正文翻譯
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What gave Japan the idea they could defeat the United States during WWII, and who ordered the attack?

是什么讓日本認為他們可以二戰(zhàn)中打敗美國，又是誰下令發(fā)動攻擊的？

評論翻譯
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Dave Hiatt, former HPC Distributing Computing, CS/Physics Degrees
Answered Aug 9
What gave them the idea? The Japanese leadership developed the plan in an echo chamber, where only true believers were allowed to participate and all others who expressed doubt or disagreed were filtered out and removed from leadership positions in the civilian and military governments/institutions.
According to post war interviews with Emperor Hirohito it was Tojo who ordered the attack to take place prior to delivering a declaration of war to the US.

是什么給了他們這樣的想法? 日本領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層在一個私下制定了這個計劃，只有真正的信徒才被允許參與，所有其他表達懷疑或不同意的人都被過濾掉，并從文官系統(tǒng)和軍事政府/機構(gòu)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)職位上移除掉。
根據(jù)戰(zhàn)后對裕仁天皇的采訪，是東條英機在向美國宣戰(zhàn)之前下令發(fā)動攻擊的。

The Japanese did not expect to “defeat” the United States in a protracted war.
Rather their plan was to hit the US Naval Fleet (which was stationed in Pearl Harbor) and render it ineffective for a period of time (their thinking was from between 6 - 18 months). During that period of time their plan was to hit the Far East possessions of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the US possessions of the Philippines, Wake, Guam, and Midway, and take the Solomon Islands, and Eastern New Guinea.

日本人沒想在一場曠日持久的戰(zhàn)爭中“打敗”美國。
相反，他們的計劃是打擊美國海軍艦隊( 駐扎在珍珠港 )，并在一段時間內(nèi)使其失去戰(zhàn)斗力 ( 他們的想法是6到18個月)，在那段時間里，他們的計劃是襲擊英國、法國、荷蘭的遠東屬地，以及美國屬地菲律賓、威克島、關(guān)島和中途島，并占領(lǐng)所羅門群島和新幾內(nèi)亞東部。

Their thinking was that this would allow them to form a defensive perimeter facing the US made of island strong points stretching from Midway in the North, through the Solomon''s, and across Dutch East Indies (current day Indonesia). It would also effectivly remove Australia and New Zealand as threats and make US, Australian, and New Zealand support problematic.
With this US facing defense in place they would move from Indochina (current day Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam), through Thailand, Burma, and into and through India.

他們的想法是，這將使他們能夠形成一個面向美國的防御外圍陣地，這些外圍陣地由北部的中途島，穿過所羅門群島，橫跨東印度尼西亞荷屬東印度(今天的印度尼西亞) 構(gòu)成，將有效地消除澳大利亞和新西蘭的威脅，使得美國、澳大利亞和新西蘭的支持成為一個問題。
在這種情況下，美國將不得不進入防御狀態(tài)，他們將從印度支那 ( 今天的老撾、柬埔寨和越南)，通過泰國、緬甸，并進入和通過印度。

The thinking was that this would allow them to secure oil reserves (Indonesia), rubber (Indochina), and markets India (as a vassal state). And then turn their attention back to pacifying the parts of China they decided to keep as a colonial empire.
The plan assumed that the US, after recovering would look at this fortified Far Eastern wall would conclude that it would not be worth the trouble and money to try and take back and accept a Japanese proposed partition of the Pacific in return for peace and no further attacks from the IJN (Japanese Navy).
THAT was the plan. As I have said in other posts, the problem with a plan no matter how good is; “No plan survives first contact with reality”. And this one wasn’t that good, and definitely did not.

