Strategic Management Journal ?2023年第1期

January 2023, Volume 44, Issue 1

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——更多動(dòng)態(tài)，請(qǐng)持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨(dú)

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1.Empirical inquiry without hypotheses: A question‐driven, phenomenon‐based approach to strategic management research

無(wú)假設(shè)的實(shí)證調(diào)查：一種由問(wèn)題驅(qū)動(dòng)的、基于現(xiàn)象的戰(zhàn)略管理研究方法

Melissa E. Graebner

Anne Marie Knott

Marvin B. Lieberman

Will Mitchell

Research Summary

Many advances in strategic management have resulted from the application of formal deductive methods, based on tests of specific hypotheses derived from theory. Nonetheless, numerous important research topics involve phenomena that are novel and/or causally complex and so resist basic hypothetico‐deductive logic. As a result, many of the most important findings in strategy research have come from open‐ended studies of relevant phenomena. The special issue of the SMJ on “Question‐Driven and Phenomenon‐Based Empirical Strategy Research” presents innovative ideas for question‐driven research and expands the toolkit of research approaches. In this introduction we describe the twelve articles in the special issue, focusing on how they contribute to continued development of the question‐driven approach to research in strategic management.

戰(zhàn)略管理方面的許多進(jìn)展都是由于正式演繹方法的應(yīng)用，基于從理論中得出的特定假設(shè)的檢驗(yàn)。盡管如此，許多重要的研究課題都涉及到一些新穎的和/或因果關(guān)系復(fù)雜的現(xiàn)象，這種課題抵制了基本的假設(shè)-演繹邏輯。因此，戰(zhàn)略研究中許多最重要的發(fā)現(xiàn)都來(lái)自于對(duì)相關(guān)現(xiàn)象的開(kāi)放式研究。SMJ關(guān)于“問(wèn)題驅(qū)動(dòng)和基于現(xiàn)象的實(shí)證策略研究”的特刊提出了問(wèn)題驅(qū)動(dòng)研究的創(chuàng)新思想，并擴(kuò)展了研究方法的工具包。在本介紹中，我們描述了特刊中的12篇文章，重點(diǎn)是它們?nèi)绾斡兄趹?zhàn)略管理研究中問(wèn)題驅(qū)動(dòng)研究方法的持續(xù)發(fā)展。

Managerial Summary

One of the frustrations managers have with academic research is that it tends to be driven by questions that are theoretically interesting or lend themselves to clever econometrics. Accordingly, the results can lack managerial relevance. We highlight research that takes the opposite approach—identifying important business phenomena and devising empirical approaches to characterize them and derive managerial implications. In this introductory article, we briefly summarize the studies in the special issue, showing how they answer a diverse set of questions using a range of methods.

管理者對(duì)學(xué)術(shù)研究的挫折之一是，它往往是由理論上有趣的問(wèn)題或聰明的問(wèn)題驅(qū)動(dòng)的計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)。因此，這些結(jié)果可能缺乏管理方面的相關(guān)性。我們強(qiáng)調(diào)了采取相反方法的研究——識(shí)別重要的商業(yè)現(xiàn)象，并設(shè)計(jì)出有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的方法來(lái)描述它們的特征，并推導(dǎo)出管理含義。在這篇介紹性的文章中，我們簡(jiǎn)要地總結(jié)了特刊中的研究，展示了他們?nèi)绾问褂靡幌盗械姆椒▉?lái)回答不同的問(wèn)題。

DOI: 10.1002/smj.3393

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2.Entry diversion: Deterrence by diverting submarket entry

進(jìn)入轉(zhuǎn)移：通過(guò)轉(zhuǎn)移次級(jí)市場(chǎng)進(jìn)入來(lái)進(jìn)行阻止

Bilgehan Uzunca

Bruno Cassiman

Research Summary

Going back to Bain (1956), strategy scholars have long recognized the importance of deterring entry for sustaining incumbents' profits in an industry. We introduce a new mechanism, entry diversion, to better understand the empirical phenomenon of persistent firm entry in spite of investments in entry deterrence by incumbents in some industries. Entry diversion happens when preemptive strategic investments by incumbents decrease the expected future profits from a target submarket such that entrants choose to enter another submarket within the same industry. Empirical evidence from the global semiconductor manufacturing industry suggests that incumbents expand their capacities beyond demand growth, and that these investments effectively divert entry into other submarkets. Greenfield entrants are more responsive to entry diversion than incumbents.

回到貝恩（1956），戰(zhàn)略學(xué)者早就認(rèn)識(shí)到阻止進(jìn)入對(duì)維持現(xiàn)有行業(yè)利潤(rùn)的重要性。我們引入了一種新的機(jī)制，即進(jìn)入轉(zhuǎn)移，以更好地理解盡管某些行業(yè)的現(xiàn)有者投資阻止進(jìn)入，但持續(xù)堅(jiān)定進(jìn)入的經(jīng)驗(yàn)現(xiàn)象。當(dāng)現(xiàn)有者先發(fā)制人的戰(zhàn)略投資降低了目標(biāo)子市場(chǎng)的預(yù)期未來(lái)利潤(rùn)，使進(jìn)入者選擇進(jìn)入同一行業(yè)的另一個(gè)子市場(chǎng)時(shí)，就會(huì)發(fā)生進(jìn)入轉(zhuǎn)移。來(lái)自全球半導(dǎo)體制造業(yè)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)表明，現(xiàn)有企業(yè)的擴(kuò)張能力超出了需求增長(zhǎng)，而這些投資有效地轉(zhuǎn)移了進(jìn)入其他次級(jí)市場(chǎng)的機(jī)會(huì)。新進(jìn)入的企業(yè)比現(xiàn)有企業(yè)更容易受到市場(chǎng)轉(zhuǎn)移的影響。

Managerial Summary

Managers have long understood that deterring entry of new players into their industry could sustain their firms' profits. In this article, we introduce a new mechanism, entry diversion, where the incumbent diverts potential entrants from its submarket toward other submarkets in the same industry. Entry diversion happens when preemptive strategic investments by incumbents decrease the expected future profits of the entrant in a submarket of the industry such that the entrant chooses not to enter the incumbent's submarket. Contrary to entry deterrence, new players will still enter the industry but settle in different submarkets. Empirical evidence from the global semiconductor manufacturing industry suggests that incumbents expand their capacities beyond demand growth, and that these investments effectively divert entry into other submarkets.

