望用最大限度的變化來解決辦法，于是提出了“工人掌握國家”，同時他們有工人武裝來提供改變的后盾。

The vast Russian armed forces were the third element of mass up- heaval.The army did not drain away to nothing under the Provisional Government.A census of 25 October 1917 put the current strength of the field army at 6,300,000,with a further 750,000 men in rear military districts(the navy would add another 750,000).1Soldati-NCOs and ordinary soldiers-made up 85 percent,say six million.As a group they were much larger than the middle class and twice the industrial working class.And this mass was a unique social force,thanks to the collapse of officer control and the growth of soldiers'committees.By the autumn of 1917 the soldiers'main wish was to end the war and go home.The Constituent Assembly elections show the soldiers(five million of them voted)to have overwhelmingly supported Russian socialist parties:82 percent voted for the SRs or the Bolsheviks.(The centrist Kadets took two percent,the nationalists one percent.)The SRs, with 41 percent of the total army vote,were the strongest party,but the Bolsheviks also took 41 percent in the army(compared to 24 percent in the population as a whole).And the Bolsheviks did even better among troops near the center of political power.In the Northern and Western Army Groups their vote was over 60 percent(and the SR vote under 30 percent),and they did extremely well in the crucial rear garrisons: 80 percent in Petrograd(12 percent for the SRs)and 80 percent in Moscow(six percent SR).

第三個因素是俄國龐大的武裝力量。在臨時政府統(tǒng)治下的俄羅斯軍隊并沒有流失殆盡。1917年10月25日的一次人口普查顯示，當下還有630萬野戰(zhàn)軍，同時有75萬人駐扎在后方軍區(qū)(算上海軍還要另增75萬人)。軍隊中的軍士和普通士兵占85%，大約有600萬人。要知道這樣一個群體的人數(shù)遠超中產(chǎn)階級，這還是工業(yè)區(qū)中工人階級人數(shù)的近兩倍。這群人最后變成一種獨特的社會力量要歸功于軍官對士兵控制的瓦解以及軍隊內(nèi)部士兵委員會的發(fā)展。在1917年的秋天，士兵們的主要愿望是趕緊結(jié)束戰(zhàn)爭回家。立憲會議選舉的結(jié)果顯示，士兵們(有近500萬人參加了投票)壓倒性地支持了俄羅斯的各大社會主義政黨:有82%的人投票支持社會革命黨或者布爾什維克。(而中間派的立憲民主黨只占2%，其他的民族主義者甚至只占1%)在軍隊中獲得41%選票的社會革命黨是票數(shù)最多的政黨，但布爾什維克黨在軍隊中同樣獲得了41%的選票(相比之下，總票數(shù)中布爾什維克只占有24%的選票)。在更靠近政治權(quán)力中心的地帶，軍隊投給布爾什維克的票要多一些，比如北方和西部集團軍中，他們的選票超過了60%(社會革命黨的選票低于30%)，同時在被布爾什維克影響的關(guān)鍵地區(qū)里部隊票型非常好:彼得格勒的軍隊中布爾什維克有近80%的選票(社會革命黨只有12%)，同時莫斯科也有80%(社會革命黨6%)。

Public opinion,then,was predominantly socialist,but it did not follow that socialism would take Bolshevik form.The Bolshevik Party's success is sometimes explained by its organization and program.The leader of the Bolshevik wing of Russian Marxism was,of course,Vladimir llich Lenin,who had organized the break of the Bolshevik wing from the Russian Marxist party(the RSDRP).

當時的公眾輿論基本都是社會主義傾向，但這并不意味著人們心中的社會主義形式都會采取布爾什維克的樣本。布爾什維克黨的成功可以用它強大有力的組織和綱領(lǐng)來解釋。俄國馬克思主義的布爾什維克派領(lǐng)袖當然是弗拉基米爾·伊里奇·列寧，他組織了布爾什維克與俄國社會民主工黨的決裂。

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//譯者注：譯者認為列寧當時在黨內(nèi)投票其實是占多數(shù)的，哪怕這個多數(shù)在當時并不是絕大多數(shù)而是差點沒過半，所以我還是認為俄羅斯社會民主工黨的分裂可以說他是推波助瀾者，但不能說列寧就脫離了社工黨，倒不如說是這是為了反對那些“經(jīng)濟派”。