他們的想法是，這將使他們獲得石油儲備(印度尼西亞)、橡膠(印度支那半島)和市場(印度，作為一個附庸國)，然后把注意力轉(zhuǎn)回安撫他們決定作為殖民地帝國保留的中國部分地區(qū)。
該計劃假定，美國在恢復(fù)之后，將重新審視這道防御嚴密的“ 遠東墻”，并得出結(jié)論認為，美國將接受日本提出的分割太平洋的提議，以換取和平，不再受到日本海軍的攻擊。
這就是日本的全盤計劃，正如我在其他文章中所說的，這個計劃的問題在于，不管其計劃得有多好，“沒有計劃能在與現(xiàn)實的第一次接觸中幸存”，這一計劃不算好，也絕對行不通。

Japan, even if their plan worked to perfection, still had to move raw materials and oil to an island nation, making that transit subject to naval attack.
The Japanese planners failed to grasp that army units holding strong point islands is not the same kind of overlapping defense as strong point units on land were the units can move to support one another.

日本，即使他們的計劃完美實施，仍然不得不將原材料和石油轉(zhuǎn)移到一個島國，這使得原材料和石油的運輸受到海軍的攻擊。
日本的規(guī)劃者沒有意識到，占據(jù)據(jù)點島嶼的軍隊不同于陸地上的據(jù)點部隊，后者可以互相支援。

The only mobile support was Naval and Naval airpower. So when the Japanese quickly lost Naval superiority at Midway and lost air superiority with the arrival of the F6F Hellcat fighter, and then faced US air supremacy, the whole concept of interlocking support islands fell to pieces. Many island “strong points” simply became “island prisons” that were just passed by and left to sit with hundreds of thousands of soldiers effectively taken prisoner without anyone having to fire a shot.

其唯一的機動支援是海軍和海軍的空中力量，因此，日本在中途島之戰(zhàn)后迅速失去海軍優(yōu)勢，隨著 F6F 地獄貓戰(zhàn)機的到來而失去空中優(yōu)勢，然后面對美國的制空權(quán)，連鎖支援島的整個概念就瓦解了，許多島嶼”要塞”變成”島嶼監(jiān)獄” ，一路下去，一槍不發(fā)幾十萬士兵被俘。

They also totally misjudged what the civilian reaction to the attack would be and the extent to which the attack rather than cow the US, actually energized a willingness to carry the war directly to Japan,.
They also completely misunderstood how fast and how many ships the US could build. By 1945, the US had 150+ aircraft carriers deployed (of all classes from escort to fleet carriers), and a Navy of over 11,000 ships and landing craft of all sizes, and the US Navy was the 2nd largest air force on the planet (after the US Army Air Force).

他們還完全錯誤地判斷了平民對此次襲擊的反應(yīng)，這次襲擊沒有嚇倒美國，反而激發(fā)了直接向日本發(fā)動戰(zhàn)爭的意愿。
他們還完全誤判了美國的建造速度和數(shù)量，到1945年，美國部署了150多艘航空母艦( 從護航到攻擊航空母艦的所有級別)，擁有11000多艘船只和各種大小的登陸艇，美國海軍是地球上第二大空軍( 僅次于美國陸軍空軍)。

Kelly La Rue, I''m an American
upxed Aug 2
The Japanese leadership never intended to defeat, much less occupy the United States. They knew that was impossible. We didn’t know that and many Americans were in a panic fearing an invasion of the West Coast. This fear is the reason we rounded up and imprisoned Japanese civilians.
They did, like a number of other countries since, vastly underestimate our backbone, fighting spirit, and determination. They were contemptuous of our “softness”. We were not soft, just different, and nicer. If you don’t understand what I mean by nicer then that’s another question.
They hoped they could cow the United States long enough to complete their ambitions in Asia which were threefold:

日本領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人從未想過要打敗美國，更不用說占領(lǐng)美國了，他們知道這是不可能的。?
但我們不知道這一點，許多美國人因擔(dān)心西海岸會受到入侵而陷入恐慌，這種恐懼是我們圍捕和囚禁日本平民的原因。
他們確實像許多其他國家一樣，大大低估了我們的骨氣、戰(zhàn)斗精神和決心，他們輕視我們的“溫柔”，我們并不軟弱，只是與眾不同，而且更強，如果你不明白我說的更強是什么意思，那就是另一個問題了。
他們希望有足夠長的時間威嚇美國，以實現(xiàn)他們在亞洲的三重野心：