管理者們已經(jīng)理解阻止新參與者進(jìn)入他們的行業(yè)可以維持他們公司的利潤(rùn)。在本文中，我們介紹了一種新的機(jī)制，即進(jìn)入轉(zhuǎn)移，即現(xiàn)有者將潛在的進(jìn)入者從其次級(jí)市場(chǎng)轉(zhuǎn)移到同一行業(yè)的其他次級(jí)市場(chǎng)。當(dāng)現(xiàn)有者先發(fā)制人的戰(zhàn)略投資降低了進(jìn)入者在行業(yè)次級(jí)市場(chǎng)的預(yù)期未來(lái)利潤(rùn)，使進(jìn)入者選擇不進(jìn)入現(xiàn)有者的次級(jí)市場(chǎng)時(shí)，就會(huì)發(fā)生進(jìn)入轉(zhuǎn)移。與進(jìn)入威懾相反，新的參與者仍將進(jìn)入該行業(yè)，但將定居在不同的次級(jí)市場(chǎng)。來(lái)自全球半導(dǎo)體制造業(yè)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)表明，現(xiàn)有企業(yè)的擴(kuò)張能力超出了需求增長(zhǎng)，而這些投資有效地轉(zhuǎn)移了進(jìn)入其他次級(jí)市場(chǎng)的機(jī)會(huì)。

DOI: 10.1002/smj.3128

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3.The firm as an architect of polycentric governance: Building open institutional infrastructure in emerging markets

公司作為多中心治理的架構(gòu)者：在新興市場(chǎng)建立開(kāi)放的制度基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施

Aline Gatignon

Laurence Capron

Research Summary

We apply pattern‐matching techniques to contrast qualitative case study data with perspectives from strategic management and institutional economics about how a firm can address voids in market‐based institutions. We identify a novel approach whereby the firm builds an open institutional infrastructure (OII) by investing in a pool of resources widely accessible beyond its exchange partners. To collectively govern OII, the firm must empower other actors within multilateral cross‐sector partnerships, and it must enforce the resulting rules through relational norms based on alignment between public and private value creation. These findings, achieved by adapting Elinor Ostrom's principles of polycentric governance to corporate actors who take the lead in building OII, advance our understanding of new organizational forms that transcend the traditional boundaries of firms and markets.

我們運(yùn)用模式匹配技術(shù)，將定性案例研究數(shù)據(jù)與戰(zhàn)略管理和制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的觀點(diǎn)進(jìn)行對(duì)比，探討企業(yè)如何解決以市場(chǎng)為基礎(chǔ)的制度中的空白。我們確定了一種新穎的方法，即公司通過(guò)投資于一個(gè)在交易所合作伙伴之外廣泛可用的資源池來(lái)建立一個(gè)開(kāi)放的制度基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施(OII)。為了共同管理OII，企業(yè)必須在多邊跨部門(mén)合作伙伴關(guān)系中授權(quán)其他行為者，并且必須通過(guò)基于公共和私人價(jià)值創(chuàng)造之間一致性的關(guān)系規(guī)范來(lái)執(zhí)行由此產(chǎn)生的規(guī)則。這些發(fā)現(xiàn)是通過(guò)將埃莉諾·奧斯特羅姆的多中心治理原則適用于率先建立OII的企業(yè)參與者而實(shí)現(xiàn)的，它促進(jìn)了我們對(duì)超越企業(yè)和市場(chǎng)傳統(tǒng)界限的新組織形式的理解。

Managerial Summary

Emerging markets typically present additional obstacles for business operations because they lack the necessary underlying institutional infrastructure such as access to capital and labor markets. We introduce a new way for firms to overcome these obstacles—which we call building an OII—by investing in such infrastructure themselves and making it available to their commercial partners, local communities, and even to competitors. Firms must empower those actors to take the lead in collectively defining the rules for accessing this infrastructure, by orchestrating cross‐sector partnerships. This process creates relational norms around the alignment of public and private interests, which ultimately can promote firms' competitive advantage.

新興市場(chǎng)通常會(huì)給企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)帶來(lái)額外的障礙，因?yàn)樗鼈內(nèi)狈Ρ匾牡讓又贫然A(chǔ)設(shè)施，比如進(jìn)入資本和勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)的渠道。我們?yōu)槠髽I(yè)介紹了一種克服這些障礙的新方法——我們稱(chēng)之為建立OII——即自己投資此類(lèi)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，并將其提供給其商業(yè)合作伙伴、當(dāng)?shù)厣鐓^(qū)，甚至競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手。企業(yè)必須通過(guò)組織跨部門(mén)合作伙伴關(guān)系，授權(quán)這些行為體率先集體制定使用這些基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的規(guī)則。這一過(guò)程創(chuàng)造了圍繞公共利益和私人利益的關(guān)系規(guī)范，最終可以促進(jìn)企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。

DOI: 10.1002/smj.3124

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4.The entrepreneurial process: Evidence from a nationally representative survey

創(chuàng)業(yè)過(guò)程：來(lái)自全國(guó)代表性調(diào)查的證據(jù)

Victor M. Bennett

Aaron K. Chatterji

Research Summary

Scholars have traditionally characterized the variation in firm performance as determined by conditions after entry, where the entry decision is a one‐shot binary choice determined by cost–benefit analysis. However, recent theoretical work has posited that the entry decision is an outcome of a learning process and that the information acquired during the pre‐entry period shapes subsequent performance dynamics. We provide the first systematic data on the pre‐entry period using a nationally representative survey. We document the activities that prospective entrants undertake, finding variation according to opportunity costs, prior experience, and confidence levels. Our results suggest the pre‐entry period is shaped by a series of choices by prospective entrants as they contemplate entry, further exploration, or ending the entrepreneurial process.

