Plato’s Republic

柏拉圖的《理想國(guó)》

Plato relied on the Theory of Ideas not only in the area of logic and metaphysics, but also in the theory of knowledge and in the foundations of morality. To see the many different uses to which he put it in the years of his maturity, we cannot do better than to consider in detail his most famous dialogue, The Republic. The official purpose of the dialogue is to seek a definition of justice, and the thesis which it propounds is that justice is the health of the soul. But that answer takes a long while to reach, and when it is reached it is interpreted in many different ways.?

柏拉圖不僅在邏輯和形而上學(xué)的領(lǐng)域，而且在知識(shí)論和道德基礎(chǔ)上都依賴于理型論。要看到他在成熟的歲月里把它用于許多不同的用途，我們最好詳細(xì)地考慮他最著名的對(duì)話《理想國(guó)》。對(duì)話的官方目的是尋求正義的定義，它提出的論題是正義是靈魂的健康。但這個(gè)答案要花很長(zhǎng)時(shí)間才能得到，而且當(dāng)它得到時(shí)，它被解釋成許多不同的方式。

The dialogue’s first book offers a number of candidate definitions which are, one after the other, exploded by Socrates in the manner of the early dialogues. The book indeed, may at one time have existed separately as a self-contained dialogue. But it also illustrates the essential structure of the entire Republic, which is dictated by a method to which Plato attached great importance and to which he gave the name ‘dialectic’.?

對(duì)話的第一卷提供了一些候選的定義，它們一個(gè)接一個(gè)地被蘇格拉底以早期對(duì)話的方式駁斥了。這本書(shū)確實(shí)可能曾經(jīng)作為一個(gè)獨(dú)立的完整的對(duì)話存在過(guò)。但它也說(shuō)明了整個(gè)《理想國(guó)》的基本結(jié)構(gòu)，這個(gè)結(jié)構(gòu)是由柏拉圖非常重視并給予“辯證法”這個(gè)名字的一種方法所決定的。

A dialectician operates as follows. He takes a hypothesis, a questionable assumption, and tries to show that it leads to a contradiction: he presents, in the Greek technical term, an elenchus. If the elenchus is successful, and a contradiction is reached, then the hypothesis is refuted; and the dialectician next puts to the test the other premisses used to derive the contradiction, subjecting them in turn to elenchus until he reaches a premiss which is unquestionable.?

一個(gè)辯證家的操作如下。他采用一個(gè)假設(shè)，一個(gè)有問(wèn)題的假設(shè)，并試圖證明它導(dǎo)致了一個(gè)矛盾：他用希臘語(yǔ)的技術(shù)術(shù)語(yǔ)提出了一個(gè)反駁。如果反駁是成功的，并且達(dá)到了矛盾，那么假設(shè)就被駁斥了；然后辯證家對(duì)用來(lái)推導(dǎo)出矛盾的其他前提進(jìn)行測(cè)試，依次對(duì)它們進(jìn)行反駁，直到他達(dá)到一個(gè)無(wú)可置疑的前提。

All this can be illustrated from the first book of the Republic. The first elenchus is very brief. Socrates’ old friend Cephalus puts forward the hypothesis that justice is telling the truth and returning whatever one has borrowed. Socrates asks: is it just to return a weapon to a mad friend? Cephalus agrees that it is not; and so Socrates concludes ‘justice cannot be defined as telling the truth and returning what one has borrowed’. Cephalus then withdraws from the debate and goes off to sacrifice.?

所有這些都可以從《理想國(guó)》的第一卷中說(shuō)明。第一個(gè)反駁是非常簡(jiǎn)短的。蘇格拉底的老朋友塞法羅斯提出了一個(gè)假設(shè)，即正義是說(shuō)實(shí)話和歸還借來(lái)的東西。蘇格拉底問(wèn)：把武器還給一個(gè)瘋狂的朋友是公正的嗎？塞法羅斯同意這是不公正的；所以蘇格拉底得出結(jié)論“正義不能被定義為說(shuō)實(shí)話和歸還借來(lái)的東西”。然后塞法羅斯退出了辯論，去祭祀了。

In pursuit of the definition of justice, we must next examine the further premisses used in refuting Cephalus. The reason why it is unjust to return a weapon to a madman is that it cannot be just to harm a friend. So next, Polemarchus, Cephalus’ son and the heir to his argument, defends the hypothesis that justice is doing good to one’s friends and harm to one’s enemies. The refutation of this suggestion takes longer; but finally Polemarchus agrees that it is not just to harm any man at all. The crucial premiss needed for this elenchus is that justice is human excellence or virtue. It is preposterous, Socrates urges, to think that a just man could exercise his excellence by making others less excellent.?

為了尋求正義的定義，我們接下來(lái)必須檢查用來(lái)駁斥塞法羅斯的進(jìn)一步的前提。把武器還給一個(gè)瘋子是不公正的，因?yàn)閭σ粋€(gè)朋友是不公正的。所以接下來(lái)，波利馬庫(kù)斯，塞法羅斯的兒子和他的論點(diǎn)的繼承者，為這樣一個(gè)假設(shè)辯護(hù)，即正義是對(duì)朋友好，對(duì)敵人壞。對(duì)這個(gè)建議的反駁花了更長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間；但最后波利馬庫(kù)斯同意傷害任何人都是不公正的。這個(gè)反駁所需要的關(guān)鍵前提是正義是人類的優(yōu)秀或美德。蘇格拉底呼吁，認(rèn)為一個(gè)正義的人可以通過(guò)使別人變得不那么優(yōu)秀來(lái)顯得他優(yōu)秀是荒謬的。

Polemarchus is knocked out of the debate because he accepts without a mur-mur the premiss that justice is human excellence; but waiting in the wings is the sophist Thrasymachus, agog to challenge that hypothesis. Justice is not a virtue or excellence, he says, but weakness and foolishness, because it is not in anyone’s interest to possess it. On the contrary, justice is simply what is to the advantage of those who have power in the state; law and morality are only systems designed for the protection of their interests. It takes Socrates twenty pages and some complicated forking procedures to checkmate Thrasymachus; but eventually, at the end of Book One, it is agreed that the just man will have a better life than the unjust man, so that justice is in its possessor’s interests.?

波利馬庫(kù)斯被淘汰出辯論，因?yàn)樗敛华q豫地接受了正義是人類優(yōu)秀的前提；但在幕后等待著的是智者色拉斯馬庫(kù)斯，他急切地要挑戰(zhàn)這個(gè)假設(shè)。正義不是一種美德或優(yōu)秀，他說(shuō)，而是軟弱和愚蠢，因?yàn)閾碛兴环先魏稳说睦?。相反，正義只是對(duì)那些在國(guó)家中有權(quán)力的人有利的東西；法律和道德只是為了保護(hù)他們的利益而設(shè)計(jì)的制度。蘇格拉底用了二十頁(yè)和一些復(fù)雜的分叉程序才將色拉斯馬庫(kù)斯打敗；但最終，在第一卷的結(jié)尾，大家都同意正義的人會(huì)比不正義的人過(guò)得更好，所以正義符合它的擁有者的利益。

Thrasymachus is driven to agree by a number of concessions he makes to Socrates. For instance, he agrees that the gods are just, that human virtue or excellence makes one happy. These and other premisses need arguing for; all of them can be questioned and most of them are questioned elsewhere in the Republic, from Book Two onwards.?

