The struggle to reinvent a firm trapped by its own mythology

努力重塑一家受困于自己的神話的公司

Jan 26th 2023

Goldman sachs has always seen itself as exceptional. When the bank floated its shares in New York in 1999 it declared: “We have an uncompromising determination to achieve excellence in everything we undertake.” Conspiracy theorists have long paid it the backhanded compliment of imagining that it secretly runs the world. Yet lately the only exceptional thing about the Wall Street icon has been its mistakes.

高盛(Goldman sachs)一直認(rèn)為自己與眾不同。1999年在紐約上市時，它宣布:“ 我們有堅定的決心，要在我們所從事的一切事情上做到卓越?！遍L期以來，陰謀論者一直在諷刺它，認(rèn)為它在秘密地掌握著世界。然而，最近這位華爾街偶像唯一與眾不同的地方就是它的錯誤。

Since October Goldman has made a u-turn on its plan to build a big consumer bank; booked one of its worst quarterly results for a decade, measured by return on equity; and attracted a probe by the Federal Reserve. The firm is not yet in serious trouble, but it is trapped by its own mythology. Its recent struggles show how hard it will be to reform—and illuminate a new balance of power in global finance.

自去年10月以來，高盛對其“建立大型消費者銀行”的計劃做出了180度大轉(zhuǎn)彎的調(diào)整; 并發(fā)布了10年來最糟糕的季度業(yè)績(以股本回報率衡量)之一; 而且還引起了美聯(lián)儲的調(diào)查。這家公司還沒有陷入嚴(yán)重的困境，但它被自己的神話所困。它最近的掙扎表明了改革的難度，并闡明了全球金融領(lǐng)域的新力量平衡。

To understand Goldman today, take a walk down Wall Street. After the financial crisis of 2007-09, two big American banks reinvented themselves. JPMorgan Chase successfully pursued vast scale across a wide range of business lines. Morgan Stanley built a thriving arm managing the assets of the wealthy, which mints reliable profits. Goldman, however, stuck to its game of trading, advising on deals and bespoke investing. Penal new capital rules made this less lucrative, but the firm staked a Darwinian bet that the resulting shakeout would kill off many competitors. Instead, it badly underperformed the stockmarket for years and got ensnared in the 1mdb scandal, in which officials in Malaysia and Abu Dhabi received $1.6bn of bribes in 2009-14. A Goldman subsidiary pleaded guilty to a criminal charge and the firm admitted “institutional failure”.

要理解今天的高盛，就去華爾街走一走。2007年至2009年的金融危機過后，美國兩大銀行進(jìn)行了自我改造。摩根大通成功地在廣泛的業(yè)務(wù)范圍內(nèi)實現(xiàn)了大規(guī)模擴張。摩根士丹利建立了一個蓬勃發(fā)展的部門，管理富人的資產(chǎn)，創(chuàng)造可靠的利潤。然而，高盛堅持自己的交易游戲，為交易提供咨詢以及定制投資。繁重的新資本規(guī)則使得這種做法不那么有利可圖，但該公司押注達(dá)爾文式的賭注，認(rèn)為由此產(chǎn)生的重組將殺死許多競爭對手。相反，該公司多年來的表現(xiàn)嚴(yán)重落后于股市，還被卷入了1MDB（一個馬來西亞發(fā)展公司）的丑聞，即2009年至2014年，馬來西亞和阿布扎比的官員收受了16億美元賄賂。高盛的一家子公司承認(rèn)了一項刑事指控，而且該公司承認(rèn)存在“制度失敗”。

The firm’s boss, David Solomon, took over in 2018. A man with a short fuse, he has tried to rebrand himself and to renew the firm by expanding its core and diversifying into new areas. Goldman now offers transaction banking to multinationals, helping them move funds globally. It has bulked up its asset- and wealth-management arm. And from their Manhattan skyscraper, flush Goldmanites dreamed of growing a mass-market digital bank for ordinary consumers, including a credit-card operation.