傳統(tǒng)上，學(xué)者們認(rèn)為企業(yè)績(jī)效的變化是由進(jìn)入后的條件決定的，其中進(jìn)入決策是由成本效益分析決定的一次性二元選擇。然而，最近的理論研究認(rèn)為，進(jìn)入決策是學(xué)習(xí)過(guò)程的結(jié)果，進(jìn)入前獲得的信息決定了隨后的績(jī)效動(dòng)態(tài)。我們使用具有全國(guó)代表性的調(diào)查提供了關(guān)于進(jìn)入前階段的第一個(gè)系統(tǒng)數(shù)據(jù)。我們記錄了潛在進(jìn)入者所從事的活動(dòng)，根據(jù)機(jī)會(huì)成本、先前的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和信心水平尋找變化。我們的研究結(jié)果表明，進(jìn)入前階段取決于潛在進(jìn)入者在考慮進(jìn)入、進(jìn)一步探索或結(jié)束創(chuàng)業(yè)過(guò)程時(shí)的一系列選擇

Managerial Summary

We created and implemented a nationally representative survey on the entrepreneurial activities of Americans. Several interesting findings emerged. First, approximately a third of Americans report having had a business idea in the past 5 years, motivated in the vast majority of cases by lifestyle concerns rather than the pursuit of significant business opportunities. Fewer than half of those who considered starting a business take even the lowest cost steps, like searching the Internet for potential competitors or speaking with a friend. Our findings reveal an entrepreneurial process which involves a significant pre‐entry period where prospective entrepreneurs seek to acquire information about the quality of their idea, perform administrative tasks to prepare for launch and encounter frictions that impede their progress.

我們創(chuàng)建并實(shí)施了一項(xiàng)關(guān)于美國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)活動(dòng)的全國(guó)代表性調(diào)查。一些有趣的發(fā)現(xiàn)出現(xiàn)了。首先，大約三分之一的美國(guó)人表示在過(guò)去五年中有過(guò)創(chuàng)業(yè)想法，絕大多數(shù)情況下是出于對(duì)生活方式的考慮，而不是為了追求重大的商業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)。在考慮創(chuàng)業(yè)的人中，只有不到一半的人采取了成本最低的步驟，比如上網(wǎng)搜索潛在的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手或與朋友交談。我們的研究結(jié)果揭示了一個(gè)創(chuàng)業(yè)過(guò)程，其中包括一個(gè)重要的進(jìn)入前階段，在此期間，潛在的企業(yè)家尋求獲得關(guān)于其想法質(zhì)量的信息，執(zhí)行行政任務(wù)以準(zhǔn)備啟動(dòng)，并遇到阻礙其進(jìn)展的摩擦。

DOI: 10.1002/smj.3077

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5.The risk of being ranked: Investor response to marginal inclusion on the 100 Best Corporate Citizens list

被排名的風(fēng)險(xiǎn):投資者對(duì)入選100位最佳企業(yè)公民榜單的反應(yīng)

Ben W. Lewis

W. Chad Carlos

Research Summary

Despite the proliferation of lists and rankings that recognize firms for superior performance, empirical studies have been limited in their ability to causally evaluate how inclusion for the marginal firm influences shareholder value. We address this limitation by examining how investors responded to firms that were barely included or excluded from the 100 Best Corporate Citizens list. Contrary to prevailing theoretical expectations, our findings indicate that marginal firms that were included in the ranking experienced negative abnormal returns compared to marginal firms that were excluded. We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings and how they inspire future research questions for scholarship on rankings and status. We also discuss implications for managers that question whether and when being ranked results in financial benefits or liabilities.

盡管現(xiàn)在有大量的名單和排名來(lái)表彰表現(xiàn)卓越的公司，但實(shí)證研究在因果評(píng)估納入邊際公司如何影響股東價(jià)值方面的能力有限。我們通過(guò)研究投資者對(duì)幾乎沒(méi)有被列入或排除在100位最佳企業(yè)公民名單之外的公司的反應(yīng)來(lái)解決這一限制。與普遍的理論預(yù)期相反，我們的研究結(jié)果表明，與被排除在外的邊際公司相比，被列入排名的邊際公司經(jīng)歷了負(fù)的異?；貓?bào)。我們討論了這些發(fā)現(xiàn)的理論含義，以及它們?nèi)绾螁l(fā)未來(lái)關(guān)于排名和地位的獎(jiǎng)學(xué)金研究問(wèn)題。我們還討論了對(duì)那些質(zhì)疑排名是否以及何時(shí)會(huì)導(dǎo)致財(cái)務(wù)利益或負(fù)債的管理者的影響。

Managerial Summary

Because being ranked is generally seen as an important strategic objective for companies, managers must carefully consider how much attention and resources to allocate toward this pursuit. Although existing research suggests that being ranked can be beneficial, we have a limited understanding about whether barely making a ranked list is worth the effort. We provide new insights for managers by showing that investors not only respond negatively to marginal inclusion on a ranking but also provide suggestions for how companies might counteract this effect. Specifically, our results suggest that making consistent, focused investments that are relevant to external stakeholders may buffer organizations from the potential negative effects of marginal inclusion on a ranking. These insights may also inspire managers to reconsider their firms' commitments to being ranked.