色拉斯馬庫(kù)斯被迫同意是因?yàn)樗麑?duì)蘇格拉底做了一些讓步。例如，他同意神是公正的，人類的美德或優(yōu)秀使人幸福。這些和其他前提都需要爭(zhēng)論；它們都可以被質(zhì)疑，而且它們中的大部分在《理想國(guó)》的其他地方都被質(zhì)疑了，從第二卷開(kāi)始。

Two people who have so far listened silently to the debate are Plato’s brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus. Glaucon intervenes to suggest that while justice may not be a positive evil, as Thrasymachus had suggested, it is not something worthwhile for its own sake, but something chosen as a way of avoiding evil. To avoid being oppressed by others, weak human beings make compacts with each other neither to suffer nor to commit injustice. People would much prefer to act unjustly, if they could do so with impunity – the kind of impunity a man would have, for instance, if he could make himself invisible so that his misdeeds passed undetected.?

到目前為止默默地聽(tīng)著辯論的兩個(gè)人是柏拉圖的兄弟格勞孔和阿德曼圖斯。格勞孔插話說(shuō)，雖然正義可能不是打著“正能量”旗號(hào)的邪惡，正如色拉斯馬庫(kù)斯所暗示的那樣，但它也不是一件為了自身而有價(jià)值的東西，而是一種作為避免邪惡的方式而選擇的東西。為了避免被別人壓迫，弱小的人類彼此之間訂立契約，既不受到也不犯下不公正。如果人們可以不受懲罰地行不義之事，他們會(huì)更喜歡這樣做——比如，一個(gè)人如果能讓自己隱身，使他的惡行不被發(fā)現(xiàn)，就會(huì)有這種不受懲罰的能力。

Adeimantus supports his brother, saying that among humans the rewards of justice are the rewards of seeming to be just rather than the rewards of actually being just, and with regard to the gods the penalties of injustice can be bought off by prayer and sacrifice. If Socrates is really to defeat Thrasymachus, he must show that quite apart from reputation, and quite apart from sanctions, justice is in itself as much preferable to injustice as sight is to blindness and health is to sickness.?

阿德曼圖斯支持他的兄弟，說(shuō)在人類中，正義的回報(bào)是看起來(lái)正義而不是真正正義的回報(bào)，而關(guān)于神，對(duì)不公正的懲罰可以通過(guò)祈禱和犧牲來(lái)贖回。如果蘇格拉底真的要打敗色拉斯馬庫(kù)斯，他必須證明，完全不考慮名聲，也完全不考慮制裁，正義本身就比不公正更可取，像有視力比盲人和健康比疾病一樣。

In response, Socrates shifts from the consideration of justice in the individual to the consideration of justice in the city-state. There, he says, the nature of justice will be written in larger letters and easier to read. The purpose of living in cities is to enable people with different skills to supply each others’ needs. Ideally, if people were content with the satisfaction of their basic needs, a very simple community would suffice. But citizens demand more than mere subsistence, and this necessitates a more complicated structure, providing, among other things, for a well-trained professional army.?

作為回應(yīng)，蘇格拉底從個(gè)人中的正義轉(zhuǎn)向了城邦中的正義。在那里，他說(shuō)，正義的本質(zhì)將會(huì)用更大的字母寫(xiě)出來(lái)，更容易閱讀。生活在城市中的目的是使具有不同技能的人能夠滿足彼此的需要。理想情況下，如果人們對(duì)滿足他們的基本需要感到滿足，一個(gè)非常簡(jiǎn)單的社區(qū)就足夠了。但是公民要求的不僅僅是生存，這就需要一個(gè)更復(fù)雜的結(jié)構(gòu)，提供一支訓(xùn)練有素的專業(yè)軍隊(duì)等其他東西。

Socrates describes a city in which there are three classes. Those among the soldiers most fitted to rule are selected by competition to form the upper class, called guardians; the remaining soldiers are described as auxiliaries; and the rest of the citizens belong to the class of farmers and artisans. The consent of the governed to the authority of the rulers is to be secured by propagating ‘a(chǎn) noble falsehood’, a myth according to which the members of each class have different metals in their souls: gold, silver, and bronze respectively. Membership of classes is in general conferred by birth, but there is scope for a small amount of promotion and demotion from class to class.?

蘇格拉底描述了一個(gè)有三個(gè)階級(jí)的城市。在士兵中最適合統(tǒng)治的人被選出來(lái)，通過(guò)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)形成上層階級(jí)，稱為守護(hù)者；剩下的士兵被稱為輔助者；其余的公民屬于農(nóng)民和工匠的階級(jí)。被統(tǒng)治者對(duì)統(tǒng)治者的權(quán)威的同意要通過(guò)傳播“一種高尚的謊言”來(lái)保證，這是一個(gè)神話，根據(jù)這個(gè)神話，每個(gè)階級(jí)的成員在他們的靈魂中有不同的金屬：分別是金、銀和銅。階級(jí)的成員身份一般是由出生決定的，但是有一些小范圍的從一個(gè)階級(jí)到另一個(gè)階級(jí)的升遷和降級(jí)。

The rulers and auxiliaries are to receive an elaborate education in literature (based on a censored version of the Homeric poems), music (only edifying and martial rhythms are allowed) and gymnastic activity (undertaken by both sexes in common). Women as well as men are to be rulers and soldiers, but the members of these classes are not allowed to marry. Women are to be held in common, and all intercourse is to be public. Procreation is to be strictly regulated in order that the population remains stable and healthy. Children are to be brought up in public creches without contact with their parents. Guardians and auxiliaries are to be debarred from possessing private property, or touching precious metals; they will live in common like soldiers in camp, and receive, free of charge, adequate but modest provisions.?

統(tǒng)治者和輔助者要接受文學(xué)（基于對(duì)荷馬詩(shī)歌的審查版）、音樂(lè)（只允許有教育意義和戰(zhàn)斗節(jié)奏的音樂(lè)）和體育活動(dòng)（兩性共同進(jìn)行）的精心教育。女人和男人都要成為統(tǒng)治者和士兵，但是這些階級(jí)的成員不允許結(jié)婚。女人要被公共擁有，所有的性行為都要公開(kāi)。生育要受到嚴(yán)格的控制，以保證人口保持穩(wěn)定和健康。孩子們要在公共托兒所里長(zhǎng)大，不與他們的父母接觸。守護(hù)者和輔助者要被禁止擁有私人財(cái)產(chǎn)或觸摸貴重金屬；他們將像營(yíng)地里的士兵一樣共同生活，并免費(fèi)得到足夠而適度的供給。

The life of these rulers may not sound attractive, Socrates concedes, but the happiness of the city is more important than the happiness of a class. If the city itself is to be happy it must be a virtuous city, and the virtues of the city depend on the virtues of the classes which make it up.?

