25_海德格 - 反人文主義 P1 - 00:43

?the joint demise of philosophies of the subject and of foundationalism → postmodernism of continental and analytic philosophy

25_海德格 - 反人文主義 P1 - 06:28

?Kehre, "the turning", truth not as correspondence but through aletheia, "disclosure" or "unconcealment"

25_海德格 - 反人文主義 P1 - 07:37

?Lichtung, "light" "a clearing in the woods", being is responsible for disclosure. truth is when being reveals itself and error is when being conceals itself.

25_海德格 - 反人文主義 P1 - 08:30

?"On the essence of truth": the essence of truth is the truth of essence. Being reveals itself through me.

25_海德格 - 反人文主義 P1 - 10:53

?humanism: conceive being through human being (Dasein) or some features of Dasein, like experience, ideas, understanding, concepts, therefore human-center and anthropocentric.

25_海德格 - 反人文主義 P1 - 11:57

?Heidegger claimed that Nietzsche's will to power is the fulfillment of the metaphysics began by Plato. we understand things through perceptions of human beings, therefore endowing power to human beings. Being is made subject to human creations. Western philosophy is an expression of human will to power by which we seek to dominate ?being rather than understand it.

25_海德格 - 反人文主義 P1 - 13:57

?"Letter on Humanism"

25_海德格 - 反人文主義 P1 - 16:24

?true humanism: recognize the essence of human is simply the openness to being, not as the lord of bing but as the shepherd of being.

25_海德格 - 反人文主義 P1 - 16:57

?"The thinking that is to come is no longer philosophy, because it thinks more originally than metaphysics, a name identical to philosophy. "

25_海德格 - 反人文主義 P1 - 17:38

"The Question concerning technology" (1953), technology enframes beings as standing reserve.

"Bestand" means standing reserve and "Gestell" means "en-frames". Technology treats being as stuff, like inventory in the warehouse, and impose a frame through which we understand the world in modern society. Science and technology is the completion of Plato's metaphysics. Being is shrunk to the present, and the present is made dependent on the mind and ideas.

25_海德格 - 反人文主義 P1 - 22:15

This can only be overcome by returning to notion of aletheia, of truth unconcealment rather as accurate representation or propositional truth. Overcoming technology doesn't mean destroying it . Technology is itself a creative act. Attending to the creative act of the invention of technology can be a way to understand what is beneath the technology. We must pay attention to the originally aletheia.

25_海德格 - 反人文主義 P1 - 25:48

?not philosophy but thinking, "techne": practical arts

25_海德格 - 反人文主義 P1 - 26:49

?"The end of Philosophy and the task of thinking" (1966): cybernetics, information technology, telecommunication evolution is the final fulfillment of philosophy began by Plato and reify being as entity.

?26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 01:37

?to view language and culture as the source of self rather than the other way around, determined not by the inner self/the phenomenological experience /authenticity, but rather by culture and language/a public reality of signs

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 02:46

• Ernst Cassirer 1874-1945: neo-Kantian philosophy of future, structuralism

• Ferdinand de Saussure 1857-1913: structuralism

• Hans-Georg Gadamer 1900-2002: revived hermeneutics

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 03:31

?Language becomes the central topic of 20th century for both European Continental and analytic philosophy.

Cassirer: "Philosophy of Symbolic Forms" (1923-1929), added historian component to Kantian method (influenced by Hegel).

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 04:28

?Human being are the animals symbolic (the symbolic animal): we organize experience not through sheer transcendental machinery but through symbols and signs that are linguistic, artistic, historical, mythical, religious, mathematical and scientific. Kantian construction of an objective world of common experience is not primary a subjective matter occurring in the mind, but an active public working of human beings through our diverse cultural media. The way I experience the world is pre-structured by the language I use in religion, myth and even science.

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 06:56

?The theory of hermeneutics by Gadamer, re-read the theory of biblical interpretation from 19th century in terms of Heidegger

Language is the cumulation of meanings. Understand always proceeds from within a horizon ? or context of meanings which we project. In that projection only takes place insofar as we are parts of an historical tradition.

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 10:29

?What Gadamer opposed was the scientific enlightenment fear that this tradition lateness blocks our understanding of objectivity, the fear that I would not be objective/neutral in terms of understanding the world since I am a historical creature.

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 10:51

?truth and Method (1960): sought to justify the non-scientific methods of other disciplines (social science, history of poetry and art)

We tried to expand the method of natural science elsewhere in order to search for truth, which was a mistake by Gadamer.

