勞動的價值理論（七）
????????本篇文章由我翻譯，全文共63頁，本篇為節(jié)選的第七部分約10.5頁內容，原文為英文并附于末尾，紅色標注為原文附帶的注釋，藍色標注為我添加的補充和注釋。文章中引用部分若已有漢譯本，則一概使用漢譯本的翻譯，并補充標注漢譯本的引用文獻。?
????????3.綜合階段：從價值到價格
????????綜合階段涵蓋了《資本論》第一卷第一篇的其余部分。馬克思在這部分中討論了抽象勞動對象化的產生方式以及這一方式是如何使抽象勞動的支配地位成為必然的；這同時表明了這種對象化的不穩(wěn)定性。它與“價值規(guī)律”的運轉有關，而其從根本上意味著抽象勞動被對象化的過程的“規(guī)律”。術語“規(guī)律”以及價值規(guī)律與“起調節(jié)作用的自然規(guī)律”（參見Capital, I, p. 168）（《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第92頁）的清晰對比再次提到了這一過程的自然主義方面，即它發(fā)生在商品所有者的“背后”。但需要注意的是，馬克思并不是持有一個嚴格的、“決定性的”“調節(jié)規(guī)律”范疇。他在關于政治經濟學的早期著作中就已經批判了這樣一種范疇：
????????“……穆勒——完全和李嘉圖學派一樣——犯了這樣的錯誤：在表述抽象規(guī)律的時候忽視了這種規(guī)律的變化或不斷揚棄（中斷）……（生產成本和價格）暫時的相適應又開始（因相同的原因而）波動和不相適應。這種現實的運動（這才是現實的運動）——（而）上面說到的規(guī)律只是它的抽象的、偶然的和片面的因素（環(huán)節(jié)）……” ('Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of Political Economy', Early Writings, p. 260.)（《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第一版第42卷第18頁）[20](14)
????????在《資本論》的論述中，馬克思小心翼翼地回避了這樣的一種“抽象規(guī)律”。
????????“總的說來，在整個資本主義生產中，一般規(guī)律作為一種占統(tǒng)治地位的趨勢，始終只是以一種極其錯綜復雜和近似的方式，作為從不斷波動中得出的、但永遠不能確定的平均數來發(fā)生作用。” (Capital, III, p. 161) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第46卷第181頁）
????????“價值規(guī)律”時常被認為是價值和價格之間的關系，但這是由于價格是抽象勞動對象化得以實現的形式。這個結果的確立就是綜合階段的第一步。
????????問題在于如何解釋作為勞動的其中一個方面的抽象勞動“對象化”為商品價值的過程。馬克思的觀點是，這需要將體現在商品（例如亞麻布）中的抽象勞動“對象化地”表現為“（一種）與麻布本身的物體不同，同時又是麻布與其他商品所共有的（東西或對象性）” (Capital, I, p. 142) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第65-6頁）。只要有一種商品具有作為價值（或價值形式）承擔者的職能，并反映出與其交換的商品的價值，馬克思的觀點就是正確的?！顿Y本論》第一章第三節(jié)專門探討了這種“反思規(guī)定”('determination of reflection')的含義（參見Capital, I, p. 149）（《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第72頁腳注21）。其中最易于理解的含義就是：
????????“商品B的自然形式成了商品A的價值形式，或者說，商品B的物體成了反映商品A的價值的鏡子。” (Capital, I, p. 144) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第67頁）
????????馬克思將作為價值承擔者的商品稱為等價形式；將價值被反映出來的商品稱為相對形式。馬克思得出的下一個結論是，為了具有作為價值承擔者或價值表現的職能，等價形式必須具有“直接交換（的能力）” (Capital, I, p. 147) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第70頁）。也就是說，它的可交換性（與它交換的可能性）不可能取決于它自己的使用價值，也不可能取決于體現在其中的實際的、個別的勞動的特征。在這個意義上，它必須不同于其他所有商品，正如我們之前所看到的那樣，它們的使用價值和它們的所有者的私人特征對它們的可交換性發(fā)揮著一定作用。可對于等價形式來說，它的可交換性卻必須建立在它作為等價物的社會性地位之上。但這種社會性地位“只是商品世界共同活動的結果” (Capital, I, p. 159) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第82-3頁）。也就是說，沒有一個個別的商品所有者能夠使自己的商品成為等價形式：這只能是每個商品所有者都試圖讓渡自己的商品來交換其他人的商品的行動的結果(另見Capital, I, p. 180) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第105頁）。
????????除非等價形式是一種一般等價物，所有其他商品都將其抽象勞動對象化、將其價值反映出來，否則直接的可交換性就仍然只能處于萌芽狀態(tài)。這種一般等價物的物體形式“是當作一切人類勞動的可以看得見的化身，一般的社會的蛹化” (Capital, I, p. 159) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第83頁）。直接可交換性的全面確立需要一個更進一步的條件，也就是應當出現一個獨特的（唯一的）一般等價物，一種“具有其特有的社會職能并因此具有一種社會壟斷地位，即在商品世界起一般等價物的作用” (Capital, I, p. 162) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》中文第二版第44卷第86頁）的商品。
????????就這一觀點，我們可以對其進行一系列論證和經驗審查。這一觀點意味著，在資本主義社會中，應當有一種商品被排擠出其他所有商品的行列，并被賦予了具有與其他所有商品直接交換的能力的社會性壟斷地位。我們能夠找到這樣一種商品嗎？如果不能，那么馬克思的觀點一定有哪里錯了。經過審查，我們確實發(fā)現了這樣一種商品：黃金貨幣。當然，這不意味著一般等價物一定永遠是黃金貨幣。正如我們已經看到的，馬克思繼續(xù)指出，出于某些目的，黃金作為一般等價物的地位可以被它自己的符號、被紙幣所取代。這意味著，作為一般等價物的黃金貨幣是紙幣的必要前驅體(precursor)(15)。這一觀點的根源在于馬克思拒絕接受一般等價物可以“通過習慣”確立，即可以通過所有商品所有者有意識地同時決策的方式來給予某種物質形式以一般等價物的特征的觀點。相反，他認為“貨幣結晶是交換過程的必然產物”(Capital, I, p. 181.)（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第106頁），因此當然不能將其視為是“通過習慣”來確立的。