該公司的老板大衛(wèi) · 所羅門于2018年上任。作為一個脾氣暴躁的人，他試圖重塑自己的形象，并通過擴大核心業(yè)務(wù)以及在新領(lǐng)域?qū)崿F(xiàn)多樣化來重振公司。高盛現(xiàn)在為跨國公司提供交易銀行業(yè)務(wù)，幫助它們在全球范圍內(nèi)轉(zhuǎn)移資金。它已經(jīng)擴大了其資產(chǎn)和財富管理部門。在他們位于曼哈頓的摩天大樓里，富裕的高盛人夢想著為普通消費者發(fā)展一個大眾市場的數(shù)字銀行，包括信用卡業(yè)務(wù)。

Parts of Mr Solomon’s strategy have paid off. Goldman’s market share in mergers and bond trading has risen, helping it make a monster $21bn in profits in 2021 as markets boomed. From taxpayers’ viewpoint, it is safer, with more capital and deposits. And, importantly, its share price has recovered lost ground, rising more than the market and those of most of its peers.

所羅門先生的部分策略得到了回報。高盛在并購和債券交易領(lǐng)域的市場份額有所上升，在市場繁榮的2021年，幫助該公司實現(xiàn)了驚人的210億美元利潤。從納稅人的角度來看，它更安全，有更多的資本和存款。而且，重要的是，該公司股價已經(jīng)收復(fù)“失地”，其上漲幅度超過了市場和大多數(shù)同行。

Yet look more closely and the project to remake the bank is vexingly incomplete. Diversification has been patchy: transaction-banking revenues are tiny and the asset-management arm is often dragged down by opaque proprietary bets. The dream of creating a consumer bank has soured. Goldman has 15m customers, but has also faced large losses and bad-debt charges, which is why it is now winding down part of the operation.

然而，如果仔細(xì)觀察，就會發(fā)現(xiàn)，“重塑”銀行的計劃并不完整，這令人惱火。多樣化也參差不齊: 交易銀行收入很少，資產(chǎn)管理部門經(jīng)常被不透明的自營押注拖垮。打造消費者銀行的夢想已經(jīng)破滅。高盛擁有1500萬客戶，但也面臨著巨額虧損和壞賬指控，這就是為什么它現(xiàn)在正在逐步縮減部分業(yè)務(wù)。

As the prospects for a big new earnings machine have receded, everything still rests on the traditional business. The profitability of the trading arm has improved but remains volatile and, on average, pedestrian. Overall, Goldman has made reasonable use of its resources, generating a return on tangible equity of 14% over Mr Solomon’s tenure. But its performance is erratic, veering from 33% in early 2021 to just 5% in the latest quarter. It has lagged behind its American peers half of the time, and the two industry leaders, JPMorgan and Morgan Stanley, two-thirds of the time. Investors think that Goldman is worth only the net book—or liquidation—value of its assets, suggesting they doubt that it can generate consistently high returns or find lucrative new areas.

隨著大型新盈利機器的前景變得黯淡，一切仍取決于傳統(tǒng)業(yè)務(wù)。交易部門的盈利能力有所改善，但波動性仍然很大，平均而言，表現(xiàn)也很平庸?？偟膩碚f，高盛合理利用了它的資源，在所羅門先生的任期內(nèi)產(chǎn)生了14% 的有形資產(chǎn)回報率。但是它的表現(xiàn)是不穩(wěn)定的，從2021年初的33% 跌到最近一個季度的5% 。在一半的時間里，它落后于美國同行，而在三分之二的時間里，落后于兩大行業(yè)領(lǐng)軍企業(yè)摩根大通和摩根士丹利。投資者認(rèn)為，高盛只值其資產(chǎn)的凈賬面價值(即清算價值) ，這表明他們懷疑高盛能否持續(xù)創(chuàng)造高回報，或者能否找到利潤豐厚的新領(lǐng)域。

Goldman’s struggles point to several lessons. One is that it still excels, but in a bad industry. Investment banking combines the drawbacks of a regulated activity (capital requirements and red tape) with the vices of a speculative one (volatility and capture by employees). The firm says it has become more disciplined on pay but last year forked out $15bn, its second-highest salary and bonus bill since the financial crisis, even as profits halved to $11bn and the firm barely beat its cost of capital. The real action in finance is outside regulated banking, where a new cohort of stars rules, including Blackstone in private markets, BlackRock in index funds, and Citadel, an investing and trading house that made its clients $16bn in 2022.