蘇格拉底承認(rèn)，這些統(tǒng)治者的生活可能聽(tīng)起來(lái)并不吸引人，但是城市的幸福比一個(gè)階級(jí)的幸福更重要。如果城市本身要幸福，它必須是一個(gè)有美德的城市，而城市的美德取決于構(gòu)成它的階級(jí)的美德。

Four virtues stand out as paramount: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. The wisdom of the city is the wisdom of its rulers; the courage of the city is the courage of its soldiers; and the temperance of the city consists in the submissiveness of the artisans to the rulers. Where then is justice? It is rooted in the principle of the division of labour from which the city-state originated: every citizen, and each class, doing that for which they are most suited. Justice is doing one’s own thing, or minding one’s own business: it is harmony between the classes.?

四種美德是最重要的：智慧、勇氣、節(jié)制和正義。城市的智慧是統(tǒng)治者的智慧；城市的勇氣是士兵的勇氣；城市的節(jié)制在于工匠對(duì)統(tǒng)治者的服從。那么正義在哪里呢？它根植于分工的原則，這個(gè)原則是城邦的起源：每個(gè)公民和每個(gè)階級(jí)都做他們最適合做的事情。正義就是做自己的事情，或者管好自己的事情：它是階級(jí)之間的和諧。

The state which Socrates imagines is one of ruthless totalitarianism, devoid of privacy, full of deceit, in flagrant conflict with the most basic human rights. If Plato meant the description to be taken as a blueprint for a real-life polity, then he deserves all the obloquy which has been heaped on him by conservatives and liberals alike. But it must be remembered that the explicit purpose of this constitution-mongering was to cast light on the nature of justice in the soul; and that is what Socrates goes on to do.?

蘇格拉底想象的國(guó)家是一個(gè)無(wú)情的極權(quán)主義國(guó)家，沒(méi)有隱私，充滿欺騙，與最基本的人權(quán)公然沖突。如果柏拉圖的意思是把這個(gè)描述作為一個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中的政體的藍(lán)圖，那么他就應(yīng)該受到保守派和自由派一致的譴責(zé)。但是必須記住，這種制憲的明確目的是為了揭示靈魂中正義的本質(zhì)；這就是蘇格拉底繼續(xù)做的事情。

He proposes that there are three elements in the soul corresponding to the three classes in the imagined state. ‘Do we,’ he asks, ‘gain knowledge with one part, feel anger with another, and with yet a third desire the pleasures of food, sex and so on? Or is the whole soul at work in every impulse and in all these forms of behaviour?’?

他提出，靈魂中有三個(gè)要素，對(duì)應(yīng)于想象中的國(guó)家中的三個(gè)階級(jí)?！拔覀儭?，他問(wèn)，“是用一部分獲得知識(shí)，用另一部分感到憤怒，用第三部分渴望食物、性欲等等的快樂(lè)？還是整個(gè)靈魂在每一個(gè)沖動(dòng)和所有這些行為模式中都在起作用？”

To settle the question he appeals to phenomena of mental conflict. A man may be thirsty and yet unwilling to drink; what impels to an action must be distinct from what restrains from it; so there must be one part of the soul which reflects and another which is the vehicle of hunger, thirst, and sexual desire. These two elements can be called reason and appetite. Now anger cannot be attributed to either of these elements; for anger conflicts with appetite (one can be disgusted with one’s own perverted desires) and can be divorced from reason (children have tantrums before they reach the years of discretion). So we must postulate a third element in the soul, temper, to go with reason and appetite.?

為了解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題，他訴諸于心理沖突的現(xiàn)象。一個(gè)人可能口渴而不愿意喝水；促使行動(dòng)的東西必須與阻止行動(dòng)的東西不同；所以靈魂中必須有一部分是反思的，另一部分是饑餓、口渴和性欲的載體。這兩個(gè)要素可以被稱為理性和欲望?，F(xiàn)在憤怒不能歸因于這兩個(gè)要素中的任何一個(gè)；因?yàn)閼嵟c欲望相沖突（一個(gè)人可以對(duì)自己的變態(tài)欲望感到厭惡）并且可以與理性分離（孩子們?cè)谶_(dá)到明辨是非的年齡之前就會(huì)發(fā)脾氣）。所以我們必須假設(shè)靈魂中有第三個(gè)要素，情緒，與理性和欲望相配。

This division is based on two premisses: the principle of non-contrariety, and the identification of the parts of the soul by their desires. If X and Y are contrary relations, nothing can unqualifiedly stand in X and Y to the same thing; and desire and aversion are contrary relations. The desires of appetite are clear enough, and the desires of temper are to fight and punish; but we are not at this point told anything about the desires of reason. No doubt the man in whom reason fights with thirst is one who is under doctor’s orders not to drink; in which case the opponent of appetite will be the rational desire for health.?

這種劃分是基于兩個(gè)前提：非對(duì)立性的原則，以及通過(guò)欲望來(lái)識(shí)別靈魂的部分。如果X和Y是相反的關(guān)系，那么沒(méi)有什么東西可以無(wú)條件地同時(shí)處于X和Y的關(guān)系中；而欲望和厭惡是相反的關(guān)系。吃東西的欲望是很清楚的，憤怒情緒的欲望是要戰(zhàn)斗和懲罰；但是在這一點(diǎn)上，我們沒(méi)有被告知任何關(guān)于理性的欲望。毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)，理性與口渴斗爭(zhēng)的人是一個(gè)被醫(yī)生命令不要喝水的人；在這種情況下，欲望的對(duì)手將是對(duì)健康的理性欲望。

Socrates’ thesis is that justice in an individual is harmony, and injustice is discord, between these three parts of the soul. Justice in the state meant that each of the three orders was doing its own proper work. ‘Each one of us likewise will be a just person, fulfilling his proper function, only if the several parts of our nature fulfil theirs.’ Reason is to rule, educated temper to be its ally, both are to govern the insatiable appetites and prevent them going beyond bounds. Like justice, the other three cardinal virtues relate to the psychic elements: courage will be located in temper, temperance will reside in the unanimity of the three elements, and wisdom will be in ‘that small part which rules . . . possessing as it does the knowledge of what is good for each of the three elements and for all of them in common’.?