????????我們確實發(fā)現存在這種社會性壟斷了可與其他所有商品直接交換的能力的商品，但這一事實并不能證明馬克思觀點的正確性，即商品是對象化的抽象勞動的可以看得見的表現。相反，這一事實僅僅只是沒有反駁它，但并沒有終止論證，而是讓它繼續(xù)下去。經驗審查所能夠做到的只有這些。我們何時才能充分抓住研究中的現實關系，何時才能夠充分了解這些關系并采取實際行動，都永遠無法通過經驗檢驗來最終確定。這只能始終是一個判斷問題。
????????馬克思對黃金貨幣作為一般等價物、作為“一切人類勞動的直接化身” （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第112頁）的作用的闡述中存在一個問題，他并沒有充分和清晰地區(qū)分作為交換中介的貨幣和作為價值的貨幣形式（作為一般等價物）的貨幣。貨幣本身并非資本主義生產方式特有的(見Brenner, 1977)，而且貨幣行使著交換中介的職能也不意味著它就是價值的表現，是“一切人類勞動的直接化身”。
????????這一區(qū)別在第二章“交換過程”的許多論述中被省略，這就給人造成了一種印象，仿佛只要存在貨幣，那就存在價值。作為交換中介的貨幣當然是價值的貨幣形式的一個必要前驅體，但在第二章中，馬克思以犧牲差異性為代價，過分強調了連續(xù)性。這一觀點可以概括如下：從一個資本主義生產方式占統(tǒng)治地位并存在著資本主義交換關系（即通過買和賣的過程，勞動產品普遍具有可交換性的情形）的經濟出發(fā)，我們可以通過分析得知價值（即抽象勞動的對象化）存在這一經濟中；接下來，我們對抽象勞動對象化的條件進行分析，并得出結論，抽象勞動的對象化表明了反映價值且作為價值表現的一般等價物的存在。資本主義經濟中的黃金貨幣確實具有作為一般等價物所必要的特征。但作為一般等價物，它自身取決于資本主義生產方式的社會關系。
????????馬克思的論證并非形式主義的，而是從資本主義特有的社會關系中的現實的前提出發(fā)；而且它的確經受住了經驗檢驗，我們確實可以在現實中發(fā)現這樣一種與綜合階段論證的前提相對應的社會現象。然而，它卻使我們得出了一個不同尋常的結論，馬克思在《資本論》第一章的最后一節(jié)中明確指出了這一結論的特殊性：
????????“如果我說，上衣、皮靴等等把麻布當作抽象的人類勞動的一般化身而同它發(fā)生關系，這種說法的荒謬是一目了然的。但是當上衣、皮靴等等的生產者使這些商品同作為一般等價物的麻布（或者金銀，這絲毫不改變問題的性質）發(fā)生關系時，他們的私人勞動同社會總勞動的關系正是通過這種荒謬形式呈現在他們面前?！?(Capital, I, p. 169) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第93頁）
????????這一點在《資本論》第一版的一段文本中得到了更為生動的闡述，但這段文本卻在之后的版本中消失了。最近Arthur, 1978重新引起了我們對這段文本的注意。通過其在一般等價物中的化身而發(fā)生的抽象勞動的對象化
????????“就像除了分類組成動物界不同屬、種、亞種、科等等的獅子、老虎、兔子和其他等等所有實在的動物以外，還存在著作為整個動物界的單個體現的動物一樣?！?(轉引自Arthur, 1978, P. 98) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第42卷第47頁）
????????抽象勞動的對象化需要它的某種表現，而這種表現依賴于某種形式規(guī)定，即貨幣商品形式。但具有一個獨立表現的對象化的抽象勞動（價值）難道不會徹底摧毀馬克思關于價值不能是絕對實體(absolute entity)的觀點嗎？在這里，請記住馬克思提出的另一個鮮為人知的區(qū)別，即“內在獨立性”與“外在獨立性”(參見Capital, I, p. 209) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第135頁）的區(qū)別。價值缺乏作為一個實體(entity)所必需的“內在獨立性”，因為它始終只是作為一個價值和使用價值統(tǒng)一體即商品的一面。但如果商品與另一種僅用于反映價值的商品發(fā)生關系，商品的價值一面可以得到“外部獨立性”。這就產生了一種虛幻的表象，貨幣形式下的價值是一個獨立的實體(independent entity)；但它賦予價值的自主性(autonomy)僅僅只是相對的。商品拜物教正是這種對象化形式中的、單方面抽象的、勞動抽象方面的外部獨立表現。但不同于“宗教世界的幻境” （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第90頁）的拜物教，商品拜物教并非某種意識形態(tài)，也不是我們看待事物的方式的產物；而是勞動確定(16)的特定形式、特定生產關系的產物。
????????在一般等價物形式中，抽象勞動不僅被對象化：其還被確立為勞動的主導方面。而具體方面則僅僅用于表現人類勞動的抽象方面；因為體現在一般等價物中的勞動的有用性在于“造了一種物體，使人們能看出它是價值” (Capital, I, p. 150) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第73頁）。體現在一般等價物中的勞動的私人方面則僅僅用于表現其社會方面：在某種商品被某種“盲目的”社會過程確立為一般等價物之前，個別生產者無法主動生產一般等價物。體現在一般等價物中的勞動的社會方面，它的社會必要性，在于生產一種商品，這種商品僅僅只是抽象勞動的化身。這并不意味著勞動的私人、具體和社會方面正在消失、消亡；而是意味著體現在一般等價物中的勞動僅僅只是抽象勞動。這意味著勞動的其他方面從屬于抽象勞動的表現。一般等價物形式僅僅反映了價值。
????????《資本論》第一卷接下來的論述繼續(xù)揭示了一般等價物、價值的貨幣形式對其他商品的統(tǒng)治(17)地位，以及這種統(tǒng)治地位是如何表現為價值的貨幣形式的自我擴張，即價值的資本形態(tài)的。此外，它還表明了價值的資本形態(tài)的統(tǒng)治不僅限于“固定”在產品中的勞動，還延伸到直接生產過程本身以及這一過程的再生產上。勞動作為資本形態(tài)的實際從屬(見《直接生產過程的結果》 p. 1019-1038)（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第38卷第103-23頁）是勞動的其他方面作為抽象勞動在一般等價物中、價值的貨幣形式中的表現的一種發(fā)展完成的實際從屬形式。
