世界需要清潔能源，但脫碳需要大量增加鋰、石墨和鈷等礦物的開采和提取。環(huán)境和平締造專家 Olivia Lazard 闡明了對(duì)這些珍貴礦產(chǎn)資源的爭(zhēng)奪——以及控制其供應(yīng)鏈的國家（包括中國和俄羅斯）如何發(fā)現(xiàn)自己處于新的全球舞臺(tái)的中心。了解為什么 Lazard 認(rèn)為地球安全取決于我們降低資源競(jìng)爭(zhēng)并避免導(dǎo)致氣候危機(jī)的同樣錯(cuò)誤的能力

Hi.?It's about as intimidating as I thought it would be.

你好。?這和我想象的一樣令人生畏。

And yet you’d think or I’d think?that I'd be accustomed to more stressful situations.?You see, I work in international security and in conflict resolution.?And today, I'm here to talk about some of our blind spots?related to decarbonization.

然而你會(huì)認(rèn)為或者我會(huì)認(rèn)為?我會(huì)習(xí)慣于壓力更大的情況。?你看，我在國際安全和解決沖突方面工作。?而今天，我在這里談?wù)勎覀兣c脫碳有關(guān)的一些盲點(diǎn)。

Now, what does one have to do with the other, you may ask.Good question.?We often hear that a climate-safe future is a necessary condition for peace.?That's true.?We also often hear that renewables could be the energy of peace.?Less true.?To understand, I need to tell you about the materials that we need?in order to decarbonize.?They're pretty.?And they can be deadly.Looking into their story tells us that confronting conflict?and building new forms of international peace?are going to be critical foundations to build a climate-safe future.

現(xiàn)在，你可能會(huì)問，一個(gè)與另一個(gè)有什么關(guān)系。?好問題。?我們經(jīng)常聽到氣候安全的未來是和平的必要條件。?確實(shí)如此。?我們還經(jīng)常聽到可再生能源可能是和平的能源。?不太真實(shí)。?為了理解，我需要告訴你?脫碳所需的材料。?他們很漂亮。?它們可能是致命的。?研究他們的故事告訴我們，面對(duì)沖突?和建立新形式的國際和平?將成為建立氣候安全未來的關(guān)鍵基礎(chǔ)。

So let me tell you about them,?starting with where we stand now.When we talk about a decarbonized future,?we generally have in mind the possibility of decoupling economic growth?from greenhouse gas emissions.?That’s what we call “green growth.”What we tend to think about less often is that to get there?we need to recouple economic growth with intensive mineral extraction.?To harness renewables or renewable energy like the sun and the wind,?we obviously need to build technologies such as solar panels,?windmills, batteries, right??And to build those,?we need to mine huge quantities of non-renewable materials?such as these.?Knowing that it takes mines as big as these?to produce that much amount of usable material.?Our ticket to green growth, in other words,?is digging deep in the environment.

所以讓我告訴你他們，?從我們現(xiàn)在的立場(chǎng)開始。?當(dāng)我們談?wù)撁撎嘉磥頃r(shí)，?我們通常會(huì)想到將經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)?與溫室氣體排放脫鉤的可能性。這就是我們所說的“綠色增長(zhǎng)”。?我們傾向于較少考慮的是，要實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)，?我們需要將經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)與密集的礦產(chǎn)開采重新結(jié)合起來。為了利用太陽能和風(fēng)能等可再生能源或可再生能源，?我們顯然需要建造太陽能電池板、?風(fēng)車、電池等技術(shù)，對(duì)嗎？?為了建造這些，我們需要開采大量的不可再生材料?，例如這些。?知道它需要像這些一樣大的地雷?生產(chǎn)那么多可用的材料。?換句話說，我們的綠色增長(zhǎng)門票?是深入環(huán)境。

Now we know that mining can have grave impacts?for local ecosystems and populations.?I’ve seen it myself, and it really isn’t pretty.?But what I want to talk about today?is about how much and where we’re going to have to dig,?and what that means for planetary security and for geopolitics.

