A letter from the President to the dey, dated April 12, 1815, was delivered; it announced that war had been declared against Algiers by Congress, and expressed a hope that the dey would choose peace rather than war. “But peace, to be durable, must be founded on stipulations equally beneficial to both parties, the one claiming nothing which it is not willing to grant to the other; and on this basis alone will its attainment or preservation by this government be desirable.”1 Shaler and Decatur sent with this a letter signed by themselves as commissioners, dated June 29, in which they say that "they are instructed to treat upon no other principle than that of perfect equality and on the terms of the most favored nations. No stipulation for paying any tribute to Algiers under any form whatever will be agreed to.”1 The captain of the port suggested that the commissioners should go on shore to negotiate, and that an amnesty should be declared, any Algerine cruisers that might return being unmolested; but the commissioners insisted that negotiations should be conducted on board the Guerriere, and Decatur declared his intention to seize any Algerine vessel that should appear before the conclusion of peace.

It was hardly to be expected in the early days, with the country exhausted and impoverished by the struggle for independence, that a correct course governing our relations with Barbary should have been laid out and pursued. It was easier and more natural to follow in the footsteps of Europe. A few wise and far-seeing men knew what ought to be done, and urged it; but as always happens in such cases, the politicians and the people were slow to follow, giving the matter little thought, with an exaggerated idea of the power of the corsairs, and preferring measures which seemed easiest and cheapest at the moment. Time was required to form a healthy, self-respecting public opinion. Mean-while the wrong course was entered upon and led to a succession of later false steps and complications. The first treaty with Algiers was on a level with the worst European practice, and its only excuse was the urgency of redeeming the unfortunate captives. It was followed by an awakening sense of national dignity, and each of the later negotiations and treaties marked an advance upon old world precedents. Their favorable terms, however, were to a great extent nullified, during the earlier years, by the necessity, imposed by the bad example set in the case of Algiers, of maintaining peace by a system of concessions and gratuities which practically constituted a sort of tribute. But the insolent demands of the Barbary rulers were resisted to a great extent and war was preferred to servile compliance.The barbarians themselves hastened the settlement of the difficulty by their overreaching arrogance, which culminated in the declaration of war by Tripoli and later by Algiers. In each case an opportunity was presented of improving existing conditions by vigorous offensive action; opportunities turned to good advantage by the Navy.