????????在討論勞動抽象方面對象化的統(tǒng)治地位時，通過價值的資本形態(tài)，馬克思將價值稱為“過程的主體”，“自行增殖著”(Capital, I, p. 255) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第180頁）。在此處，價值似乎又被當作一個絕對獨立的實體。這些文本事實上構成了資本-邏輯方法的出發(fā)點。在這里馬克思似乎確實將“現實的生產行為”誤認為是“范疇的運動”。但我們只需要回想起剛剛提到的外部獨立性與內部獨立性的區(qū)別；以及這些文本出現在對資本流通，即貨幣增殖的表現形式的討論中的這一事實。在這個層次上，價值當然是過程的主體，并被賦予了它自己的生命力。但它不僅僅是直接出現在眼前的；馬克思用諷刺的話語說：
????????“它所以獲得創(chuàng)造價值的奇能，是因為它是價值。它會產仔，或者說，它至少會生金蛋?！?(Capital, I, p. 255) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第180頁）
????????在商品拜物教一節(jié)的開頭，我們可以回想起對商品神秘能力的諷刺，它的“形而上學的微妙和神學的怪誕”(Capital, I, p. 162) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第88頁），
????????“商品形式在人們面前把人們本身勞動的社會性質反映成勞動產品本身的物的性質，反映成這些物的天然的社會屬性?！?(Capital, I, p. 165.) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第89頁）
????????馬克思對價值和價格（表現為貨幣形式的交換價值）之間關系的論述基于“反思規(guī)定”，即商品中的抽象勞動通過其價值的貨幣形式表現而被對象化。從本文前面的章節(jié)中就可以清楚地看到，《資本論》第一卷第一章前兩節(jié)中提及的勞動時間對價值量的規(guī)定并非一個關于價值和價格關系的論述，而是一個關于價值和其內在尺度的論述。在第一章的第三節(jié)和第四節(jié)中，我們才能首次發(fā)現對價值作為交換比率的自動調節(jié)器的描述，其中最值得注意的是：
????????“顯然，不是交換調節(jié)商品的價值量，恰好相反，是商品的價值量調節(jié)商品的交換比例?！?(Capital, I, p. 156.) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第79頁）
????????以及
????????“……在私人勞動產品的偶然的不斷變動的變換比例中，生產這些產品的社會必要勞動時間作為起調節(jié)作用的自然規(guī)律?！?(Capital, I, p. 165.) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第92頁）
????????從我先前的論證中可以明顯地看出來，不能用因變量與自變量之間的關系來解釋“調節(jié)”。相反，我們應該以某種形式的內在特征在表象層次上、在它的反映上調節(jié)它的表現的方式來理解“調節(jié)”一詞。因此，化學物質（實體，substance）的分子結構以晶體的形式調節(jié)著物質(substance)的表現，而有機生物體的細胞結構調節(jié)著有機生物體的軀體。
????????我們也應當留意到，在上面引用的文本中，馬克思只提到了價值“調節(jié)”交換比率。他沒有具體說明這種調節(jié)的形式；特別是，他并不認為作為等價形式表現的交換比率直接地表示了價值量（即價格等于價值）。在關于“一般價值形式”的討論中，有一段文本比較模糊：
????????“現在，一切商品，在與麻布等同的形式上，不僅表現為在質上等同，表現為價值一般，而且同時也表現為在量上可以比較的價值量。由于它們都通過同一個材料，通過麻布來反映自己的價值量，這些價值量也就相互反映。例如，10磅茶葉=20碼麻布，40磅咖啡=20碼麻布。因此，10磅茶葉=40磅咖啡?；蛘哒f，1磅咖啡所包含的價值實體即勞動，只等于1磅茶葉所包含的1/4。” (Capital, I, p. 159.) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第83頁）
????????其中的最后一句話無疑是在暗示價值與價格相等（馬克思認為麻布在這里起到了貨幣的作用）。但我認為我們必須特別留意與“表象”有關的文本。馬克思在這一論證階段正在從對商品之間關系的內在實體(substance)的分析回到它們的表象之上。但問題是，根據迄今為止的研究，商品交換的比率似乎直接反映了它們價值量，而目前還沒有否定這種表象的依據。然而，在寫作《資本論》第一卷時，馬克思就清楚地意識到了，在之后的研究階段中，基于這一表象所得出的結論一定會受到挑戰(zhàn)。他在腳注中指出了李嘉圖對價值量分析的不足，而“這一點人們將在本書的第三冊和第四冊中看到”(Capital, I, p. 173)（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第93頁腳注31）。
????????在1859年——也就是《資本論》第一卷出版的八年前——出版的《政治經濟學批判》中似乎還看不出這樣的觀點，里面也沒有對實體(substance)（或內在結構）和表象進行同樣細致的區(qū)分，例如，馬克思并沒有對價值和交換價值進行系統(tǒng)性地區(qū)分。
????????在《資本論》第一卷中，馬克思并沒有采取任何措施來澄清價格直接表示價值量的表象。但這與假設價格與價值近似相等并在隨后放松這一假設的方式并不相同。相反，在《資本論》第一卷中，關于這一點的論述從對社會關系的分析中被抽象掉了，這意味著價格不能直接表示價值量。這常常被解釋為馬克思在《資本論》第一卷中研究“資本一般”，而在對價值量表現形式進行精確分析的《資本論》第三卷中則研究“許多資本”('many capitals')(18)(參見Rosdolsky, 1977, p. 41-50)。這種解釋的問題在于，它經常導致對競爭的混淆：例如，認為《資本論》第一卷將競爭抽象掉了。但事實顯然并非如此：競爭是資本主義的一個基本特征；資本只能以許多資本的形式存在。馬克思在第一卷中抽象掉的不是競爭，而是資本之間的價值分配問題。
????????馬克思本人在《直接生產的結果》的開頭作出了更有用的區(qū)分，即將商品視為勞動的產物和將商品視為資本（即自行增殖的勞動）的產物之間的區(qū)別。馬克思指出，商品曾經是他論證的出發(fā)點，因為它是資產階級財富的最直接外觀形式。第一卷的研究準確地表明了商品的這種直接外觀的膚淺性，并揭示了商品，作為“資本主義生產過程的直接結果” （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第38卷第29頁），不僅體現為價值，而且體現為剩余價值；不僅以價格形式表示，而且以利潤形式表示。(19)
