交流會(huì)

?

馬克思、黑格爾與辯證法：研討會(huì)（第二部分）

編者按：針對(duì)羅森塔爾的論文《逃離黑格爾》的討論的第一部分發(fā)表于2000年秋季刊。以下是另外的兩篇評(píng)論，以及羅森塔爾對(duì)所有評(píng)論者的回復(fù)。

?

論羅森塔爾對(duì)黑格爾的“逃離”

?

【489】

????????在現(xiàn)在這個(gè)充滿剝削和不平衡發(fā)展、數(shù)十億人生活在水深火熱中的世界中，如何正確理解黑格爾與馬克思之間的理論聯(lián)系似乎只是一件微不足道的小事。然而，馬克思的《資本論》仍然是理解產(chǎn)生這一痛苦的社會(huì)制度所需的最重要的文本。因此，如何正確解讀這一著作的問(wèn)題依然十分重要。而這一問(wèn)題遲早會(huì)讓我們審視黑格爾/馬克思之間的關(guān)系。

????????在最近一篇發(fā)表在《科學(xué)與社會(huì)》的文章中(Rosenthal, 1999)，約翰·羅森塔爾強(qiáng)有力地論證了，黑格爾主義主題在且僅在《資本論》中唯一的一個(gè)地方發(fā)揮了作用。按照羅森塔爾的觀點(diǎn)，馬克思對(duì)貨幣與普通商品(ordinary commodities)之間關(guān)系的描述刻意呼應(yīng)了黑格爾的唯心主義體系中普遍與有限東西之間的關(guān)系。而馬克思發(fā)現(xiàn)黑格爾思想的這一方面是有用的這一事實(shí)也根本就不是黑格爾的功勞。按照羅森塔爾的說(shuō)法，黑格爾的思想將抽象歪曲地置于活生生的人類主體之上，【490】這與貨幣，一種“現(xiàn)實(shí)的抽象”，歪曲地統(tǒng)治了資本主義中的社會(huì)個(gè)體極其相似。除此之外，羅森塔爾堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，馬克思在《資本論》中放棄了他早期的黑格爾主義實(shí)驗(yàn)。具體地說(shuō)，在《資本論》中找不到像黑格爾主義辯證法那樣建立在惡劣的雙關(guān)語(yǔ)與無(wú)效推理之上的“方法論”。

????????為了證明這一命題的合理性，羅森塔爾在兩條主要戰(zhàn)線上展開(kāi)了攻擊。首先，他希望說(shuō)服讀者，黑格爾對(duì)“普遍性”、“特殊性”以及“個(gè)別性”等關(guān)鍵術(shù)語(yǔ)的使用存在著無(wú)法挽回的錯(cuò)誤。羅森塔爾抱怨道，黑格爾的術(shù)語(yǔ)“普遍性”存在著系統(tǒng)性的歧義，有些時(shí)候指向相對(duì)更具包容性的含義，而另一些時(shí)候則指向包羅萬(wàn)象的含義。在黑格爾的著作中，術(shù)語(yǔ)“特殊性”的含義在相對(duì)獨(dú)特性（“單純的”特殊性）的含義和相對(duì)更確定性（“特定性”）的含義之間相互變換。以及概念“個(gè)別性”的含義在絕對(duì)唯一性（再一次的，單純的特殊性）的含義和完全確定的體系（“總體”）的含義之間跳躍。有了這樣的滑變，任何東西都可以從任何東西中發(fā)展出來(lái)?；蛘撸‘?dāng)?shù)卣f(shuō)，與所謂辯證“邏輯”的辯護(hù)者們的主張相反，我們無(wú)法從任何東西中得到任何東西。

????????羅森塔爾的另一個(gè)行動(dòng)是對(duì)馬克思在《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》從“貨幣”推導(dǎo)出“資本”的嘗試進(jìn)行擴(kuò)展討論，《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》作為馬克思的一部早期著作，確實(shí)采用了來(lái)源于黑格爾主義辯證方法的主題。這一實(shí)驗(yàn)顯而易見(jiàn)的失敗，以及這一實(shí)驗(yàn)并未在《資本論》中重復(fù)的這一事實(shí)，按照羅森塔爾的說(shuō)法，證實(shí)了馬克思明確地打破了黑格爾主義辯證法。根據(jù)羅森塔爾的說(shuō)法，馬克思在《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》中嘗試通過(guò)作為價(jià)值的一般等價(jià)形式的貨幣概念與所有特定數(shù)額的貨幣的界限之間的矛盾來(lái)解釋資本的存在。但是，如果說(shuō)一筆特定數(shù)額的貨幣與貨幣概念“相矛盾”，就等同于說(shuō)特殊僅僅憑借其作為特殊就與它的類相矛盾。對(duì)于羅森塔爾來(lái)說(shuō)，這就像說(shuō)鋅因?yàn)槠涫墙饘俚囊粋€(gè)特殊種而與金屬類“相矛盾”一樣荒謬。此外，貨幣本身流通所需的社會(huì)關(guān)系顯然與界定資本主義——一個(gè)歷史性的特定生產(chǎn)方式——的社會(huì)關(guān)系相當(dāng)不同。貨幣本身的流通可能是其作為資本流通的必要條件，但非資本主義生產(chǎn)方式中貨幣的存在表明，前者并非后者的充分條件。在馬克思成熟的著作中，他放棄了所有這些謬論。相反，他僅僅只是將資本主義利潤(rùn)視為給定條件，接著就其可能性的必要條件提出了康德式的問(wèn)題。