因?yàn)榕琶ǔ１灰暈楣镜囊粋€(gè)重要戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)，管理者必須仔細(xì)考慮為這一目標(biāo)分配多少注意力和資源。盡管現(xiàn)有的研究表明，排名可能是有益的，但我們對(duì)勉強(qiáng)排名是否值得付出努力的理解有限。我們通過(guò)展示投資者不僅對(duì)排名中的邊際排名做出負(fù)面反應(yīng)，而且還為公司如何抵消這種影響提供了建議，為經(jīng)理們提供了新的見(jiàn)解。具體而言，我們的研究結(jié)果表明，與外部利益相關(guān)者相關(guān)的持續(xù)、有重點(diǎn)的投資可能會(huì)緩沖組織對(duì)排名的邊際納入的潛在負(fù)面影響。這些見(jiàn)解也可能激勵(lì)經(jīng)理們重新考慮他們公司對(duì)排名的承諾。

DOI: 10.1002/smj.3083

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6.Entrepreneurial teams' acquisition of talent: Evidence from technology manufacturing industries using a two‐sided approach

創(chuàng)業(yè)團(tuán)隊(duì)對(duì)人才的獲取:來(lái)自技術(shù)制造業(yè)的證據(jù)，采用雙向方法

Florence Honoré

Martin Ganco

Registered:

Research summary

One of the established findings in the spinout literature is that founders with prior industry experience assemble larger entrepreneurial teams and create better‐performing startups. We examine the role of prior industry experience in the startups' next stage—its hiring of new employees. We tackle two empirical challenges—the mutual aspect of hiring and the effect of unobserved variables on employees' earnings using a two‐sided matching model. Our results reveal that even firms founded by entrepreneurs without industry experience can attract new employees with such experience if the founders start with a large entrepreneurial team. Further, startups provide new hires with an earnings premium for their industry experience. Our approach illustrates the benefits of matching models over traditional regressions.

分拆文獻(xiàn)中的一個(gè)既定發(fā)現(xiàn)是，具有先前行業(yè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的創(chuàng)始人可以組建更大的創(chuàng)業(yè)團(tuán)隊(duì)，創(chuàng)建業(yè)績(jī)更好的初創(chuàng)公司。我們考察了之前的行業(yè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)在創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的下一階段——招聘新員工——中的作用。我們利用雙側(cè)匹配模型解決了兩個(gè)實(shí)證挑戰(zhàn)——招聘的相互方面和未觀察到的變量對(duì)員工收入的影響。我們的研究結(jié)果表明，即使是由沒(méi)有行業(yè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的企業(yè)家創(chuàng)辦的公司，如果創(chuàng)始人從一個(gè)大型創(chuàng)業(yè)團(tuán)隊(duì)開(kāi)始，也可以吸引有這些經(jīng)驗(yàn)的新員工。此外，初創(chuàng)公司會(huì)根據(jù)新員工的行業(yè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)為他們提供額外的收入。我們的方法說(shuō)明了匹配模型相對(duì)于傳統(tǒng)回歸的好處。

Managerial summary

Growing startups face the question of who to hire and how much to compensate the new hires. Simultaneously, prospective new hires ask which startup to join and how much their salary will be. We explore these questions using a novel method that tackles the mutual selection process. In the context of five technological manufacturing industries, we find that having industry experience within founding teams may not be necessary to attract new hires with high quality if the startup can signal its own quality through other means such as having a larger founding team. Our results indicate that startups prefer employees with industry experience for which startups offer a wage premium. Thus, employees seeking startup employment benefit from gaining industry experience prior to joining a startup.

成長(zhǎng)中的初創(chuàng)公司面臨著雇傭誰(shuí)以及給新員工多少補(bǔ)償?shù)膯?wèn)題。同時(shí)，潛在的新員工會(huì)詢(xún)問(wèn)加入哪家初創(chuàng)公司以及他們的薪水是多少。我們使用一種解決相互選擇過(guò)程的新方法來(lái)探索這些問(wèn)題。在五個(gè)科技制造業(yè)的背景下，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，如果創(chuàng)業(yè)公司可以通過(guò)擁有更大的創(chuàng)始團(tuán)隊(duì)等其他方式來(lái)展示自己的質(zhì)量，那么在創(chuàng)始團(tuán)隊(duì)中擁有行業(yè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)可能并不需要吸引高質(zhì)量的新員工。我們的研究結(jié)果表明，創(chuàng)業(yè)公司更喜歡有行業(yè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的員工，因?yàn)閯?chuàng)業(yè)公司會(huì)提供更高的工資。因此，在加入初創(chuàng)公司之前獲得行業(yè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)對(duì)尋求初創(chuàng)公司職位的員工有好處。DOI: 10.1002/smj.3127

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7.The performance effects of creative imitation on original products: Evidence from lab and field experiments

創(chuàng)造性模仿對(duì)原始產(chǎn)品的性能影響:來(lái)自實(shí)驗(yàn)室和現(xiàn)場(chǎng)實(shí)驗(yàn)的證據(jù)

Liangyan Wang

Brian Wu

Cornelia Pechmann

Yitong Wang

Research Summary

A market entrant often challenges the incumbent using creative imitation: The entrant creatively combines imitated aspects of the original with its own innovative characteristics to create a distinct offering. Using lab and field experiments to examine creative imitation in China, we find the effects of creative imitations on the originals depend on the creative imitation's quality. We explore the underlying mechanisms, and show that including a low‐quality creative imitation in the retail choice set increases satisfaction with and choice of the original, while a moderate‐quality creative imitation does the opposite. Moreover, creative imitation affects consumers' satisfaction with the original by influencing whether their experience with the original verifies their expectations. Our paper reveals creative imitation effects to help incumbent firms effectively address them.

市場(chǎng)進(jìn)入者通常使用創(chuàng)造性模仿來(lái)挑戰(zhàn)現(xiàn)有者:進(jìn)入者創(chuàng)造性地將模仿的方面與自己的創(chuàng)新特征結(jié)合起來(lái)，創(chuàng)造出獨(dú)特的產(chǎn)品。通過(guò)對(duì)中國(guó)創(chuàng)造性模仿的實(shí)驗(yàn)室實(shí)驗(yàn)和現(xiàn)場(chǎng)實(shí)驗(yàn)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)創(chuàng)造性模仿對(duì)原作的影響取決于創(chuàng)造性模仿的質(zhì)量。我們探索了潛在的機(jī)制，并表明在零售選擇集中包括低質(zhì)量的創(chuàng)意模仿會(huì)增加對(duì)原版的滿(mǎn)意度和選擇，而中等質(zhì)量的創(chuàng)意模仿則相反。此外，創(chuàng)造性模仿通過(guò)影響消費(fèi)者對(duì)原作的體驗(yàn)是否驗(yàn)證其預(yù)期來(lái)影響消費(fèi)者對(duì)原作的滿(mǎn)意度。本文揭示了創(chuàng)造性模仿效應(yīng)，以幫助現(xiàn)有企業(yè)有效地解決這一問(wèn)題。