????????這就要求對由價格表示的價值量進行重新考慮，而這一點在《資本論》第三卷中進行，在其中生產價格范疇得到了闡述。與馬克思所得結論的充分性相關的討論已經超出了本文的范圍。在這里，我們只需要注意到，第三卷中有關價格與價值之間關系的分析并不基于與第一卷中不同的前提，而是對同一分析的更進一步發(fā)展，并試圖納入那些在第一卷中被抽象掉的資本主義生產方式的特征。
????????馬克思不僅主張價值調節(jié)著——在我們之前解釋的意義上——價格。他還指出，這種調節(jié)存在著被破壞的可能性。為了使體現在商品中的勞動的抽象方面對象化，商品必須擁有一個價格。但這個價格
????????“既可以表現商品的價值量，也可以表現比它大或小的量，在一定條件下，商品就是按這種較大或較小的量來讓渡的?？梢?，價格和價值量之間的量的不一致的可能性，或者價格偏離價值量的可能性，已經包含在價格形式本身中?！?(Capital, I, p. 196) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第122-3頁）
????????作為一般等價物的貨幣是抽象勞動對象化的必要條件，但并不是這一對象化在數量規(guī)定上、在社會必要形式上的充分條件。由于商品生產下貨幣流通的相對自主性，以價格形式實現的價值量是不穩(wěn)定的。在這兩個過程的關系中，
????????“作為使用價值的商品同作為交換價值的貨幣對立著。另一方面，對立的雙方都是商品，也就是說，都是使用價值和價值的統(tǒng)一。但這種差別的統(tǒng)一按相反的方向表現在兩極中的每一極上，并且由此同時表現出它們的相互關系。” (Capital, I, p. 199) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第125頁）
????????放棄自己所有的商品形式的使用價值與獲得其他人的使用價值之間沒有必然的聯系；因為人們可以選擇持有貨幣，這是一種不同于其他商品的商品，它通?？梢栽谌魏螘r間與任何商品進行交換。但貨幣的價值量必然是不確定的，因為沒有唯一反映它的價值的一般等價物，只有給定數量的貨幣所能購買到的其他所有商品所組成的一系列反映(見Capital, I, p. 147) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第70-1頁）(20)。因此，不同商品在購買和出售時的時間和順序都可以對價格產生一個獨立的影響，且在任何時候，總銷售和總購買都不會必然一致。
????????但是，如果商品生產下貨幣流通的相對自主性
????????“達到一定程度時，統(tǒng)一就要強制地通過危機顯示出來。商品內在的使用價值和價值的對立，私人勞動同時必須表現為直接社會勞動的對立，特殊的具體的勞動同時只是當作抽象的一般的勞動的對立，物的人格化和人格的物化的對立，……這種內在的矛盾在商品形態(tài)變化的對立中取得發(fā)展了的運動形式。因此，這些形式包含著危機的可能性，但僅僅是可能性。這種可能性要發(fā)展為現實，必須有一系列的關系，從簡單商品流通的觀點來看，這些關系還根本不存在。” (Capital, 1, p. 209.) （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第135-6頁）
????????我們對資本主義經濟的觀察告訴我們，危機的可能性不僅實現了，而且還得到了——暫時性的——解決，在這個意義上來說，資本主義經濟的重構正在進行并從危機中復蘇。因此，貨幣流通能夠在多大的程度上與商品生產相脫節(jié)是存在一個明確的限度的；或者換句話說，價格能夠在多大的程度上偏離價值量是存在一個明確的限度的。是什么決定了這些限度的大小只能經過大量的調查研究才能夠確定。鑒于目前為止我們已經確立的分析范疇，我們只能說，這些限度必須以某種形式向商品生產者施加壓力以讓他們用貨幣形式表示生產中耗費的勞動時間，而且每時每刻都要用貨幣計算[21]。要確定這種壓力是如何產生的，就需要對資本主義生產進行分析。認為這種壓力必然來自于資本再生產它自己的“需求”是完全不合理的。在這里，我贊同Cutler et al.反對功能主義和經濟主義推理的觀點(同上1977, p. 71)。但我也要強調一下，馬克思從來沒有提出過這樣的觀點。
????????的確，《資本論》第一卷的研究在很大程度上是基于均衡的假設——價值量反映為商品的價格（等價物的交換）——而非基于非均衡的假設——這種反映不能夠在數量上確定（非等價物的交換）。但這是因為，商品生產中貨幣流通的相對自主性過程體現在資本之間的利潤分配上（見Capital, I, p. 262-6中對此的一個初步說明）（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第44卷第186-91頁）(21)，這恰恰是馬克思在第一卷中提出的問題。第一卷主要關注的是確定勞動是如何成為“創(chuàng)造價值的實體” （《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第38卷第98頁）的，這又是如何使勞動從屬于資本形態(tài)的。在研究這一點時，馬克思首先對他所考慮的過程的均衡方面進行審查，但他同時也指出，這僅僅只是過程的一個方面，資本主義經濟中勞動確定過程的形式意味著不均衡與危機，就如同均衡和規(guī)律一樣。
????????
????????注釋：
????????[20]當然，穆勒和李嘉圖確實認識到了市場價格的波動非常大。但這一波動被視為表面上的“噪音”，掩蓋了而不是暴露了潛在的關系(見Banaji, this volume, p. 14-45中對古典政治經濟學中潛在關系與表象之間關系的進一步討論)。
????????[21]這并不意味著每一小時的勞動都被對象化為相同數量的價值并被表現為相同數量的貨幣。不同種類的勞動時間可以被對象化為不同數量的價值并表現為不同數量的貨幣。馬克思用劃分熟練勞動與非熟練勞動的方式解決了這一問題。對馬克思的解決方法是否足夠充分的討論超出了本文的范圍，但我們可能會注意到，大量無論是專門對這一問題進行討論的文獻還是與馬克思價值理論相關的一般性著作都對其充滿了誤解
????????但這也不意味著價值理論的目的就是建立這樣一些定價規(guī)則——根據這些規(guī)則，勞動時間的貨幣表現必須由勞動時間決定以保證特定的勞動力耗費模式的再生產。因此，即使在聯合生產下生產單個商品所需的社會必要勞動時間無法與該商品的價格聯系起來，也不會推翻馬克思的價值理論（對這一點的進一步討論，見Himmelweit and Mohun, 1978, Sections 4 and 5）（伊恩?斯蒂德曼和保羅?斯威齊等，2016，p. 276-89）
????????相反，馬克思的價值理論為我們提供了一個可以用于分析定價規(guī)則的建立為什么在資本主義的發(fā)展中如此必要，從而產生了諸如會計師、資本預算專家和價格分析師（原文如此）等等現代職業(yè)陣容的工具；現代經濟學家們對尋找一個“最佳”定價規(guī)則的關注的產生也同樣如此。它同樣為我們提供了一些可以用來研究那些馬克思不太關心的現象的工具，或許是因為在他的那個時代中，這些現象沒有太大的實際意義，定價規(guī)則中固有的矛盾，以及其中計算聯合生產中耗費的勞動時間的嘗試中的矛盾就是一個很好的例子。
????????