現(xiàn)在我們知道采礦會(huì)對(duì)?當(dāng)?shù)厣鷳B(tài)系統(tǒng)和人口產(chǎn)生嚴(yán)重影響。?我自己也看過，真的不好看。?但我今天想談的?是我們將要挖掘多少和在哪里挖掘，?以及這對(duì)行星安全和地緣政治意味著什么。

I'll start from there.?History tells us?that when the dominant source of energy changes,?power relations change as well.Countries that can transform energy to their own advantage,?can gain the upper hand economically and politically,?and then can put themselves at the center of the global order.?Think of the United Kingdom and coal, for instance,?or how oil determined the ascendance of the US to a global superpower.?What that tells us is that the access to?and processing of energy?literally materializes into the ability to shape geopolitical power dynamics.And today,?we're facing the challenge of implementing the biggest energy transition?in the history of humankind?under a ticking climate clock.?The race is on for a new generation of power.?At the heart of which you have all of the critical materialsthat we need to decarbonize on the one hand?and digitalize on the other.

我將從那里開始。?歷史告訴我們?，當(dāng)能源的主要來源發(fā)生變化時(shí)，權(quán)力關(guān)系也會(huì)發(fā)生變化。?能夠?qū)⒛茉崔D(zhuǎn)化為自身優(yōu)勢(shì)的國家，?能夠在經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治上占據(jù)上風(fēng)，?進(jìn)而能夠?qū)⒆约褐糜谌蛑刃虻闹行摹?/span>例如，想想英國和煤炭，?或者石油如何決定了美國成為全球超級(jí)大國。?這告訴我們的是，?能源的獲取和處理?實(shí)際上轉(zhuǎn)化為塑造地緣政治權(quán)力動(dòng)態(tài)的能力。?而今天，?我們正面臨著實(shí)施?人類歷史上最大的能源轉(zhuǎn)型的挑戰(zhàn)?在滴答作響的氣候時(shí)鐘下。?爭(zhēng)奪新一代權(quán)力的競(jìng)賽正在進(jìn)行中。?在其中的核心，您擁有?我們一方面需要脫碳?和另一方面數(shù)字化所需的所有關(guān)鍵材料。

So what's happening with them??On the demand side we're at the beginning of an exponential demand curve.?If you take lithium as a proxy, a key component for [batteries],?global production already increased by just short of 300 percent?between 2010 and 2020.?I'm going to pause here for a sec.?This is really good news.?It means that decarbonization is in motion.?The not so good news is that our "clean" future?is going to be more materially intensive than before.?If you take a simple measure for it,?the International Energy Agency tells us?that with the current level of innovation,?an electric car requires six times more mineral inputs?than a conventional car.?And this is only the start.?The World Bank tells us that with the current projections,?global production for minerals such as graphite and cobalt?will increase by 500 percent by 2050,?only to meet the demand for clean energy technologies.

那么他們?cè)趺戳耍?在需求方面，我們處于指數(shù)需求曲線的起點(diǎn)。?如果你把鋰作為[電池]的關(guān)鍵組成部分，那么?在 2010 年至 2020 年間，全球產(chǎn)量已經(jīng)增長(zhǎng)了近 300% 。?我將在此稍作停頓。這真是個(gè)好消息。這意味著脫碳正在進(jìn)行中。不太好的消息是，我們的“清潔”未來將比以前更加密集。如果你采取一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，國際能源署告訴我們，以目前的創(chuàng)新水平，電動(dòng)汽車需要的礦物投入是傳統(tǒng)汽車的六倍。?而這僅僅是開始。?世界銀行告訴我們，按照目前的預(yù)測(cè)，到 2050 年，?全球石墨和鈷等礦物的產(chǎn)量?將增加 500%，以滿足對(duì)清潔能源技術(shù)的需求。

Now let's look on the supply side.?That's where a lot of really interesting things are happening.?Who currently exploits and processes minerals?and where deposits to meet future demand are located?tell us exactly how the transition is going to change geopolitics.?So if you look at a material such as lithium,?countries like Chile and Australia tend to dominate extraction?while China dominates processing.?For cobalt, the Democratic Republic of Congo dominates extraction?while China dominates processing.For nickel,?countries like Indonesia and the Philippines?tend to dominate extraction,?while China, you guessed it, thank you,dominates processing.?And for rare earths,?China dominates extraction while China dominates processing.

