The Quarterly Journal of Economics，2022年第四季刊

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1．Systemic Discrimination Among Large U.S. Employers

美國(guó)大型雇主之間的系統(tǒng)性歧視

Patrick Kline,?Evan K Rose,?Christopher R Walters

We study the results of a massive nationwide correspondence experiment sending more than 83,000 fictitious applications with randomized characteristics to geographically dispersed jobs posted by 108 of the largest U.S. employers. Distinctively Black names reduce the probability of employer contact by 2.1 percentage points relative to distinctively white names. The magnitude of this racial gap in contact rates differs substantially across firms, exhibiting a between-company standard deviation of 1.9 percentage points. Despite an insignificant average gap in contact rates between male and female applicants, we find a between-company standard deviation in gender contact gaps of 2.7 percentage points, revealing that some firms favor male applicants and others favor women. Company-specific racial contact gaps are temporally and spatially persistent, and negatively correlated with firm profitability, federal contractor status, and a measure of recruiting centralization. Discrimination exhibits little geographical dispersion, but two-digit industry explains roughly half of the cross-firm variation in both racial and gender contact gaps. Contact gaps are highly concentrated in particular companies, with firms in the top quintile of racial discrimination responsible for nearly half of lost contacts to Black applicants in the experiment. Controlling false discovery rates to the 5% level, 23 companies are found to discriminate against Black applicants. Our findings establish that discrimination against distinctively Black names is concentrated among a select set of large employers, many of which can be identified with high confidence using large-scale inference methods.

我們研究了一項(xiàng)大規(guī)模的全國(guó)性通信實(shí)驗(yàn)的結(jié)果，該實(shí)驗(yàn)將超過(guò)83，000份具有隨機(jī)特征的虛構(gòu)申請(qǐng)發(fā)送到108個(gè)美國(guó)最大雇主發(fā)布的地理上分散的工作。與獨(dú)特的白人名字相比，獨(dú)特的黑人名字將雇主接觸的可能性降低了2.1個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。這種接觸率的種族差距在公司之間差異很大，顯示出1.9個(gè)百分點(diǎn)的公司間標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差。盡管男性和女性申請(qǐng)人之間的平均接觸率差距微不足道，但我們發(fā)現(xiàn)性別接觸差距的公司間標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差為2.7個(gè)百分點(diǎn)，這表明一些公司偏愛(ài)男性求職者，而另一些公司偏愛(ài)女性。公司特定的種族聯(lián)系差距在時(shí)間和空間上是持久的，并且與公司盈利能力、聯(lián)邦承包商地位和招聘集中化措施呈負(fù)相關(guān)。歧視在地理上幾乎沒(méi)有分散性，但兩位數(shù)的行業(yè)解釋了種族和性別接觸差距的跨公司差異的大約一半。聯(lián)系差距高度集中在特定的公司，在種族歧視方面排名前五分之一的公司占實(shí)驗(yàn)中與黑人申請(qǐng)人失去聯(lián)系的近一半。將虛假發(fā)現(xiàn)率控制在5%的水平，發(fā)現(xiàn)23家公司歧視黑人申請(qǐng)人。我們的研究結(jié)果表明，對(duì)黑人名字的歧視集中在一組選定的大型雇主中，其中許多雇主可以使用大規(guī)模推理方法高置信度地識(shí)別。

https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac024

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2．Valuing the Global Mortality Consequences of Climate Change Accounting for Adaptation Costs and Benefits??

評(píng)估氣候變化對(duì)全球死亡率的影響 考慮適應(yīng)成本和收益

Tamma Carleton,?Amir Jina,?Michael Delgado,?Michael Greenstone,?Trevor Houser,?Solomon Hsiang,?Andrew Hultgren,?Robert E Kopp,?Kelly E McCusker,?Ishan Nath?

