Journal of Political Economy 2023年第2期

Volume 131, Issue 2

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——更多動態(tài)，請持續(xù)關注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨

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Consumption and Income Inequality in the United States since the 1960s

20世紀60年代以來美國的消費與收入不平等
Bruce D. Meyer & James X. Sullivan

Recent research concludes that the rise in consumption inequality mirrors, or even exceeds, the rise in income inequality. We revisit this finding, constructing improved measures of consumption, focusing on its well-measured components that are reported at a high and stable rate relative to national accounts. While overall income inequality rose over the past 5 decades, the rise in overall consumption inequality was small. The declining quality of income data likely contributes to these differences for the bottom of the distribution. Asset price changes likely account for some of the differences in recent years for the top of the distribution.

最近的研究得出結論，消費不平等的加劇反映了，甚至超過了收入不平等的加劇。我們將重新審視這一發(fā)現(xiàn)，構建改進的消費衡量指標，重點關注相對于國民核算以高而穩(wěn)定的比率報告的、測量良好的組成部分。盡管在過去50年里，總體收入不平等程度有所上升，但總體消費不平等程度的上升幅度很小。收入數據質量的下降可能導致了這些分布底層的差異。資產價格的變化可能是近年來分布頂部的一些差異的原因。

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Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work

讓動態(tài)實現(xiàn)工作
Yi-Chun Chen & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Yifei Sun & Tom Wilkening

We develop a new class of two-stage mechanisms, which fully implement any social choice function under initial rationalizability in complete information environments. We show theoretically that our simultaneous report (SR) mechanisms are robust to small amounts of incomplete information about the state of nature. We also highlight the robustness of the mechanisms to a wide variety of reasoning processes and behavioral assumptions. We show experimentally that an SR mechanism performs well in inducing truth telling in both complete and incomplete information environments and that it can induce efficient investment in a two-sided holdup problem with ex ante investment.

我們開發(fā)了一類新的兩階段機制，在完全信息環(huán)境下，充分實現(xiàn)初始合理化下的任何社會選擇功能。我們從理論上表明，我們的同步報告(SR)機制對有關自然狀態(tài)的少量不完整信息是穩(wěn)健的。我們還強調了該機制對各種各樣的推理過程和行為假設的穩(wěn)健性。實驗表明，SR機制在完全信息環(huán)境和不完全信息環(huán)境中都能很好地誘導說實話，并能在具有事前投資的雙邊停滯問題中誘導有效投資。

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?The Performance of School Assignment Mechanisms in Practice

學校指派機制在實踐中的表現(xiàn)
Monique De Haan & Pieter A. Gautier & Hessel Oosterbeek & Bas van der Klaauw

We use a unique combination of register and survey data from Amsterdam to investigate the performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice. We find that deferred acceptance (DA) results in higher mean welfare than the adaptive Boston mechanism. This is due to students making strategic mistakes. The welfare gain of a switch from actual Boston to DA is over 90% of the welfare difference between actual Boston and optimal (proxy) Boston. Disadvantaged and lower-ability students would benefit most from such a switch.

我們使用阿姆斯特丹的注冊和調查數據的獨特組合來調查學校分配機制在實踐中的表現(xiàn)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，延遲接受(DA)比適應性波士頓機制帶來更高的平均福利。這是因為學生們犯了戰(zhàn)略性錯誤。從實際波士頓到DA轉換的福利收益超過了實際波士頓與最優(yōu)(代理)波士頓之間福利差異的90%。弱勢和能力較低的學生將從這種轉變中受益最大。

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?Sources of Wage Growth

工資增長來源
Jér?me Adda & Christian Dustmann

This paper investigates the sources of wage growth over the life cycle, determined by sectoral and firm mobility, unobserved ability, the accumulation of cognitive-abstract or routine-manual skills, and whether workers enroll in vocational training at the start of their career. Our analysis uses longitudinal administrative data over three decades and shows that routine-manual skills drive early wage growth, while cognitive-abstract skills become more important later. Moreover, job amenities are an important determinant of mobility decisions. Vocational training has long-term effects on career outcomes through various channels and generates returns for both the individual and society.

本文調查了整個生命周期中工資增長的來源，由部門和企業(yè)流動性、不可觀察的能力、認知-抽象或常規(guī)-手工技能的積累，以及工人在職業(yè)生涯開始時是否參加職業(yè)培訓決定。我們的分析使用了30年的縱向行政數據，結果表明，常規(guī)手工技能推動了早期的工資增長，而認知抽象技能在之后變得更加重要。此外，工作便利設施是流動性決策的重要決定因素。職業(yè)培訓通過各種渠道對職業(yè)結果產生長期影響，并為個人和社會帶來回報。

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Costless Information and Costly Verification: A Case for Transparency?

免費的信息和昂貴的驗證:透明度的理由

Deniz Kattwinkel & Jan Knoepfle

A principal has to take a binary decision. She relies on information privately held by an agent who prefers the same action regardless of his type. The principal cannot incentivize with transfers but can learn the agent’s type at a cost. Additionally, the principal privately observes a signal correlated with the agent’s type. Transparent mechanisms are optimal: the principal’s payoff is the same as if her signal was public. A simple cutoff form is optimal: favorable signals ensure the agent’s preferred action. Signals below this cutoff lead to the nonpreferred action unless the agent appeals. An appeal always triggers type verification.

委托人必須做出一個二元的決定。她依靠的是一個代理人私下掌握的信息，而這個代理人不管他的類型如何，都喜歡采取同樣的行動。委托人不能通過轉讓進行激勵，但可以在一定成本下了解代理人的類型。此外，委托人私下觀察與代理人類型相關的信號。透明機制是最優(yōu)的:如果她的信號是公開的，委托人的回報是一樣的。一個簡單的截止形式是最優(yōu)的:有利的信號確保代理的首選行動。低于此截止點的信號將導致非優(yōu)先行動，除非代理人上訴。申訴總是觸發(fā)類型驗證。

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Large-Scale Education Reform in General Equilibrium: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from India

一般均衡下的大規(guī)模教育改革:來自印度的回歸間斷證據
Gaurav Khanna

The economic consequences of large-scale government investments in education depend on general equilibrium effects in both the labor market and the education sector. I develop a general equilibrium model capturing the consequences of massive countrywide schooling initiatives. I provide unbiased estimates of the model’s elasticities, using a regression discontinuity derived from Indian government policy. The earnings returns to a year of education are 13.4%, and the general equilibrium labor market effects substantially depress returns, by 6.6 percentage points. These general equilibrium effects have distributional consequences across cohorts and skill groups, whereby unskilled workers are better off and skilled workers worse off.

政府大規(guī)模教育投資的經濟后果取決于勞動力市場和教育部門的一般均衡效應。我開發(fā)了一個一般均衡模型，捕捉了大規(guī)模全國教育舉措的后果。我利用從印度政府政策中得出的回歸不連續(xù)，對模型的彈性進行了無偏倚的估計。受教育一年的收益回報率為13.4%，而一般均衡勞動力市場效應大大降低了回報，降低了6.6個百分點。這些一般均衡效應在不同群體和技能群體中產生了分配后果，即非技術工人的境況更好，而技術工人的境況更差。

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