現(xiàn)在讓我們看看供應(yīng)方面。?這就是許多真正有趣的事情發(fā)生的地方。?目前誰在開采和加工礦產(chǎn)?，以及滿足未來需求的礦床位于何處，這些都?告訴我們轉(zhuǎn)型將如何改變地緣政治。?因此，如果你看一下鋰等材料，?智利和澳大利亞等國家往往主導(dǎo)開采?，而中國主導(dǎo)加工。?對(duì)于鈷，剛果民主共和國主導(dǎo)開采?，而中國主導(dǎo)加工。?對(duì)于鎳，?印度尼西亞和菲律賓等國家?往往主導(dǎo)開采，?而中國，你猜對(duì)了，謝謝，?主導(dǎo)加工。?而對(duì)于稀土，?中國主導(dǎo)著開采，而中國主導(dǎo)著加工。

I've just said China a lot, didn't I??Well, that's because China skillfully leveraged?its geo-economic rise to power over the last two decades?on the back of integrating supply chains for rare earths?from extraction to processing to export.?We tend to point fingers at China today?for not going fast enough on its own domestic energy transition,?but the truth is that China understood already long ago?that it would play a central role in other countries' transitions.?And it is.?The European Union, for instance,?is 98 percent dependent on China for rare earths.Needless to say,?this puts China in a prime position to redesign the global balance of power.

我剛剛說了很多中國，不是嗎？?嗯，這是因?yàn)橹袊擅畹乩?了過去 20?年的地緣經(jīng)濟(jì)崛起，在整合稀土供應(yīng)鏈（?從開采到加工再到出口）的支持下。?今天，我們傾向于指責(zé)中國?在國內(nèi)能源轉(zhuǎn)型方面的步伐不夠快，?但事實(shí)是，中國早就明白?它將在其他國家的轉(zhuǎn)型中發(fā)揮核心作用。?它是。?例如，歐盟?98% 的稀土依賴中國。?不用說，?這使中國處于重新設(shè)計(jì)全球力量平衡的首要位置。

Now, you may argue that this is a good thing?because the global balance of power needs a rehaul anyway.?And you know what??I can totally roll with that.?But -- and this applies to China, the United States,?and any other big player --?we need to make sure that the redesigning process?doesn't compromise on human rights or open societies.?And that it doesn't lead to the weaponization of supply chains?at a time of international instability, and more importantly,?at a time of complete climate breakdown.?Unfortunately, we're already seeing signs of this happening.?China is currently trying to gain access to more mineral resources?through its Belt and Road Initiative.?The United States and Europe?are both thinking of reshoring critical miningand processing?and orienting some of their international partnerships?to facilitate access to more mineral resources.Japan is exploring some of its oceanic marine reserves?to build strategic reserves.?I'm also speaking in the shadow of a war on the European continent.?Now at first sight,?Russia's invasion of Ukraine has nothing to do with what I've been talking about.?But Ukraine happens to be mineral rich.?It also happens to be one of only two countries?that had struck a partnership with the European Union?to diversify and develop supply chains for critical raw materials.?That partnership was specifically designed to help the EU decarbonize?and in the process to better integrate with Ukraine?from a political and economic perspective.?Eight months after the partnership was struck,?the invasion took place.?Now, mineral resources may not explain everything about the war.?But they certainly can't be ignored in analyzing the events.?Because when it comes to the race for critical raw materials,?what's actually happening?is that we're headed right back into a new scramble for resources,?at the heart of which you find all of the big players?eyeing countries with vast mineral deposits.