Using 40 countries’ subnational data, we estimate age-specific mortality-temperature relationships and extrapolate them to countries without data today and into a future with climate change. We uncover a U-shaped relationship where extreme cold and hot temperatures increase mortality rates, especially for the elderly. Critically, this relationship is flattened by higher incomes and adaptation to local climate. Using a revealed-preference approach to recover unobserved adaptation costs, we estimate that the mean global increase in mortality risk due to climate change, accounting for adaptation benefits and costs, is valued at roughly 3.2% of global GDP in 2100 under a high-emissions scenario. Notably, today’s cold locations are projected to benefit, while today’s poor and hot locations have large projected damages. Finally, our central estimates indicate that the release of an additional ton of CO2?today will cause mortality-related damages of $36.6 under a high-emissions scenario, with an interquartile range accounting for both econometric and climate uncertainty of [?$7.8, $73.0]. These empirically grounded estimates exceed the previous literature’s estimates by an order of magnitude.

我們使用40個(gè)國(guó)家的次國(guó)家級(jí)數(shù)據(jù)，估計(jì)了特定年齡的死亡率與溫度之間的關(guān)系，并將其外推到今天沒(méi)有數(shù)據(jù)的國(guó)家以及氣候變化的未來(lái)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)了一種U型關(guān)系，其中極端寒冷和酷熱的溫度會(huì)增加死亡率，尤其是對(duì)老年人而言。至關(guān)重要的是，這種關(guān)系因收入增加和對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)貧夂虻倪m應(yīng)而變得扁平化。使用揭示偏好方法來(lái)恢復(fù)未觀察到的適應(yīng)成本，我們估計(jì)，在高排放情景下，氣候變化造成的全球死亡風(fēng)險(xiǎn)平均增加（包括適應(yīng)效益和成本）在2100年約占全球GDP的3.2%。值得注意的是，今天的寒冷地區(qū)預(yù)計(jì)將受益，而今天的貧困和炎熱地區(qū)預(yù)計(jì)將受到較大的損害。最后，我們的中心估計(jì)表明，在高排放情景下，今天額外釋放一噸二氧化碳將導(dǎo)致36.6美元的死亡相關(guān)損害，計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和氣候不確定性的四分位間距為[-7.8美元，73.0美元]。這些基于經(jīng)驗(yàn)的估計(jì)比以前的文獻(xiàn)估計(jì)高出一個(gè)數(shù)量級(jí)。

https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac020

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3．Reshaping Global Trade: The Immediate and Long-Run Effects of Bank Failures

重塑全球貿(mào)易：銀行倒閉的直接和長(zhǎng)期影響

Chenzi Xu

I show that a disruption to the financial sector can reshape the patterns of global trade for decades. I study the first modern global banking crisis originating in London in 1866 and collect archival loan records that link multinational banks headquartered there to their lending abroad. Countries exposed to bank failures in London immediately exported significantly less and did not recover their lost growth relative to unexposed places. Their market shares within each destination also remained significantly lower for four decades. Decomposing the persistent market-share losses shows that they primarily stem from lack of extensive-margin growth, as the financing shock caused importers to source more from new trade partnerships. Exporters producing more substitutable goods, those with little access to alternative forms of credit, and those trading with more distant partners experienced more persistent losses, consistent with the existence of sunk costs and the importance of finance for intermediating trade.

本文表明，金融部門(mén)的中斷可以重塑數(shù)十年的全球貿(mào)易模式。我研究了1866年起源于倫敦的第一次現(xiàn)代全球銀行業(yè)危機(jī)，并收集了檔案貸款記錄，將總部設(shè)在倫敦的跨國(guó)銀行與其海外貸款聯(lián)系起來(lái)。倫敦銀行倒閉的國(guó)家立即出口大幅減少，并且沒(méi)有恢復(fù)相對(duì)于未暴露地區(qū)失去的增長(zhǎng)。四十年來(lái)，它們?cè)诿總€(gè)目的地的市場(chǎng)份額也一直明顯較低。分解持續(xù)的市場(chǎng)份額損失表明，它們主要源于缺乏廣泛的利潤(rùn)率增長(zhǎng)，因?yàn)槿谫Y沖擊導(dǎo)致進(jìn)口商從新的貿(mào)易伙伴關(guān)系中獲取更多。生產(chǎn)更多可替代商品的出口商、難以獲得替代信貸形式的出口商以及與較遠(yuǎn)伙伴進(jìn)行貿(mào)易的出口商經(jīng)歷了更持久的損失，這與沉沒(méi)成本的存在和融資對(duì)中間貿(mào)易的重要性相一致。

https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac016

4．Sexual Harassment and Gender Inequality in the Labor Market?

勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)中的性騷擾和性別不平等

Olle Folke,?Johanna Rickne

We describe how sexual harassment contributes to sex segregation and pay inequality in the labor market. Combining nationally representative survey data and administrative data, we show that both harassment and wages vary strongly and systematically across workplaces. Women self-report more harassment from colleagues and managers in male-dominated workplaces where wages are relatively high, and men self-report more harassment in female-dominated workplaces where wages are low. These patterns imply two ways that harassment may contribute to gender inequality. First, harassment deters women and men from applying for jobs in workplaces where they are the gender minority. A survey experiment with hypothetical job choices supports this mechanism. Respondents are highly averse to accepting jobs in workplaces with a higher harassment risk for their own gender, but less averse when people of the opposite sex are at higher risk. A second way that harassment contributes to inequality is by making workplace gender minorities leave their workplaces for new jobs. An analysis of workplace transitions supports this mechanism. Women who self-report harassment are more likely to switch to new workplaces with more female colleagues and lower pay.

我們描述了性騷擾如何導(dǎo)致勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)中的性別隔離和薪酬不平等。結(jié)合具有全國(guó)代表性的調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)和行政數(shù)據(jù)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)騷擾和工資在工作場(chǎng)所之間差異很大且系統(tǒng)。在工資相對(duì)較高的男性占主導(dǎo)地位的工作場(chǎng)所，女性自我報(bào)告受到同事和經(jīng)理的騷擾更多，而在工資低的女性占主導(dǎo)地位的工作場(chǎng)所，男性自我報(bào)告受到的騷擾更多。這些模式意味著騷擾可能導(dǎo)致性別不平等的兩種方式。首先，騷擾使女性和男性無(wú)法申請(qǐng)他們屬于性別少數(shù)群體的工作場(chǎng)所的工作。一項(xiàng)假設(shè)工作選擇的調(diào)查實(shí)驗(yàn)支持這一機(jī)制。受訪者非常反感接受自己性別騷擾風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較高的工作場(chǎng)所的工作，但當(dāng)異性面臨較高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)時(shí)，受訪者則不那么反感。騷擾加劇不平等的第二種方式是讓工作場(chǎng)所的性別少數(shù)群體離開(kāi)工作場(chǎng)所去找新工作。對(duì)工作場(chǎng)所過(guò)渡的分析支持這一機(jī)制。自我報(bào)告性騷擾的女性更有可能轉(zhuǎn)向女性同事更多、工資更低的新工作場(chǎng)所。

https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac018

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5．The Quality and Efficiency of Public and Private Firms: Evidence from Ambulance Services

公共和私營(yíng)公司的質(zhì)量和效率：來(lái)自救護(hù)車(chē)服務(wù)的證據(jù)

Daniel Knutsson,?Bj?rn Tyrefors

Economic theory predicts that outsourcing public services to private firms reduces costs, but the effect on quality is ambiguous. We explore quality differences between publicly and privately owned ambulances in Stockholm County, Sweden, a setting where patients are as good as randomly assigned to ambulances with different ownership status. We find that private ambulances reduce costs and perform better on contracted measures such as response time, but perform worse on noncontracted measures such as mortality. In fact, a patient has a 1.4% higher risk of death within three years if a private ambulance is dispatched (in aggregate, 420 more deaths each year). We also present evidence of the mechanism at work, suggesting that private firms cut costs at the expense of ambulance staff quality.

