作者：John Haldon約翰·哈爾頓

出版商：Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

自翻：流瀲紫琳

Outbreak：Why and how did Byzantium fight wars?

爆發(fā)：拜占庭為什么以及如何打仗？

????????? Byzantine generals and rulers were generally fully aware of the relationship between the allocation and redistribution of resources — soldiers, supplies, equipment, livestock and so forth — and the ability of the empire to ward off hostile military action or to strike back at its enemies. Military handbooks and treatises dating from the 6th to the 11th centuries make it apparent that the imbalance in resources between Byzantium and its enemies was recognised. Generals were exhorted not to give battle in unfavourable conditions, because this might lead to waste of life and resources; indeed the dominant motif in these works is that it was the Byzantines who were compelled to manoeuvre, to use delaying tactics, to employ ambushes and other strategems to even the odds stacked against them; but that it was quite clearly a main war aim to win without having to fight a decisive battle. Victory could be achieved through a combination of delaying tactics, intelligent exploitation of enemy weaknesses, the landscape, seasonal factors, and diplomacy. Wars were costly, and for a state whose basic income derived from agricultural production, and which remained relatively stable as well as being vulnerable to both natural and man-made disasters, they were to be avoided if at all possible.

（拜占庭的將軍和統(tǒng)治者都充分意識到資源（士兵、補給、裝備、牲畜等）的分配和再分配與帝國抵御敵對軍事行動或反擊敵人的能力之間的關系。從6 世紀到11世紀的軍事手冊和論文清楚地表明，拜占庭與其敵人之間的資源不平衡已經(jīng)得到承認。告誡將軍不要在不利的情況下戰(zhàn)斗，因為這可能會導致生命和資源的浪費；事實上，這些作品的主要主題是拜占庭人被迫采取行動，使用拖延戰(zhàn)術(shù)，使用伏擊和其他策略來平衡對他們不利的可能性；但這很明顯是一場主要的戰(zhàn)爭，目的是在不必打決戰(zhàn)的情況下取勝。勝利可以通過拖延戰(zhàn)術(shù)、巧妙利用敵人弱點、地形、季節(jié)因素和外交手段相結(jié)合來實現(xiàn)。戰(zhàn)爭代價高昂，對于一個基本收入來自農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)、保持相對穩(wěn)定、易受自然和人為災害影響的國家來說，應該盡可能避免戰(zhàn)爭。）

?????????? Another, closely related, factor in imperial strategic thinking was manpower: from a Byzantine perspective, they were always outnumbered, and strategy as well as diplomacy needed to take this factor into account in dealing with enemies. One way of evening the balance was to reduce enemy numbers: delay the enemy forces until they could no longer stay in the field, destroying or removing any possible sources of provisions and supplies, for example, misleading them with false information about Byzantine intentions, these are all methods which the military treatises recommend. Avoiding battle, which was a keystone of Byzantine strategy, would also increase the possibility that the enemy host might be struck by illness, run out of water and supplies, and so on.

帝國戰(zhàn)略思維中另一個密切相關的因素是人力：從拜占庭的角度來看，他們總是寡不敵眾，在與敵人打交道時，戰(zhàn)略和外交都需要考慮到這一因素。平衡的一種方法是減少敵人數(shù)量：拖延敵軍直到他們無法再留在戰(zhàn)場，摧毀或移除任何可能的補給和補給來源，例如，用有關拜占庭意圖的虛假信息誤導他們，這些都是軍事手冊推薦的方法。避免戰(zhàn)斗是拜占庭戰(zhàn)略的基石，也會增加敵軍生病、缺水和補給等的可能性。

????????? Defence thus had to be the primary concern of Byzantine rulers and generals. Byzantine military dispositions were administered upon a consistent and logistically well-considered basis, and their main purpose was to secure the survival of the empire by deploying the limited resources available to the best effect. They were, necessarily, defensive in orientation, a point noted quite clearly by the mid-10th-century visitor from Italy, the ambassador Liutprand of Cremona, with regard to the precautions taken to secure Constantinople at night, in case of an unexpected enemy attack. The emphasis placed by Byzantine writers and governments on effective and intelligent diplomacy is not just a question of cultural preference informed by a Christian distaste for the shedding of blood: to the contrary, the continued existence of the state depended upon the deployment of a sophisticated diplomatic arsenal. The whole history of Byzantine foreign relations and both the theory and practice of Byzantine diplomacy reflect this. Diplomacy had its military edge, of course: good relations with the various peoples of the steppe were essential to Byzantine interests in the Balkans and Caucasus, because a weapon might thereby be created that could he turned on the enemies of the empire. Such contacts were also an essential source of information, of course, and much effort was expended in gathering information that might be relevant to the empire's defence.