????????羅森塔爾的敘述有許多值得贊同的地方。他清楚地認(rèn)識(shí)到，馬克思的價(jià)值理論與其說(shuō)是一個(gè)相對(duì)價(jià)格理論，不如說(shuō)它是一個(gè)關(guān)于貨幣——價(jià)值的根本形式——如何統(tǒng)治【491】資本主義社會(huì)生活的理論。他對(duì)價(jià)值形式重要性的堅(jiān)持正確地強(qiáng)調(diào)了馬克思的價(jià)值理論完全不同于其他所有將貨幣簡(jiǎn)化為單純的計(jì)價(jià)物、從而將資本主義簡(jiǎn)化為一種物物交換形式的方法。但在羅森塔爾的解讀中也存在著許多問(wèn)題。我在這里簡(jiǎn)要地指出三個(gè)地方：1)黑格爾的《邏輯學(xué)》與資本之間的所謂相同性；2)黑格爾體系性著作中的方法論；以及3)《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》與《資本論》之間的關(guān)系。[1]

?????????

????????一、貨幣：黑格爾的馬克思主義中心

????????羅森塔爾并不是第一個(gè)斷言黑格爾邏輯學(xué)中的最終范疇(the culminating categories)反映了由馬克思所充分描述的資本統(tǒng)治的人。馬克思本人也持有相同的觀點(diǎn)。[2]然而，盡管存在著這種令人印象深刻的理論來(lái)源，這一觀點(diǎn)依然是難以成立的。在黑格爾邏輯學(xué)的終極(At the culmination of Hegel's Logic)，我們可以找到這樣一個(gè)定義了一種特定的本體論結(jié)構(gòu)，即復(fù)雜總體的范疇，復(fù)雜總體中的相互存在差異的不同要素和方面和諧地共存于一個(gè)動(dòng)態(tài)整體中。但馬克思在兩個(gè)意義深遠(yuǎn)的方面上表明了資本領(lǐng)域并不存在這一結(jié)構(gòu)。資本建立在對(duì)雇傭勞動(dòng)者的剝削之上，因此資本與勞動(dòng)之間的階級(jí)對(duì)立必然處于其核心。其次，盡管資本僅僅只是對(duì)象化勞動(dòng)，但資本呈現(xiàn)為一種位于雇傭勞動(dòng)者之上且超越雇傭勞動(dòng)者的外力形式，使他們屈服于價(jià)值增殖的要求。換句話說(shuō)，勞動(dòng)者共有的社會(huì)權(quán)力必然以資本權(quán)力的形式扭曲地表現(xiàn)出來(lái)。一種本質(zhì)上以對(duì)立和異化為主要特征的生產(chǎn)方式，并沒(méi)有這樣一種與黑格爾邏輯學(xué)的結(jié)論中的范疇相一致的結(jié)構(gòu)。在資本主義中，差異于統(tǒng)一整體中的和諧共存并不存在；存在的只是對(duì)雇傭勞動(dòng)的支配，即資本的“他者”。黑格爾在他的著作中一直在批判這種結(jié)構(gòu)。他最大的失敗就是沒(méi)能理解資本主義正是這種結(jié)構(gòu)的體現(xiàn)。

????????黑格爾本人確實(shí)相信資本主義體現(xiàn)了他的邏輯學(xué)的最終范疇。他認(rèn)為，資本主義市場(chǎng)使個(gè)人與特定群體得以在經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域中最大程度地繁榮發(fā)展，而國(guó)家則確保了個(gè)人與群體利益與整個(gè)社會(huì)的普遍利益相一致。然而，他在這件事上的看法大錯(cuò)特錯(cuò)。將使社會(huì)的普遍利益與不同【492】群體和個(gè)人的繁榮發(fā)展相一致的社會(huì)秩序的制度化需要社會(huì)主義。在這種意義上，黑格爾的邏輯學(xué)，就像資本主義時(shí)代其他偉大的藝術(shù)作品一樣，包含了一個(gè)超越資本主義的烏托邦環(huán)節(jié)。羅森塔爾的解讀掩蓋了這一烏托邦環(huán)節(jié)。

?????????

????????二、普遍性、特殊性、個(gè)別性

????????羅森塔爾對(duì)“金屬”與“鋅”之間關(guān)系的討論表明了，對(duì)于他而言，黑格爾對(duì)普遍性、特殊性以及個(gè)別性的劃分就是對(duì)類、種和個(gè)體的傳統(tǒng)劃分。當(dāng)這種形式的劃分應(yīng)用到黑格爾的許多主張上時(shí)，確實(shí)會(huì)顯得很荒謬。但黑格爾明確地、一貫地以及不斷地否認(rèn)世界可以用靜態(tài)的形式分類來(lái)充分地理解。黑格爾的用詞確實(shí)晦澀難懂，但其是為了理解一些完全不同的東西。