現(xiàn)在，你可能會(huì)爭(zhēng)辯說這是一件好事?，因?yàn)闊o論如何全球力量平衡都需要重新調(diào)整。?你知道嗎？?我完全可以接受。?但是——這適用于中國、美國?和任何其他大國——?我們需要確保重新設(shè)計(jì)的過程不會(huì)損害人權(quán)或開放社會(huì)。?在國際不穩(wěn)定的時(shí)候，更重要的是，在氣候完全崩潰的時(shí)候，它不會(huì)導(dǎo)致供應(yīng)鏈的武器化。?不幸的是，我們已經(jīng)看到了這種情況發(fā)生的跡象。中國目前正試圖通過“一帶一路”倡議獲得更多礦產(chǎn)資源。?美國和歐洲?都在考慮將關(guān)鍵的采礦?和加工業(yè)務(wù)重新轉(zhuǎn)移，?并調(diào)整它們的一些國際合作伙伴關(guān)系?，以促進(jìn)獲得更多礦產(chǎn)資源。?日本正在探索其部分海洋海洋保護(hù)區(qū)?，以建立戰(zhàn)略儲(chǔ)備。?我也是在歐洲大陸戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的陰影下發(fā)言。?現(xiàn)在乍看之下，俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭與我所說的毫無關(guān)系。?但烏克蘭恰好礦產(chǎn)豐富。它也恰好是僅有的兩個(gè)?與歐盟建立伙伴關(guān)系?以實(shí)現(xiàn)關(guān)鍵原材料供應(yīng)鏈多樣化和發(fā)展的國家之一。?該伙伴關(guān)系旨在幫助歐盟脫碳，并在此過程中?從政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)角度更好地與烏克蘭融合。?合作關(guān)系終止八個(gè)月后，入侵發(fā)生了。現(xiàn)在，礦產(chǎn)資源可能無法解釋戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的一切。但在分析事件時(shí)，它們當(dāng)然不能被忽視。因?yàn)楫?dāng)談到關(guān)鍵原材料的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí)，實(shí)際發(fā)生的事情是，我們正重新進(jìn)入新的資源爭(zhēng)奪戰(zhàn)，在這個(gè)爭(zhēng)奪戰(zhàn)的核心，你會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)所有大型企業(yè)都在關(guān)注擁有大量礦藏的國家。

And yet it's so obvious many of these countries that are located,for the most part, in Africa,?in Latin America, in Central Asia and in the Indo-Pacific.?Economists will tell you that this is a great thing,because these countries, or at least a lot of them,?need economic resources and many,?to accelerate their development pathway and climate adaptation.?But.?Many of these countries also have very real overlapping risk profiles.?The International Institute for Sustainable Development?first produced this map back in 2018.?Can you see the green dots on the map??They represent all of the different materials?that we need in order to decarbonize,?their geographic location and their deposit size.?As it so happens, a lot of the deposits are located in countries?that rank fairly high on corruption indices.?They are represented essentially by the shades of brown and red on the map.?And as it so happens,?a lot of the materials are also located in countries that are fragile,?such as Sri Lanka,?or downright conflict affected, like Myanmar?and the Central African Republic.

然而，很明顯，這些國家中有許多?大部分位于非洲、?拉丁美洲、中亞和印太地區(qū)。?經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家會(huì)告訴你，這是一件了不起的事情，?因?yàn)檫@些國家，或者至少其中很多國家，?需要經(jīng)濟(jì)資源和許多國家，?以加快他們的發(fā)展道路和氣候適應(yīng)。?但。?其中許多國家也有非常真實(shí)的重疊風(fēng)險(xiǎn)狀況。?國際可持續(xù)發(fā)展研究所?于 2018 年首次制作了這張地圖。?你能看到地圖上的綠點(diǎn)嗎？?它們代表了?我們脫碳所需的所有不同材料，?他們的地理位置和存款規(guī)模。?碰巧的是，許多存款都位于?腐敗指數(shù)排名相當(dāng)高的國家。?它們基本上由地圖上的棕色和紅色陰影表示。?碰巧?的是，許多材料也位于脆弱的國家，?例如斯里蘭卡，?或受到徹底沖突影響的國家，例如緬甸?和中非共和國。