????????譯者注：
????????(14)英譯本與中譯本在這里的表述方式有較大差異，因此我進行了一些補充來使句子相對通順，下同。這段的大意是：穆勒認為現實總是與抽象規(guī)律相一致，即使不一致，現實也總是朝著抽象規(guī)律所規(guī)定的均衡方向發(fā)展；但實際上恰恰相反，現實的趨勢反而是在不斷偏離均衡（由于資本的競爭，尤其是使各資本利潤率差別化的部門內競爭以及其采取的競爭形式——技術革新，獲得技術優(yōu)勢的資本家不會僅僅滿足于自己當下占有的市場，而是會通過諸如擴大產量和降價的方式獲取更大的市場，此時供給就會超過需求，市場價格就會偏離價值或生產價格；注意，“競爭不過是資本的內在本性”，技術進步內生于資本積累過程中），而朝向均衡的運動僅僅是一種對偏離趨勢作出反應的反趨勢（競爭中的失敗者要么同樣采取技術革新，要么就被迫縮減生產規(guī)模、將資本轉移到其他生產部門或直接退出生產，這才是使市場趨向均衡的力量，但這股力量是由非均衡趨勢所引起的，它不可能抵消非均衡趨勢，均衡只不過是偶然），趨勢引起了反趨勢；穆勒所認為的抽象規(guī)律僅僅只是對現實運動中反趨勢的片面抽象，而它卻被認為是本質、必然，趨勢卻被認為是非本質、偶然，這是嚴重的歪曲；而這一歪曲的起源則在于“他們把國民經濟學歸結為一些嚴格而準確的公式”，“國民經濟學的真正規(guī)律是偶然性，我們這些學者可以從這種偶然性的運動任意地把某些因素固定在規(guī)律的形式中”。穆勒對本質的選取是武斷的，他按照自己的心意任意選取某些偶然性因素作為固定不變的本質（因而運用形式邏輯從這些“本質”推導而來的“抽象規(guī)律”也是固定不變的，新古典經濟學實際上犯的是同樣的錯誤），而缺乏對資本主義現實世界真實特征的把握。在穆勒眼中，不是現實的運動決定理論，反而是理論決定現實的運動，因此他只能得出由這些任意選取的“本質”推論出的“抽象規(guī)律”而不能正確地認識現實世界中的資本主義。
????????(15)在通常的釋義中沒能找到合適的詞語，但前驅體這一化學術語卻出奇的合適，希望沒有學習過化學的讀者也能夠理解這一詞語的含義。
????????(16)這里的“勞動確定”在前文曾經提到過，人類勞動的不固定性。
????????(17)在本譯文中，包括該注釋之前的絕大多數“主導”、“支配”和“統(tǒng)治”對應的英文單詞均相同’domination’、’dominant’，三者含義也相同。
????????(18)柳欣采用的是相同的分析方法，更進一步的，他追隨Rosdolsky將“資本一般”理解為“總量資本”，因此他認為《資本論》第一卷討論的就是一種宏觀上的“總量理論”，而與商品的相對價格分析無關。價值在他的分析中具有了一種絕對實體，“絕對價值”也就出現在了他的理論中。此外，在他的著作中，“許多資本”被翻譯為“多數資本”。
????????(19)在《剩余價值理論》中同樣有一段文本表明了作為勞動產物的商品一般與作為資本產物的資本主義商品之間的區(qū)別，這明確地展現了馬克思分析的歷史和社會背景：“我們現在從作為資本主義生產的基礎和前提的商品——產品的這個特殊的社會形式——出發(fā)。我們考察個別的產品，分析它們作為商品所包含的，也就是給它們打上商品烙印的形式規(guī)定性。在資本主義生產以前——在以前的生產方式下——很大一部分產品不進入流通，不投入市場，不作為商品生產出來，不成為商品。另一方面，在這個時期，加入生產的很大一部分產品不是商品，不作為商品進入過程。產品轉化為商品，只發(fā)生在個別場合，只涉及產品的剩余部分等等，或只涉及個別生產領域（制造業(yè)產品）等等。產品既不是全部作為交易品進入過程，也不是全部作為交易品從過程出來。但是產品發(fā)展為商品，一定范圍的商品流通，從而一定范圍的貨幣流通，從而達到一定發(fā)展程度的貿易，是資本形成和資本主義生產的前提和起點。我們把商品作為這樣的前提對待，因為我們就是從作為資本主義生產的最簡單的元素的商品出發(fā)的。但是，另一方面，資本主義生產的產物，它的結果是商品。表現為資本主義生產元素的東西，后來表現為資本主義生產本身的產物。只有在資本主義生產的基礎上，商品才成為產品的普遍形式，而且資本主義生產越發(fā)展，產品就越是在商品形式上作為組成部分進入資本主義生產過程。從資本主義生產中出來的商品，與我們據以出發(fā)的、作為資本主義生產元素的商品不同。在我們面前的已經不是個別的商品，個別的產品。個別的商品，個別的產品，不僅實在地作為產品，而且作為商品，表現為總產品的一個不僅是實在的、而且是觀念的部分、每個個別的商品都表現為一定部分的資本和資本所創(chuàng)造的剩余價值的承擔者?！?（《馬克思恩格斯全集》第二版第35卷第119頁）
????????(20)作為一般等價物的貨幣在交換中（購買其他商品時）只能處在擴大的價值形式的位置上，不存在一般等價物的一般等價物，貨幣的價值只能表現在商品世界中其他無數的一系列商品上而不存在唯一的價值表現，每一其他種類的商品都是反映貨幣價值的鏡子。
????????(21)這里說的并不是與價值轉化為生產價格有關的利潤分配，而是在《資本論》第一卷的背景下指出，非等價交換（低買高賣）并不能為所有商品生產者（在這里就是資本主義社會中的資本家）提供利潤，因此普遍存在的利潤不可能從商品流通領域中產生。
????????
????????參考文獻
????????伊恩?斯蒂德曼和保羅?斯威齊等. (2016). 價值問題的論戰(zhàn). 商務印書館.
????????Arthur, C J (1978), 'Labour: Marx's Concrete Universal', Inquiry, No. 2.
????????Banaji, J (1979), 'From the Commodity to Capital: Hegel's Dialectic in Marx's Capital' in Elson, D (ed.), op. cit.
????????Brenner, R (1977), 'The Origins of Capitalist Development—A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism', New Left Review, No. 104.
????????Cutler, A, Hindess, B, Hirst, P and Hussain, A (1977), Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today, Vol. I, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
????????Himmelweit, S and Mohun, S (1978), 'The Anomalies of Capital', Capital & Class No. 6.
????????Rosdolsky, R (1977), The Making of Marx's Capital, Pluto Press, London.