經(jīng)濟(jì)理論預(yù)測(cè)，將公共服務(wù)外包給私營(yíng)企業(yè)可以降低成本，但對(duì)質(zhì)量的影響是模糊的。我們探討了瑞典斯德哥爾摩縣公有和私營(yíng)救護(hù)車(chē)之間的質(zhì)量差異，在這種情況下，患者就像隨機(jī)分配到具有不同所有權(quán)狀態(tài)的救護(hù)車(chē)一樣好。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，私人救護(hù)車(chē)降低了成本，在響應(yīng)時(shí)間等合同措施上表現(xiàn)更好，但在死亡率等非合同措施上表現(xiàn)更差。事實(shí)上，如果派遣私人救護(hù)車(chē)，患者在三年內(nèi)的死亡風(fēng)險(xiǎn)要高出 1.4%（每年總共有 420 人死亡）。我們還提出了該機(jī)制發(fā)揮作用的證據(jù)，表明私營(yíng)公司以犧牲救護(hù)車(chē)人員的質(zhì)量為代價(jià)來(lái)削減成本。

https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac014

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6．Does Welfare Prevent Crime? the Criminal Justice Outcomes of Youth Removed from Ssi

福利能預(yù)防犯罪嗎？從SSI中移除的青少年的刑事司法結(jié)果

Manasi Deshpande,?Michael Mueller-Smith

We estimate the effect of losing Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits at age 18 on criminal justice and employment outcomes over the next two decades. To estimate this effect, we use a regression discontinuity design in the likelihood of being reviewed for SSI eligibility at age 18 created by the 1996 welfare reform law. We evaluate this natural experiment with Social Security Administration data linked to records from the Criminal Justice Administrative Records System. We find that SSI removal increases the number of criminal charges by a statistically significant 20% over the next two decades. The increase in charges is concentrated in offenses for which income generation is a primary motivation (60% increase), especially theft, burglary, fraud/forgery, and prostitution. The effect of SSI removal on criminal justice involvement persists more than two decades later, even as the effect of removal on contemporaneous SSI receipt diminishes. In response to SSI removal, youth are twice as likely to be charged with an illicit income-generating offense than they are to maintain steady employment at?$$15,000/year in the labor market. As a result of these charges, the annual likelihood of incarceration increases by a statistically significant 60% in the two decades following SSI removal. The costs to taxpayers of enforcement and incarceration from SSI removal are so high that they nearly eliminate the savings to taxpayers from reduced SSI benefits.

我們估計(jì)了在未來(lái)二十年中，18歲時(shí)失去補(bǔ)充保障收入（SSI）福利對(duì)刑事司法和就業(yè)結(jié)果的影響。為了估計(jì)這種影響，我們使用回歸不連續(xù)設(shè)計(jì)來(lái)評(píng)估1996年福利改革法在18歲時(shí)被審查SSI資格的可能性。我們使用與刑事司法行政記錄系統(tǒng)記錄相關(guān)聯(lián)的社會(huì)保障管理局?jǐn)?shù)據(jù)來(lái)評(píng)估這一自然實(shí)驗(yàn)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在未來(lái)二十年中，SSI的移除使刑事指控的數(shù)量增加了20%，具有統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)意義。指控的增加集中在以創(chuàng)收為主要?jiǎng)訖C(jī)的犯罪上（增加60%），特別是盜竊、入室盜竊、欺詐/偽造和賣(mài)淫。二十多年后，SSI移除對(duì)刑事司法參與的影響仍然存在，即使移除對(duì)同時(shí)期收到SSI的影響減弱。作為對(duì)SSI取消的回應(yīng)，年輕人被指控犯有非法創(chuàng)收罪的可能性是他們?cè)趧趧?dòng)力市場(chǎng)上保持穩(wěn)定就業(yè)的兩倍，每年15，000美元。由于這些指控，在SSI移除后的二十年中，每年監(jiān)禁的可能性增加了60%，具有統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)意義。納稅人因SSI移除而執(zhí)行和監(jiān)禁的成本如此之高，以至于它們幾乎消除了納稅人因減少SSI福利而節(jié)省的費(fèi)用。

https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac017

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7．Labor Market Returns and the Evolution of Cognitive Skills: Theory and Evidence

勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)回報(bào)與認(rèn)知技能的演變：理論與證據(jù)

Santiago Hermo,?Miika P??llysaho,?David Seim,?Jesse M Shapiro

A large literature in cognitive science studies the puzzling “Flynn effect” of rising fluid intelligence (reasoning skill) in rich countries. We develop an economic model in which a cohort’s mix of skills is determined by different skills’ relative returns in the labor market and by the technology for producing skills. We estimate the model using administrative data from Sweden. Combining data from exams taken at military enlistment with earnings records from the tax register, we document an increase in the relative labor market return to logical reasoning skill as compared to vocabulary knowledge. The estimated model implies that changes in labor market returns explain 37% of the measured increase in reasoning skill, and can also explain the decline in knowledge. An original survey of parents, an analysis of trends in school curricula, and an analysis of occupational characteristics show evidence of increasing emphasis on reasoning as compared to knowledge.