One: Conquer China and the other Southeast Asian countries down to and eventually to include Australia and the Midway Islands.
Two: Turn the Pacific into a Japanese lake. To this end they even invaded and held part of the Alaskan Aleutian Islands.
Three: Hand the US and her Allies a fait accompli. Once done they thought we would accept that they were the de facto ruler of all the territories they held.
The plan was ambitious but not impossible. But for some critical mistakes during the Pearl Harbor attack they might have succeeded. These mistakes was also threefold:
One: They didn’t get the carriers. These same carriers ended up tearing the heart out of their offensive naval arm and killing any chance of keeping their gains.
Two: They didn’t make a third raid to take out the maintenance arms and fuel storage thus allowing us to keep our fleet operating in the Pacific.
Three: Again they underestimated what we were capable of once they pissed us off.

第一：征服中國和其他東南亞國家，最終包括澳大利亞和中途島。
第二：把太平洋變成日本內(nèi)海，為此，他們甚至入侵并占領(lǐng)了部分阿拉斯加阿留申群島。
第三：給美國及其盟國一個既成事實，一旦這樣做，他們認為我們會接受他們是這些領(lǐng)土的實際統(tǒng)治者。

這個計劃雄心勃勃，但并非不可能。
如果不是偷襲珍珠港期間的一些重大失誤，他們可能已經(jīng)成功了。
這些錯誤也有三方面：
第一：他們沒有干掉航母，正是這些航母最終撕裂了他們進攻性海軍的心臟，扼殺了他們保留任何戰(zhàn)果的機會。
第二：他們沒有進行第三次襲擊來摧毀維護武器和燃料儲存，從而使我們的艦隊得以在太平洋上繼續(xù)運作。
第三：他們低估了我們的能力，他們?nèi)敲宋覀儭?br/>

Japan was not militarily or economically powerful enough to fight a long war against the United States, and the Japanese military knew this. Its attack on Pearland Harbor was a tremendous gamble — and though the short-run gamble was successful, the long-run gamble was lost because the Japanese were wrong about the American reaction.?

日本在軍事和經(jīng)濟上都不夠強大，無法與美國打一場持久戰(zhàn)，日本軍方對此心知肚明。
它對珍珠港的攻擊是一場巨大的賭博——雖然短期的賭博是成功的，但長期的賭博是失敗的，因為日本人對美國的反應(yīng)的認識是錯誤的。

After the Battle of Midway the Japanese were defeated. It just took them a few years of further defeats to accept this. Actually even after they realized they had lost the war they didn’t surrender, partly because of their ideology but also for a more practical reason. They were holding out for a treaty that allowed them to keep at least some of their gains.

中途島戰(zhàn)役之后，日本人被打敗了，花費數(shù)年時間，他們只能接受這個事實。
事實上，即使他們意識到他們輸?shù)袅藨?zhàn)爭，他們也沒有投降，部分原因是他們的意識形態(tài)，但也有更實際的原因，他們堅持要求簽訂一項條約，允許他們保留至少一部分所得。

Roosevelt and Truman were having none of that. They either surrendered unconditionally meaning the US would set the whatever terms it liked giving Japan no say in whether they kept the emperor or not or it was the possibility of complete destruction. This was a hard one to swallow and they weren’t going to until the Emperor, so horrified after the bombs destroyed two important cities, realizing Japan might be turned into a cinder, insisted they accept Allied terms. It is possible the entry of the Soviet unx into the war played a part in the decision but the Emperor in his announcement to his people credits the bomb for his decision.