蘇格拉底的論點(diǎn)是，每個(gè)人心中的正義是這三個(gè)靈魂部分之間的和諧，不公正是不和諧。國(guó)家中的正義意味著三個(gè)階層中的每一個(gè)都做著自己適當(dāng)?shù)墓ぷ鳌！拔覀兠恳粋€(gè)人同樣也會(huì)成為一個(gè)正義的人，只有當(dāng)我們的本性中的幾個(gè)部分都履行它們自己的職能時(shí)，才能完成自己適當(dāng)?shù)墓δ??！崩硇砸y(tǒng)治，受過(guò)教育的情緒要成為它的盟友，兩者都要控制不知足的欲望，并防止它們超出界限。像正義一樣，其他三種基本美德也與心靈要素有關(guān)：勇氣將位于情緒中，節(jié)制將存在于三個(gè)要素的一致性中，智慧將在“那個(gè)統(tǒng)治著的小部分……它擁有對(duì)每個(gè)要素和所有要素共同有利的東西的知識(shí)”。

Justice in the soul is a prerequisite even for the pursuits of the avaricious and ambitious man, the making of money and the affairs of state. Injustice is a sort of civil strife among the elements when they usurp each other’s functions.?

靈魂中的正義甚至是貪婪和雄心勃勃的人追求的先決條件，是賺錢(qián)和國(guó)家事務(wù)的基礎(chǔ)。不公正是當(dāng)要素篡奪彼此的功能時(shí)，要素之間的一種內(nèi)亂。

‘Justice is produced in the soul, like health in the body, by establishing the elements concerned in their natural relations of control and subordination, whereas injustice is like disease and means that this natural order is subverted.’?

“正義是在靈魂中產(chǎn)生的，就像身體中的健康一樣，是通過(guò)建立有關(guān)要素在控制和從屬方面的自然關(guān)系而產(chǎn)生的，而不公正就像疾病一樣，意味著這種自然秩序被顛覆了?！?br>

Since virtue is the health of the soul, it is absurd to ask whether it is more profitable to live justly or to do wrong. All the wealth and power in the world cannot make life worth living when the bodily constitution is going to rack and ruin; and can life be worth living when the very principle whereby we live is deranged and corrupted??

既然美德是靈魂的健康，那么問(wèn)公正地生活或者做錯(cuò)事哪個(gè)更有利就是荒謬的。當(dāng)身體的構(gòu)造即將崩潰時(shí)，世界上所有的財(cái)富和權(quán)力都不能使生活值得過(guò)；當(dāng)我們生活的原則被擾亂和腐敗時(shí)，生活還有什么價(jià)值呢？
We have now reached the end of the fourth of the ten books of the Republic, and the dialectical process has moved on several stages. One of the hypotheses assumed against Thrasymachus was that it is the soul’s function to deliberate, rule, and take care of the person.?

我們現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)到了《理想國(guó)》十卷中的第四卷的結(jié)尾，辯證過(guò)程已經(jīng)進(jìn)展了幾個(gè)階段。反對(duì)色拉斯馬庫(kù)斯所假設(shè)的一個(gè)假設(shè)是，靈魂的功能是思考、統(tǒng)治和照顧人。

Now that the soul has been divided into reason, appetite, and temper, this is abandoned: these functions belong not to the whole soul but only to reason. Another hypothesis is employed in the establishment of the trichotomy: the principle of non-contrariety. This, it turns out, is not a principle which can be relied on in the everyday world.?

現(xiàn)在靈魂已經(jīng)被分成理性、欲望和情緒，這個(gè)假設(shè)就被放棄了：這些功能不屬于整個(gè)靈魂，而只屬于理性。在建立三分法時(shí)，又使用了另一個(gè)假設(shè)：非對(duì)立性的原則。結(jié)果證明，這不是一個(gè)可以在日常世界中依賴的原則。

In that world, whatever is moving is also in some respect stationary; whatever is beautiful is also in some way ugly. Only the Idea of Beauty neither waxes nor wanes, is not beautiful in one part and ugly in another, nor beautiful at one time and ugly at another, nor beautiful in relation to one thing and ugly in relation to another. All terrestrial entities, including the tripartite soul, are infected by the ubiquity of contrariety. The theory of the tripartite soul is only an approximation to the truth, because it makes no mention of the Ideas.?

在那個(gè)世界里，任何運(yùn)動(dòng)的東西也在某些方面是靜止的；任何美麗的東西也在某種方式上是丑陋的。只有美的理型既不增加也不減少，不是一部分美麗而另一部分丑陋，也不是一會(huì)兒美麗一會(huì)兒丑陋，也不是相對(duì)于一件事物美麗而相對(duì)于另一件事物丑陋。所有的塵世實(shí)體，包括三部分的靈魂，都被對(duì)立性的無(wú)處不在所感染。三部分靈魂的理論只是對(duì)真理的一個(gè)近似，因?yàn)樗鼪](méi)有提到理型。

In the Republic these make their first appearance in Book Five, where they are used as the basis of a distinction between two mental powers or states of mind, knowledge and opinion. The rulers in an ideal state must be educated in such?a ?way that they achieve true knowledge; and knowledge concerns the Ideas, which alone really are (i.e., for any F, only the idea of F is altogether and without qualification F). Opinion, on the other hand, concerns the pedestrian objects which both are and are not (i.e., for any F, anything in the world which is F is also in some respect or other not F).?

在《理想國(guó)》中，這些理型在第五卷中首次出現(xiàn)，它們被用作區(qū)分兩種心智能力或心態(tài)的基礎(chǔ)，即知識(shí)和意見(jiàn)。理想國(guó)中的統(tǒng)治者必須接受這樣的教育，使他們獲得真正的知識(shí)；而知識(shí)關(guān)乎理型，它們是唯一真正存在的東西（即，對(duì)于任何F，只有F的理型才完全而無(wú)條件地是F）。另一方面，意見(jiàn)關(guān)乎那些既存在又不存在的平凡對(duì)象（即，對(duì)于任何F，在世界上是F的東西也在某些方面或其他方面不是F）。

These powers are in turn subdivided, with the aid of a line diagram (see below), in Book Six: opinion includes two items,?

(a) imagination, whose objects are ‘shadows and reflections’, and?

(b) belief, whose objects are ‘the living creatures about us and the works of nature or of human hands’. Knowledge, too, comes in two forms.?

Knowledge par excellence is?

(d) philosophical understanding, whose method is dialectic and whose object is the realm of Ideas.?

But knowledge also includes?

(c), mathematical investigation, whose method is hypothetical and whose objects are abstract items like numbers and geometrical figures. The objects of mathematics, no less than the Ideas, possess eternal unchangeability: like all objects of knowledge they belong to the world of being, not of becoming. But they have in common with terrestrial objects that they are not single, but many, for the geometers’ circles, unlike The Ideal Circle, can intersect with each other, and the arithmeticians’ twos, unlike the one and only Idea of Two, can be added to each other to make four.?