That's not all.?The Notre Dame Institute tells us, with this map,?in which you see, again, some red and orange,?that countries that are climate vulnerable?are also the ones that are resource endowed.?And one final thing.?You know those big ecosystems that we need to protect and regenerate?in order to stabilize the global climate regime??To reboot the hydrological cycle?and to protect biodiversity??They're also represented in orange and red on this map.?Many of these big ecosystems are located in the same fragile countries?that I was mentioning before.?They also happen to sit on vast mineral deposits.?Changing or eliminating these ecosystems?through mining, through deforestation or anything else?would undermine planetary security.?Not just international security.?Planetary security.

那不是全部。?圣母院研究所通過這張地圖告訴我們，?您再次看到一些紅色和橙色的地圖，?氣候脆弱?的國家也是資源豐富的國家。?最后一件事。?您知道我們需要保護(hù)和再生?以穩(wěn)定全球氣候制度的那些大生態(tài)系統(tǒng)嗎？?重啟水文循環(huán)?并保護(hù)生物多樣性？?它們?cè)谶@張地圖上也以橙色和紅色表示。?這些大型生態(tài)系統(tǒng)中的許多都位于?我之前提到的同樣脆弱的國家。?它們也恰好坐落在巨大的礦藏上。?改變或消除這些生態(tài)系統(tǒng)?通過采礦、砍伐森林或其他任何?方式都會(huì)破壞地球的安全。?不僅僅是國際安全。?行星安全。

It's essentially like a perfect storm in the making.?Corruption,institutional and socioeconomic fragility,?climate disruptions and environmental plundering,?all acting as a backdrop?to a competition to gain access to the minerals?that we need in order to decarbonize.?All of these factors will be magnified?if we don't rein in the scramble for resources.?All of them will reinforce one another.

它本質(zhì)上就像一場(chǎng)完美的風(fēng)暴。?腐敗、?制度和社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的脆弱性、氣候破壞和環(huán)境掠奪，?所有這些都是?競(jìng)爭(zhēng)獲取?脫碳所需礦物的背景。?如果我們不控制對(duì)資源的爭(zhēng)奪，所有這些因素都會(huì)被放大。?他們都會(huì)互相加強(qiáng)。

And I want to make something very clear here.?The countries at the heart of the resource scrambling?may suffer the most direct consequences?in terms of their ability to develop, to adapt to climate change?and to avoid violence.?But their fate is not isolated.?Their problems are not geographically distant.?Our big blind spot here?is that we're headed towards a decarbonization trajectory?that may end up undermining ecological integrity?and heighten the risks of conflict and insecurity?whose consequences would reverberate worldwide.

我想在這里說得很清楚。?處于資源爭(zhēng)奪中心的國家可能?在其發(fā)展能力、適應(yīng)氣候變化和避免暴力方面遭受最直接的后果。?但他們的命運(yùn)并不是孤立的。他們的問題在地理上并不遙遠(yuǎn)。我們?cè)谶@里的最大盲點(diǎn)是，我們正走向脫碳軌跡，最終可能會(huì)破壞生態(tài)完整性，并增加沖突和不安全的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，其后果將在全球范圍內(nèi)引起反響。

I know that this is not a particularly encouraging picture.?And that it comes on top of layers of pictures?that are not particularly encouraging.?Our modern economies have advanced and grown for two centuries?through the gigantic blind spot of fossil fuel exploitation?and its unintended consequences.?The big lesson here?is that we can't afford to just shift to a different set of energies,?technologies and materials?without paying attention to the unintended consequences.?The stakes are too high.?They involve our future.?That we know.?But they also involve our humanity.?And they involve our nature,?by which I mean the nature that we choose for ourselves.