認(rèn)知科學(xué)的大量文獻(xiàn)研究了富裕國(guó)家流體智力（邏輯推理技能）上升的令人費(fèi)解的“弗林效應(yīng)”。我們開(kāi)發(fā)了一種經(jīng)濟(jì)模型，在該模型中，群體的技能組合由不同技能在勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)上的相對(duì)回報(bào)和生產(chǎn)技能的技術(shù)決定。我們使用瑞典的行政數(shù)據(jù)估計(jì)模型。將入伍時(shí)參加的考試數(shù)據(jù)與稅務(wù)登記處的收入記錄相結(jié)合，我們記錄了與詞匯知識(shí)相比，相對(duì)勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)對(duì)邏輯推理技能的回報(bào)有所增加。估計(jì)模型意味著勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)回報(bào)的變化可以解釋推理技能增長(zhǎng)的37%，也可以解釋知識(shí)的下降。對(duì)家長(zhǎng)的原始調(diào)查、對(duì)學(xué)校課程趨勢(shì)的分析以及對(duì)職業(yè)特征的分析表明，與知識(shí)相比，推理越來(lái)越受到重視。

https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac022

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8．Army Service in the All-Volunteer Era

全志愿軍時(shí)代的軍隊(duì)服役

Kyle Greenberg,?Matthew Gudgeon,?Adam Isen,?Corbin Miller,?Richard Patterson

Since the beginning of the all-volunteer era, millions of young Americans have chosen to enlist in the military. These volunteers disproportionately come from disadvantaged backgrounds, and while some aspects of military service are likely to be beneficial, exposure to violence and other elements of service could worsen outcomes. This article links the universe of army applicants between 1990 and 2011 to their federal tax records and other administrative data and uses two eligibility thresholds in the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) in a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effects of army enlistment on earnings and related outcomes. In the 19?years following application, army service increases average annual earnings by over?$$4,000 at both cutoffs. However, whether service increases long-run earnings varies significantly by race. Black servicemembers experience annual gains of?$$5,500 to?$$15,000 11–19?years after applying while white servicemembers do not experience significant changes. By providing Black servicemembers a stable and well-paying army job and by opening doors to higher-paid postservice employment, the army significantly closes the Black-white earnings gap in our sample.

自全志愿時(shí)代開(kāi)始以來(lái)，數(shù)百萬(wàn)美國(guó)年輕人選擇參軍。這些志愿者不成比例地來(lái)自弱勢(shì)背景，雖然服兵役的某些方面可能是有益的，但暴露于暴力和其他服務(wù)要素可能會(huì)使結(jié)果惡化。本文將 1990 年至 2011 年間的軍隊(duì)申請(qǐng)者范圍與其聯(lián)邦稅務(wù)記錄和其他行政數(shù)據(jù)聯(lián)系起來(lái)，并在回歸不連續(xù)性設(shè)計(jì)中使用武裝部隊(duì)資格測(cè)試 （AFQT） 中的兩個(gè)資格閾值來(lái)估計(jì)軍隊(duì)入伍對(duì)收入和相關(guān)結(jié)果的影響。在申請(qǐng)后的19年中，服兵役在兩個(gè)截止時(shí)間都會(huì)使平均年收入增加4，000美元以上。然而，服務(wù)是否增加長(zhǎng)期收入因種族而異。黑人軍人在申請(qǐng) 11-19 年后的年收益為 5，500 至 15，000 美元，而白人軍人沒(méi)有顯著變化。通過(guò)為黑人軍人提供穩(wěn)定且高薪的軍隊(duì)工作，并為高薪的退役后就業(yè)敞開(kāi)大門(mén)，軍隊(duì)顯著縮小了我們樣本中的黑人與白人的收入差距。