這些能力又被細(xì)分，在第六卷中用一條線圖（見(jiàn)下圖）來(lái)輔助：意見(jiàn)包括兩個(gè)項(xiàng)目，

（a）想象力，其對(duì)象是“陰影和反射”，

（b）信念，其對(duì)象是“我們周圍的生靈和自然或人類之手的作品”。知識(shí)也有兩種形式。

最高級(jí)的知識(shí)是

（d）哲學(xué)理解，其方法是辯證法，其對(duì)象是理型的領(lǐng)域。

但知識(shí)也包括

（c）數(shù)學(xué)研究，其方法是假設(shè)性的，其對(duì)象是抽象的項(xiàng)目，如數(shù)字和幾何圖形。數(shù)學(xué)的對(duì)象和理型一樣，具有永恒的不變性：像所有知識(shí)的對(duì)象一樣，它們屬于存在的世界，而不是變化的世界。但它們與地球?qū)ο笥幸粋€(gè)共同點(diǎn)，那就是它們不是單一的，而是多樣的，因?yàn)閹缀螌W(xué)家的圓與理想圓不同，可以相互相交，而算術(shù)家的二與唯一的二的理型不同，可以相加得到四。

Philosophical dialectic is superior to mathematical reasoning, according to Plato, because it has a firm grasp of the relation between hypothesis and truth. Mathematicians treat hypotheses as axioms, from which they draw conclusions and which they do not feel called upon to justify.?

根據(jù)柏拉圖的說(shuō)法，哲學(xué)的辯證法優(yōu)于數(shù)學(xué)的推理，因?yàn)樗鼘?duì)假設(shè)和真理之間的關(guān)系有著牢固的把握。數(shù)學(xué)家把假設(shè)當(dāng)作公理，從中得出結(jié)論，而不覺(jué)得有必要證明它們。

The dialectician, in contrast, though starting likewise from hypotheses, does not treat them as self-evident axioms; he does not immediately move downwards to the drawing of conclusions, but first ascends from hypotheses to an unhypothetical principle.?

相反，辯證家雖然也是從假設(shè)開(kāi)始，但不把它們當(dāng)作不言自明的公理；他不是立即向下推出結(jié)論，而是先從假設(shè)上升到一個(gè)非假設(shè)的原則。

Hypotheses, as the Greek word suggests, are things ‘laid down’ like a flight of steps, up which the dialectician mounts to something which is not hypothetical. The upward path of dialectic is described as a course of ‘doing away with assumptions – unhypothesizing the hypotheses – and travelling up to the first principle of all, so as to make sure of confirmation there’.?

假設(shè)，正如希臘語(yǔ)詞根所暗示的，是一些“放下”的東西，就像一段臺(tái)階，辯證家沿著它們上升到一些不是假設(shè)的東西。辯證法的上升之路被描述為一種“消除假定——將假設(shè)去假設(shè)化——并上升到所有事物的第一個(gè)原則，以確保在那里得到確認(rèn)”

We have seen in the?的過(guò)程。earlier parts of the Republic how hypotheses are unhypothesized, either by being abandoned or by being laid on a more solid foundation. In the central books of the Republic we learn that the hypotheses are founded on the Theory of Ideas, and that the unhypothetical principle to which the dialectical ascends is the Idea of the Good.?

我們?cè)凇独硐雵?guó)》的前面部分看到了假設(shè)是如何被去假設(shè)化的，要么是被放棄，要么是被放在更堅(jiān)實(shí)的基礎(chǔ)上。在《理想國(guó)》的中心部分，我們了解到假設(shè)是建立在理型論的基礎(chǔ)上的，而辯證法上升到的非假設(shè)原則就是善的理型。

Light is thrown on all this by the allegory of the cave, which Plato uses as an illustration to supplement the abstract presentation of his line-diagram. We are to imagine a group of prisoners chained in a cave with their backs to its entrance, facing shadows of puppets thrown by a fire against the cave’s inner wall. Education in the liberal arts of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and harmony is to release the prisoners from their chains, and to lead them, past the puppets and the fire in the shadow-world of becoming, into the open sunlight of the world of being.?

柏拉圖用洞穴寓言來(lái)說(shuō)明這一切，作為他線圖抽象表達(dá)的補(bǔ)充。我們要想象一群囚犯被鎖在一個(gè)洞穴里，背對(duì)著洞口，面對(duì)著火光在洞穴內(nèi)壁上投射出來(lái)的木偶的影子。算術(shù)、幾何、天文和和聲等自由藝術(shù)的教育是為了解放囚犯?jìng)兊逆i鏈，帶領(lǐng)他們，越過(guò)木偶和火光，在變化的陰影世界中，走向存在的世界的開(kāi)放陽(yáng)光。

The whole course of this education, the conversion from the shadows, is designed for the best part of the soul – i.e. for reason; and the chains from which the pupil must be released so as to begin the ascent are the desires and pleasures of appetite. The prisoners have already had training in gymnastics and music according to the syllabus of Books Two and Three. Even to start the journey out of the cave you must already be sound of mind and limb.?

這整個(gè)教育過(guò)程，從陰影中醒悟，是為了靈魂的最好的部分——即理性而設(shè)計(jì)的；而學(xué)生必須擺脫的鎖鏈就是欲望和享樂(lè)，以便開(kāi)始上升。囚犯?jìng)円呀?jīng)按照第二卷和第三卷的教學(xué)大綱接受了體育和音樂(lè)的訓(xùn)練。即使是開(kāi)始走出洞穴的旅程，你也必須已經(jīng)身心健全。

The four segments of the line-diagram are the four stages of the education of the philosopher. Plato illustrates the stages most fully in connection with the course in mathematics. If a child reads a story about a mathematician, that is an exercise of the imagination. If someone use arithmetic to count the soldiers in an army, or any other set of concrete objects, that will be what Plato calls mathematical belief. Mature study of arithmetic will lead the pupil out of the world of becoming altogether, and teach him to study the abstract numbers, which can be multiplied but cannot change. Finally, dialectic, by questioning the hypotheses of arithmetic – researching, as we should say, into the foundations of mathematics – will give him a true understanding of number, by introducing him to the Ideas, the men and trees and stars of the allegory of the cave.?

線圖的四個(gè)部分是哲學(xué)家教育的四個(gè)階段。柏拉圖最充分地用數(shù)學(xué)課程來(lái)說(shuō)明這些階段。如果一個(gè)孩子讀一個(gè)關(guān)于數(shù)學(xué)家的故事，那就是想象力的練習(xí)。如果有人用算術(shù)來(lái)數(shù)軍隊(duì)里的士兵，或者任何其他一組具體的對(duì)象，那就是柏拉圖所說(shuō)的數(shù)學(xué)信念。成熟的算術(shù)研究將把學(xué)生完全帶出變化的世界，教他研究抽象的數(shù)字，這些數(shù)字可以相乘但不能改變。最后，辯證法通過(guò)質(zhì)疑算術(shù)的假設(shè)——我們應(yīng)該說(shuō)，對(duì)數(shù)學(xué)的基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行研究——將使他真正理解數(shù)字，通過(guò)把他引入理型，即洞穴寓言中的人和樹(shù)和星星。

The Republic is concerned more with moral education than with mathematical education; but it turns out that this follows a parallel path. Imagination in morals consists of the dicta of poets and tragedians. If the pupil has been educated in the bowdlerized literature recommended by Plato, he will have seen justice triumphing on the stage, and will have learned that the gods are unchanging, good, and truthful. This he will later see as a symbolic representation of the eternal idea of Good, source of truth and knowledge. The first stage of moral education will make him competent in the human justice which operates in courts of law.?