????????3. The phase of synthesis: from value to price
????????The phase of synthesis encompasses the whole of the rest of Part One of Capital, I. In it Marx discusses the way that the objectification of abstract labour occurs and how this entails the dominance of abstract labour; and also shows the precarious nature of this objectification. It is about the operation of the 'law of value' which fundamentally means the 'law' of the process by which abstract labour is objectified. The term 'law' and the explicit comparison of the law of value with 'a regulative law of nature' (cf. Capital, I, p. 168) is once more a reference to the naturalistic aspect of this process, the fact that it takes place 'behind the backs' of the commodity owners. But it is important to note that Marx does not have a rigid, 'deterministic' concept of a 'regulative law'. He criticised such a concept in one of his earliest writings on political economy:
????????.. Mill succumbs to the error, made by the entire Ricardo School, of defining abstract law without mentioning the fluctuations or the continual suspension by which it comes into being... the momentary co-incidence (of cost of production and price) is succeeded by the same fluctuations and the same disparity. This is the real movement, then, and the above-mentioned law is no more than an abstract, contingent and one-sided moment in it.' ('Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of Political Economy', Early Writings, p. 260.)20
????????And he was careful to avoid such an 'abstract law' in the argument of Capital.?
????????'Under capitalist production, the general law acts as the prevailing tendency only in a very complicated and approximate manner, as a never ascertainable average of ceaseless fluctuations.' (Capital, III, p. 161).
????????The 'law of value' is often posed as a relation between value and price, but this is because price is the form through which the objectification of abstract labour is achieved. Establishing this result is the first step of the phase of syntheses.
????????The problem is to explain the process by which abstract labour, an aspect of labour, becomes 'objectified' as the value of a commodity. Marx's argument is that this requires the abstract labour embodied in a commodity (e.g. linen) to be expressed 'objectively', as a 'thing which is materially different from the linen itself and yet common to the linen and all other commodities' (Capital, I, p. 142). This can be done if one commodity functions as the bearer of value (or value-form), and reflects the value of the commodities exchanged with it. Section III of chapter 1, Capital, I, is devoted to exploring the implications of this 'determination of reflection' (cf. Capital, I, p. 149). The simplest implication is that,?
????????' . . . the natural form of commodity B becomes the value form of commodity A, in other words the physical body of commodity B becomes a mirror for the value of commodity A'. (Capital, I, p. 144).
????????Marx calls the commodity which serves as the bearer of value the equivalent form; and the commodity whose value is being reflected, the relative form. The next implication that Marx draws, is that in order to function as a bearer or representation of value, the equivalent form must be 'directly exchangeable' (Capital, I, p. 147). That is, its exchangeability (the possibility of exchanging it) must not depend upon its own use-value, nor on the character of the actual, individual labour embodied in it. In this it must differ from all other commodities, where, as we have already seen, their use-value and the private characteristics of their owners play a role in their exchangeability. In the case of the equivalent form, its exchangeability must instead depend upon its social position as equivalent. But this social position 'can only arise as the joint contribution of the whole world of commodities' (Capital, I, p. 159). That is, no individual commodity owner can decide to make his commodity an equivalent form: this can only come about as the byproduct of the actions of each commodity owner trying to exchange his own commodity for others he would rather have (see also Capital, I, p. 180).
????????Direct exchangeability will remain in only an embryonic form unless the equivalent form is a universal equivalent, in which all other commodities have their abstract labour objectified, their value reflected. The physical form of such a universal equivalent 'counts as the visible incarnation, the social chrysalis state, of all human labour' (Capital, I, p. 159). The full establishment of direct exchangeability requires a further condition that there should be a unique universal equivalent, a commodity whose 'specific social function, and consequently its social monopoly (is) to play the part of universal equivalent in the world of commodities' (Capital, I, p. 162).
????????And at this point we can make an empirical check on the line of argument. The argument has implied that in capitalist societies there should be a tendency for one commodity to be excluded from the ranks of all other commodities, to have conferred upon it the social monopoly of direct exchangeability with all other commodities. Can such a commodity be found? If not, then something must be wrong with Marx's argument. On inspection we do find such a commodity: gold-money. The implication is not, of course that the universal equivalent must always be gold money. As we have already seen, Marx goes on to note that gold, for some purposes, can be replaced as universal equivalent by symbols of itself, by paper money. The implication is rather, that gold-money as the universal equivalent-is a necessary precursor to paper money. At the root of the argument here is Marx's rejection of the view that the universal equivalent can be established 'by a convention', i.e. by a conscious and simultaneous decision of all commodity owners to invest some material form with the properties of universal equivalent. Rather he takes the view that 'Money necessarily crystallises out of the process of exchange' (Capital, I, p. 181), and that it certainly cannot be treated 'as if' established 'by a convention'.
????????The fact that we do find a commodity with the social monopoly of direct exchangeability with all other commodities does not prove the correctness of Marx's argument that such a commodity is the visible expression of objectified abstract labour. Rather it has the negative effect of not disproving it, of not halting the line of argument, but allowing it to proceed. This is all an empirical check on the argument can ever do. The question of when we have sufficiently grasped the real relations under investigation, when we know enough about them to proceed to practical action, is not one that can ever be finally decided by an empirical test. It must always be a matter of judgement.
????????There is a problem with Marx's exposition of the role of gold-money as universal equivalent, 'direct incarnation of all human labour', in that he does not distinguish sufficiently clearly between money as a medium of exchange and the money form of value (money as universal equivalent). Money in itself is not specific to the capitalist mode of production (see Brenner, 1977), and the fact that money is functioning as a medium of exchange does not mean that it is functioning as an expression of value, the 'direct incarnation of all human labour'. This distinction is ellided in many of the statements made in Chapter 2, 'The Process of Exchange', creating the impression that where there is money, there is also value. Money as medium of exchange is certainly a necessary precursor to the money form of value, but in Chapter 2 Marx overstresses the continuity at the expense of the difference. To recapitulate the argument: beginning from an economy in which the capitalist mode of production is dominant and in which there are capitalist relations of exchange (i.e. the general exchangeability of products of labour through a process of sale and purchase), we arrived through analysis at the conclusion that this presupposes value (i.e. the objectification of abstract labour); we then considered the conditions for the objectification of abstract labour and concluded that this implies a universal equivalent that reflects and is the expression of value. Gold-money in capitalist economies does have the characteristics necessary for being a universal equivalent. But being a universal equivalent is itself predicated upon the social relations of the capitalist mode of production.
????????Marx's line of argument is not formalist but begins from real premises in the specific social relations of capitalism; and it does survive empirical checks, in that a social phenomenon can be found corresponding to what is posited by the argument of the phase of synthesis. Nevertheless, it leads us to an extraordinary conclusion, the extraordinariness of which Marx notes quite explicitly in the last section of Chapter 1, Capital, I:
????????'If I state that work or boots stand in a relation to linen because the latter is the universal incarnation of abstract human labour, the absurdity of the statement is self evident. Nevertheless, when the producers of coats and boots bring these commodities into a relation with linen, or with gold or silver (and this makes no difference here), as the universal equivalent, the relation between their own private labour and the collective labour of society appears to them in exactly this absurd form'. (Capital, I, p. 169).