羅斯福和杜魯門都拒絕接受，他們要么無條件投降，這意味著將由美國按照喜好設(shè)定條件，日本在是否保留天皇的問題上沒有發(fā)言權(quán)，要么就是完全毀滅。
這是一個難以接受的事實，直到原子彈摧毀兩座重要城市后，天皇深感震驚，意識到日本可能會變成一片廢墟，他們只能接受盟軍的條件，蘇聯(lián)加入戰(zhàn)爭可能在這個決定中起了一定作用，但是天皇在他對人民的通告中把這個決定完全歸結(jié)于原子彈。

Neal Elkind, I was lucky enough to meet a man that survived Iwo Jima
Answered Jul 31
That’s a damn good question. It’s not so much they believed they could defeat the US, but their opinion of us was that we were lazy, indifferent, and had no stomach for war.
Admiral Yamamoto who had lived in the US and knew the capabilities of our production cautioned the Japanese leaders “do not underestimate the power of America and what their capable of”.
The problem that Japan faced was called victory disease, they had never lost a war or battle, and had defeated Russia in the war of 1905, and were starting to believe their own propaganda.

這是個好問題。?
他們并不認為自己能打敗美國，但他們對我們的看法是，我們懶惰、漠不關(guān)心，對戰(zhàn)爭沒有胃口。
曾在美國生活過、了解我們生產(chǎn)能力的山本海軍上將告誡日本領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，“不要低估美國的力量及其能力”。
日本這種病叫“ 勝利病”，他們自覺從未輸過一場戰(zhàn)爭或戰(zhàn)斗，并在1905年的戰(zhàn)爭中擊敗了俄羅斯，開始深信自己的宣傳。

Yamamoto was asked to devise a plan for taking out the US right from the start, and he along with trusted aides came up with the Pearl Harbor attack. He did expressly made it clear that Japan declare war before the attack.
He also said I can guarantee that for 6 months we will run wild and take all we attack, and damn if 6 months later the Midway day disaster started the eventual demise of japan. It’s rather spooky when you think about it how exact he was in this prediction he made?
Well we know that no declaration was made, and he said “I’m afraid all we have done is awakened a sleeping giant, and filled him with a terrible resolve”. How true he was, and 3 1/2 years later japan had been pulverized by a lazy, weak, and indifferent nation.

山本被要求從一開始就設(shè)計一個消滅美國的計劃，他和他信任的助手一起想出了偷襲珍珠港的計劃，他明確表示日本在進攻之前就宣戰(zhàn)了。
他還說，我可以保證，6個月內(nèi)我們會瘋狂地進攻，該死的，6個月后中途島的災(zāi)難最終導(dǎo)致日本的滅亡，當你想到他在這個預(yù)言中有多么精確時，你會不會覺得相當恐怖？
我們都知道日本沒有宣戰(zhàn)，但他說： “恐怕我們所做的只是喚醒了一個沉睡的巨人，并使他產(chǎn)生了可怕的決心?！?，三年半以后，日本被一個懶惰、軟弱、漠不關(guān)心的國家粉碎了。

Kevin Delamer, Professor of Strategy at US Naval War College (2007-present)
Answered Nov 3
Japan was guilty of what some strategists call scxt writing. In both the Russo-Japanese and Sino-Japanese Wars, Japan took on numerically a financially more powerful adversaries. In both cases, an initial surprise attack neutralized the opponent’s navy. This had a demoralizing effect on the adversary. Each time, Japan fought a limited war against a diplomatically isolated opponent.

日本犯了一些戰(zhàn)略家所說的“劇本錯誤”，無論是日俄戰(zhàn)爭還是中日戰(zhàn)爭，日本都在數(shù)量上和經(jīng)濟上更強大的對手較量，這兩場戰(zhàn)爭中，最初的突然襲擊都會使對手的海軍失去作用，這對敵人的士氣產(chǎn)生了打擊， 每一次，日本都是與一個外交上孤立的對手進行一場有限的戰(zhàn)爭。

Jay Faulkner, lives in The United States of America
upxed Dec 3
I believe it was likely their experience with Russian empire during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese war. The Russians had the resources to win, but they were mostly located in Europe. The Japanese defeated what the Russians were able to get to Asia. The Russians then gave up.