Managerial Summary

When the incumbent is challenged by an entrant using creative imitation, consumers may react differently to the incumbent, and understanding consumers' reactions allows the incumbent to make better strategic decisions about how to address the challenge. Using lab and field experiments, we investigate creative imitations with two quality levels common in our empirical context, low quality and moderate quality, and examine how and why they differentially affect the originals. We find the presence of a low‐quality creative imitation actually increased choice of the original by enhancing consumers' satisfaction with it, while a moderate‐quality creative imitation reduced choice of the original by undermining satisfaction with it. Our research suggests the incumbent should address moderate‐quality creative imitations' challenges to customer satisfaction, while temporarily tolerating low‐quality creative imitations.

當(dāng)在位者受到使用創(chuàng)造性模仿的新進(jìn)入者的挑戰(zhàn)時(shí)，消費(fèi)者可能會(huì)對(duì)在位者做出不同的反應(yīng)，而理解消費(fèi)者的反應(yīng)可以讓在位者就如何應(yīng)對(duì)挑戰(zhàn)做出更好的戰(zhàn)略決策。通過(guò)實(shí)驗(yàn)室和現(xiàn)場(chǎng)實(shí)驗(yàn)，我們研究了在我們的經(jīng)驗(yàn)環(huán)境中常見(jiàn)的兩種質(zhì)量水平的創(chuàng)造性模仿，低質(zhì)量和中等質(zhì)量，并研究了它們?nèi)绾我约盀槭裁磿?huì)對(duì)原件產(chǎn)生不同的影響。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，低質(zhì)量的創(chuàng)意仿制品實(shí)際上會(huì)提高消費(fèi)者對(duì)原作的滿(mǎn)意度，從而增加消費(fèi)者對(duì)原作的選擇;而中等質(zhì)量的創(chuàng)意仿制品則會(huì)降低消費(fèi)者對(duì)原作的滿(mǎn)意度，從而減少消費(fèi)者對(duì)原作的選擇。我們的研究表明，在任者應(yīng)解決中等質(zhì)量的創(chuàng)造性模仿對(duì)客戶(hù)滿(mǎn)意度的挑戰(zhàn)，同時(shí)暫時(shí)容忍低質(zhì)量的創(chuàng)造性模仿。

DOI: 10.1002/smj.3094

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8.What is a pivot? Explaining when and how entrepreneurial firms decide to make strategic change and pivot

什么是軸心?解釋創(chuàng)業(yè)型公司何時(shí)以及如何決定進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)略變革和轉(zhuǎn)向

Jacqueline Kirtley

Siobhan O'Mahony

Research Summary

Most theories of strategic change focus on how large, established firms recognize or fail to recognize the need for strategic change. Little research examines how early‐stage entrepreneurs decide when and how to change their strategies. With a longitudinal field study of seven entrepreneurial firms developing innovations in energy and cleantech, we examined 93 strategic decisions at risk for change. We found that decision‐makers chose to change their strategies only after new information conflicted with or expanded their beliefs. Furthermore, a pivot, or strategic reorientation, was not achieved with a single decision, but by incrementally exiting or adding strategy elements over time, accumulating into a pivot. We contribute a grounded definition of what constitutes a pivot and explain when and how entrepreneurial firms pivot.

大多數(shù)戰(zhàn)略變革理論關(guān)注的是大型、成熟的企業(yè)如何認(rèn)識(shí)到或未能認(rèn)識(shí)到戰(zhàn)略變革的必要性。很少有研究調(diào)查早期創(chuàng)業(yè)者如何決定何時(shí)以及如何改變他們的戰(zhàn)略。通過(guò)對(duì)七家發(fā)展能源和清潔技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的創(chuàng)業(yè)公司進(jìn)行縱向?qū)嵉匮芯?，我們考察?3項(xiàng)面臨變革風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的戰(zhàn)略決策。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，決策者只有在新信息與他們的信念相沖突或擴(kuò)大了他們的信念后，才會(huì)選擇改變他們的策略。此外，一個(gè)支點(diǎn)或戰(zhàn)略調(diào)整不是通過(guò)一個(gè)單一的決策來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)的，而是通過(guò)隨著時(shí)間的推移逐步退出或添加戰(zhàn)略元素，積累成一個(gè)支點(diǎn)。我們提供了一個(gè)關(guān)于什么構(gòu)成支點(diǎn)的基礎(chǔ)定義，并解釋了創(chuàng)業(yè)公司何時(shí)以及如何支點(diǎn)。

Managerial Summary

The term “pivot” is used extensively by practitioners and scholars alike, yet little is known about when and how entrepreneurial firms actually choose to change their strategies and when that change constitutes a pivot. We find that entrepreneurial firms choose to change their strategies only after receiving new information that conflicts with or expands their beliefs about their firm or uncertainties they face. However, this is more rare than the norm. Rather than make wholesale change with one decision, firms incrementally exit or add a single element to their strategies. A firm pivots and reorients their strategic direction by reallocating or restructuring the firm's activities, resources, and attention through an accumulated series of decisions to address the on‐going stream of problems and opportunities early‐stage firms confront.