《理想國(guó)》更關(guān)注道德教育而不是數(shù)學(xué)教育；但事實(shí)證明，這是一條平行的道路。道德中的想象力由詩(shī)人和悲劇家的格言組成。如果學(xué)生接受了柏拉圖推薦的刪節(jié)文學(xué)的教育，他將看到正義在舞臺(tái)上勝利，他將學(xué)到神是不變的、善良的和誠(chéng)實(shí)的。他后來(lái)會(huì)把這看作是永恒的善的理型的象征性表現(xiàn)，這是真理和知識(shí)的源泉。道德教育的第一階段將使他有能力在法庭上踐行人類正義。

This will give him true belief about right and wrong; but it will be the task of dialectic to teach him the real nature of justice and to display its participation in the Idea of the Good at the end of dialectic’s upward path.

這將使他對(duì)是非有真正的信念；但辯證法的任務(wù)是教他正義的真實(shí)本質(zhì)，并在辯證法的上升之路的盡頭展示它與善的理型的參與。

Every Idea, for Plato, depends hierarchically on the Idea of the Good: for the Idea of X is the perfect X, and so each Idea participates in the Idea of Perfection or Goodness.?

對(duì)于柏拉圖來(lái)說(shuō)，每一個(gè)理型都是層級(jí)地依賴于善的理型：因?yàn)閄的理型是完美的X，所以每一個(gè)理型都參與了完美或善良的理型。

In the allegory of the cave, it is the Idea of the Good which corresponds to the all-enlightening sun. A philosopher who had contemplated that Idea would no doubt be able to replace the hypothetical definition of justice as psychic health with a better definition which would show beyond question the mode of its participation in goodness.?

在洞穴寓言中，善的理型就是對(duì)應(yīng)于照亮一切的太陽(yáng)。一個(gè)思考過(guò)那個(gè)理型的哲學(xué)家無(wú)疑能夠用一個(gè)更好的定義來(lái)代替正義作為心靈健康的假設(shè)性定義，這個(gè)定義將毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)地顯示出它參與善良的方式。

But Socrates proves unable to achieve this task: his eyes are blinded by the dialectical sun, and he can talk only in metaphor, and cannot give even a provi-sional account of goodness itself.?

但蘇格拉底證明自己無(wú)法完成這個(gè)任務(wù)：他的眼睛被辯證法的太陽(yáng)所蒙蔽，他只能用隱喻來(lái)說(shuō)話，甚至不能給出善本身的臨時(shí)性描述。

When next we see clearly in the Republic, dialectic has begun its downward path. We return to the topics of the books – the natural history of the state, the divisions of the soul, the happiness of the just, the deficiencies of poetry – but we study them now in the light of the Theory of Ideas.?

當(dāng)我們?cè)凇独硐雵?guó)》中再次看清楚時(shí)，辯證法已經(jīng)開(kāi)始了它的下降之路。我們回到了書(shū)中的話題——國(guó)家的自然歷史、靈魂的分裂、正義者的幸福、詩(shī)歌的缺陷——但我們現(xiàn)在是在理型論的光芒下研究它們。

The just man is happier than the unjust, not only because his soul is in concord, but because it is more delightful to fill the soul with understanding than to feed fat the desires of appetite. Reason is no longer the faculty which takes care of the person, it is a faculty akin to the unchanging and immortal world of truth.?

正義者比不義者更幸福，不僅因?yàn)樗撵`魂是和諧的，而且因?yàn)橛美斫鈦?lái)充實(shí)靈魂比用嗜好來(lái)養(yǎng)肥欲望更令人愉悅。理性不再是照顧人的能力，它是一種類似于不變和不朽的真理世界的能力。

And the poets fall short, not just because – as Socrates insisted when censoring their works for the education of the guardians – they spread unedifying stories and pander to decadent tastes, but because they operate at the third remove from the reality of the Ideas. For the items in the world that poets and painters copy are themselves only copies of Ideas: a picture of a bed is a copy of a copy of the Ideal Bed.?

詩(shī)人們也達(dá)不到，不僅因?yàn)椤缣K格拉底在為守衛(wèi)者的教育審查他們的作品時(shí)堅(jiān)持的那樣——他們傳播了不教化的故事，迎合了頹廢的品味，而且因?yàn)樗麄兪窃陔x理型的現(xiàn)實(shí)有三重距離的地方運(yùn)作。因?yàn)樵?shī)人和畫(huà)家所復(fù)制的世界中的物品本身只是理型的復(fù)制品：一張床的畫(huà)像是理想床的復(fù)制品的復(fù)制品。

The description of the education of the philosopher in the central books of the Republic was meant to establish the characteristics of the ideal ruler, the philosopher king. The best constitution, Socrates claims, is one ruled by the wisdom thus acquired – it may be either monarchy or aristocracy, for it does not matter whether wisdom is incarnate in one or more rulers. But there are four inferior types of constitution: timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and despotism. And to each of these degraded types of constitution in the state, there corresponds a degraded type of character in the soul.?

描述哲學(xué)家的教育是在《理想國(guó)》的中心部分，旨在建構(gòu)理想統(tǒng)治者，哲學(xué)王的特點(diǎn)。蘇格拉底聲稱，最好的政體是由這樣獲得智慧的人所統(tǒng)治的——它可以是君主制或貴族制，因?yàn)橹腔凼腔碛谝粋€(gè)或多個(gè)統(tǒng)治者并不重要。但有四種低劣的憲法類型：貴族政治、寡頭政治、民主政治和專制政治。而且對(duì)于國(guó)家中這些墮落的憲法類型，靈魂中也有相應(yīng)的墮落的性格類型。

If there are three parts of the soul, why are there four cardinal virtues, and five different characters as constitutions? The second part of this question is easier to answer than the first. There are five constitutions and four virtues because each constitution turns into the next by the downgrading of one of the virtues; and it takes four steps to pass from the first constitution to the fifth.?

如果靈魂有三個(gè)部分，為什么有四個(gè)基本美德，和五種不同的性格作為政體呢？這個(gè)問(wèn)題的第二部分比第一部分更容易回答。有五種政體和四種美德，因?yàn)槊恳环N政體都是通過(guò)降低一種美德而變成下一種政體；而且從第一種政體到第五種政體需要四個(gè)步驟。

It is when the rulers cease to be men of wisdom that aristocracy gives place to timocracy.