????????The point is made even more vividly in a passage included in the First Edition of Capital, but not in subsequent editions, and recently brought to our attention by Arthur, 1978. The objectification of abstract labour through its incarnation in the universal equivalent
????????' . . . is as if alongside and external to lions, tigers, rabbits and all other actual animals, which form grouped together the various kinds, species, sub-species, families etc. of the animal kingdom, there existed also in addition the animal, the individual incarnation of the entire animal kingdom.' (quoted by Arthur, 1978, P- 98).
????????The objectification of abstract labour entails its dependent expression in a determinate form, the form of the money commodity. But does not this conclusion, that objectified abstract labour (value) has an independent expression, undermine Marx's claim that value is not conceived as an absolute entity? Here it is helpful to bear in mind another little-noticed distinction drawn by Marx, that between 'internal independence' and 'external independence' (cf. Capital, I, p. 209). Value lacks the 'internal independence' necessary for it to be an entity because it is always one side of a unity of value and use-value, i.e. the commodity. But the value side of the commodity can be given 'external independence' if the commodity is bought into a relation with another commodity which serves only to reflect value. This produces the illusory appearance that value in its money form is an independent entity; but the autonomy it confers on value is only relative. It is this externally independent expression, in objectified form, of a one-sided abstraction, the abstract aspect of labour, which is the fetishism of commodities. Unlike the fetishism of the misty realm of religion' it is not an ideological form, a product of our way of looking at things; but a product of the particular form of the determination of labour, of particular relations of production.
????????In the form of the universal equivalent, abstract labour is not only objectified: it is established as the dominant aspect of labour. The concrete aspect serves only to express the abstract aspect of human labour; for the usefulness of the labour embodied in the universal equivalent consists in 'making a physical object which we at once recognize as value' (Capital, I, p. 150). The private aspect of the labour embodied in it serves only to express the social aspect: individual producers cannot decide to produce the universal equivalent until it has already been established as universal equivalent by a 'blind' social process. The social aspect of the labour embodied in it, its social necessity, consists in producing a commodity which functions simply as the incarnation of abstract labour. This does not mean that the private, concrete and social aspects of labour are being extinguished, obliterated; that the labour embodied in the universal equivalent is simply abstract labour. What it means is that other aspects of labour are subsumed as expressions of abstract labour. The form of the universal equivalent reflects only abstract labour.
????????The argument of Capital, I, goes on to show the dominance of the universal equivalent, the money form of value, over other commodities, and how this domination is expressed in the self-expansion of the money form of value i.e. in the capital form of value. Further it shows that the domination of the capital form of value is not confined to labour 'fixed' in products, it extends to the immediate process of production itself, and to the reproduction of that process. The real subsumption of labour as a form of capital (see Results of Immediate Process of Production, p. 1019-1038) is a developed form of the real subsumption of the other aspects of labour as expressions of abstract labour in the universal equivalent, the money form of value.
????????In discussing the domination of objectified abstract aspect of labour, through the capital form of value, Marx refers to value as 'the subject of a process', valorising itself Independently' (Capital, I, p. 255). Here again it seems as if value is being posed as an absolutely independent entity. It is indeed these references which form the point of departure of the capital-logic approach. It does seem as if here is a case where Marx is mistaking the movement of the categories' for the 'real act of production'. But we need to recall the distinction, made earlier, between external and internal independence; and the fact that these references occur in a discussion of the circulation of capital, i.e. of the form of appearance of valorisation in money terms. At this level it certainly appears that value is the subject of a process, endowed with a life of its own. But there is more to it than immediately meets the eye; which Marx signals in these ironic words:
????????'By virtue of being value, it has acquired the occult ability to add value to itself. It brings forth living offspring, or at least lays golden eggs.' (Capital, I, p. 255.)
????????We are reminded of the ironical references to the mysterious abilities of the commodity, its "metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties', at the beginning of the section on the fetishism of commodities (Capital, I, p. 162). In my view, value appearing as 'the subject of a process', valorising itself 'independently' is posed by Marx as one more aspect of the fact that,
????????'the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men's own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things.' (Capital, I, p. 165.)
????????The 'determination of reflection' whereby the abstract labour of one commodity is objectified by its expression in the money form of value is what underlies Marx's statements about the relation of value to price (exchange-value expressed in the money form). It should be clear from earlier sections of this paper that the references in the first two sections of Chapter 1, Volume I of Capital (i.e. the phase of analysis) to the determination of the magnitude of value by labour-time do not constitute an argument about the relation of value and price, but about the relation of value and its internal measure. It is in Sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 1 that we find the first references to value as a regulator of exchange ratios, most notably:
????????'It becomes plain that it is not the exchange of commodities which regulates the magnitude of their value, but rather the reverse, the magnitude of the value of commodities which regulates the proportion in which they exchange.' (Capital, I, p. 156.)
????????and,
????????' . . . in the midst of the accidental and ever-fluctuating exchange relations between the products, the labour-time socially necessary to produce them asserts itself as a regulative law of nature'. (Capital, I, p. 156.)
????????It will be apparent from my earlier argument that it would be a mistake to interpret 'regulate' in terms of a relation between a dependent and an independent variable. Rather we should understand it in terms of the way in which the inner character of some form regulates its representation at the level of appearance, its reflection. Thus the molecular structure of a chemical substance regulates the representation of the substance in the form of a crystal, and the cell-structure of a living organism regulates the form of the organism's body.
????????We should note that in the passages quoted above, Marx confines himself to saying that values 'regulate'exchange ratios. He says nothing specific about the form of this regulation; in particular, he does not commit himself to the view that the exchange ratios expressed in the equivalent form, directly represent the magnitude of values (i.e. that prices are equal to values). There is a passage in the discussion of the General Form of Value which is rather more ambiguous:
????????'In this form, when they are all counted as comparable with linen, all commodities appear not only as qualitatively equal, as values in general, but also as values of quantitatively comparable magnitude. Because the magnitudes of their values are expressed in one and the same material, the linen, these magnitudes are now reflected in each other. For instance, 10 lb of tea = 20 yards of linen, and 40 lb of coffee = 20 yards of linen. Therefore, 10 lb of tea = 40 lb of coffee, in other words, 1 lb of coffee contains only a quarter as much of the substance of value, that is, labour, as 1 lb of tea.' (Capital, I, p. 159.)