????????類、種和個(gè)體的形式邏輯隱含性地假設(shè)了世界由一些固定實(shí)體組成，且這些固定實(shí)體之間存在的只是一些外部關(guān)系，它們有時(shí)擁有一些共同特征，有時(shí)則沒(méi)有。對(duì)于黑格爾來(lái)說(shuō)，這一框架是理解世界的必要組成部分。但一旦我們離開(kāi)了相對(duì)簡(jiǎn)單的機(jī)械體系，世界的要素就只有在它們與其他元素的內(nèi)在和動(dòng)態(tài)關(guān)系中、在各種各樣復(fù)雜的和動(dòng)態(tài)的總體中才是它們自身(Oilman, 1971; 1993)。而任何給定的總體之所以是它們自身，也只是由于它們?cè)诟鼜?fù)雜的整體中與其它總體之間存在著內(nèi)在和動(dòng)態(tài)關(guān)系。這使得世界極其復(fù)雜。黑格爾對(duì)術(shù)語(yǔ)“普遍性”、“特殊性”和“個(gè)別性”的使用，也許就是西方哲學(xué)史中理解這種復(fù)雜性的最大嘗試。對(duì)這一點(diǎn)進(jìn)行嘲笑非常簡(jiǎn)單，因?yàn)楫?dāng)它被翻譯為形式和靜態(tài)分類體系的簡(jiǎn)化框架時(shí)，它不具有任何實(shí)際意義。但這并不算是對(duì)黑格爾的“逃離”；這只是在避開(kāi)他。

????????黑格爾用術(shù)語(yǔ)“普遍性”來(lái)指代復(fù)雜總體中的統(tǒng)一原則，例如，人類主體相對(duì)于她或他的構(gòu)成要素和方面的統(tǒng)一性。只要這種統(tǒng)一性涵蓋了所有構(gòu)成人的不同環(huán)節(jié)，它就是包羅萬(wàn)象的。但只要人類主體是她或他自身在一個(gè)更復(fù)雜的總體（比如說(shuō)，社會(huì)）中的一個(gè)環(huán)節(jié)，她或他就僅僅只是相對(duì)更具包容性的。一個(gè)給定的總體本身就是特殊的，因?yàn)橄鄬?duì)于同一層次的其它總體而言，它是獨(dú)特的，因此人類主體相對(duì)于其他人就是一個(gè)單純的特殊。然而，這一總體也有一些比其更具體的特殊環(huán)節(jié)，比如人類主體由血管系統(tǒng)、認(rèn)知處理系統(tǒng)等等所組成。最后，一個(gè)復(fù)雜總體包含個(gè)別【493】要素，比如人體可以被劃分為個(gè)別器官。但它也與其他人一樣，本身是一個(gè)個(gè)別總體。羅森塔爾認(rèn)為這一歧義是有害的，但我們可以將之視為一次嚴(yán)肅的嘗試，來(lái)理解構(gòu)成這一世界的復(fù)雜性的差異中的統(tǒng)一性(unity-in-difference)的各種形式。

????????這和馬克思有什么關(guān)系呢？考察一下資本的流通。首先，我們要有貨幣資本來(lái)投資。接著貨幣資本投資在商品（生產(chǎn)資料和勞動(dòng)力）上。在生產(chǎn)過(guò)程結(jié)束時(shí)，我們得到了新商品的庫(kù)存。如果它們是以利潤(rùn)為目的而出售的話，從出售中得到的貨幣就會(huì)多于最初投入的貨幣，從而積累資本，并啟動(dòng)新的一輪流通。在這一G-W-(P)-W-G’的流通中，資本在哪里？?jī)H僅說(shuō)資本是一個(gè)以貨幣資本、生產(chǎn)資本以及商品資本作為其種的屬是不夠的?！百Y本”是一個(gè)持續(xù)發(fā)生的過(guò)程中的統(tǒng)一性原則，而這一過(guò)程構(gòu)成了一個(gè)復(fù)雜且動(dòng)態(tài)的總體。除了在流通中呈現(xiàn)出來(lái)的特殊形式之外，資本并沒(méi)有獨(dú)立的存在，然而這些特殊形式之所以是資本，也僅僅只是因?yàn)樗鼈兘y(tǒng)一于同一個(gè)復(fù)雜且動(dòng)態(tài)的整體中。正如我們需要范疇來(lái)劃分這一過(guò)程中的不同環(huán)節(jié)一樣，我們也需要一個(gè)范疇來(lái)把握這一過(guò)程的統(tǒng)一性。因此“資本”既是一個(gè)普遍，[3]一個(gè)差異中的統(tǒng)一性，又是一個(gè)相對(duì)于其他生產(chǎn)方式而言的特殊。黑格爾的邏輯學(xué)正是用來(lái)把握這種復(fù)雜性的。