（因此，防御必須是拜占庭統(tǒng)治者和將軍們的首要關注點。拜占庭軍事部署是在一致且經(jīng)過深思熟慮的基礎上進行管理的，其主要目的是通過部署可用的有限資源以達到最佳效果，從而確保帝國的生存。它們在方向上必然是防御性的，這一點被 10 世紀中葉來自意大利的訪問者、克雷莫納大使柳特普蘭德清楚地指出，關于在夜間保護君士坦丁堡采取的預防措施，以防敵人突然襲擊。拜占庭作家和政府對有效和明智的外交的重視不僅僅是基督教對流血的厭惡所傳達的文化偏好問題：相反，國家的持續(xù)存在取決于部署復雜的外交寶庫。拜占庭外交的整個歷史以及拜占庭外交的理論和實踐都反映了這一點。當然，外交有其軍事優(yōu)勢：與大草原上的各個民族保持良好關系對于拜占庭在巴爾干和高加索地區(qū)的利益至關重要，因為這樣可能會制造出一種武器來對付帝國的敵人。當然，這種聯(lián)系也是重要的信息來源，并且在收集可能與帝國防御相關的信息方面花費了大量精力。）

???????? Going to war was thus rarely the result of a planned choice made by emperors or their advisers, for the empire was perpetually threatened from one quarter or another, and was thus in a constant state of military preparedness. The difference between war and peace in the frontier areas became a matter, not of the state of the empire as a whole in relation to a particular neighbouring power, but rather of the part of the empire in which one found oneself. While recovery of former territories was permanently on the ideological agenda, efforts to implement it reflected an ad hoc reaction to an unforeseen advantage gained through victories in battle and the exploitation of favourable circumstances. In real terms, the potential for the reconquest and restoration of lost territories was severely limited. Strategy was determined by the interplay between resources and political beliefs, tempered by ideological pragmatism: most Byzantine warfare was fought not on the basis of delivering a knock-out blow to the enemy, but on that of attempting to reach or maintain a state of parity or equilibrium, though attrition, raid and counter-raid, and destruction of the enemy's short-term potential. Members of the government and imperial court may have shared common ideals in respect of their relations with the outside world; but the strategic dispositions of the armies of the later Roman and Byzantine empire were not necessarily arranged with these concerns as a priority.

因此，發(fā)動戰(zhàn)爭很少是皇帝或他們的顧問做出有計劃選擇的結(jié)果，因為帝國永遠受到來自各個方面的威脅，因此一直處于軍事準備狀態(tài)。邊疆地區(qū)的戰(zhàn)爭與和平之間的區(qū)別成為一個問題，不是整個帝國相對于特定鄰國的狀況，而是一個人所處的帝國部分。雖然恢復舊領土一直在意識形態(tài)議程上，但實施它的努力反映了對通過戰(zhàn)斗勝利和利用有利環(huán)境獲得的不可預見的優(yōu)勢的臨時反應。實際上，重新征服和恢復失去的領土的潛力非常有限。戰(zhàn)略由資源和政治信仰之間的相互作用決定，并受到意識形態(tài)實用主義的影響：大多數(shù)拜占庭戰(zhàn)爭不是基于對敵人的致命打擊，而是基于試圖達到或維持均等狀態(tài)或平衡，雖然消耗，突襲和反突襲，以及敵人的短期潛力的破壞。政府和朝廷成員在與外界的關系方面可能有著共同的理想；但后來羅馬帝國和拜占庭帝國軍隊的戰(zhàn)略部署不一定以這些關注為優(yōu)先事項。