????????The last sentence certainly suggests an equality of magnitude of value and price. (Marx argues that here linen is playing the role of money). But I think we have to pay particular attention to the unstressed reference to 'appearance'. Marx in this stage of the argument is returning from consideration of the inner substance of the relations between commodities to their appearance. The point is that on the basis of the investigation so far, it appears that commodities exchange in ratios which reflect directly the magnitude of their values, and there is as yet no basis for challenging that appearance. In writing Capital, I, Marx was however well aware that at a later stage of the investigation conclusions based on this appearance would have to be challenged. He signals this in his footnote reference to the insufficiency of Ricardo's analysis of the magnitude of value' which *will appear from the third and fourth books of this work' (Capital, I, p. 173).
????????Such an awareness is not to be found in Critique of Political Economy published in 1859, eight years before Capital, I, and which does not contain the same careful distinction between substance (or inner structure) and appearance, failing, for instance, to make a systematic distinction between value and exchange-value.
????????In Capital, I, Marx takes no steps to dispel the appearance that prices directly represent values as magnitudes. But this is not quite the same as making the assumption that prices are approximately equal to values, and subsequently relaxing it. Rather, in Capital, I, the argument abstracts from consideration of the social relations that imply that prices cannot directly represent the magnitude of values. This is often explained in terms of Capital, I, dealing with 'capital in general' and Capital, III, where the form of representation of the magnitude of value is explicitly considered, dealing with 'many capitals' (cf. Rosdolsky, 1977, p. 41-50). The trouble with this explanation is that it often leads to confusion about competition: to the view, for instance, that Capital, I, abstracts from competition. This is clearly not the case: competition is an essential feature of capitalism; capital can only exist in the form of many capitals. It is not competition that Marx abstracts from in Volume I, but the question of the distribution of value between capitals.
????????More helpful is the distinction that Marx himself makes at the beginning of Results of the Immediate Process of Production, a distinction between considering the commodity simply as the product of labour, and considering it as the product of capital (i.e. of self-valorising labour). Marx indicates that his procedure in Volume I is to begin from the commodity viewed simply as the product of labour, because this is its immediate form of appearance. The investigations of Volume I show precisely the superficiality of this immediate appearance of the commodity, revealing that the commodity, as the 'immediate result of the capitalist process of production', embodies not only value, but also surplus value; is represented not only in the price but in the profit form.
????????This forces a reconsideration of the representation of magnitudes of value by prices, which is undertaken in Capital, III, where the concept of price of production is elaborated. A discussion of the adequacy of the conclusions reached is beyond the scope of this paper. Here we need merely note that the analysis of the relation between prices and values presented in Volume III does not rest on different premises from that offered in Volume I, but is a further development of the same analysis, attempting to encompass features of the capitalist mode of production from which Volume I abstracts.
????????Marx not only claims that values regulate, in the sense explained, prices. He also points to the possibility of breakdown of this regulation. In order for the abstract aspect of the labour embodied in a commodity to be objectified, the commodity must have a price. But this price
????????'may express both the magnitude of value of the commodity and the greater or lesser quantity of money for which it can be sold under given circumstances. The possibility, therefore, of a quantitative incongruity between price and magnitude of value, i.e. the possibility that the price may diverge from the magnitude of value, is inherent in the price-form itself.' (Capital, I, p. 196).
????????Money as universal equivalent is a necessary condition for the objectification of abstract labour, but not a sufficient condition for its objectification in a quantitatively determinate, socially necessary form. The realisation of the magnitude of value in the price form is precarious because of the relative autonomy of the circulation of money from the production of commodities. In the relation between the two processes,
????????'commodities as use-values confront money as exchange values. On the other hand, both sides of this opposition are commodities, hence themselves unities of use-value and value. But this unity of differences is expressed at two opposite poles, and at each pole in an opposite way.' (Capital, I, p. 199).
????????There is no necessary relation between relinquishing one's own use-value in the commodity form and acquiring someone else's use-value; for one can choose to hold money, a commodity which, unlike any other, is normally exchangeable at any time for any commodity. But the magnitude of value of money is necessarily indeterminate, for there is no universal equivalent uniquely reflecting its value, but a whole series of reflections in the quantities of all other commodities that a given amount of money will purchase (see Capital, I, p. 147). The timing and sequence of purchases and sales of different goods can thus have an independent effect upon prices, and at any moment in time there is no necessary identity of aggregate sales and aggregate purchases.
????????But if the assertion of the relative autonomy of the circulation of money from the production of commodities
????????"proceeds to a certain critical point, their unity violently makes itself felt by producing—a crisis. There is an antithesis, immanent in the commodity, between use-value and value, between private labour, which must simultaneously manifest itself as directly social labour, and a particular concrete kind of labour, which simultaneously counts as merely abstract universal labour, between the conversion of things into persons and the conversion of persons into things; the antithetical phases of the metamorphosis of the commodity are the developed forms of motion of this immanent contradiction. These forms therefore imply the possibility of crises, though no more than the possibility. For the development of this possibility into a reality a whole series of conditions is required, which do not yet exist from the standpoint of the simple circulation of commodities.' (Capital, 1, p. 209.)
????????Our observations of capitalist economies tell us that not only is this possibility of crisis realised, it is also—temporarily—resolved, in the sense that restructuring takes place and there is recovery from the crisis. Thus there are clearly limits to the extent to which the circulation of money departs from the production of commodities; or, in other words, to the extent to which price departs from the magnitude of value. What sets these limits can only be established after a good deal more investigation. Given the categories of analysis established so far, all that we can say is that these limits must take the form of some pressure on commodity producers to represent labour-time expended in production in money terms, to account in money terms for every moment. 21 To establish how such pressure is brought to bear requires an analysis of capitalist production. It is quite illegitimate to argue that the pressure must come from capital's 'need' to reproduce itself. Here I am in agreement with Cutler et al. who reject such reasoning as functionalist and economistic (op. cit. 1977, p. 71). But I would also stress that nowhere does Marx present an argument of this type.
????????It is true that the investigations of Capital, I, proceed for the most part on the assumption of equilibrium —the reflection of the magnitude of value in the price of commodities (exchange of equivalents) —rather than on the assumption of disequilibrium—the failure of this reflection to be quantitatively determinate (exchange of non-equivalents). But this is because the assertion of the relative autonomy of the circulation of money from the production of commodities shows up in terms of the distribution of profit between capitals (see Capital, I, p. 262-6 for a preliminary indication of this), precisely the question from which Marx abstracts in Volume I. The major concern of Volume I is to establish how it is that labour comes to count 'simply as a valuecreating substance', how this entails the subsumption of labour as a form of capital. In doing this Marx follows the procedure of first examining the equilibrium aspect of the process he is considering, its 'law', but he also indicates that this is merely one side of the process, and that the forms of the process of the determination of labour in capitalist economies imply disequilibrium and crisis, just as much as equilibrium and law'
