中文目錄?（機翻）
1.現(xiàn)代信息技術的經(jīng)濟后果研究（JAR）
2.強制性非財務披露的財務影響研究（JAR）
3.財務報告質量與短視投資（TAR）
4.誓言與公司財務報告質量（TAR）
5.國際財務報告準則與宏觀經(jīng)濟預測（TAR）
6.政府任命監(jiān)督員對公司的影響效應（JAR）

1.The Real Effects of Modern Information Technologies: Evidence from the EDGAR Implementation

Using the implementation of the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system from 1993 to 1996 as a shock to information dissemination technologies, we examine how a significant reduction in disclosure processing costs affects the real economy. We find that the EDGAR implementation leads to an increase in corporate investment and that this effect is concentrated in value firms. We provide evidence that improved equity financing and enhanced managerial incentives are likely the underlying mechanisms. Specifically, the EDGAR implementation leads to an increase in a firm's stock liquidity, a decrease in the cost of equity capital, and an increase in the level of equity financing. Consistent with the monitoring effect of broad information dissemination, the EDGAR implementation leads to an increase in a firm's operating performance. Our findings suggest that it is important to consider information dissemination beyond information production when examining the real effects of corporate disclosures.

2.The Financially Material Effects of Mandatory Nonfinancial Disclosure

Complaints from institutional investors suggest that principles-based disclosure regimes that rely on financial materiality standards produce inadequate nonfinancial environmental and social (E&S) information. Using the staggered introduction of 40 country-level regulations that mandate disclosure, I document that reporting E&S information relates to increased investment from institutional owners and has material effects on firms’ investment and financing decisions. Firms mandated to disclose E&S information allocate more investment toward long-term, innovative projects and raise more equity capital. Evidence indicates that disclosure attracts long-term–oriented institutional clientele with E&S preferences, which then feeds back on firm decision making. Although the effects of nonfinancial disclosure are similar to those of improved financial disclosure, this clientele mechanism is unique. Taken together, these results suggest that jurisdictions that rely solely on financial materiality disclosure standards create nonfinancial information frictions with material effects on investors and firm decision making.

3.Financial Reporting Quality and Myopic Investments: Theory and Evidence

We present theory and empirical evidence that greater financial reporting quality can incentivize myopic investments. In the model, greater financial reporting quality increases investor response to earnings, elevating the manager’s incentive to invest myopically to improve earnings. Using the setting of Big N auditors’ acquisitions of non-Big Ns, which increased investor response to earnings for the acquired client firms, we find evidence supporting myopic investments. Specifically, acquired clients decrease intangible investments, particularly when (1) the increase in investor response to earnings is larger and (2) the horizon of shareholders is shorter. The investment decrease is inefficient, as evidenced by reduced profitability, fewer exploratory innovations, and other measures.

4.When Executives Pledge Integrity: The Effect of the Accountant’s Oath on Firms’ Financial Reporting

We study the effect of executives’ pledges of integrity on firms’ financial reporting outcomes by exploiting a 2016 regulation that requires holders of Dutch professional accounting degrees to pledge an integrity oath. We identify chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) required to take the integrity oath and find that firms reduce income-increasing discretionary accruals after executives took the oath. These firms also reduce discretionary expenditures, indicating that oath-taking executives reduce overall earnings management and do not merely substitute accruals-based with real-activities earnings management. These effects are concentrated in firms where the CFO took the oath. Overall, our results indicate that integrity oaths for executives improve firms’ financial reporting quality.

5.International Financial Reporting Standards and the Macroeconomy

Using a generalized aggregate-level difference-in-differences analysis across 32 countries over the 1991–2017 period, we find that the ability of aggregate earnings to predict one-year ahead GDP growth is greater for countries that adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) than those that did not. IFRS adoption also enables aggregate earnings to better predict growth in GDP components and related factors. We show that aggregate accruals drive this effect, not aggregate cash flows. The mechanism for the enhanced predictive ability of IFRS-based aggregate earnings for future GDP growth is due to fair value-based accruals, which we proxy with IFRS-driven special items. In additional analyses, we find that our main results are stronger for adopting countries with greater differences between local accounting standards and IFRS and robust to controls for enforcement. Our findings suggest that IFRS adoption improves aggregate earnings’ ability to reflect fundamental economic news in a timely manner.

6.Out of Site, Out of Mind? The Role of the Government-Appointed Corporate Monitor

We study the role of a relatively new type of external firm monitor, an on-site government-appointed Corporate Monitor, and assess whether such appointments reduce firms' propensity to violate laws. Using a sample of deferred and non-prosecution agreements, we first document the determinants of Monitor-appointment. We find firms that voluntarily disclose wrongdoing and have more independent directors are less likely to have Corporate Monitors, whereas those with more severe infractions, mandated board changes, and increased cooperation requirements are more likely to have Monitors. We find such appointments are associated with an 18%–25% reduction in violations while the Monitor is on site, however, the effect does not persist after the Monitorship ends. Using a semi-supervised machine learning method to measure changes in firms' ethics and compliance norms, we find that the reduction in violations is associated with changes in ethics and compliance that also do not persist. Finally, we document that firms under Monitorship experience a persistent reduction in innovation, highlighting a previously unexplored cost of these interventions. Overall, our results suggest that, although Corporate Monitors on site are associated with fewer violations, firms revert to previous levels of violations following Monitors' departure.