For a decade and a half in exile he had been,if not the total master of the Bolshevik group,at least the single most important influence on doctrine and?organization.Lenin called for the creation of a "vanguard party"in his What Is to Be Done? of 1902:"Give us an organization of revolutionaries and we will turn Russia upside down!The Bolsheviks entered 1917 with a core of dedicated,experienced,and radical activists,hardened by Tsarist repression,committed to a maximalist political and economic program, and completely hostile to any vestige of the old regime.The Bolsheviks were better organized than the other socialists.They had in Lenin a remarkable leader,whose political daring in 1917 exceeded that of his closest lieutenants and matched the radical activists.His insistence on an uprising just before the(October)Second Congress of Soviets allowed him to present the congress with power and to form a "Soviet"cabinet (Sovnarkom,the Council of People's Commissars)made up entirely of Bolsheviks.

列寧流亡在外有將近15年，即使他不是布爾什維克的唯一領(lǐng)導人，至少他也是對黨理論和組織產(chǎn)生最重要影響的人。比如說列寧在1902年的《怎么辦?》一書中就呼吁建立一個“先鋒黨”。他說:

給我們一個革命者的組織，我們將把俄國搞得天翻地覆!

進入1917年時，布爾什維克其核心就已經(jīng)是一群有獻身精神的、搞事經(jīng)驗豐富的、思想激進的積極分子，過去他們因沙皇的鎮(zhèn)壓而變得更加強硬，他們致力于最高綱領(lǐng)的政治和經(jīng)濟計劃，他們對舊政權(quán)的任何殘余都充滿了敵意。布爾什維克比其他社會主義者更有組織性：列寧是一位杰出的領(lǐng)導人，他在1917年的政治膽略超過了他身邊親密的副手，與那些最激進的分子站在了一起。他堅持在第二屆蘇維埃代表大會召開前發(fā)動起義，這讓他得以向代表大會授予權(quán)力，并組建了一個完全由布爾什維克組成的“蘇維?！眱?nèi)閣(即人民委員會)。

//譯者注：《怎么辦?》一書中雖然列寧提到了先鋒隊的概念，但是譯者沒有找到類似的表達，不過我估計列寧應該也是想過這樣的事情，畢竟他太能打嘴仗了，如果在以前他真的說出過這樣的話——那也很正常。

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But Bolshevik strengths can easily be exaggerated.Lenin's party was no monolith;the myth of the tightly organized Bolshevik party has rightly been called a"cruel mockery."Membership did indeed swell to 300,000 in October 1917,but from a tiny base of no more than 24,000 in February 1917;this meant that eleven out of twelve Bolsheviks had only a few months'stazh (experience).Communications between the party center and its new branch membership were poor.The very seizure of power would deal a near mortal blow to the party"machine," as the attention of the most active members was turned to their new state,the soviet network.And party organizations were concentrated in a few radical regions,such as Petrograd,the Central Industrial Region (including Moscow),and the Urals;even here the party's reach did not extend beyond the boundaries of towns and industrial settlements. Bolshevik "voters"in the Assembly elections were 35 times party membership,some 10,661,000,but a total of 44,433,000 people voted. And the eight provinces where the party got more than 50 percent of the votes were restricted to a Red heartland in central and western Russia; here too were the military formations that gave more than half their votes to the party-two of the five army groups,and the Baltic Fleet.

但是他人總是很容易夸大布爾什維克的力量。實際上列寧的政黨并不是鐵板一塊的，布爾什維克政黨組織嚴密的神話其實多少有些 “殘酷的嘲弄”：1917年10月布爾什維克的黨員人數(shù)確實增加到30萬人，但在1917年2月這個基數(shù)還不到2.4萬人，這意味著在當時12個布爾什維克中有11個人其實只有幾個月的黨員經(jīng)驗。所以黨中心和新支部成員之間的聯(lián)系很弱。黨里面的積極分子必須成為新國家——蘇維埃通訊網(wǎng)絡的一部分，所以當時其黨組織通常只集中在少數(shù)幾個激進地區(qū)，如彼得格勒、中央工業(yè)區(qū)(包括莫斯科)和烏拉爾地區(qū);即使在這些地區(qū)，黨的勢力也沒有超出城鎮(zhèn)和工業(yè)區(qū)的邊界。在議會選舉中，布爾什維克的“選民”是其黨員數(shù)的35倍，約10661000人，但全國總共有44433000人投票。紅黨獲得50%以上選票的8個省份，全都位于俄羅斯中西部的紅色腹地; 而五個陸軍集團和波羅的海艦隊中只有兩個把一半以上的選票投給了布爾什維克，基本上站在了紅黨一邊。