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 13:02

?it's our own interpretive strategies or our very prejudices inherited from the past provide us a mode of access to the history that was the source of the prejudices. It is precisely the opposite of the scientific idea of objectivity. It is our involvement with the historical document/artifact puts us into a dialogue with it and that dialogue is how we generate the historical understanding.

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 15:44

?"Fusion of horizons": our own contemporary interpretive horizon must fuse with the interpretive horizon of the past artifact or document.

Alasdair Maclntyre ?1929:rationality is already and always rationality in a tradition. Reason itself is subordinate to or part of tradition.

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 17:31

?Ferdinand de Saussure, Swiss linguist

Langue: language; Parole: speech

He was not concerned with the pragmatics of actual speech but rather with the system of signs in the language, the "langue" not the "parole"

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 18:27

?arbitrariness of the sign: each sign has a purely conventional reaction to its referent.

Some people held the notion that language comes from cries or onomatopoeia. Saussure objected such notion of natural causal connection.

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 20:11

?signifier (a word)and signified (a concept)

The meanings of signifiers are fixed by the differences or relations between signifiers in a system of signs. Each sign is defined by its relation to a host of other signs. In language, there are only differences.

Unlike hermeneutics, the meaning of a word, according to Saussure, does not come form the word's history (not its origin or invention nor a connection between it and the actual stuffing the world that it refers to).

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 23:19

?Later French writers applied structuralism to many different topics in the human sciences.

eg. Jacques Lacan 1901-1981, a french psychoanalyst, the unconscious is structured like a language

Louis Althusser 1918-1990, applied structuralism to ?Marxist theory

Claude Levi-Strauss, anthropologist, analyzed the meanings of artifacts and customs in non-western societies in structural terms

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 24:54

It is a movement away from functionalism and behaviorism in the social sciences. The meanings, ideas and concepts aren't inside the heads of participants but public meanings that are part of the culture.

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 25:53

They agreed with the Verstehen (understanding) school of interpretive German historiography

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 26:56

?The meanings in my mind are not dependent on what is in me/my spirit/experience/authentic self, but some kind of an expression of a cultural world of rules and structure of which I am an occupant, but of which I am not the origin.

Both hermeneutics and structuralism meant a break with the German philosophies of alienated subjectivity, phenomenology, existentialism, western marxism and psychoanalysis. Those views held the self to be the origin of meanings.

Authenticity self was a mistake romantic idea.

26_文化，解釋學(xué)，結(jié)構(gòu)主義 P2 - 29:20

?While both hermeneutics and structuralism see the culture/language/history as bigger than and as the source of the self, it is the structuralism that in the long run that would have the much more radical implications. It fueled post-structuralism, or post-modernism.

27_維根斯坦 - 語言哲學(xué) P3 - 00:15

?Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations

27_維根斯坦 - 語言哲學(xué) P3 - 02:01

?Ordinary language philosophy, in contrast to the ideal language philosophy (Frege, Russell and other positivists)

27_維根斯坦 - 語言哲學(xué) P3 - 03:28

?neither diachronic (overtime)structure nor synchronic (at any one moment) structure. The use of language in human activity/practice is what determines meanings.

27_維根斯坦 - 語言哲學(xué) P3 - 04:04

?The meaning of a term is not an essence or set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Most uses of words just have a family resemblance meaning.

27_維根斯坦 - 語言哲學(xué) P3 - 05:50

?ostension, or pointing, whether external or internal is by itself inadequate to fix or teach the meaning of a term. Mere ostension cannot define the meaning of a term. There must a context or stage-setting.

27_維根斯坦 - 語言哲學(xué) P3 - 07:07

?Meaning is not a mental process or referent that accompanies utterance (not "Augustinian" view).

Meanings are not psychological entities.Wittgenstein takes a different view than Frege, Russell, Husserl and his own earlier Tractatus. He now declares that a word's meaning is a contribution ?to a sentence, but in particular to the sentence's use, to what the sentence pragmatically does in a context of human activity (practice, a language game).

27_維根斯坦 - 語言哲學(xué) P3 - 09:00

?"language game": some context of activity

"form of life", "To understand a sentence means to understand a language.To understand a language means to be master of a technique."

"Words are also deeds."

He opposed Platonists, like Russell and Frege who believed that concepts must be objectively existent. ?He also opposed verificationists like Carnap, the positivist notion of verification.

27_維根斯坦 - 語言哲學(xué) P3 - 11:44

?Meaning is also acquired publicly in public action, not through ostension.

27_維根斯坦 - 語言哲學(xué) P3 - 12:47

There can be no private language.

27_維根斯坦 - 語言哲學(xué) P3 - 15:59

?"Here I should like to say a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it is not part of the mechanism."