https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac026

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9．Competing Models

競(jìng)爭(zhēng)模型

José Luis Montiel Olea,?Pietro Ortoleva,?Mallesh M Pai,?Andrea Prat

Different agents need to make a prediction. They observe identical data, but have different models: they predict using different explanatory variables. We study which agent believes they have the best predictive ability—as measured by the smallest subjective posterior mean squared prediction error—and show how it depends on the sample size. With small samples, we present results suggesting it is an agent using a low-dimensional model. With large samples, it is generally an agent with a high-dimensional model, possibly including irrelevant variables, but never excluding relevant ones. We apply our results to characterize the winning model in an auction of productive assets, to argue that entrepreneurs and investors with simple models will be overrepresented in new sectors, and to understand the proliferation of “factors” that explain the cross-sectional variation of expected stock returns in the asset-pricing literature.

不同的代理需要做出預(yù)測(cè)。他們觀察相同的數(shù)據(jù)，但具有不同的模型：他們使用不同的解釋變量進(jìn)行預(yù)測(cè)。我們研究哪個(gè)智能體認(rèn)為他們具有最好的預(yù)測(cè)能力 - 通過(guò)最小的主觀后驗(yàn)均方預(yù)測(cè)誤差來(lái)衡量 - 并顯示它如何取決于樣本量。對(duì)于小樣本，我們呈現(xiàn)的結(jié)果表明它是使用低維模型的代理。對(duì)于大樣本，它通常是具有高維模型的代理，可能包含不相關(guān)的變量，但從不排除相關(guān)變量。我們應(yīng)用我們的結(jié)果來(lái)描述生產(chǎn)性資產(chǎn)拍賣(mài)中的獲勝模型，論證具有簡(jiǎn)單模型的企業(yè)家和投資者在新行業(yè)中的代表性過(guò)高，并了解解釋資產(chǎn)定價(jià)文獻(xiàn)中預(yù)期股票回報(bào)橫斷面變化的“因素”的擴(kuò)散。

https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac015

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10．Improving Management Through Worker Evaluations: Evidence from Auto Manufacturing

通過(guò)工人評(píng)估改善管理——來(lái)自汽車(chē)制造業(yè)的證據(jù)

Using a randomized experiment with an automobile manufacturing firm in China, we measure the effects of letting workers evaluate their managers on worker and firm outcomes. In the treatment teams, workers evaluate their managers monthly. We find that providing feedback leads to significant reductions in worker turnover and increases in team-level productivity. In addition, workers report higher levels of happiness and well-being. The evidence suggests that these results are driven by learning by managers, leading to changes in their behavior and an overall better relationship between managers and workers.

通過(guò)對(duì)中國(guó)一家汽車(chē)制造公司的隨機(jī)實(shí)驗(yàn)，我們衡量了讓員工評(píng)估經(jīng)理對(duì)工人和公司結(jié)果的影響。在治療團(tuán)隊(duì)中，工人每月評(píng)估他們的經(jīng)理。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，提供反饋可以顯著降低員工流動(dòng)率并提高團(tuán)隊(duì)層面的生產(chǎn)力。此外，工人報(bào)告的幸福感和幸福感更高。有證據(jù)表明，這些結(jié)果是由管理者的學(xué)習(xí)驅(qū)動(dòng)的，導(dǎo)致他們的行為改變，以及管理者和工人之間整體更好的關(guān)系。

https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac019

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11. Price Discrimination by Negotiation: a Field Experiment in Retail Electricity

談判價(jià)格歧視：零售電力的實(shí)地實(shí)驗(yàn)

David P Byrne,?Leslie A Martin,?Jia Sheen Nah

We use a field experiment to study price discrimination in a market with price posting and negotiation. Motivated by concerns that low-income consumers do poorly in markets with privately negotiated prices, we built a call center staffed with actors armed with bargaining scripts to reveal negotiated prices and their determinants. Our actors implement sequential bargaining games under incomplete information in the field. By experimentally manipulating how information is revealed, we generate sequences of price offers that allow us to identify price discrimination in negotiations based on retailer perceptions of consumers’ search and switching costs. We also document differences in price distributions between entrants and incumbents, reflecting differences in captivity of their respective consumer bases. Finally, we show that higher prices paid by lower-income subsidy recipients in our market is not due to discriminatory targeting; they can be explained by variation in consumer willingness and ability to search and bargain.