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Neither the Bolshevik program in its pure form nor the Bolshevik leaders'assessments of the situation were a guarantee of victory or even of support across a wide social spectrum.The small working class was ready,it is true,to support the Bolsheviks;the vague Bolshevik solutions to the economic crisis-workers'control and the expropri- ation of the capitalists,state control of trade,and the replacement of the market with state-controlled barter-were popular enough in the factories.But the great majority of the Russian people were peasants,and the Bolsheviks were a town-based Marxist party.Until well into 1917 Bolshevik agrarian policy had called for turning the landowners' estates into large socialist farms,not simply,dividing them up among the peasants. In addition,the Leninist view of a peasantry split between rich and poor would prove unworkable in the years to follow.On the question of war,Lenin's goal was not simple pacifism but the trans- formation of World War into international civil war.All the Bolsheviks placed their faith in the myth of a European revolution that would save them in Russia.They believed,too,that if attacked by the"imperial- ists"they could defend themselves by means of "revolutionary war." The Bolsheviks' political tactics were also out of step;at a time when the country's mood still favored socialist cooperation,Lenin's dominant faction among the Bolshevik leaders refused to work with other socialists.And unlike most of the population,the Bolsheviks wrote off the Constituent Assembly as a parliamentary sham much inferior to the soviets. Finally,the Bolsheviks,with their stress on the class struggle, were opposed in principle to the idea of independence for the national minorities,who made up half the population.Many strands of Bolshevik policy,then,did not meet the hopes of war-weary,rural,multinational Russia-and much of the program was simply not viable.

無論是單純的起義計劃，還是布爾什維克領(lǐng)導人對形勢的評估，都不是十月革命最終勝利的保證，甚至也不是布爾什維克獲得廣泛社會支持的基本保證。的確大部分工人階級已經(jīng)準備好支持布爾什維克;對付經(jīng)濟危機布爾什維克提出了一個模糊的解決方案——工人控制工廠和沒收資本家財產(chǎn)，國家控制貿(mào)易，用國家控制的易貨系統(tǒng)代替自由市場——這種方案在工廠里很受歡迎。絕大多數(shù)俄國人都是農(nóng)民，同時布爾什維克是一個以城鎮(zhèn)為基礎(chǔ)的馬克思主義政黨。直到1917年前布爾什維克的農(nóng)業(yè)政策都是要求把地主的地產(chǎn)變成大型的社會主義集體農(nóng)場，而不是簡單地把土地分給農(nóng)民。此外，馬克思列寧主義中關(guān)于農(nóng)民會繼續(xù)在貧富之間分裂的觀點在隨后的幾年里被證明是行不通的。

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//譯者注：不論是古代朝代更換還是現(xiàn)在都證明農(nóng)民內(nèi)部的分化一直在進行，怎么就行不通了。除非你把貧農(nóng)傭戶變成城市工人另一個種類不然農(nóng)民怎么不會分化？

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在戰(zhàn)爭問題上，列寧的目標不是簡單的和平主義，而是把世界大戰(zhàn)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)閲H上的內(nèi)戰(zhàn)。所有布爾什維克都相信只有歐洲爆發(fā)革命才會拯救俄國。他們還相信，如果受到“帝國主義者”的攻擊，他們可以通過“革命戰(zhàn)爭”來進行自衛(wèi)。布爾什維克的政治策略也不協(xié)調(diào);在這個國家的情緒仍然傾向于社會主義各派系相互合作的時候，列寧主導下的布爾什維克拒絕與其他社會主義者合作。與大多數(shù)人不同，布爾什維克認為制憲會議是一個比蘇維埃議會低劣得多的騙局。最后，強調(diào)階級斗爭的布爾什維克原則上反對至少占人口一半的少數(shù)民族的獨立主張。當時許多布爾什維克的政策并無法滿足厭戰(zhàn)的、農(nóng)村化、多民族化的俄羅斯，而且許多計劃根本就不可行。

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The organization and the ideology of the Bolsheviks are not enough to explain their success.What counted was the concept of "Soviet Power."The common name,the "Bolshevik Revolution,"is in this sense misleading.Power was seized not in the name of the Bolshevik Party but in that of "Soviet Power," of the much broader soviet movement.Workers'and soldiers' councils(sovety)had appeared in most towns at the start of 1917.Their success did not come from some special creativity of the Russian workers and soldiers (not the peasants) who elected them.The power of the soviets came partly from the lack of any alternative broadly based local government;under the Tsar the towns had been run by appointees and a wealthy elite.But the soviets, elected directly by factories and military units,did provide a remark- ably direct(if administratively ineffective) means of giving political institutions to a wider range of people than ever before.