“支點(diǎn)”一詞被從業(yè)者和學(xué)者廣泛使用，但很少有人知道創(chuàng)業(yè)型企業(yè)何時(shí)、如何選擇改變戰(zhàn)略，以及這種改變何時(shí)構(gòu)成支點(diǎn)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，創(chuàng)業(yè)型企業(yè)只有在接收到與他們對(duì)公司的信念或面臨的不確定性相沖突或擴(kuò)大的新信息后，才會(huì)選擇改變戰(zhàn)略。然而，這種情況比正常情況更少見(jiàn)。企業(yè)不是通過(guò)一個(gè)決定進(jìn)行大規(guī)模的改變，而是逐步退出或在戰(zhàn)略中添加單一元素。一個(gè)公司通過(guò)重新分配或重組公司的活動(dòng)、資源和注意力來(lái)調(diào)整其戰(zhàn)略方向，通過(guò)一系列累積的決策來(lái)解決處于早期階段的公司所面臨的持續(xù)不斷的問(wèn)題和機(jī)遇。

DOI: 10.1002/smj.3131

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9.Are U.S. firms becoming more short‐term oriented? Evidence of shifting firm time horizons from implied discount rates, 1980–2013

美國(guó)公司是否會(huì)變得更加具有短期導(dǎo)向性？來(lái)自1980-2013年公司隱含貼現(xiàn)率發(fā)生變化的證據(jù)

Rachelle C. Sampson

Yuan Shi

Research Summary

We provide evidence that investors in U.S. public markets are increasingly discounting firms' expected future cash flows during 1980–2013. This trend is shown not only on average across firms, but also within firms over time after alternative explanations are accounted for. To corroborate a link with firm time horizons, we estimate the relationship between an implied discount rate (“IDR”) and factors relevant to firm long‐term strategy. We find that IDR is correlated in expected ways with firm investments, management incentives, financial health, ownership, and external pressures—measures that have been argued to correlate with firm time horizons. This article represents one of the first attempts to document market‐wide evidence of shortening firm time horizons. These changing horizons bear important implications for firm strategy.

我們提供的證據(jù)表明，美國(guó)公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)的投資者越來(lái)越多地貼現(xiàn)公司在1980-2013年期間的預(yù)期現(xiàn)金流。這一趨勢(shì)不僅在公司間平均表現(xiàn)出來(lái)，而且在考慮了其他解釋后，隨著時(shí)間的推移，在公司內(nèi)部也表現(xiàn)出來(lái)。為了證實(shí)與企業(yè)時(shí)間范圍之間的聯(lián)系，我們估計(jì)了隱含貼現(xiàn)率(“IDR”)與企業(yè)長(zhǎng)期戰(zhàn)略相關(guān)因素之間的關(guān)系。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，IDR與企業(yè)投資、管理層激勵(lì)、財(cái)務(wù)健康、所有權(quán)和外部壓力(這些指標(biāo)一直被認(rèn)為與企業(yè)時(shí)間范圍相關(guān))以預(yù)期的方式相關(guān)。本文是記錄縮短公司時(shí)間范圍的全市場(chǎng)證據(jù)的首次嘗試之一。這些不斷變化的視野對(duì)企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略具有重要意義。

Managerial Summary

Whether U.S. firms have become more short‐term oriented remains an active debate among managers, investors, researchers, and policymakers. In this study, we report that investors have been increasingly discounting the expected future returns of public firms over the last three decades. We find that a firm's discounting rate is explained by signals of its long‐term strategy, including investment decisions, ownership structure, financial health, executive compensation scheme, and short‐term pressures from the external environment. Our findings indicate a market‐wide contraction of firm time horizons, highlighting firm characteristics that suggest how and why firms differ in their time horizons. These demonstrated relationships may help guide firms in devising investment strategies as well as external communications to attract investors that share a firm's preferred time horizon.

美國(guó)公司是否變得更加短視仍然是管理者、投資者、研究人員和政策制定者之間的一個(gè)活躍的爭(zhēng)論。在這項(xiàng)研究中，我們報(bào)告說(shuō)，在過(guò)去30年里，投資者越來(lái)越多地貼現(xiàn)上市公司的預(yù)期未來(lái)回報(bào)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，公司的貼現(xiàn)率是由其長(zhǎng)期戰(zhàn)略信號(hào)來(lái)解釋的，包括投資決策、所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、財(cái)務(wù)健康狀況、高管薪酬方案和來(lái)自外部環(huán)境的短期壓力。我們的研究結(jié)果表明，市場(chǎng)范圍內(nèi)企業(yè)時(shí)間范圍的收縮，突出了企業(yè)特征，說(shuō)明了企業(yè)在時(shí)間范圍上的差異是如何以及為什么。這些關(guān)系可以幫助指導(dǎo)公司制定投資策略，以及外部溝通，以吸引與公司偏好時(shí)間范圍相同的投資者。

DOI: 10.1002/smj.3158

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10.Changing the channel: Digitization and the rise of “middle tail” strategies

渠道轉(zhuǎn)換:數(shù)字化與“中尾”戰(zhàn)略的興起

Mary J. Benner

Joel Waldfogel

Research Summary

Prior research has studied whether digitization shifts demand away from mass‐appeal blockbusters toward a “l(fā)ong tail” of existing products. We extend this work by studying whether digitization influences the products created. Using unique data on movies, we examine whether the reduced costs of production and new digital distribution channels spur producers to create products aimed at smaller audiences. We employ a flexible, transparent, and largely graphical empirical approach to document changes unfolding with digitization. We find growth in both intended blockbuster and long tail products, but also, the rise of a “middle tail,” movies distributed via digital channels, with budgets suggesting commercial intent but well below the averages for theatrical distribution. The new middle tail is largely due to newcomers rather than major incumbents.