????????? Resources were a key element in strategic thinking, for obvious reasons - armies cannot fight without adequate supplies, equipment, training and shelter. But warfare was not necessarily conducted with a purely material advantage in mind, since ideological superiority played an important role in Byzantine notions of their own identity and role in the order of things; nor was it conducted with any longer-term strategic objective in mind. Any damage to the enemy was a good thing, but some ways of hitting the enemy also carried an ideological value strategically wasteful attacks against symbolically important enemy fortresses or towns were carried out by all medieval rulers at one time or another, since the short-term propaganda value, associated perhaps also with a raising of morale, was often considered as valuable as any real material gains. By the same token, some theatres were ideologically more important than others. Fighting the barbarians in the Balkans and north of the Danube was regarded as much less prestigious and glorious than combating the religious foe, the Muslims in the east: an 11th-century writer remarks: 'There seemed nothing grand (in fighting) the barbarians in the West ..., but were he (the emperor Romanos III) to turn to those living in the east, he thought that he could perform nobly ...'

（資源是戰(zhàn)略思維的關鍵要素，原因顯而易見——如果沒有足夠的補給、裝備、訓練和住所，軍隊就無法作戰(zhàn)。但是，戰(zhàn)爭不一定是為了純粹的物質(zhì)優(yōu)勢，因為意識形態(tài)優(yōu)勢在拜占庭關于他們自己的身份和事物秩序的觀念中發(fā)揮了重要作用。也沒有考慮到任何更長期的戰(zhàn)略目標。對敵人造成任何傷害都是好事，但某些打擊敵人的方式也帶有意識形態(tài)價值 對具有象征意義的敵人堡壘或城鎮(zhèn)的戰(zhàn)略性浪費攻擊是所有中世紀統(tǒng)治者一次或另一次進行的，因為短期內(nèi) 宣傳價值，也許還與鼓舞士氣有關，通常被認為與任何真正的物質(zhì)收益一樣有價值。出于同樣的原因，一些劇院在意識形態(tài)上比其他劇院更重要。在巴爾干半島和多瑙河以北與野蠻人作戰(zhàn)，被認為遠不如與宗教敵人、東部的穆斯林作戰(zhàn)那樣有聲望和光榮：一位 11 世紀的作家評論道：“（在戰(zhàn)斗中）西方……但如果他（羅馬諾斯三世皇帝）轉(zhuǎn)向住在東方的人，他認為他可以表現(xiàn)得高貴……”）

????????? There is little evidence that warfare was conducted to gain resources that could then be deployed in a coherent way to further a given strategy, except in the sense that more territory and the wealth that usually accompanied it were desirable in themselves. Warfare was conducted on the basis of inflicting maximum damage to the enemy's economy and material infrastructure - enslavement or killing of populations, destruction of fortifications and urban installations, devastation of the countryside. Equally, measures to protect one's own side had to be taken, and by the middle of the 10th century the Byzantines had developed both aspects of such warfare to a fine art. Both in the war against the Arabs in the cast from the 7th to 10th centuries, and against Slays and Bulgars in the west, Byzantine warfare was conducted effectively on the basis of a struggle of attrition. This is not to suggest that there was never a longer-term strategic aim or ulterior motive at issue - in the case of the accelerated eastward expansion in the 10th century and in the slightly later, but closely related, conquest of Bulgaria under Basil II, it is possible to suggest that this was the case, for example. In the first case, through an aggressive imperialism towards the minor Muslim powers in Syria and Jazira, the extension and consolidation of the empire's territorial strength in the area was clearly an important consideration; in the second case, and partly stimulated by the first development, the creation of a new resource-base for the emperors and Constantinopolitan government, independent of the power and influence of the eastern magnates, was a significant consideration; but it was also in the context of an equally practical decision to eradicate the threat from an independent Bulgaria and reassert imperial dominance throughout the Balkan regions. Both facets of these processes mirror very particular structural tensions within Byzantine state and society, and at the same time they also demonstrate particularly clearly the extent to which the foreign policies and military strategy of a state can reflect power relations within the society as a whole.