布爾什維克的組織和意識形態(tài)不足以解釋他們的成功， “蘇維埃的權(quán)力”是什么？將其等同于 “布爾什維克革命”在某個意義上是有誤導性的。因為奪取政權(quán)不是以布爾什維克黨的名義獲得的，而是以更廣泛的蘇維埃運動即 “蘇維埃政權(quán)”的名義獲得的。1917年初的大多數(shù)城鎮(zhèn)出現(xiàn)了工人和士兵委員會(sovety)。但蘇維埃的成功建立并非來自于選舉他們的俄國工人和士兵(沒有農(nóng)民)的一種“自我能動性”。蘇維埃的權(quán)力搶走了部分缺乏廣泛基礎(chǔ)的地方政府;因為過去在沙皇統(tǒng)治下，城鎮(zhèn)任命給了富有的精英管理。而由工廠和軍隊中每個人直接選舉產(chǎn)生的蘇維埃，提供了一種比以往任何時候都更廣泛的政治制度上的直接選舉手段(盡管其在行政上無效)。

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The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets,which met in late October,was not entirely dominated by the Bolsheviks,but it did show dissatisfaction with the slow pace of change under the Provisional Government.More important,the leaders of the October uprising in Petrograd claimed to be acting in defense of the soviet congress in the face of a counterrevol- utionary threat from the Provisional Government.This threat was claimed to be a repetition of the August attempt by General Kornilov, the army Supreme Commander-in-Chief,to overthrow the Petrograd Soviet.At the very top of the Bolshevik Party,where the idea of insurrection was indeed born,the counterrevolutionary bogey was a piece of self-conscious manipulation.But even among middle-ranking party activists the tales of Prime Minister Kerensky's scheming were believed-and it was the "defense"of the congress that got so many supporters of the soviets out into the streets in October.And this action was organized not directly by the Bolsheviks but by the Petrograd Soviet's Military-Revolutionary Committee(MRC).

十月下旬召開的第二次全俄蘇維埃代表大會也并不是由布爾什維克完全主導的，但它確實對臨時政府領(lǐng)導下緩慢的變革步伐表示了不滿。更重要的是，在彼得格勒十月起義后，蘇維埃的領(lǐng)導人聲稱，這一行為是為了應對臨時政府的反革命威脅，而他們的行動是為了保護蘇維埃議會。他們說這一威脅是八月份最高統(tǒng)帥科爾尼洛夫?qū)④娖髨D推翻彼得格勒蘇維埃政權(quán)的重演。在布爾什維克黨的最高層中間確實誕生了起義的思想——在自覺的操縱下一種反革命的妖物敘事誕生了。但即使是黨內(nèi)中層許多人也相信克倫斯基總理正在運量著陰謀——同時也正是臨時政府的這種“軟弱”姿態(tài)，才讓這么多蘇維埃的支持者在10月走上街頭。當然這次行動不是由布爾什維克直接組織的，而是由彼得格勒士兵革命委員會 (MRC)組織的。

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The soviets not only gave an excuse for an uprising but also provided the skeleton of an administration to run the country.Indeed,the soviets had been increasing their power for months and,as has been sug-gested,the October Revolution was here more a "shifting of gears,an acceleration of tempo"than a decisive break.After October the Bolsheviks had control of the Central Executive Committeeand of Sovnarkom.The political cooperation of the Left faction of the agrarian- socialist SR Party gave the Central ExCom and Sovnarkom some claim to speak for the peasant majority.The nationwide network of nine hundred soviets made possible the quick spread of the revolution from town to town,and on to the most distant parts of the Empire.Once "Soviet"power had been proclaimed in the capital,local soviets across Russia formed their own MRCs,ejected representatives of the Pro- visional Government,and took sole power in their own hands-with the support of much of the population.