先前的研究已經(jīng)研究了數(shù)字化是否會(huì)將需求從具有大眾吸引力的大片轉(zhuǎn)移到現(xiàn)有產(chǎn)品的“長(zhǎng)尾”。我們通過(guò)研究數(shù)字化是否會(huì)影響所創(chuàng)造的產(chǎn)品來(lái)擴(kuò)展這項(xiàng)工作。利用電影的獨(dú)特?cái)?shù)據(jù)，我們研究了制作成本的降低和新的數(shù)字發(fā)行渠道是否會(huì)刺激制片人創(chuàng)造針對(duì)小眾觀眾的產(chǎn)品。我們采用一種靈活、透明且主要是圖形化的經(jīng)驗(yàn)方法來(lái)記錄隨著數(shù)字化而展開(kāi)的變化。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)大片和長(zhǎng)尾產(chǎn)品都在增長(zhǎng)，但“中尾”電影也在增長(zhǎng)，即通過(guò)數(shù)字渠道發(fā)行的電影，其預(yù)算顯示出商業(yè)意圖，但遠(yuǎn)低于院線(xiàn)發(fā)行的平均水平。新的中尾在很大程度上是由于新來(lái)者，而不是主要的在位者。

Managerial Summary

Digitization has reduced the costs to create movies, while also enabling new distribution channels that avoid the high costs of theatrical distribution. With lower costs, movies no longer need to be “blockbusters” at the box office to be financially successful. In this article, we study whether digitization has spurred an increase in lower‐budget movies that are not aimed for release in theaters. We find that digitization has unleashed a large number of very low budget movies that attract little commercial attention (i.e., the “l(fā)ong tail”). However, we also find an increase in a new category of movies with budgets between $100,000 and $10 million, aimed at smaller audiences via new digital distribution channels. We show growth in this “middle tail” following digitization.

數(shù)字化降低了電影制作成本，同時(shí)也催生了新的發(fā)行渠道，從而避免了影院發(fā)行的高額成本。隨著成本的降低，電影不再需要票房上的“大片”來(lái)獲得經(jīng)濟(jì)上的成功。在本文中，我們將研究數(shù)字化是否刺激了非院線(xiàn)發(fā)行的低成本電影的增長(zhǎng)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，數(shù)字化催生了大量低成本電影，這些電影幾乎不吸引商業(yè)關(guān)注(即“長(zhǎng)尾效應(yīng)”)。然而，我們也發(fā)現(xiàn)預(yù)算在10萬(wàn)美元至1000萬(wàn)美元之間的新類(lèi)別電影有所增加，這些電影通過(guò)新的數(shù)字發(fā)行渠道面向較小的觀眾。我們?cè)跀?shù)字化之后的“中間尾巴”中看到了增長(zhǎng)。

DOI: 10.1002/smj.3130

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11.Bad bets: Nonlinear incentives, risk, and performance

錯(cuò)誤的賭注：非線(xiàn)性激勵(lì)、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和績(jī)效

Rui J. P. de Figueiredo

Evan Rawley

Orie Shelef

Research Summary

This article examines the consequences of incentive slope and shape on performance and risk‐taking. It focuses on how slope—incentive intensity—influences risk‐taking, and how shape—nonlinearity—influences performance. We use quasi‐random variation in the context of the hedge‐fund industry to separate slope and shape effects. Our results demonstrate that shape has large and important effects on performance, and that slope affects risk‐taking. The evidence suggests that poor performance in the industry is often due to bad bets—excessive risk‐taking that reduces performance—taken in response to nonlinear incentives. The findings suggest that, although nonlinear incentives are widely used, they can, under certain circumstances, predictably produce pernicious effects on organizational performance.

本文考察了激勵(lì)斜率和形狀對(duì)績(jī)效和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的影響。它著重于斜坡-激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度-如何影響風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)，以及形狀-非線(xiàn)性-如何影響績(jī)效。我們?cè)趯?duì)沖基金行業(yè)的背景下使用準(zhǔn)隨機(jī)變化來(lái)分離斜率和形狀效應(yīng)。我們的研究結(jié)果表明，形狀對(duì)性能有很大而重要的影響，而坡度會(huì)影響風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)。有證據(jù)表明，該行業(yè)表現(xiàn)不佳往往是由于錯(cuò)誤的賭注——過(guò)度冒險(xiǎn)降低了業(yè)績(jī)——對(duì)非線(xiàn)性激勵(lì)的響應(yīng)。研究結(jié)果表明，盡管非線(xiàn)性激勵(lì)被廣泛使用，但在某些情況下，它們可以預(yù)見(jiàn)地對(duì)組織績(jī)效產(chǎn)生有害影響。

Managerial Summary

This article examines how nonlinear incentive contracts—such as contracts that reward performance above a threshold substantially more than below it—influence managerial behavior. Using the hedge‐fund industry, in which nonlinear incentives are ubiquitous, as a laboratory, we find that nonlinear incentive schemes cause managers who are “close” to, but below, the performance threshold to take bad bets—excessive risk‐taking that reduces performance. The findings suggest that, although nonlinear incentives are widely used, they can, under certain circumstances, predictably produce pernicious effects on organizational performance.

本文研究了非線(xiàn)性激勵(lì)契約(例如，對(duì)高于閾值的績(jī)效的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于低于閾值的績(jī)效的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì))如何影響管理行為。以非線(xiàn)性激勵(lì)無(wú)處不在的對(duì)沖基金行業(yè)為實(shí)驗(yàn)室，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)非線(xiàn)性激勵(lì)方案會(huì)導(dǎo)致那些“接近”但低于績(jī)效閾值的經(jīng)理進(jìn)行錯(cuò)誤的押注——過(guò)度承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)會(huì)降低績(jī)效。研究結(jié)果表明，盡管非線(xiàn)性激勵(lì)被廣泛使用，但在某些情況下，它們可以預(yù)見(jiàn)地對(duì)組織績(jī)效產(chǎn)生有害影響。

DOI: 10.1002/smj.3111

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12.Whom should a leader imitate? Using rivalry‐based imitation to manage strategic risk in changing environments

領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者應(yīng)該模仿誰(shuí)?利用基于競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的模仿來(lái)管理不斷變化的環(huán)境中的戰(zhàn)略風(fēng)險(xiǎn)

Dmitry Sharapov

Jan‐Michael Ross

Research Summary

We study the performance implications of dynamic environments for a leader's rivalry‐based imitation efforts in a setting with multiple rivals. We disentangle competitive interactions from environmental changes to show that a leader's simple rules to either imitate the closest rival in terms of attributes (her neighbor) or the closest rival in terms of rank (her challenger) can help to maintain the performance gap to her competitors. Using a computational model and an empirical test, we find that environmental changes alter the trade‐offs between imitation accuracy and the responsiveness to threats from distant rivals. Consequently, when environmental changes are infrequent and minor, neighbor imitation is more effective in maintaining the lead, whereas challenger imitation prevails as environmental changes become more frequent and substantial.

我們研究動(dòng)態(tài)環(huán)境對(duì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者在有多個(gè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的環(huán)境中基于競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的模仿努力的績(jī)效影響。我們將競(jìng)爭(zhēng)相互作用從環(huán)境變化中分離出來(lái)，以表明領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的簡(jiǎn)單規(guī)則，即在屬性方面模仿最接近的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手(她的鄰居)或在級(jí)別方面模仿最接近的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手(她的挑戰(zhàn)者)，可以幫助保持與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的績(jī)效差距。通過(guò)計(jì)算模型和實(shí)證測(cè)試，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)環(huán)境變化改變了模仿精度和對(duì)遠(yuǎn)方競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手威脅的反應(yīng)能力之間的權(quán)衡。因此，當(dāng)環(huán)境變化不頻繁和輕微時(shí)，鄰居模仿在保持領(lǐng)先地位方面更有效，而挑戰(zhàn)者模仿則在環(huán)境變化更頻繁和實(shí)質(zhì)性時(shí)盛行。

Managerial Summary

By showing that imitating a lower‐ranked rival can help a leader to stay ahead, recent research has overturned the common thinking that imitation is only useful for those trying to catch up with the leader. However, these insights come from contexts in which the leader has only one competitor. Can imitation also be effective for a leader competing against multiple rivals, and whom should the leader imitate? We find that imitation can indeed help the leader to maintain their lead against multiple rivals, but that the choice of imitation target matters and should take the competitive environment into account. In relatively stable environments, imitating your most similar rival works best, while imitating whoever is in second place is a more effective approach in changeable environments.

最近的研究表明，模仿排名較低的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手可以幫助領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者保持領(lǐng)先地位，這顛覆了人們普遍認(rèn)為的模仿只對(duì)那些試圖追趕領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的人有用的想法。然而，這些見(jiàn)解來(lái)自于領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者只有一個(gè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的情況。領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者在與多個(gè)對(duì)手競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí)，模仿是否也有效?領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者應(yīng)該模仿誰(shuí)?我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，模仿確實(shí)可以幫助領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者在面對(duì)多個(gè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手時(shí)保持領(lǐng)先地位，但模仿目標(biāo)的選擇很重要，應(yīng)該考慮競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境。在相對(duì)穩(wěn)定的環(huán)境中，模仿最相似的對(duì)手效果最好，而在多變的環(huán)境中，模仿排名第二的人是更有效的方法。

DOI: 10.1002/smj.3120

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13.The effects of strategy and institutions on value creation and appropriation in firms: A longitudinal study of three telecom companies

戰(zhàn)略和制度對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值創(chuàng)造和占有的影響:對(duì)三家電信公司的縱向研究

Philipp Kern

Howard Gospel

Research Summary

Strategic management has come to pay more attention to value creation and appropriation (VCA) among the firm's stakeholders, including customers, capital owners, and employees. Existing research has conceptualized this as a strategic choice bounded by the bargaining power of each stakeholder group, which, we argue, risks misattributing outcomes by neglecting structural constraints. Instead, these dynamics need to be understood within the wider institutional context shaping the behavior of managers and stakeholders. Using a question‐driven mixed‐methods approach, we investigate the evolution of VCA in three telecom companies located in different institutional systems—British Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, and Telecom Italia. Our findings suggest that national institutional and firm strategic effects must be considered together to understand patterns of VCA among stakeholders.

戰(zhàn)略管理越來(lái)越重視企業(yè)利益相關(guān)者(包括客戶(hù)、資本所有者和員工)之間的價(jià)值創(chuàng)造和分配(VCA)?，F(xiàn)有的研究將其定義為一種受每個(gè)利益相關(guān)者群體議價(jià)能力限制的戰(zhàn)略選擇，我們認(rèn)為，忽視結(jié)構(gòu)性約束可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致結(jié)果的錯(cuò)誤歸屬。相反，需要在塑造管理者和利益相關(guān)者行為的更廣泛的制度背景下理解這些動(dòng)態(tài)。使用問(wèn)題驅(qū)動(dòng)混合方法，我們調(diào)查了位于不同制度體系的三家電信公司(英國(guó)電信、德國(guó)電信和意大利電信)VCA的演變。我們的研究結(jié)果表明，要理解利益相關(guān)者之間的VCA模式，必須同時(shí)考慮國(guó)家制度和企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略效應(yīng)。

Managerial Summary

Using an emerging methodology, we quantify how three telecom firms (British Telecom, Deutsche Telecom, and Telecom Italia) have created and distributed economic value since privatization. Our focus is on explaining the extent to which various stakeholders—employees, customers, capital owners, and government—were able to appropriate the value created by the firms. Some similarities are found across the three companies, but we also found major differences. To explain patterns, we bring together (a) strategic decision making by managers within the firm and (b) constraints imposed by institutions outside the firm. We find both to be important, interlinked drivers of distributional patterns. The article gives managers and stakeholders a means to understand major changes and determinants of value creation and distribution.

使用一種新興的方法，我們量化了三家電信公司(英國(guó)電信、德國(guó)電信和意大利電信)自私有化以來(lái)如何創(chuàng)造和分配經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值。我們的重點(diǎn)是解釋不同的利益相關(guān)者——員工、客戶(hù)、資本所有者和政府——能夠在多大程度上利用公司創(chuàng)造的價(jià)值。這三家公司之間存在一些相似之處，但我們也發(fā)現(xiàn)了重大差異。為了解釋這些模式，我們將(a)企業(yè)內(nèi)部管理者的戰(zhàn)略決策和(b)企業(yè)外部機(jī)構(gòu)施加的限制結(jié)合在一起。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)兩者都是重要的、相互關(guān)聯(lián)的分布模式驅(qū)動(dòng)因素。本文為管理者和利益相關(guān)者提供了一種理解價(jià)值創(chuàng)造和分配的主要變化和決定因素的方法。

DOI: 10.1002/smj.3129

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