當(dāng)統(tǒng)治者不再是智慧之人時(shí)，貴族政治就讓位于金權(quán)政治。

The oligarchic rulers differ from the timocrats because they lack courage and military virtues.?

寡頭政治者與金權(quán)政治者不同，因?yàn)樗麄內(nèi)狈τ職夂蛙娛旅赖隆?br>

Democracy arises when even the miserly temperance of the oligarchs is abandoned.?

當(dāng)寡頭政治者的吝嗇節(jié)制也被放棄時(shí)，民主就會(huì)出現(xiàn)。

For Plato, any step from aristocracy is a step away from justice; but it is the step from democracy to despotism that marks the enthronement of injustice incarnate. So the aristocratic state is marked by the presence of all the virtues, the timocratic state by the absence of wisdom, the oligarchic state by the decay of courage, the democratic state by contempt for temperance, and the despotic state by the overturning of justice.?

對(duì)于柏拉圖來(lái)說(shuō)，任何從貴族政治到其他政治的步驟都是遠(yuǎn)離正義的步驟；但從民主到獨(dú)裁的步驟標(biāo)志著不義化身的登基。所以，貴族政治的特征是所有美德的存在，金權(quán)政治的特征是智慧的缺乏，寡頭政治的特征是勇氣的衰敗，民主政治的特征是對(duì)節(jié)制的蔑視，獨(dú)裁政治的特征是正義的顛覆。

But how are these vices and these constitutions related to the parts of the soul??

但是這些惡習(xí)和這些政體與靈魂的部分有什么關(guān)系呢？

The pattern is ingeniously woven. In the ideal constitution the rulers of the state are ruled by reason, in the timocratic state the rulers are ruled by temper, and in the oligarchic state appetite is enthroned in the rulers’ souls.?

這種模式是巧妙地編織的。在理想的政體中，國(guó)家的統(tǒng)治者受理性所支配，在金權(quán)政體中，統(tǒng)治者受情緒所支配，在寡頭政體中，欲望在統(tǒng)治者的靈魂中登上王位。

But now within the third part of the tripartite soul a new tripartition appears. The bodily desires which make up appetite are divided into necessary, unnecessary, and lawless desires.?

但是現(xiàn)在，在三部分靈魂的第三部分中，出現(xiàn)了一個(gè)新的三分法。構(gòu)成欲望的肉體欲望被分為必要的、不必要的和無(wú)法無(wú)天的欲望。

A desire for plain bread and meat is a necessary desire; a desire for luxuries is an unnecessary desire. Lawless desires are those unnecessary desires which are so impious, perverse, and shameless that they find expression normally only in dreams.?

對(duì)普通面包和肉類的渴望是一種必要的欲望；對(duì)奢侈品的渴望是一種不必要的欲望。無(wú)法無(wú)天的欲望是那些非常不敬、反常和無(wú)恥的不必要的欲望，它們通常只在夢(mèng)中表達(dá)出來(lái)。

The difference between the oligarchic, democratic, and despotic constitutions arises from the different types of desire which dominate the rulers of each state.?

寡頭政體、民主政體和專制政體之間的區(qū)別，源于支配每個(gè)國(guó)家統(tǒng)治者的不同類型的欲望。

The few rulers of the oligarchic state are themselves ruled by a few necessary desires; each of the multitude dominant in the democracy is dominated by a multitude of unnecessary desires; the sole master of the despotic state is himself mastered by a single dominating lawless passion.?

寡頭政體中少數(shù)的統(tǒng)治者自己被少數(shù)必要的欲望所支配；民主政體中占優(yōu)勢(shì)的眾多人被眾多不必要的欲望所支配；獨(dú)裁政體中唯一的主人自己被一個(gè)占主導(dǎo)地位的無(wú)法無(wú)天的激情所控制。

Socrates makes further use of the tripartite theory of the soul to prove the superiority of the just man’s happiness. Men may be classified as avaricious, ambitious, or academic according to whether the dominant element in their soul is appetite, temper, or reason.?

蘇格拉底進(jìn)一步利用靈魂三部分理論來(lái)證明正義人士幸福的優(yōu)越性。人們可以根據(jù)他們靈魂中占主導(dǎo)地位的元素是欲望、情緒還是理性，被分類為貪婪、有野心或鉆研型。

Men of each type will claim that their own life is best: the avaricious man will praise the life of business, the ambitious man will praise a political career, and the academic man will praise knowledge and understanding and the life of learning.?

每種類型的人都會(huì)聲稱自己的生活是最好的：貪婪的人會(huì)贊揚(yáng)商業(yè)生活，有野心的人會(huì)贊揚(yáng)政治生涯，鉆研型的人會(huì)贊揚(yáng)知識(shí)和理解以及學(xué)習(xí)生活。

It is the academic, the philosopher, whose judgement is to be preferred: he has the advantage over the others in experience, insight, and reasoning. Moreover, the objects to which the philosopher devotes his life are so much more real than the objects pursued by the others that their pleasures seem illusory by comparison.?

鉆研型的人，即哲學(xué)家，他的判斷是應(yīng)該被優(yōu)先考慮的：他在經(jīng)驗(yàn)、洞察力和推理方面比其他人有優(yōu)勢(shì)。而且，哲學(xué)家奉獻(xiàn)自己生命的對(duì)象比其他人追求的對(duì)象更加真實(shí)，以至于其他人的快樂(lè)相比之下顯得虛幻。

To obey reason is not only the most virtuous course for the other elements in the soul, it is also the pleasantest.?

服從理性不僅是靈魂中其他要素最有美德的行為，也是最令人愉快的。

In Book Ten Plato redescribes, once again, the anatomy of the soul. He makes a contrast between two elements within the reasoning faculty of the tripartite soul.?

在第十卷中，柏拉圖再次重新描述了靈魂的解剖。他在三部分靈魂的理性能力內(nèi)部，對(duì)兩個(gè)要素進(jìn)行了對(duì)比。

There is one element in the soul which is confused by straight sticks looking bent in water, and another element which measures, counts, and weighs. Plato uses this distinction to launch an attack on drama and literature.

靈魂中有一個(gè)要素被水中看起來(lái)彎曲的直棍所迷惑，另一個(gè)要素則能夠測(cè)量、計(jì)數(shù)和稱重。柏拉圖利用這種區(qū)別來(lái)對(duì)戲劇和文學(xué)進(jìn)行攻擊。

In the actions represented by drama, there is an internal conflict in a man analogous to the conflict between the contrary opinions induced by visual impressions. In tragedy, this conflict is between a lamentation-loving part of the soul and the better part of us which is willing to abide by the law that says we must bear misfortune quietly. In comedy this noble element has to fight with another element which has an instinctive impulse to play the buffoon.?