我認為這很可能是他們在1904年至1905年間與俄羅斯帝國打交道的日俄戰(zhàn)爭，俄羅斯人擁有獲勝的資源，但他們大部分力量在歐洲，日本人打敗了俄國人，然后俄國人放棄了。

I believe the Japanese hoped that something similar would happen with the United States. In other words, the Japanese didn''t believe they could win a long sustained war. They thought they would inflict a lot of early, smashing defeats and leave the US faced with a Pacific fortress area that would take years to reconquer. They thought the Americans would then just negotiate a peace deal and live with it.

我相信日本希望類似的事情會發(fā)生在美國身上，換句話說，日本人不相信他們（美國）能夠贏得一場持久的戰(zhàn)爭，他們認為，日本可以造成美國早期的慘敗，讓美國面對一個需要多年才能重新征服的太平洋要塞地區(qū)，他們認為美國人會通過談判達成和平協(xié)議，然后接受這個協(xié)議。

The Japanese lived in an isolated, racially homogeneous society that left them rather ethnocentric. They regarded the diverse population of the United States as a weakness, i.e. a people who couldn''t get on the same page and withstand the rigors of war long enough to win a difficult, sustained fight over a period of years.

日本人生活在一個孤立的、種族單一的社會，這使他們相當具有種族中心主義，他們認為美國多元化的人口是一個弱點，也就是說，日本人認為美國無法達成社會共識，無法經(jīng)受住戰(zhàn)爭的嚴酷考驗，無法在長達數(shù)年的時間里贏得艱難而持久的戰(zhàn)斗。

Japan''s Navy was skeptical of this view because many of its higher ranking officers had been groomed by the service to have experience living/working abroad. Yet, the Army was the key decider in this case, and its officers were as insular as the broader Japanese population, and probably even more so.

日本海軍對這種觀點持懷疑態(tài)度，因為許多高級軍官都是由海軍培養(yǎng)出來的，他們都有在國外生活和工作的經(jīng)驗，然而，軍隊是這次事件的關(guān)鍵決策者，其軍官與廣大日本民眾一樣保守，甚至可能更加保守。

The key goal of the Japanese was to secure natural resources sufficient to sustain its hold over those parts of China that it had conquered. They had two choices to attain those resources: attack the Soviet unx or attack the European and American colonies of Asia. The Japanese Army had been defeated by the Soviet Red Army in 1938 and again in 1939. These disastrous outcomes had made believers out of the Japanese Army. Its leaders thought that attacking the Europeans and Americans would be the easier path to victory.

日本人的主要目標是獲得足夠的自然資源，以維持其對中國等被其征服的地區(qū)的控制。?
要獲得這些資源，他們有兩個選擇：要么進攻蘇聯(lián)，要么進攻歐洲和美洲的亞洲殖民地。?
日本軍隊在1938年和1939年先后被蘇聯(lián)紅軍打敗，這些災(zāi)難性的后果使得日本軍隊認為此路不通，其領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人認為攻擊歐洲人和美國人才是通往勝利的捷徑。

The Pearl Harbour attack was meant to cripple said naval assets so that Japan could continue its plans as well planned. They believed that the US would take about 1 to 2 years to recover from the attack and by then most major territories would have been occupied and fortified thus not allowing the US a suitable landing zone for intervention.

襲擊珍珠港是為了削弱上述海軍力量，以便日本能夠繼續(xù)其精心策劃的計劃，他們認為美國需要1到2年的時間才能從攻擊中恢復(fù)過來，到那時大多數(shù)地方都已被日本占領(lǐng)并加固，美國會找不到合適的登陸區(qū)進行干預(yù)。