我知道這不是一個(gè)特別令人鼓舞的畫面。?而且它出現(xiàn)在并不是特別令人鼓舞的圖片層之上。?通過化石燃料開采的巨大盲點(diǎn)及其意想不到的后果，我們的現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)已經(jīng)發(fā)展和發(fā)展了兩個(gè)世紀(jì)。這里的重要教訓(xùn)是，我們不能只轉(zhuǎn)移到一組不同的能源、技術(shù)和材料而不注意意外后果。賭注太高了。它們涉及我們的未來。我們知道。但它們也涉及我們的人性。它們涉及我們的本性，我指的是我們?yōu)樽约哼x擇的本性。

Decarbonization is the way forward.?There’s not one single doubt allowedd about this.?But the way forward also demands of usthat we start imagining our future beyond decarbonization already.?Remember what I said at the beginning??A climate-safe future is a necessary condition for peace.?But we won't achieve a climate-safe future without peace.?And to build peace,?we need to shake things up in international politics?and in the way that we do business and economics.?So where do we start??I'd like to offer the scaffolding of a plan in four different baskets.

脫碳是前進(jìn)的方向。?這一點(diǎn)不容置疑。?但前進(jìn)的道路也要求?我們開始想象我們已經(jīng)超越脫碳的未來。?還記得我一開始說的話嗎？?氣候安全的未來是和平的必要條件。?但是，如果沒有和平，我們將無法實(shí)現(xiàn)氣候安全的未來。?為了建立和平，?我們需要改變國際政治以及我們開展商業(yè)和經(jīng)濟(jì)的方式。?那么我們從哪里開始呢？?我想在四個(gè)不同的籃子中提供一個(gè)計(jì)劃的腳手架。

First, science.?Science can tell us exactly where it is safe to mine and where it isn't,?from an ecological perspective.?Where it is not safe to mine,?we need to act as though these minerals did not exist?and establish protected areas?under which no mining licensing can take place.?Where mining does take place,?we can integrate socioeconomic?and ecological regeneration within business models.

第一，科學(xué)。?從生態(tài)學(xué)的角度，科學(xué)可以準(zhǔn)確地告訴我們哪里可以安全開采，哪里不安全。?在開采不安全的地方，我們需要假裝這些礦物不存在，并建立保護(hù)區(qū)，在該保護(hù)區(qū)內(nèi)不得獲得采礦許可。在確實(shí)進(jìn)行采礦的地方，我們可以將社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)和生態(tài)再生整合到商業(yè)模式中。

Second, a global public good regime.?If decarbonization is a matter of human survival,?then the materials that we need in order to decarbonize?should be managed collectively under a global public good regime.?The alternative is conflict and planetary breakdown.?So while we figure out exactly how to design this regime,?the countries at the heart of the scramble for resources?should receive adequate support,?competent and coherent support?to face off the joint challenges of geopolitical competition?and climate disruptions on the other hand.?In other words, investing into conflict resolution,?into the fight against corruption?and into context-specific resilience,?should be top priorities of our global energy transition.

第二，全球公益制度。?如果脫碳事關(guān)人類生存，?那么脫碳所需的材料?應(yīng)在全球公共產(chǎn)品制度下進(jìn)行集體管理。?另一種選擇是沖突和行星崩潰。?因此，當(dāng)我們確切地弄清楚如何設(shè)計(jì)這一制度時(shí)，?處于資源爭(zhēng)奪中心的國家?應(yīng)該得到足夠的支持、?有能力和一致的支持?，以應(yīng)對(duì)地緣政治競(jìng)爭(zhēng)?和氣候破壞的共同挑戰(zhàn)。?換言之，投資于解決沖突、?打擊腐敗?和針對(duì)具體情況的復(fù)原力，?應(yīng)該是我們?nèi)蚰茉崔D(zhuǎn)型的重中之重。

Third,?changing the way that we do business and economics.?We can't just switch from one energy system to another.?I've made that pretty clear, right??What we need instead?is to reduce our need for energy and for materials.?And that starts with massive public and private investments?into circular economic modelsthat favor recyclability and material substitution.?Now, here's the thing.?We know that this is a necessary step,?but not a sufficient one.?So what we also need to do?is to develop ecological assessments for supply chains?that account for greenhouse gas emissions,?but also for water, soil, biodiversity, material?and energy footprint all at once.?Only on this all-encompassing basiswill we understand how supply and distribution chains need to change?and therefore how globalization needs to transform.