在戲劇所表現(xiàn)的行為中，人內(nèi)部存在著一種類似于視覺(jué)印象引起的相反意見(jiàn)之間的沖突。在悲劇中，這種沖突是在靈魂中喜愛(ài)哀悼的部分和我們更好的部分之間，后者愿意遵守我們必須默默忍受不幸的法則。在喜劇中，這種高尚的元素必須與另一個(gè)有著本能地沖動(dòng)去扮演小丑的元素斗爭(zhēng)。

Plato’s notion of justice as psychic health makes its final appearance in a new proof of immortality which concludes the Republic. Each thing is destroyed by its characteristic disease: eyes by ophthalmia, and iron by rust. Now vice is the characteristic disease of the soul; but vice does not destroy the soul in the way disease destroys the body. But if the soul is not killed by its own disease, it will hardly be killed by diseases of anything else – certainly not by bodily disease – and so it must be immortal.?

柏拉圖將正義視為心靈健康的概念，在一種新的不朽性的證明中最后出現(xiàn)，這一證明結(jié)束了《理想國(guó)》。每一樣?xùn)|西都被它特有的疾病所摧毀：眼睛被眼疾，鐵被銹蝕?，F(xiàn)在，惡習(xí)是靈魂的特有疾?。坏菒毫?xí)并不像疾病那樣摧毀靈魂。但是如果靈魂沒(méi)有被它自己的疾病所殺死，它就很難被其他任何東西的疾病所殺死——當(dāng)然不會(huì)被身體的疾病所殺死——因此它必須是不朽的。

The principle that justice is the soul’s health is now finally severed from the tripartite theory of the soul on which it rested. An uneasily composite entity like the threefold soul, Socrates says, could hardly be everlasting. The soul in its real nature is a far lovelier thing in which justice is much more easily to be distinguished. The soul in its tripartite form is more like a monster than its natural self, like a statue of a sea-god covered by barnacles. If we could fix our eye on the soul’s love of wisdom and passion for the divine and everlasting, we would realize how different it would be, once freed from the pursuit of earthly happiness.?

正義是靈魂的健康這一原則，現(xiàn)在終于從它所依賴的靈魂三部分理論中割裂出來(lái)。蘇格拉底說(shuō)，像三重靈魂這樣一個(gè)不安的復(fù)合實(shí)體，很難是永恒的。靈魂在它真實(shí)的本性中是一種比較可愛(ài)的東西，在其中正義更容易被區(qū)分出來(lái)。靈魂在它三部分的形式中更像是一個(gè)怪物，而不是它自然的自我，就像一個(gè)被藤壺覆蓋的海神雕像。如果我們能夠?qū)⑽覀兊难酃夤潭ㄔ陟`魂對(duì)智慧的愛(ài)和對(duì)神圣和永恒的熱情上，我們就會(huì)意識(shí)到它一旦從對(duì)塵世幸福的追求中解放出來(lái)，會(huì)有多么不同。

By defining justice as the health of the soul Plato achieved three things. First, he provided himself with an easy answer to the quesion ‘why be just?’ Everyone wants to be healthy, so if justice is health, everyone must really want to be just. If some do not want to behave justly, this can only be because they do not understand the nature of justice and injustice, and lack insight into their own condition. Thus, the doctrine that justice is mental health rides well with the Socratic theses that no one does wrong voluntarily, and that vice is fundamentally ignorance.?

通過(guò)將正義定義為靈魂的健康，柏拉圖實(shí)現(xiàn)了三件事。首先，他為自己提供了一個(gè)回答“為什么要正義？”的簡(jiǎn)單答案。每個(gè)人都想要健康，所以如果正義是健康，每個(gè)人都必須真正地想要正義。如果有些人不想表現(xiàn)得正義，這只能是因?yàn)樗麄儾焕斫庹x和不正義的本質(zhì)，并且缺乏對(duì)自己狀況的洞察力。因此，正義是心理健康的教義與蘇格拉底的論題相符，即沒(méi)有人會(huì)自愿地做錯(cuò)事，而惡習(xí)根本上是無(wú)知。

Secondly, if injustice is a disease, it should be possible to eradicate it by the application of medical science. So Plato can offer the strict training programme and educational system of the Republic as the best preventative against an epidemic of vice.?

其次，如果不正義是一種疾病，那么應(yīng)該有可能通過(guò)醫(yī)學(xué)的應(yīng)用來(lái)根除它。所以柏拉圖可以提供《理想國(guó)》中嚴(yán)格的訓(xùn)練計(jì)劃和教育制度作為防止惡習(xí)流行的最佳預(yù)防措施。

Thirdly, if every vicious man is really a sick man, then the virtuous philosopher can claim over him the type of control which a doctor has over his patients. To treat injustice as mental sickness is to assimilate vice to madness; and the point is made very early on in the Republic that madmen have no rights; they may not claim their property, they are not entitled to be told the truth.?

第三，如果每一個(gè)惡毒的人真的是一個(gè)病人，那么有美德的哲學(xué)家就可以對(duì)他施加醫(yī)生對(duì)病人所擁有的那種控制。把不正義當(dāng)作心理疾病就是把惡習(xí)同化為瘋狂；而這一點(diǎn)在《理想國(guó)》中很早就提出了，即瘋子沒(méi)有權(quán)利；他們不能占有他們的財(cái)產(chǎn)，他們沒(méi)有資格被告知真相。

But of course by Plato’s lights all who fall short of the standards of the philosopher king are more or less mad: and thus the guardians in the totalitarian state are allowed to use the ‘drug of falsehood’ on their subjects.?

但是在柏拉圖的觀點(diǎn)下，所有不能達(dá)到哲人王的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的人都或多或少是瘋狂的：因此，極權(quán)國(guó)家的守護(hù)者被允許對(duì)他們的臣民使用“謊言之藥”。

The thesis that madmen need restraint is lethal when combined with the view that all the world is mad but me and possibly thee.?

瘋子需要約束的論點(diǎn)在與這樣一種觀點(diǎn)結(jié)合時(shí)是致命的，即全世界都是瘋子，除了我和可能正常的你。

That justice is the health of the soul is the unifying theme of the Republic; but, as we have seen, Plato ranges in the dialogue over philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of education, aesthetics, theory of knowledge, and metaphysics.?

正義是靈魂的健康，這是《理想國(guó)》的統(tǒng)一主題；但是，正如我們所看到的，柏拉圖在對(duì)話中涉及了心靈哲學(xué)、道德哲學(xué)、政治哲學(xué)、教育哲學(xué)、美學(xué)、知識(shí)論和形而上學(xué)。

In all these areas the Theory of Ideas is brought to bear. It remains for us to consider some of Plato’s later writings in which his philosophy is no longer anchored to that theory.?

在所有這些領(lǐng)域，理型論都發(fā)揮了作用。我們還需要考慮柏拉圖后期的一些著作，在這些著作中，他的哲學(xué)不再依附于那個(gè)理論。