????????當(dāng)然，世界的復(fù)雜性很難證明這樣一種任何東西都可以從其他任何東西中得出的方法論是合理的。但辯證方法真的比其他理解世界的方式更武斷嗎？對(duì)于黑格爾來(lái)說(shuō)，對(duì)復(fù)雜總體以及構(gòu)成它的內(nèi)在關(guān)系的充分理解不可能一次完成。體系辯證理論從對(duì)給定總體的簡(jiǎn)單且抽象的理解開(kāi)始，然后繼續(xù)一步步地對(duì)同一總體進(jìn)行更復(fù)雜和具體的概念化。這排除了引入新的隨機(jī)主題的可能性。只有當(dāng)一些新的規(guī)定被補(bǔ)充以理解眼前的對(duì)象領(lǐng)域時(shí)，向新理論層次的過(guò)渡才是合理的。因此，不同抽象層次之間的突然跳躍也就被排除在外了。此外，只要規(guī)定的先行發(fā)展使我們對(duì)給定總體在具體性和復(fù)雜性上的理解更進(jìn)一步，它就為理論的早期階段提供了回溯性解釋。在這一意義上，【494】該方法使我們能夠確定，理論的出發(fā)點(diǎn)并不僅僅是一組隨意的假設(shè)。[4]

????????更不用說(shuō)，任何方法都能或多或少地被隨意運(yùn)用。但辯證方法并沒(méi)有內(nèi)在地比其他方法更能導(dǎo)致理論的任意性。恰恰相反。辯證方法就是被用來(lái)對(duì)所考慮的對(duì)象領(lǐng)域的本質(zhì)特征以最全面的方式進(jìn)行最大限度的考察的。

?????????

????????三、《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》是一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤的起點(diǎn)嗎？

????????在以下這點(diǎn)上，我明確地贊同羅森塔爾的觀點(diǎn)：從普遍存在于不同歷史時(shí)期的貨幣概念中推導(dǎo)出資本，一種歷史性的特定社會(huì)形式，的嘗試，應(yīng)當(dāng)被徹底否定。但不同于羅森塔爾的觀點(diǎn)，這一嘗試并非黑格爾主義所關(guān)心的問(wèn)題。對(duì)于黑格爾來(lái)說(shuō)，“哲學(xué)就是被把握在思想中的它的時(shí)代” (Hegel, 1967, 11)(1)黑格爾明確地認(rèn)為，他的社會(huì)哲學(xué)中所推導(dǎo)出來(lái)的范疇都僅僅適用于現(xiàn)代。同樣的，這一嘗試也并非馬克思在《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》中所關(guān)心的問(wèn)題。

????????在《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》的導(dǎo)言中，馬克思指出，在他的方法論中，他“從關(guān)于整體的一個(gè)混沌的表象著手”，接著

????????“從表現(xiàn)中的具體達(dá)到越來(lái)越稀薄的抽象，直到我達(dá)到一些最簡(jiǎn)單的規(guī)定。于是行程又得從那里回過(guò)頭來(lái)，直到我最后又回到[具體]，但是這回[具體]已不是關(guān)于整體的一個(gè)混沌的表象，而是一個(gè)具有許多規(guī)定和關(guān)系的豐富的總體了……具體之所以是具體，因?yàn)樗窃S多規(guī)定的綜合，因而是多樣性的統(tǒng)一?！?Marx, 1973, 100-101.)(2)

????????因此，馬克思在《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》中的出發(fā)點(diǎn)并非某些超歷史的抽象，而是“整體”的“最簡(jiǎn)單的規(guī)定”，即一個(gè)歷史性的給定總體。

????????這里所討論總體就是資本主義。把資本主義當(dāng)作一個(gè)整體來(lái)考慮的最簡(jiǎn)單和最抽象方式，就是從普遍商品生產(chǎn)(generalized commodity production)的角度來(lái)考慮。生產(chǎn)商品的勞動(dòng)是由私人來(lái)承擔(dān)的，【495】而且這些勞動(dòng)可能也可能不會(huì)被證明是一種社會(huì)耗費(fèi)。這種勞動(dòng)的社會(huì)必要性只有通過(guò)成功的交換才能得到確立。如果成功的交換依賴于每個(gè)交換者都需要由對(duì)方生產(chǎn)的特定商品，那么交換就只能是有限的和偶然發(fā)生的。因此普遍的商品交換(Generalized commodity exchange)就需要一種代表了普遍可交換性(general exchangeability)的一般商品(universal commodity)。這種一般商品就是貨幣（Marx, 1973, 147等處）(3)。這里涉及到的貨幣概念并非一個(gè)普遍存在于各種各樣生產(chǎn)方式的超歷史概念。而是普遍商品生產(chǎn)所需的貨幣的歷史性的特定形式。因此，正如羅森塔爾所認(rèn)為的那樣，在這之后從貨幣范疇到資本的推導(dǎo)過(guò)程并非從一個(gè)超歷史概念到一個(gè)歷史性的特定社會(huì)形式的跳躍。這是從一個(gè)較抽象層次到另一個(gè)更明確階段的運(yùn)動(dòng)，在這一抽象層次中隱含了在資本主義下，貨幣就是一般商品。

????????更仔細(xì)地看一下羅森塔爾本人所引用的這段文本，就能夠證實(shí)這一解讀：

????????“作為價(jià)值而獨(dú)立化的價(jià)值——或者說(shuō)財(cái)富的一般形式——除了量上的變動(dòng)，除了自身的增大外，不可能有其他的運(yùn)動(dòng)……一定的貨幣額……對(duì)于使貨幣恰恰不再成為貨幣的一定消費(fèi)來(lái)說(shuō)，可能完全夠用。但是貨幣作為一般財(cái)富的代表，就不會(huì)是這樣了……作為一定量的數(shù)額，作為有限的數(shù)額，貨幣只是一般財(cái)富的有限的代表……因此，作為財(cái)富，作為財(cái)富的一般形式，作為起價(jià)值作用的價(jià)值而被固定下來(lái)的貨幣，是一種不斷要超出自己的量的界限的驅(qū)動(dòng)力?！?Marx, 1973, 270)(4)

????????不同于羅森塔爾的觀點(diǎn)，這里論證的并非是一種越出（超歷史的）貨幣概念所固有的任何確定界限的內(nèi)在驅(qū)動(dòng)力。馬克思在這一論證中的出發(fā)點(diǎn)是給定的歷史事實(shí)，即價(jià)值已經(jīng)“獨(dú)立化”，也就是說(shuō)，貨幣已經(jīng)成為目的本身，“財(cái)富的一般形式，起價(jià)值作用的價(jià)值”。這是將資本主義這一復(fù)雜總體概念化的相對(duì)簡(jiǎn)單和抽象的方式，因?yàn)樨泿诺倪@一形式只存在于普遍商品生產(chǎn)中，也就是說(shuō)，只存在于資本主義中。馬克思認(rèn)為，如果我們預(yù)設(shè)了一種價(jià)值已經(jīng)“獨(dú)立化”的生產(chǎn)方式，那么經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序就是建立在積累貨幣的驅(qū)動(dòng)力之上，且這一驅(qū)動(dòng)力沒(méi)有內(nèi)在的限度。這里的過(guò)渡并非是從超歷史的貨幣概念到歷史性的特定生產(chǎn)方式即資本主義的過(guò)渡。相反，這一過(guò)渡是從相對(duì)簡(jiǎn)單和抽象的資本主義概念（作為一個(gè)價(jià)值已經(jīng)“獨(dú)立化”的社會(huì)秩序）到更加復(fù)雜和具體的同一復(fù)雜總體的概念（作為一個(gè)積累的無(wú)盡動(dòng)力已占主導(dǎo)地位的社會(huì)秩序）的過(guò)渡。

【496】

????????《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》中從“普遍商品生產(chǎn)”到“作為一般商品的貨幣”再到“資本”的概念體系性序列與《資本論》中的序列相同。對(duì)從一個(gè)抽象層次到下一個(gè)抽象層次的過(guò)渡的論證本質(zhì)上也是相同的?！顿Y本論》也與《政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)批判大綱》一樣，是一次在思想上重構(gòu)資本主義本質(zhì)規(guī)定的嘗試，系統(tǒng)性地從最簡(jiǎn)單、最抽象的規(guī)定抵達(dá)越來(lái)越復(fù)雜和具體的規(guī)定(Smith, 1990, 1998)。無(wú)論馬克思如何否定黑格爾主義社會(huì)理論的實(shí)質(zhì)主張，都無(wú)法回避他是在黑格爾的體系辯證法中找到這種理論范式的這一事實(shí)。

?

Tony Smith

?

哲學(xué)系

愛(ài)荷華州立大學(xué)

443 Catt Hall

Ames, IA 50014

tonys@iastate.edu

?

注釋：

????????1. 本次辯論所涉及到的其他問(wèn)題在Smith, 1999中有詳細(xì)討論。

????????2. 有關(guān)馬克思對(duì)黑格爾的解讀的進(jìn)一步討論，可見(jiàn)Smith, 1990, Chapter 1。

????????3. 如上所述，資本終究仍然是黑格爾主義意義上的“單調(diào)的”普遍性，因?yàn)樗且环N凌駕于個(gè)人之上的力量，而非一種使個(gè)人和群體在作為一個(gè)整體的社會(huì)中繁榮發(fā)展的原則。黑格爾本人用“本質(zhì)”這一術(shù)語(yǔ)來(lái)指代這種單調(diào)的普遍性。

????????4. 羅森塔爾提出了這一事實(shí)，即黑格爾的辯證法包括了回溯性解釋，揭示了其與理論的“前進(jìn)”（或“內(nèi)在”）運(yùn)動(dòng)內(nèi)在地相矛盾。但他并沒(méi)有為將這兩者視為矛盾而非相互補(bǔ)充提供任何理由。他似乎也沒(méi)有意識(shí)到，回溯性解釋的重要性在黑格爾的文本中是老生常談的（見(jiàn)Hartmann, 1972; Pinkard, 1985; Arthur, 1998）。

?

譯者注：

????????(1) 黑格爾，鄧安慶譯，《法哲學(xué)原理》，《黑格爾著作集》第7卷，人民出版社，第13頁(yè)。

????????(2) 《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第30卷第41-2頁(yè)。

????????(3) 《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第30卷第96頁(yè)。

????????(4) 《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第30卷第227-8頁(yè)，譯文有改動(dòng)。

REFERENCES

?

????????Arthur, Chris. 1998. "Systematic Dialectic/ Science & Society, 62:3 (Fall).

????????Hartmann, Klaus. 1972. "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View." In Hegel, ed. A. Maclntyre. New York: Doubleday Anchor.

????????Hegel, G. W. F. 1967. The Philosophy of Right. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

????????Marx, Karl. 1973. The Grundrisse. New York: Vintage.

????????Oilman, Berteli. 1971. Alienation: Marx's Concept of Man in Capitalist Society. New York: Cambridge University Press.

????????——. 1993. Dialectical Investigations. New York: Routledge.

????????Pinkard, Terry. 1985. "The Logic of Hegel's Logic." In Hegel, ed. M. Inwood. New York: Oxford University Press.

????????Rosenthal, John. 1999. "The Escape from Hegel." Science àf Society, 63:3 (Fall).

????????Smith, Tony. 1990. The Logic ofMarxs Capital. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

????????——. 1998. "Value Theory and Dialectics." Science ?f Society, 62:3 (Fall).

????????——. 1999. "The Relevance of Systematic Dialectics to Marxian Thought." Historical Materialism, Fall.

COMMUNICATIONS

?

MARX. HEGEL AND DIALECTICS:

A SYMPOSIUM (PART TWO)

?

Editor's Note: Part one of this discussion, which refers to John Rosenthal's "The Escape from Hegel" (Fall 1999), appeared in the Fall 2000 issue. Following are two more comments, and Rosenthal's reply to all of the commentators.

?

ON ROSENTHAL'S "ESCAPE" FROM HEGEL

?

????????In a world where exploitation and uneven development condemn billions to suffering, the proper understanding of the intellectual relationship between Hegel and Marx appears a small matter indeed. Marx's Capital, however, remains the single most important text for comprehending the system that inflicts this suffering. The question of the proper reading of this work thus remains important. Sooner or later this brings us to the Hegel/Marx question.

????????In a recent article in Science &Society (Rosenthal, 1999) , John Rosenthal forcefully argues that there is one and only one place where Hegelian themes play a role in Capital. In Rosenthal's view, Marx's description of the relationship between money and ordinary commodities deliberately echoes the relationship between universais and finite things in Hegel's system of idealism. The fact that Marx found this aspect of Hegel's thought useful is not at all to Hegel's credit. According to Rosenthal, Hegel's thought perversely grants abstractions priority over flesh and blood human subjects in a way that exactly parallels the way money, a "real abstraction," perversely dominates social agents in capitalism. Apart from this, Rosenthal insists, Marx abandons in Capital his earlier experiments with Hegelian motifs. In specific, nothing like Hegelian dialectics can be found, a "methodology" based on bad puns and spurious reasoning.

????????In order to justify this thesis Rosenthal attacks on two main fronts. First, he hopes to convince the reader that Hegel's use of the key terms "universality," "particularity," and "individuality" is irredeemably flawed. Rosenthal complains that Hegel's term "universality" is systematically ambiguous, sometimes referring to the relatively more inclusive, on other occasions to the all-inclusive. The sense of the term "particularity" shifts in Hegel's writings between what is relatively unique ("bare" particularity) and what is relatively more determinate ("specificity"). And the notion of "individuality" jumps between the absolutely unique (bare particularity again) and the fully determinate system ("totality"). With such slippage just about anything can be made to follow from just about anything else. Or, better, nothing can really be made to follow from anything else, contrary to claims made by defenders of so-called dialectical "logic."

????????Rosenthal's other move is to present an extended discussion of Marx's attempt to derive "capital" from "money" in the Grundrisse, an earlier work that does employ themes taken from Hegel's dialectical method. The transparent failure of this experiment, and the fact that it is not repeated in Capital, supposedly confirms the proposition that Marx unequivocally broke from Hegelian dialectics. According to Rosenthal, Marx attempted to explain the existence of capital in the Grundrisse by reference to the contradiction between the concept of money as the general equivalent form of value and the limit of all particular sums of money. But to say that a particular sum of money "contradicts" the concept of money is to say that the particular contradicts its genus simply by being particular. For Rosenthal, this is as ludicrous as saying that zinc "contradicts" the genus metal because it is a particular sort of metal. Further, the social relations required for the circulation of money as such are obviously quite different from the social relations that define capitalism as a historically specific mode of production. The circulation of money as such may be a necessary condition for its circulation as capital, but the presence of money in non-capitalist modes of production shows that it is hardly a sufficient condition. In his mature work Marx abandons all such nonsense. Instead he simply accepts capitalist profit as a given, and then asks the Kantian question regarding the necessary conditions of its possibility.

????????There is much to agree with in Rosenthal's account. He clearly recognizes that Marx's value theory is not so much a theory of relative prices as it is a theory of how money, the ultimate form of value, dominates social life in capitalism. His insistence on the importance of the value form correctly stresses how Marx's theory profoundly differs from all approaches that reduce money to a mere numeraire, thereby reducing capitalism to a form of barter. But there is also much to question in Rosenthal's reading. I shall comment briefly on three matters here: 1) the alleged homology between Hegel's Logic and capital; 2) the methodology found in Hegel's systematic works; and 3) the relationship between the Grundrisse and Capital.1

?????????