27_維根斯坦 - 語言哲學(xué) P3 - 17:34

?"On certainty". It's nonsense to say both "I don't know this is my hand" and "I know this is my hand".

27_維根斯坦 - 語言哲學(xué) P3 - 21:18

?Weltanschauung, worldview

He claimed that pragmatism has a worldview that he disagreed. In fact, he wants no theory of truth, and he associates that with pragmatism. Nevertheless, the account he gives of meaning is essentially pragmatic. The proper task of philosophy is to show how whatever seems like a deep problem of philosophy is actually the result of a misuse of language.

27_維根斯坦 - 語言哲學(xué) P3 - 24:45

?"Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language."

27_維根斯坦 - 語言哲學(xué) P3 - 26:45

?"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. for it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is."

The proper role of philosophy now is merely therapeutic (not to solve philosophical problems but to dissolve them), serving to reveal philosophical statements as linguistic errors.

27_維根斯坦 - 語言哲學(xué) P3 - 27:37

?The narrow impact was the turn of analytic philosophers away from the search for an ideal logical language and towards the investigation of ordinary language philosophy, which was continued by John Langshaw Austin.

The wider impact was a new nonscientific skepticism about philosophical problems as rooted in the mishandling of language.

28_奎因 - 邏輯實(shí)證主義的終結(jié) P4 - 01:04

?William Van Orman Quine 1908-2000

28_奎因 - 邏輯實(shí)證主義的終結(jié) P4 - 01:56

"behaviorist semantics", rejected the notion that meanings are mental contents and his behaviorism had or led in a particularly pragmatic direction.

28_奎因 - 邏輯實(shí)證主義的終結(jié) P4 - 02:17

?attacked "the two dogmas of empiricism" in 1951

1. analytic-synthetic distinction invented by Kant

2. the reducibility of factual claims to sense data reports

Even paraphrased/synonymous terms (with the exception of the trivial case, meaning the simple statements of identity)need a set of empirical criteria or evidence to adjudicate. We cannot say that the statement all bachelors are unmarried is being made true by meanings alone with absolutely no influence from experience since bachelor has other meanings as in bachelor's degree.

28_奎因 - 邏輯實(shí)證主義的終結(jié) P4 - 06:09

• extension of a term, objects referred to

• intension of a term, sense or meaning

Extension: ?meanings depend on their references

Words that have the same extension (reference) don't necessarily have the same meaning.

28_奎因 - 邏輯實(shí)證主義的終結(jié) P4 - 07:33

We cannot reduce theoretical statements in science (synthetical statements as opposed to analytic statements)to a set of statements about sense data. Quine opposed positivist thought that lawlike statements of science about the world were nothing but summaries of sense data.

28_奎因 - 邏輯實(shí)證主義的終結(jié) P4 - 09:19

?Quine's epistemic holism: When theories confront experiences as a whole, therefore we cannot find direct connections from particular statements internal to the theory and the stimulus conditions or particular sense data (what's observed). In another word, when the theory is wrong, it will not be clear which of the statements in our theory ought to be thrown out.

“The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or information at all.”

"My counter-suggestion... is that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body."

?28_奎因 - 邏輯實(shí)證主義的終結(jié) P4 - 11:47

?Quine is knocking down a strict dualism and epistemic dualism (Hume, Kant and logical?positivists), the distinction between the analytic (what's true by meaning) and the synthetic (what's true by reduction to observable data). Quine claimed that line is porous. Your choice to reject/change wrong statements of the wrong theory should be pragmatic, namely which statement causes the least trouble when being removed.

28_奎因 - 邏輯實(shí)證主義的終結(jié) P4 - 13:49

?indeterminacy of meaning

addition to Wittgenstein: any one of a number of different ontologies that is basic metaphysical theories about what exists which applied to a word (eg. a rabbit) will give it a different meaning.

There will be no aspect of the observable situation of behavior that the native engages in which I see or my interaction with the native, which will be able to differentiate among those different ontologies that the native might have.

28_奎因 - 邏輯實(shí)證主義的終結(jié) P4 - 19:30

?reference is "behaviorally inscrutable"

Translation always remains indeterminate and reference inscrutable.

28_奎因 - 邏輯實(shí)證主義的終結(jié) P4 - 20:12

?Quine goes further: if the behavioral situation does not distinguish these meanings, then they don't exist. We know as much of the native's meanings as the native knows

28_奎因 - 邏輯實(shí)證主義的終結(jié) P4 - 21:53

?Quine's doctrine of "ontological relativity"

Reference can only occur in a linguistic framework. We cannot separate our perceptions or conceptions of what the objects are from the linguistic framework that interprets them.