但蘇維埃不僅為起義提供了自己的宣稱，他們還提供了管理國家的政府框架。事實上，這幾個月以來蘇維埃就一直在增強他們的力量，正如所暗示的那樣，十月革命在這里更多起到了“齒輪的轉(zhuǎn)換，節(jié)奏的加快”的作用，而不是整個社會的割裂，十月革命之后布爾什維克完全控制了全俄中央執(zhí)行委員會(蘇維埃代表大會的常設機構(gòu))和國家通訊社。同時他們擁有了農(nóng)業(yè)上的盟友——帶社會主義傾向的左翼社會革命黨，這也使得中央執(zhí)行委員會和國家糧食署有了能代表大多數(shù)農(nóng)民的權(quán)利。由九百名代表組成的蘇維埃選舉形成了全國性的大網(wǎng)，這使得革命可以從一個城鎮(zhèn)迅速得蔓延到另一個城鎮(zhèn)，最后蔓延到帝國最遙遠的邊區(qū)。一旦“蘇維?！闭?quán)在首都宣告成立，俄羅斯各地的蘇維埃支持者們就組成了自己的士兵革命委員會，驅(qū)逐那些舊臨時政府的代表，并通過大多數(shù)人的支持獨攬當?shù)氐恼?quán)。

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What might be called the"Soviet program"-as opposed to the Bolsh-evik program-was also of great importance.A series of sweeping social reforms announced by the new soviet government seemed to justify popular confidence.Of the various planks of the Bolshevik program,it was those related to industry and trade that were put into effect in the most full-blooded form:workers' control of the factories was announced, a Supreme Economic Council(VSNKh) set up to run the economy,the banks were nationalized (there was as yet no official nationalization of industry, although many factories were taken over "from below,"by the workers).

他們所稱的“蘇維埃計劃”，當然與布爾什埃維克的最高綱領(lǐng)也有所不同——起到了非常重要的作用。新的蘇維埃政府宣布了一系列徹底的社會改革，這似乎證明了民眾們的信心是正確的。在布爾什維克的規(guī)劃下，與工業(yè)和貿(mào)易有關(guān)的各種措施以最全面的形式得到了實施:宣布工人對工廠的控制，成立了最高經(jīng)濟委員會來管理經(jīng)濟，銀行被國有化(盡管許多工廠被工人“自下而上”接管，但當時還沒有正式的工業(yè)國有化)

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In other areas of policy,however,the hard ideological cutting edge of radical Marxism was softened into a program more suited to 1917 Russia.The Decree on Land divided the landowners'big estates among millions of individual peasant families(rather than keeping them as "modelfarms'")；the Bolsheviks had simply adapted a draft SR land program.The Decree on Peace offered negotiations with the fighting powers.Talks with the Central Powers began,and on 2 December an armistice was signed.As the armies were sent home nothing more was heard of a revolutionary war against imperialism. Three issues were of greatest importance to all social groups in the winter of 1917-1918:peace,salvation from economic catastrophe,and social change.The Soviet program promised to deal with these issues,and it won wide support in the first two or three months after October,especially after the failure of the Provisional Government even to make gestures.The program won popular support,too,for the Bolshevik domination of the Soviet regime.

然而在政策的其他領(lǐng)域，激進馬克思主義者的強硬意識形態(tài)還是被軟化為更適合1917年俄羅斯的狀態(tài)。比如《土地法令》將地主的大地產(chǎn)分給了數(shù)百萬個體農(nóng)民家庭(而不是將其改造成“模范的集體農(nóng)場”)，這件事上布爾什維克只是對左派社會革命黨的土地計劃草案進行了小部分修改。同時《和平法令》提出與一戰(zhàn)中的大國們進行談判?，F(xiàn)在與同盟國的談判開始了，他們于12月2日簽訂了停戰(zhàn)協(xié)定。普通士兵們被遣回家時也沒有聽到過關(guān)于進行反帝國主義戰(zhàn)爭輸出革命的消息。在1917-1918年的冬天，三個問題的解決對所有社會群體來說都是十分重要的:和平、從經(jīng)濟危機中拯救，還有合適的社會變革。蘇維埃的計劃承諾處理完這些問題，蘇維埃的成功讓其在10月后的頭兩三個月贏得了人民廣泛的支持，畢竟過去臨時政府執(zhí)政期間甚至沒有做出類似姿態(tài)。同時人們看的出來是布爾什維克在運作蘇維埃，所以該計劃也贏得了民眾的廣泛支持。