????????1. Money: The Marxian Locus of Hegel

????????Rosenthal is hardly the firsto assert that the culminating categories of Hegel's Logic mirror the domination of capital so compellingly described by Marx. Marx himself held this view.2 Despite this impressive pedigree, however, this position cannot be sustained. At the culmination of Hegel's Logic we find categories that define a specific sort of ontological structure, that of complex totalities whose different elements and dimensions are harmoniously reconciled together in a dynamic whole. But Marx established that the realm of capital does not have this structure in two profound respects. Capital rests on the exploitation of wage laborers, and so a class antagonism between capital and labor necessarily lies at its heart. Second, although capital is nothing but objectified labor, capital insanely takes on the form of an alien force standing above and beyond wage laborers, subjecting them to the imperatives of valorization. In other words, the collective social powers of working men and women necessarily appear in the distorted form of powers of capital. A mode of production essentially categorized by antagonism and alienation does not have a structure homologous with the categories at the conclusion of Hegel's Logic. In capitalism there is no harmonious reconciliation of differences within an overarching unity; there is instead the subjugation of wage labor, the "other" of capital. Hegel consistently critiques this sort of structure throughout his writings. His great failure was to not comprehend that capitalism exemplifies this sort of structure.

????????Hegel himself did believe that capitalism exemplifies the culminating categories of his Logic. He thought that capitalist markets allow individuals and particular groups to flourish to the greatest extent possible in the economic realm, with the state ensuring that individual and group interests cohere with the general good of the community as a whole. He was horribly wrong about this. The institutionalization of a social order in which the universal good of the community is reconciled with the flourishing of different groups and individuals demands socialism. In this manner Hegel's Logic, like the greatest works of art in the capitalist epoch, includes a Utopian moment pointing beyond capitalism. Rosenthal's reading suppresses this Utopian moment.

?????????

????????2. Universal, Particular, Individual

????????Rosenthal's discussion of the relationship between "metal" and "zinc" shows that for him Hegel's categories of universality, particularity, and individuality are supposed to map the traditional categories of genus, species, and individual. Many of Hegel's claims are indeed absurd when applied to this formal scheme of classification. But Hegel explicitly, consistently, and repeatedly denied that the world could be adequately comprehended solely in terms of static formal classifications. Hegel's vocabulary, as obscure as it is, aims to comprehend something quite different.

????????The formal logic of genus, species, and individual implicitly assumes that the world consists of fixed entities standing in external relations to other fixed entities, sometimes sharing features in common, sometimes not. For Hegel, this framework is a necessary part of comprehending the world. But once we leave relatively simple mechanical systems behind, the elements of the world are what they are only in so far as they are internally and dynamically related to other elements within various complex and dynamic totalities (Oilman, 1971; 1993). And any given totality is what it is only because of the internal and dynamic relations through which it is connected with other totalities within yet more complex wholes. This makes the world a very complicated place. Hegel's usage of the terms "universal," "particular," and "individual" is perhaps the greatest attempt in the history of Western philosophy to comprehend this complexity. It is easy enough to mock this on the grounds that it doesn't make any sense when translated into the simplistic framework of formal and static classificatory systems. But this doesn't count as "escaping" from Hegel; it counts as avoiding him.

????????The term "universal" is used by Hegel to refer to the principle of unity in a complex totality, for example, the unity of a human subject vis-à-vis her or his constitutive elements and dimensions. In so far as this unity encompasses all of the different moments that make up a person, it is all-inclusive. But in so far as a human subject is herself or himself a moment within a yet more complex totality (society, say), she or he is only relatively more inclusive. A given totality is itself particular in the sense of being unique vis-à-vis other totalities on the same level, as one human subject is a bare particular compared to others. Yet this totality also has particular moments that are specific to it, as the human subject is made up of a vascular system, a cognitive processing system, and so on. Finally, a complex totality includes individual elements, as individual organs can be distinguished within the human body. But it is also itself an individual totality alongside others. What Rosenthal dismisses as pernicious ambiguity thus can be seen as a serious attempt to comprehend the various forms of unity-in-difference making up the world's complexity.

????????What does any of this have to do with Marx? Consider the circuit of capital. First we have money capital to be invested. It is then invested in commodities (means of production, labor power). At the conclusion of the production process we have new commodities in inventory. If they are sold for a profit, the money from the sale exceeds the initial money invested, allowing capital to be accumulated and a new circuit to commence. Where is capital in this M - C - (P) - C - M' circuit? It is not enough to say that capital is a genus with money capital, production capital, and commodity capital as its species. "Capital" is the principle of unity in an ongoing process that makes up a complex and dynamic totality. It has no separate existence apart from the particular forms it takes on in the circuit, and yet those particular forms are what they are only because they are united together in a single complex and dynamic whole. Just as we need categories to distinguish the different moments of this process, so too we need a category to capture the unity of this process. "Capital" is thus at once a universal,3 a unity-in-difference, and a particular vis-à-v is other modes of production. Hegel's Logic is designed to capture precisely this sort of this complexity.

????????Of course the complexity of the world hardly justifies a methodology in which anything can be made to follow from anything else. But is dialectical method really more arbitrary than other ways of comprehending the world? For Hegel, the comprehension of a complex totality and the internal relations that make it up cannot be adequately completed in one take. Systematic dialectical theories begin with a simple and abstract comprehension of a given totality, and then proceed in a step-by-step fashion to ever more complex and concrete conceptualizations of the same totality. This rules out introducing new topics randomly. A transition to a new theoretical level can only be justified if it adds some new determination to the comprehension of the object realm at hand. Abrupt jumps among different levels of abstraction are thus also ruled out. Further, in so far as the linear progression of determinations brings us closer to a comprehension of the given totality in its concreteness and complexity, this provides a retrospective justification for the earlier stages of the theory. In this manner the method allows us to establish that the starting point of the theory was not merely a set of arbitrary assumptions.4

????????Needless to say, any method can be employed more or less intelligently. But there is nothing inherent in dialectical method leading to greater theoretical arbitrariness than other approaches. Just the opposite. Dialectical method is explicitly designed to maximize the chances that the essential features of the object realm under consideration are taken into account in the most comprehensive manner possible.