高盛的困境道出了幾大教訓(xùn)。其中之一是，它仍然出類拔萃，但其處于一個糟糕的行業(yè)。投資銀行業(yè)既有監(jiān)管活動(資本要求和繁文縟節(jié))的缺點，也有投機活動(波動性和員工捕獲)的缺點。該公司表示，在薪酬方面已變得更加自律，但去年（不情愿地）支付了150億美元，這是自金融危機以來第二高的薪酬和獎金支出，盡管利潤減半至110億美元，而且該公司的資本成本勉強高于這一水平。金融領(lǐng)域的真正行動是在受監(jiān)管的銀行業(yè)之外進(jìn)行的，在那里，一批新的明星銀行掌控著市場，包括私募市場領(lǐng)域的黑石、指數(shù)基金領(lǐng)域的貝萊德 ，以及2022年為其客戶帶來160億美元收入的投資和交易機構(gòu)城堡投資。

Another lesson is that it is hard to compete in winner-takes-all digital markets. Goldman thought that brains and brand were enough. Not true. It has spent billions, but its customer base remains a fraction of that of PayPal or Amazon. JPMorgan reaches 66m American households, but maintains a vast physical network of branches. Goldman has achieved digital scale by teaming up with Apple to provide a credit card. However, given that the tech giant has almost a billion paying subscribers, Apple holds the whip hand in that relationship.

另一個教訓(xùn)是，在贏者通吃的數(shù)字市場上很難競爭。高盛認(rèn)為，人才和品牌就足夠了。（事實）并非如此。它已經(jīng)花費了數(shù)十億美元，但其客戶基礎(chǔ)仍然只是貝寶或亞馬遜的一小部分。摩根大通的業(yè)務(wù)覆蓋了6600萬美國家庭，但仍維持著龐大的分支機構(gòu)網(wǎng)絡(luò)。高盛通過與蘋果合作提供信用卡，實現(xiàn)了數(shù)字化規(guī)模。然而，鑒于這家科技巨頭擁有近10億付費用戶，蘋果在這種關(guān)系中占據(jù)了主導(dǎo)地位。

A final lesson is that the stagnation of globalisation has shrunk Wall Street’s horizons. In the decade after Goldman listed, international revenues provided half of its growth, as its bankers conquered Europe and then broke into Asia. Today they supply a third of growth, as local competitors have emerged and some countries have become wary of foreign financiers. The number-one arranger of shares and bonds last year in China was citic Securities; in India Kotak Mahindra and Axis led the pack. These are names that many on Wall Street may not know.

最后一個教訓(xùn)是，全球化的停滯縮小了華爾街的視野。在高盛上市后的10年里，國際收入貢獻(xiàn)了其一半的增長，因為高盛的銀行家征服了歐洲，然后進(jìn)軍亞洲。如今，隨著本土競爭對手的出現(xiàn)，以及一些國家開始對外國金融家保持警惕，國際收入貢獻(xiàn)了三分之一的增長。去年，中國最大的股票和債券承銷商是中信證券，印度領(lǐng)頭的公司是 Kotak Mahindra 和 Axis。這許多華爾街人士可能并不知道這些名字。

Raging bulls

Can Goldman recover its swagger? Mr Solomon is wisely laying off staff and shrinking the bank’s proprietary investments. Over time he may be vindicated by prosaic changes—running its asset-management arm better, say, or pioneering new tech to cut exorbitant labour costs—or even by orchestrating a merger.

高盛還能重振雄風(fēng)嗎？所羅門先生正明智地裁員并縮減了銀行的自營投資業(yè)務(wù)。隨著時間的推移，他可能會通過平淡無奇的改變來證明自己，比如更好地經(jīng)營其資產(chǎn)管理部門，或者開發(fā)新技術(shù)以降低過高的勞動力成本，甚至通過精心策劃合并。

Yet there is something uniquely hard about reforming elite firms whose unwritten code is that they are smarter than everyone else. Just ask McKinsey, a scandal-magnet once known as the world’s most-admired consultancy. Goldman’s culture of self-regard remains at odds with the facts. Instead it now needs to be self-critical. For yesterday’s masters of the universe, that may be the hardest leap of all.

然而，對于那些不成文的準(zhǔn)則是他們比其他公司都聰明的精英公司來說，改革是一件特別困難的事情。問問麥肯錫就知道了，這家吸引丑聞的公司曾被譽為全球最受尊敬的咨詢公司。高盛的自負(fù)文化仍與事實不符。相反，它現(xiàn)在需要自我批評。對于昔日的“宇宙主宰者 ”來說，這可能是最艱難的一步。