（幾乎沒有證據(jù)表明進行戰(zhàn)爭是為了獲得資源，然后可以以連貫的方式部署這些資源以推進特定戰(zhàn)略，除非在某種意義上說，更多的領土和通常伴隨而來的財富本身是可取的。戰(zhàn)爭是在對敵人的經(jīng)濟和物質(zhì)基礎設施造成最大破壞的基礎上進行的——奴役或殺害人口、摧毀防御工事和城市設施、破壞鄉(xiāng)村。同樣，必須采取措施保護自己的一方，到 10 世紀中葉，拜占庭人已將此類戰(zhàn)爭的兩個方面發(fā)展為一門藝術(shù)。無論是在公元 7 世紀到 10 世紀對阿拉伯人的戰(zhàn)爭，還是在西方對殺戮者和保加利亞人的戰(zhàn)爭中，拜占庭戰(zhàn)爭都是在消耗斗爭的基礎上有效地進行的。這并不是說從來沒有長期的戰(zhàn)略目標或不可告人的動機——在 10 世紀加速向東擴張以及稍晚但密切相關的巴西爾二世統(tǒng)治下的保加利亞征服的情況下，例如，有可能表明情況就是如此。在第一種情況下，帝國主義通過對敘利亞和賈茲拉的穆斯林小勢力的侵略，擴大和鞏固帝國在該地區(qū)的領土力量顯然是一個重要的考慮因素；在第二種情況下，部分受到第一種發(fā)展的刺激，為皇帝和君士坦丁堡政府建立一個新的資源基礎，獨立于東方權(quán)貴的權(quán)力和影響，是一個重要的考慮因素；但這也是在消除來自獨立保加利亞的威脅并在整個巴爾干地區(qū)重新確立帝國統(tǒng)治地位的同樣實際決定的背景下。這些過程的兩個方面都反映了拜占庭國家和社會內(nèi)部非常特殊的結(jié)構(gòu)性緊張局勢，同時它們也特別清楚地表明了一個國家的外交政策和軍事戰(zhàn)略在多大程度上可以反映整個社會內(nèi)部的權(quán)力關系。）

????????? Warfare for ideological reasons alone was very rare. Clearly, all defensive warfare could be justified on a range of such grounds - the threat to the empire's territory and population, the challenge to Orthodox rule and God's appointed ruler, the emperor at Constantinople, challenges to Roman sovereignty, and so forth. Offensive or aggressive warfare was, in the Christian Roman empire, a little more difficult to justify, but it was readily accomplished. But there is no doubt that the dominant element in Byzantine military thinking throughout the long history of the empire was defensive, and necessarily so in view of its strategic situation. Byzantium survived as long as it did because it was able to defend itself, intelligently exploit natural frontiers or boundaries in the crisis years of the 7th and 8th centuries, and diplomatic and political relationships thereafter. And whatever the specific details of the process of its political-historical withering away after 1204, the gradual demise of the Byzantine empire went hand-in-hand with its declining ability to muster the resources necessary to defend itself. Strategy was, in practical terms, a matter of pragmatic reaction to events in the world around the empire, only loosely informed by the political-ideological imperatives of the Christian Roman empire. In this respect, the political and strategic conditions of existence of the east Roman or Byzantine state rendered a grand strategy in the narrower sense irrelevant - the strategy of the empire was based on maintaining the conditions appropriate to political, cultural and ideological survival.

（僅出于意識形態(tài)原因的戰(zhàn)爭是非常罕見的。顯然，所有防御性戰(zhàn)爭都可以基于一系列這樣的理由來辯護——對帝國領土和人口的威脅、對東正教統(tǒng)治和上帝指定的統(tǒng)治者、君士坦丁堡皇帝的挑戰(zhàn)，對羅馬主權(quán)的挑戰(zhàn)等等。 在基督教羅馬帝國，進攻性或侵略性戰(zhàn)爭更難以證明其合理性，但它很容易實現(xiàn)。但毫無疑問，在整個帝國漫長的歷史中，拜占庭軍事思想的主導元素是防御性的，考慮到其戰(zhàn)略形勢也必然如此。拜占庭之所以能幸存下來，是因為它能夠自衛(wèi)，在 7 世紀和 8 世紀的危機年代巧妙地利用自然邊界或邊界，以及此后的外交和政治關系。無論 1204 年之后其政治歷史消亡過程的具體細節(jié)如何，拜占庭帝國的逐漸滅亡與其召集必要資源以保衛(wèi)自己的能力下降是密切相關的。實際上，戰(zhàn)略是對帝國周圍世界事件的務實反應，只是對基督教羅馬帝國的政治意識形態(tài)要求有所了解。在這方面，東羅馬或拜占庭國家存在的政治和戰(zhàn)略條件使狹義的大戰(zhàn)略變得無關緊要——帝國的戰(zhàn)略建立在維持適合政治、文化和意識形態(tài)生存的條件之上。）

未完待續(xù)