?????????

????????3. Was the Grundrisse a False Start?

????????On one point I unequivocally agree with Rosenthal: the attempt to derive capital, a historically specific social form, from a concept of money common to various historical periods ought to be vehemently rejected. Pace Rosenthal, however, this is not a Hegelian project. For Hegel, "philosophy is its time apprehended in thoughts" (Hegel, 1967, 11). Hegel unequivocally insisted that the categories derived in his social philosophy apply to the modern age only. And this was not Marx's project in the Grundrisse either.

????????In the introduction to the Grundrisse Marx states that in his methodology he "begins with a chaotic conception of the whole" and then moves

????????analytically towards ever more simple concepts, from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until Ihad arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at [the concrete], but this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich determination of many determinations and relations. . . . The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. (Marx, 1973, 100-101.)

????????Marx's beginning point in the Grundrisse is therefore not some transhistorical abstraction, but the "simplest determination" of a "whole," that is, a historically given totality.

????????The totality in question here is capitalism. The simplest and most abstract manner of conceiving capitalism as a whole is in terms of generalized commodity production. Commodity producing labor is privately undertaken, and may or may not prove to be socially wasted. The social necessity of this labor can only be established through successful exchange. If successful exchange depended upon each of the exchanging partners needing the particular commodity produced by the other, exchange would be limited and sporadic. Generalized commodity exchange thus requires a universal commodity representing general exchangeability. This universal commodity is money (Marx, 1973, 147, passim). The relevant notion of money here is not a transhistorical concept common to a great variety of modes of production. It is the historically specific form of money required by generalized commodity production. The subsequent derivation of capital from this category of money thus is not a jump from a transhistorical notion to a historically specific social form, as Rosenthal believes. It is a move from a level of abstraction in which it is merely implicit that a world where money is the universal commodity is a capitalist world, to a stage where this is explicit.

????????A closer look at the very passage Rosenthal himself cites verifies this reading:

????????Value, having become independent as such - or the general form of wealth – is capable of no other motion than a quantitative one; to increase itself... A determinate sum of money . . . can entirely suffice for a determinate consumption, wherein it ceases to be money. But as a representative of general wealth it cannot do so. ... Adhered to as wealth, as the general form of wealth, as value which counts as value, it is thus the constant drive to go beyond its quantitative limit. (Marx, 1973, 270.)

????????Pace Rosenthal, the argument here is not that there is an immanent drive to go beyond any determinate limit inherent in the (transhistorical) concept of money. Marx's starting point in this argument is the given historical fact that value "has become independent as such," that is, money has become an end-in-itself, "the general form of wealth, value which counts as value." This is a relatively simple and abstract way of conceptualizing the complex totality that is capitalism, for this form of money is found only in generalized commodity production, that is, only in capitalism. Marx argues that if we presuppose a mode of production in which value has "become independent as such," then the economic order is based on a drive to accumulate money with no inherent limit. The transition here is not from a transhistorical concept of money to the historically specific mode of production that is capitalism. The transition is instead from a relatively simple and abstract categorization of capitalism (as a social order in which value "has become independent as such") to a more complex and concrete categorization of the same complex totality (as a social order in which the endless drive to accumulate holds sway).

????????The systematic ordering of categories in the Grundrisse proceeding from "generalized commodity production" through "money as universal commodity" to "capital" is the same as the ordering found in Capital And the arguments used to justify the transition from one level of abstraction to the next are essentially the same as well. Capital, no less than the Grundrisse, is an attempt to reconstruct in thought the essential determinations ofcapitalism, moving systematically from its simplest and most abstract determinations to progressively more complex and concrete determinations (Smith, 1990, 1998). However much Marx rejected the substantive claims of Hegelian social theory, there is just no getting around the fact that he found the paradigm for this sort of theory in Hegel's systematic dialectics.

?

Tony Smith

?

Department of Philosophy

Iowa State University

443 Catt Hall

Ames, IA 50014

tonys@iastate.edu

????????1 Other issues in this debate are discussed in detail in Smith, 1999.

????????2 An extensive discussion of Marx's interpretation of Hegel is found in Smith, 1990, Chapter 1.

????????3 As argued above, capital ultimately remains a "false" universal in the Hegelian sense of the term, since it is a force lording over individuals rather than a principle allowing individuals and groups to flourish within the community as a whole. Hegel himself used the term "essence" to refer to this sort of false universal.

????????4 Rosenthal presents the fact that Hegelian dialectics includes retrospective justifications as a damning revelation that inherently contradicts the "forwards" (or "immanent") movement of the theory. But he provides no reason whatsoever to regard the two as contradictory rather than complementary. He also appears to be unaware of the fact that the importance of retrospective justification is a commonplace in the literature on Hegel (see Hartmann, 1972; Pinkard, 1985; Arthur, 1998).