第三，?改變我們做生意和經(jīng)濟(jì)的方式。?我們不能只是從一種能源系統(tǒng)切換到另一種能源系統(tǒng)。?我已經(jīng)說得很清楚了，對(duì)吧？?相反，我們需要?的是減少對(duì)能源和材料的需求。?首先是對(duì)有利于可回收性和材料替代的循環(huán)經(jīng)濟(jì)模型進(jìn)行大量公共和私人投資。?現(xiàn)在，事情就是這樣。我們知道這是一個(gè)必要的步驟，但還不夠。因此，我們還需要做的是對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈進(jìn)行生態(tài)評(píng)估，這些評(píng)估包括溫室氣體排放，以及水、土壤、生物多樣性、材料?和能源足跡。?只有在這個(gè)包羅萬象的基礎(chǔ)上?，我們才能理解供應(yīng)鏈和分銷鏈需要如何改變?，以及全球化需要如何轉(zhuǎn)型。

Fourth,?innovation.?All of this can only happen?if we start shifting our thinking about innovation.?Innovation in our times?is about bringing back economic footprint within planetary boundaries.Anything else, even the coolest of new products,?if it isn't aligned with that goal, it's not innovation,?it's business as usual.?In our little corner of the world,?my team and I at Carnegie Europe have been working really hard?to identify what regenerative foreign policy looks like?and what it aims for.?There are two things that we know by now.?One is obvious, we need to tackle fundamental issues?around economic redistribution on a global scale.?The other thing is that we need a geopolitical de-escalation?around decarbonisation and regeneration.?We've translated that into a concept we've called ecological diplomacy.?And we're pushing really hard for the European Union?to adopt this framework within their foreign policy.?Because if there is one thing that we've understood,?it's that ecological integrity is the foundation?for all types of security.?Which makes it the one common denominatorthat we can work on rebuilding collectively.?And we can manage.Truly, I believe that we can.?As long as we shed light on our transition blind spots?and take them as our guiding companionsto identify what truly systemic,?truly peaceful?and truly safe solution pathways look like?for the age of climate-disrupted futures.

是?創(chuàng)新。?只有當(dāng)我們開始轉(zhuǎn)變對(duì)創(chuàng)新的思考時(shí)，所有這一切才能發(fā)生。?我們時(shí)代的創(chuàng)新是要在地球邊界內(nèi)恢復(fù)經(jīng)濟(jì)足跡。其他任何事情，即使是最酷的新產(chǎn)品，如果不符合這個(gè)目標(biāo)，那就不是創(chuàng)新，而是一切照舊。在我們這個(gè)世界的小角落，我和我在卡內(nèi)基歐洲的團(tuán)隊(duì)一直在努力確定再生外交政策的樣子和目標(biāo)。我們現(xiàn)在知道兩件事。顯而易見，我們需要在全球范圍內(nèi)解決圍繞經(jīng)濟(jì)再分配的基本問題。?另一件事是，我們需要圍繞脫碳和再生?的地緣政治降級(jí)。我們已經(jīng)將其轉(zhuǎn)化為我們稱之為生態(tài)外交的概念。?我們正在努力推動(dòng)歐盟?在其外交政策中采用這一框架。?因?yàn)槿绻覀円呀?jīng)理解了一件事，?那就是生態(tài)完整性是?所有類型安全的基礎(chǔ)。?這使它成為我們可以共同重建的一個(gè)共同點(diǎn)。?我們可以管理。真的，我相信我們可以。只要我們闡明我們的過渡盲點(diǎn)，并將它們作為我們的指導(dǎo)伙伴，以確定什么是真正的系統(tǒng)性，?真正和平?和真正安全的解決方案路徑看起來像?受氣候破壞的未來時(shí)代。

Thank you so much.

太感謝了。