Consequently, we cannot check the correspondence of framework to data. The perception and sense data cannot be independent of the framework, therefore they can't adjudicate between frameworks. Our choice of knowledge has to be a pragmatic choice as a result as to which ontology works better to the theory that seems to fit best so far.

28_奎因 - 邏輯實(shí)證主義的終結(jié) P4 - 26:15

?"Naturalizing Epistemology" (1969)

He renounced the goal of justifying all knowledge per se and abandoned foundationalism. Science is our best form of knowledge and it cannot in principle justify itself. This goal is impossible and unnecessary. We can only use science to study how human organisms acquire knowledge. There is no other kind of knowledge which could get underneath it to judge whether it's true or false. Philosophy is no longer in the role of judging science on some other criteria.

We can have a natural epistemology, a theory of knowledge which bases knowledge on their scientific investigation of human cognition and perception.

28_奎因 - 邏輯實(shí)證主義的終結(jié) P4 - 29:42

?Otto Neurath, the metaphor that we sail as we repair the boat.

29_新科學(xué)哲學(xué) P5 - 01:39

Karl Popper 1902-1994

Donald Davidson 1917-2003 supervenience

Thomas S. Kuhn 1922-1996

29_新科學(xué)哲學(xué) P5 - 02:09

Induction: our ability to infer from a set of occurrences, like a sample, to a true statement about a general population or a general conclusion.

29_新科學(xué)哲學(xué) P5 - 04:13

?Experience or observations do not confirm scientific ?or inductive hypotheses.

The function of induction is not to confirm; it is do disconfirm hypotheses.

29_新科學(xué)哲學(xué) P5 - 05:30

?falsificationism

fallibilist: All our judgements are fallible.

They don't undermine realism.

29_新科學(xué)哲學(xué) P5 - 06:47

?Positivist had always endorsed physicalist reductionism, the view that all scientific knowledge should in principle be reducible to physics as the most basic science.

Dissenters: British Emergentists, new property emerges from the sum of parts.

Then emergentism fell from favor after the 1920s due jointly to the success of positivism and quantum mechanics.

29_新科學(xué)哲學(xué) P5 - 10:40

?Ernest Nagel 1901-1985

supported physical reductionism and empirical and theoretical philosophy of science

29_新科學(xué)哲學(xué) P5 - 13:06

?supervenience: while any change in mental events or properties must presuppose a change in neural events or properties, the mental events or properties could still not be reduced to, or explained by, neural events alone.

Davidson claimed that there is a special kind of dependency relationship between mental events and physical events like neurological events in the brain. Nevertheless, we still need two different kinds of science, both psychology and neurology, to study those events.

Science and explanations get to be pluralistic but the ontology or the theory of what actually exists is reductionistic physicalistic.

29_新科學(xué)哲學(xué) P5 - 17:41

?Philosophy of biology

29_新科學(xué)哲學(xué) P5 - 18:23

purpose, teleological causation

29_新科學(xué)哲學(xué) P5 - 19:41

?They began to separate their notion of purpose from mental purpose or as Colin Pittendregh put it, "teleonomic versus teleological causality".

teleological causality: when a creature with a mind has an idea, and that idea has a causal relationship to what it does

29_新科學(xué)哲學(xué) P5 - 21:04

?Ernst Mayr 1904-2005

teleonomic (telic)

He said evolutionary biologist does not merely say the following: "the wood thrush flies south and thereby escapes the winter." What they were really trying to say was "the wood thrush flies south in order to escape the winter." The wood thrush has a genetic program which it has acquired from evolution in order to survive the winter. Biologists cannot get off this teleonomic.

29_新科學(xué)哲學(xué) P5 - 23:27

?The Structure of Scientific revolutions (1962) by Thomas Kuhn

"Whig" interpretation of the history of science: science proceeds cumulatively and inevitably through the linear addition of discovery and argument based on a background foundation of a set of concepts and assumptions.

When cracks and fissures appeared and then became grave enough, scientific revolution takes place, nothing incremental but a sharp break, resulting in the wholesale replacement of "paradigm" (the fundamental concepts and practices of a science in a period of time)

29_新科學(xué)哲學(xué) P5 - 27:16

?Kuhn held that the meanings of the terms used in observation and theory in any period of normal science are dependent on that holistic paradigm.

New observation already has some theories with it from the new paradigm, therefore it is no longer neutral judges of which theory is true.

The question is whether paradigms are incommensurable (mutually untranslatable). If it is true, there would be no logical inference across paradigms. And there would be no rational argument from the old paradigm to the new one. (eg. sociological explanation, the holder of the old paradigms die off.)