我們使用實(shí)地實(shí)驗(yàn)來(lái)研究市場(chǎng)上的價(jià)格歧視，包括價(jià)格發(fā)布和談判。出于對(duì)低收入消費(fèi)者在私下協(xié)商價(jià)格的市場(chǎng)中表現(xiàn)不佳的擔(dān)憂，我們建立了一個(gè)呼叫中心，配備了手持討價(jià)還價(jià)腳本的參與者，以揭示協(xié)商價(jià)格及其決定因素。我們的參與者在現(xiàn)場(chǎng)信息不完整的情況下實(shí)施順序討價(jià)還價(jià)游戲。通過(guò)實(shí)驗(yàn)操縱信息的披露方式，我們生成了一系列價(jià)格報(bào)價(jià)，使我們能夠根據(jù)零售商對(duì)消費(fèi)者搜索和轉(zhuǎn)換成本的看法來(lái)識(shí)別談判中的價(jià)格歧視。我們還記錄了進(jìn)入者和現(xiàn)有者之間的價(jià)格分布差異，反映了他們各自消費(fèi)者群的囚禁差異。最后，我們表明，我們市場(chǎng)上低收入補(bǔ)貼接受者支付的較高價(jià)格不是由于歧視性目標(biāo);它們可以通過(guò)消費(fèi)者意愿以及搜索和討價(jià)還價(jià)能力的變化來(lái)解釋。

https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac021

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12．Investing in Infants: the Lasting Effects of Cash Transfers to New Families

投資于嬰兒：現(xiàn)金轉(zhuǎn)移支付對(duì)新家庭的持久影響

Andrew Barr,?Jonathan Eggleston,?Alexander A Smith

We provide new evidence that cash transfers following the birth of a first child can have large and long-lasting effects on that child’s outcomes. We take advantage of the January 1 birthdate cutoff for U.S. child-related tax benefits, which results in families of otherwise similar children receiving substantially different refunds during the first year of life. For the average low-income single-child family in our sample, this difference amounts to roughly?$$1,300, or 10% of income. Using the universe of administrative federal tax data in selected years, we show that this transfer in infancy increases young adult earnings by at least 1%–2%, with larger effects for males. These effects show up at earlier ages in terms of improved math and reading test scores and a higher likelihood of high-school graduation. The observed effects on shorter-run parental outcomes suggest that additional liquidity during the critical window following the birth of a first child leads to persistent increases in family income that likely contribute to the downstream effects on children’s outcomes. The longer-term effects on child earnings alone are large enough that the transfer pays for itself through subsequent increases in federal income tax revenue.

我們提供了新的證據(jù)，證明第一個(gè)孩子出生后的現(xiàn)金轉(zhuǎn)移可以對(duì)該孩子的結(jié)果產(chǎn)生巨大而持久的影響。我們利用 1 月 1 日美國(guó)兒童相關(guān)稅收優(yōu)惠的出生日期截止日期，這導(dǎo)致其他類似孩子的家庭在出生后的第一年獲得截然不同的退稅。對(duì)于我們樣本中的平均低收入獨(dú)生子女家庭來(lái)說(shuō)，這種差異約為1300美元，占收入的10%。使用選定年份的行政聯(lián)邦稅收數(shù)據(jù)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)嬰兒期的這種轉(zhuǎn)移使年輕人的收入至少增加了1%-2%，對(duì)男性的影響更大。這些影響在較早的年齡表現(xiàn)為數(shù)學(xué)和閱讀考試成績(jī)的提高以及高中畢業(yè)的可能性更高。觀察到的對(duì)短期父母結(jié)果的影響表明，在第一個(gè)孩子出生后的關(guān)鍵窗口期，額外的流動(dòng)性導(dǎo)致家庭收入持續(xù)增加，這可能有助于對(duì)兒童結(jié)果的下游影響。僅對(duì)兒童收入的長(zhǎng)期影響就足夠大，以至于轉(zhuǎn)移支付通過(guò)隨后增加聯(lián)邦所得稅收入來(lái)收回成本。

https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac023